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Abstract 
 
By a “concept” , I mean a unitary thought (of the sort normally represented by a word) that 
applies to a plurality of differing objects, and by “The Problem of Concepts” I mean the 
pervasive philosophical questions of how such thoughts are to be explained and by what 
standards they are to be evaluated. Aristotle is generally held to have been a Moderate Realist, 
who held that a concept is a putative grasp of a mind-independent universal object that exist 
somehow in or derivatively on the many particular objects to which the concept applies. I argue 
that Aristotle rejected the posit of such universal objects and instead understood universality as a 
feature of thought, which has a basis in reality and a function in cognition. With some notable 
exceptions, concepts are based on relations of difference in “the more and the less” between their 
instances and on the causal relations between the various parts and characteristics of each 
instance. A concept’s function is to serve as a term in deductions which enable us to represent 
the necessity of causal connections. I go on, then, to explore the manner in which, on Aristotle’s 
view, concepts compose propositions and bodies of knowledge and the way in which they are 
formed. 
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PREFACE 
This project has taken four years to complete; during that period and the years leading up to it, I 
have benefitted from the input and support of a number of people. I’d like to begin by thanking 
my advisor, Jim Lennox, first, for all the guidance he has given me on every aspect of this 
project and for always making himself available to discuss it, second, for his consistently 
insightful and  prompt feedback on my material, and, third, for his patience. I’d like to thank my 
committee as a whole for their input, especially in connection with the first two chapters, which 
strongly reflect the influence of conversations with each member. I owe Allan Gotthelf a special 
debt of gratitude, and not only for his role on the committee. Ten years ago, as one my first 
philosophy professors, he introduced me both to Aristotle and to the philosophical study of 
concepts. He continues to be invaluable as teacher, a mentor, and one of my closest friends. 
Many other friends deserve acknowledgement as well. My thinking on some of the topics 
of this dissertation has been spurred by conversations over the years with Jason Rheins and 
Harry Binswanger, and with Ben Bayer, who also read and commented on portions of the text. 
Many of my friends have been important sources of encouragement; in addition to those already 
mentioned, I’d like to single out Robert Mayhew, Tara Smith, John McCaskey, and Onkar and 
Debi Ghate. My girlfriend, Karen Shoebotham, has also been a source of such encouragement, 
and I’d like to thank her for this and for the many other contributions she’s made to my life over 
the past for years. I would also like thank my parents for their unfailing support, over the years, 
which has taken too many forms to enumerate here. 
Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the support of several institutions. The University of 
Pittsburgh and the Andrew Mellon Foundation provided fellowships which supported me during 
the second and third years of this project. The Ayn Rand Institute has been supportive of my 
career in a number of ways, and I’d like to thank them especially for grants which freed me from 
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teaching during the summer of 2004, when I began work on this project, and also during my final 
year of work on it. 
I turn now to the more mundane task of announcing some conventions regarding texts, 
translations, and citations. Except where otherwise indicated, translations from Greek are my 
own, and are from the texts included in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG). Square and 
angle brackets, which I sometimes reproduce in the translations, represent material so bracketed 
in these texts (though, for these purposes I don’t distinguish between things that appear in square 
brackets and daggers in the text). Interpolations of my own in quoted material (whether 
translated or otherwise) are enclosed in braces. Citations to 20th Century and most 19th Century 
works are in the “name, date” format. Earlier texts are cited by their titles, with portions referred 
to by section, paragraph, or line number depending on the scholarly convention associated with 
the relevant text. I have often found it necessary to use (rather than merely mention) Greek 
words in my exposition. Because of this, I have dispensed with the tradition of omitting 
quotation marks around mentions of Greek words. 
1.0  THE PROBLEM 
My aim in this dissertation is to determine Aristotle’s position on what I take to be one of 
philosophy’s fundamental and most persistent problems. I call this problem the “Problem of 
Concepts”, though it is more commonly known as the “Problem of Universals”. A fundamental 
problem cannot be defined without controversy. It forces itself upon philosophers from different 
traditions in different periods, who address it in their differing vocabularies and in the context of 
their differing assumptions. The Problem of Concepts is no exception. I will offer my own 
account of it shortly; for the moment, it will be sufficient to give the problem’s resumé—to list 
some of the debates and doctrines that have been forms or consequences of it. 
The problem arose in Socrates’ search for definitions and motivated Plato’s Theory of 
Forms. In the Medieval period, it became a debate about the metaphysical status and location of 
“universals”. In the early Modern period, it was the debate over the existence and nature of 
“general ideas”. For Kant and his successors, the conviction that concepts spring from the mind 
prompted a radical reconceptualization of the relationship between mind and world. The Problem 
remains current in the growing literature on concepts, in theories of reference, in continued 
debates about the ontological status of universals, in questions about the proper methods of 
scientific classification and about what makes these methods proper, and in debates about 
whether perception has the kind of “content” that can serve as a justification for propositional 
(i.e., conceptual) knowledge.  
Many of the positions in these contemporary and historical debates claim Greek 
pedigrees, and, in every period, the scholarship of Greek philosophy has been motivated and 
colored by then-contemporary ideas. Recent philosophers have increasingly looked to Aristotle 
for inspiration and have inspired a renewed scholarly interest in him. Most notable in this 
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connection is the literature on natural kinds originating in the works of Putnam and Kripke.1 It 
self-consciously looks back to Aristotle and it has informed and motivated the work of scholars 
such as Bolton and Charles.2 A similar pattern is evident in Nussbaum’s attribution to Aristotle 
of a Kantian/Putnamite “internal realism,” and Irwin’s contrary attribution to him of an anti-
Kantian “metaphysical realism”.3 Both advocate the position they attribute to Aristotle and do so 
for what they take to be Aristotelian reasons. Michael Esfeld (2000) argues that a study of 
Aristotle’s “direct realism” about cognition shows us how, in general, the “price” of direct 
realism is a McDowell-like “ontology on which the world has a somewhat conceptual structure,” 
and McDowell himself has compared his conceptually structured world with Aristotle’s 
conception of the structure provided by form.4 These controversies show Aristotle’s relevance to 
contemporary thought, but they also show a lack of consensus about Aristotle’s position on the 
nature of concepts and their relationship to the world that we know by means of them. My aim in 
this dissertation is to address this question directly—to determine Aristotle’s position on The 
Problem of Concepts. 
In order to proceed, I must first define the Problem in terms that capture the fundamental 
philosophical issue, are true to concerns that moved Aristotle himself, and are accessible to a 
philosophical readership that is increasingly diverse in its methods, assumptions, and technical 
vocabulary. In the first part of this chapter, I lay out the Problem as I understand it, making little 
reference to any of the controversies that I listed in the Problem’s resumé above. In the second 
part, I discuss how this problem arose in Plato’s dialogues, where Aristotle identified it as the 
motivation for Plato’s Theory of Forms. In the third, and final part, of the chapter, I will discuss 
the relation between the Problem of Concepts and the Problem of Universals as it is traditionally 
understood.  
No way of posing a fundamental philosophical problem will be intuitive to all readers, 
but I hope that my way will not be idiosyncratic. Whether or not readers are convinced that the 
Problem as I lay it out is the fundamental problem responsible for all the controversies that I 
listed in the resumé above, I hope they will recognize it as a problem of importance. 
                                                 
1 See Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1977. 
2 See Bolton 1976 and Charles 2000.  
3 See Nussbaum 1986 and Irwin 1988a. 
4 Personal conversation, October 2004. 
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Given the nature of my project, there is one issue that I must discuss briefly in advance. It 
may seem odd to speak of a problem of “concepts” in a work on Aristotle, since “concept” does 
not translate any word in Aristotle’s Greek (at least not without controversy). Nevertheless, as I 
will argue later, this term best captures something that Aristotle was thinking about, and by 
raising the problem in terms that are not part of his vocabulary, I avoid pre-judging interpretive 
questions about his technical terms (“καθόλου”, “νόημα”, “εἶδος”, “ὅρος”, etc.). 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS 
1.1.1 Concepts as unitary cognitions of indefinitely many differing objects 
When I speak of “concepts,” I mean the basic units or components of thought (expressed in 
language by words), each of which is (or enables) a unitary cognition of an indefinite number of 
differing objects. For example, the concept “man” subsumes all men, tall and short, black and 
white, local and distant, past, present, and future. Consequently, when one thinks that men are 
mortal, one unitarily affirms mortality of indefinitely many differing men.5 Similarly, when one 
thinks that triangles have an angle sum equal to that of two right angles, one thinks this at once 
about all triangles—equilateral, isosceles and scalene. Again, when someone commits himself to 
acting justly, he commits in a single mental act to an indefinite number of differing actions in 
differing circumstances, the particulars of which actions and circumstances he may not be able to 
foresee. 
In defining concepts as “cognitions,” I mean to identify them with states or abilities of the 
conscious subject.6 Of course, in some sense different subjects can share the same concept, as 
they can share the same knowledge or the same abilities, and this fact may call for explanation. 
Proposed explanations have often involved positing some existent apart from both the subjects 
and the many objects (e.g. a Fregean sense, which is supposed to be a mind-independent “mode 
                                                 
5 I am assuming here that the same concept is expressed by plural and singular forms of the same word, and more 
generally that all the various grammatical forms of a given word express the same concept. However, nothing in 
what follows will turn on this assumption. 
6 Compare Geach 1971 18-19, Anglin 1977 1-2, Fodor 1998  23, and Murphy 2004 1.  
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of presentation” of an object).7 Such existents would not be concepts, as I use that term. Rather, 
on such a view, the concept would be the relation in which each individual subject must stand to 
the posited existent in order to be able entertain the relevant thoughts. 
This said, however, I mean my definition of “concept” to be as generic as possible. Any 
theory of what it is to think in general about, e.g., men, is a theory of concepts, no matter 
whether it accounts for these thoughts in terms of a complex mental entity or capacity, a direct 
acquaintance with a universal human nature, a disposition to use particular sounds or images in 
particular ways, the thinker’s membership in a linguistic community, or in some other terms. 
From within the context of some theories of concepts it may be more natural to set up the 
Problem in a different way than I have, but I do not mean my framework to rule out any theory. 
In a similar spirit, when I say that concepts are the components or units of thought of the 
sort expressed by single words, I do not mean to exclude the possibility that there are some 
concepts that either lack words altogether or are expressed by multi-word phrases. I merely mean 
that the paradigm cases of concepts are expressed by single words. If (either in fact or according 
some theory) the way in which we think of pet fish (or of some unnamed group) is trivially 
different from the way in which we think of fish, then our cognition of pet fish will be a concept. 
When mentioning (as opposed to using) a given concept, I will enclose the word 
expressing it in quotes, as I would when referring to the word. When I speak of an “instance of a 
concept”, I mean one of the many differing things of which the concept is a cognition. So, for 
example, Socrates would be an instance of the concept “man” and Helen’s beauty8 an instance of 
the concept “beauty”. 
1.1.2 The Problem of Concepts: How can pluralities be unitarily cognized? 
The Problem of Concepts is simply the question of what concepts are, or—what amounts to the 
same thing—how we are able to have unitary cognition of a plurality of differing objects. Since 
the instances of a concept are many and diverse, it is unclear what the object of the concept is—
i.e., what it is precisely that someone is thinking of when he employs the concept. If the object is 
                                                 
7 Frege 1970 57. 
8 Or perhaps Helen herself or Helen’s appearance; theories of concepts may differ on this score.  
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the many instances, how does the thought have its unitary character? If the object is not the 
instances but some unitary thing, then what is this thing, by what means are we aware of it, and 
in what sense is the thought still a thought of the instances—i.e., how does it manage to apply to 
them? By answering these questions, a theory of concepts would provide an explanation of our 
ability to think unitary thoughts about (or applying to) a plurality of differing objects. 
The Problem of Concepts, then, is the problem of explaining a certain human ability. 
There are many other questions that take a similar form. It will be instructive to consider several:  
How are we able to perceive three-dimensional objects that persist over time 
when our several sense organs are separately and sporadically stimulated by 
distinct forms of ambient energy?  
How are we able to process ingested material, which is not human tissue, into 
human tissue?  
How are we able to turn a group of distinct ingredients, none of which is bread, 
into a loaf of bread?  
In each case, there is an ability to perform a certain action and this ability takes certain objects or 
inputs. Any theory explaining such an ability will need to do so in terms of facts about both the 
objects and the agent. Aristotle’s account of the operation of the nutritive faculty gives us the 
basic pattern here. He pointed out that the food that we ingest is potentially but not actually like 
us (i.e., is potentially, not actually, human tissue) and that we have the ability (or potential, 
δύναμις) to convert this food which is potentially like us into something that is actually like us.9 
Modern biologists have fleshed out Aristotle’s account, explaining the potencies of the food and 
of the organism, but the basic explanatory pattern is the same.10  
                                                 
9 See De Anima II.4. For a brief and useful discussion of Aristotelian explanation in terms of potentials, see Gotthelf 
1987 209. 
10 One popular college Biology text, for example defines digestion as “the process of breaking down food into 
molecules small enough for the body to absorb”. It continues: 
The bulk of the organic material in food consists of proteins, fats, and carbohydrates in the form of 
starch and other polysaccharides. Although these macromolecules are suitable raw materials, 
animals cannot use them directly for two reasons. First, macromolecules are too large to pass 
through membranes and enter the cells of the animal. Second, the macromolecules that make up 
an animal are not identical to those of its food. (Campbell, Reece, and Mitchell 1999 798, 
emphasis added.) 
The text continues to note that all organisms build their macromolecules out of a small set of monomers, and that 
“digestion cleaves macromolecules into their component monomers, which the animal then uses to make its own 
molecules”. Food is digestible, then, in part because it is made of the same components as the animal itself and so 
have the potential to be “cleaved” into these components, which can be recombined into the macromolecules that 
make up the animal. The book goes on to observe that the animal breaks down the macromolecules through the 
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Like metabolism, baking and perception are explained by facts about the objects and about the 
agents. Not just any group of ingredients can be baked into a cake. The ingredients must have 
certain characteristics. In order to turn appropriate ingredients into a cake, the baker must 
perform certain actions on them—he must mix and heat them in certain ways, and to perform 
these actions he needs to possess certain attributes (e.g., certain tools, knowledge of the relevant 
actions, etc.). The same pattern applies in the case of perception. Not all sets of sensory stimuli 
can be processed into perceptual awareness; when a set of stimuli can be so processed, an 
organism needs to do specific things to process it; and the organism needs to have certain 
attributes in order to perform the processing; most obviously, it needs certain organs in a certain 
condition.11 
We would expect the same points to apply in the case of concepts. Plausibly, not all 
groups of things are susceptible to unitary thought and, in order to think unitarily of the groups 
which can be so thought, a thinker may need to perform a certain process and to possess certain 
attributes. We should expect, then, a theory of concepts (1) to have something to say about what 
needs to be true of a group of things in order for them to be instances of a concept, (2a) to tell us 
what a thinker needs to do in order to think of these things unitarily, and (2b) to tell us what 
needs to be true of the thinker in order for him to do this.12 (We can admit the possibility, as a 
limiting case, that any random group can be unitarily thought. A theory that held this prima-facie 
implausible view would still be a theory of concepts.) 
There are, of course, differences between the four parallel explanatory problems that we 
have been considering. The most obvious difference is that concepts and perception, as opposed 
                                                                                                                                                             
process of hydrolysis, which is facilitated by certain hydrolytic enzymes. The possession of these enzymes, then, 
constitutes (in part at least) the animal’s ability to digest the food. 
11 The work of Gibson is instructive here. Consider his comment on the structure of ambient (as opposed to radiant 
light): “If the ambient light were unstructured or undifferentiated, it would provide no information about an 
environment, although it would stimulate the photoreceptors of an eye” (1986 64). See his sixth chapter, for a 
discussion of the structure of the light which enables visual perception and his 1966 book for discussions of the 
other senses. 
12 These two parts of the Problem of Concepts—(1) what needs to be true of a group of things for them to be 
instances of a single concept, and (2) how is it that we think of such groups unitarily—correspond roughly to two 
different questions concerning universals that were isolated by Aaron (1939, cf. 1952 vii), and which Armstrong 
(Realism and Nominalism 1978a 26) formulates as follows: “(a) what are concepts and how do they apply to the 
things which fall under them; and (b) what constitutes the unity of a class of things which are all said to have the 
same property or be of the same kind”. Armstrong’s (b) corresponds to my (1) and his (a) to my (2).  Unlike 
Armstrong, I do not think that these problems can be treated in isolation from one another. Rather, they must be 
treated as components of a single, wider problem, which is best understood as a problem about concepts. See 
§§1.3.1-2 below. 
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to baking and metabolism, are closely interrelated abilities, which are both integral to human 
knowledge. The things that we perceive are (or at least can be) instances of concepts.13 This 
relationship is something that has been explained differently by different theories of concepts 
and of perception. On some views of concepts, for example, concepts are based on perception in 
the sense that the instances of concepts must stand in a certain sort of relationship that can be 
perceptually detected (or detected by the use of prior concepts that have their basis in some 
relationship that can ultimately be perceptually detected). On other theories of perception, the 
ability to perceive objects (rather than experiencing either an incoherent flux of sensations or 
nothing at all) is explained by prior possession of concepts, which impose order on what would 
otherwise be chaotic perceptual data. There is a respect, however, to which we will now turn, in 
which the Problem of Concepts is unlike these questions about perception and more like 
questions we might ask about baking or carpentry. 
 
1.1.3 The normative import of the Problem 
Perception and metabolism occur automatically whereas baking is something we do deliberately. 
Consequently, theories of perception and metabolism are not normative or action-guiding in the 
way that “a theory of baking” is.14 Theories of perception and metabolism are normative in one 
sense: they can provide the means to tell whether a certain person is perceiving or metabolizing 
properly. However, theories of perception and metabolism do not serve as standards to which 
one can refer in directing one’s perception or metabolism, because one does not direct one’s 
perception or metabolism as a volitional agent. At best, we have a sort of indirect influence over 
these processes (and theories can occasionally be helpful in telling us how to exercise this 
influence). The contrast here with baking is clear. A baker bakes deliberately, and during the 
process he must make myriad decisions about, e.g., how much flour to knead into the dough, 
                                                 
13 Not all instances of concepts are perceived or even perceptible. Many of the instances of a given concept, e.g., 
“stone” may have never been perceived by anyone and there are concepts for things that cannot be perceived (e.g., 
electrons). Moreover, many instances of concepts are conceptualized sub-groups rather than individuals. For 
example, man and horse are instances of “animal”.  
14 Partially for this reason, it is perverse to speak of a “theory of baking”. Baking is, after all, an art. But we do have 
theories that are normative in precisely this sense—for example, moral theories. 
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when to stop kneading, how high to set his oven, etc.15 To make the right decisions, he must 
know how to bake—he must know what ingredients can be turned into bread and how they can 
be transformed into bread. Henceforth I will use “normative” in the sense in which it is 
applicable to baking-knowledge but not to a theory of metabolism. A theory or problem is 
normative if and only if it is a theory or problem about how to proceed. 
The Problem of Concepts is normative, at least in part. The formation and use of concepts 
is not always automatic. Different people form and use concepts differently, and can give or 
request reasons for their differing policies. We can evaluate these reasons and think about 
whether to accept or employ a given concept in a given way. For example, people differ on 
whether or not we should have a concept “terrorism”, on how this concept should be defined, on 
whether terrorism as such is immoral, and on whether certain individuals and organizations are 
terrorists. Reasons can be requested or given for any of the positions taken on any of these 
issues. How these reasons should be assessed, and, therefore, which answers one should accept, 
depends on how The Problem of Concepts is to be resolved.  
This point may be clearer if we distinguish several types of questions on which theories 
of concepts bear, and discuss each individually. Our list of points on which people may differ 
concerning terrorism included four types of issues: (1) whether a given concept is proper, (2) 
what the definition of the concept is, (3) whether a certain attribute belongs to instances of the 
concept, (4) whether a given thing is an instance of the concept. I will take these four questions 
up in reverse order. 
We constantly face questions about whether things are instances of concepts. For 
example: “Was Yasser Arafat a terrorist?” “Is a fetus a person?” and “Is abortion murder?” How 
these questions are to be answered depends on what, in general, makes something an instance of 
a concept. Consider, for example, the consequences of two extreme positions on the Problem of 
Concepts. If concepts are mere linguistic conventions then whether a fetus is a person is a matter 
of how the word “person” is used, and it can be settled either by lexicography or by a sort of 
collective stipulation. Alternately, if concepts are grasps of transcendent Forms, then whether a 
                                                 
15 In Physics II.8, Aristotle tells us that “art does not deliberate” (199b28), and it is true that a baker can have many 
of the relevant decisions and procedures automatized so that he does not need to deliberate during the course of 
making his bread. But, even if so, the fact remains that these are things about which he could deliberate, and—
likely—they are things about which he (or someone) had to deliberate in the past. 
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fetus is a person depends on whether it stands in the requisite relationship to the Form, and 
determining this may require some sort of intuitive knowledge of the Form.  
When we think about whether abortion is murder or whether emeralds are green, we 
make and assess claims that are supposed to hold true of indefinitely large pluralities of differing 
objects—different procedures performed on different women in different locations for different 
reasons, different gems of different sizes and shapes discovered in different locations at different 
times, etc. A theory of concepts will explain what it is to make a unitary claim about such a 
plurality, and such a theory will have implications for the conditions under which such claims are 
justified. Different theories of what makes the instances of a given concept instances will have 
implications for the conditions under which we can infer that all the instances will have 
characteristics known to be possessed by certain instances. If, for example, the instances all 
count as instances because they share some “deep structure,” perhaps such inferences can never 
be certain until the relevant characteristics can be shown to result from the shared structure. 
Also, one’s theory of concepts will determine (in part at least) whether one subscribes to an 
analytic/synthetic dichotomy, which will, in turn, have a pronounced influence on how one 
thinks that claims of different sorts are to be validated. 
On certain theories of concepts, definitions will play a significant role in determining 
what can be predicated universally of a concept’s instances and in identifying instances of the 
concept. One’s theory of concepts will also influence one’s views on when definition is possible 
and necessary, on what forms a proper definition can take, and on when definition is even 
possible. If, for example, having a concept is a matter of knowing a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for distinguishing instances,16 then a person could not understand a 
proposition unless he was capable of defining its constituent concepts by specifying necessary 
and sufficient conditions for each. If, alternately, having a concept is a matter of knowing a set of 
paradigmatic instances and of having some ability to apply knowledge from them to derivative 
cases, then one would not need to be able to define a concept in this way in order to understand 
propositions containing it.17 
                                                 
16 This position is referred to as the “Classical Theory” in the psychological literature on concepts. See Margolis and 
Laurence 1999 8-27. 
17 On this sort of “Prototype Theory”, see Margolis and Laurence 1999 27-43; also Smith and Medin 1999. 
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There are many concepts whose propriety is in question. When philosophers debate, for 
example, whether there are analytic propositions, they are not usually asking whether there are 
any instances of a certain concept, but whether the concept itself is proper. I’ve already alluded 
to the controversial decision by Reuters news service to abandon the word “terrorist” on the 
grounds that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”—i.e., on the grounds that no 
objective distinction can be drawn between terrorists and non-terrorists.18 Stanly Fish defended 
this decision on slightly different grounds, claiming that the word is “unhelpful”, because it 
“prevents us from making distinctions”.19 Both of these reasons for rejecting the concept rest on 
presuppositions about what concepts are and how they’re supposed to function. Arguments about 
the propriety of concepts are not limited to philosophy and politics. Scientists have abandoned 
such concepts as “bilious” and “sublunary”, and it is generally acknowledged that there is 
something defective about putative concepts like “grue” (a term coined by Nelson Goodman to 
apply to all things that are green and first examined before a certain time or blue and first 
examined thereafter).20  
Different theories about what we’re doing when we think unitarily about pluralities will 
yield different standards for which concepts are proper and which improper. For example, a 
theorist who held that we are able to think unitarily of the many instances of a concept only 
because they and only they share some feature or set of features would hold that “terrorist” is a 
concept if and only if “terrorist” can be defined in terms of some such feature(s). If so called 
“terrorists” do not share such a feature(s), the theorist would hold that “terrorist” is not a concept, 
but some sort of cognitive miscarriage (as a burnt mass of unleavened dough is a miscarriage of 
baking rather than a loaf of bread). Such a theorist would hold that thoughts about “terrorists” 
involve some sort of confusion. Someone who held a contrary view of concepts might come to a 
contrary conclusion. 
Granted that it is possible to think unitarily about a certain plurality of differing things, 
there may still be a question of whether it is proper to think about them in this way. Someone 
might hold, for example, that it would be possible to think about  “grue” objects in much the way 
that we now think of green ones, but that it would be improper to think in this way because it 
                                                 
18 Kurtz 2001. 
19 Quoted in Rothstein 2002.  
20 Goodman 1983 74. 
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would frustrate attempts to gain inductive knowledge. Even if it would not be possible to form so 
perverse a concept as “grue”, the history of science abounds with plausible cases of concepts that 
were ultimately abandoned because they impeded induction. Some theories may treat these 
concepts as defective qua concepts. Others might view their tendency to stultify cognition as 
incidental to their nature as concepts. The same applies to other sorts of considerations that might 
be thought relevant to the propriety or impropriety of concepts. For example, one might ask 
whether (and in what way) compatibility with moral or social programs is relevant to a concept’s 
quality as a concept.21 
In telling us what concepts are, we would expect a theory of concepts to explain what 
makes concepts possible and proper (both in general and in any particular case). We need such a 
theory in order to guide our thinking and to provide a standard for evaluating claims to 
knowledge. Thus, the Problem of Concepts is a problem about cognition, which is pressing 
insofar as that cognition is answerable to norms. For this reason, I take the Problem to belong 
primarily to epistemology rather than to metaphysics (or to psychology or the philosophy of 
mind or language). 
However, the Problem of Concepts is not exclusively an epistemological problem. 
Presumably, mind-independent facts about a concept’s instances are relevant to their 
conceptualization. Different theories of concepts have different accounts of what these facts are. 
Some theories posit whole classes of theoretical entities to explain concepts or else employ for 
this purpose entities posited on some other grounds. Thus, the problem has a pronounced 
metaphysical side—more pronounced on some theories than others—and one’s thought about 
concepts and one’s ontology will exert a reciprocal influence on one another. 
Because the epistemological problem is intertwined with metaphysics (as, arguably, all 
epistemological problems are), and because of the problem’s fundamentality, different thinkers 
have confronted it in different forms and tried to solve it in different ways. Not all of the parties 
to controversies I listed in the Problem’s resumé are motivated by explicitly epistemological 
concerns. I do think, however, that the problem laid out in this section is at the root of all these 
                                                 
21 Notice a parallel here too with metabolism. Among the many things that can be metabolized, some are better 
foods than others for reasons having to do with the nature of metabolism—they can be digested more easily or are 
more nutritious—, others are good or bad for other reasons. For example, it is wrong to eat human flesh, not because 
it is difficult to digest, but because it is immoral, and it has been maintained that morality also prohibits us from 
eating animal flesh, or even beans. Or, someone might argue that Brussels sprouts are a bad food, despite their 
nutritional value, because of their taste.  
 11 
controversies. To prove this claim, I would need to address each controversy individually and 
that would take me far beyond the scope of my present project. However, since I will be using 
some of the vocabulary familiar from discussions of the Problem of Universals, I need to show 
that I am entitled to this vocabulary, and, to do this, I need to show that the Problem of Concepts 
has at least some claim to lie at the root of the “Problem of Universals”. 
Moreover, I need to show that Aristotle in particular was concerned with the Problem of 
Concepts. While it can hardly be denied that he held views on issues that are germane to the 
controversies in the Problem’s resumé, it may be thought that he is entirely unconcerned with 
concepts but is interested rather in some entirely distinct metaphysical problem concerning the 
existence and nature of universals. I need to show that this is not the case.  
I will take up these two tasks in the remainder of this chapter. In §1.2, I will show how 
the Problem of Concepts motivated (in part at least) Plato’s Theory of Forms and how Aristotle 
recognized this and took the Problem seriously, both in his response to Plato’s Theory and in his 
own philosophizing.  
In addition to answering the charge that my conception of the Problem is anachronistic, 
this section will provide support for my thesis that the Problem of Concepts is fundamental to the 
Problem of Universals. Insofar as Plato’s Theory of Forms is a paradigm case of a solution to the 
latter problem, any evidence that it was motivated by the former supports my general 
fundamentality thesis. I will advance some further considerations in favor of this thesis in §1.3, 
where I will also develop its implications for how we should understand the traditional schools 
of thought on the Problem of Universals. 
1.2 SOCRATES, PLATO AND THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS 
Aristotle’s explanation of the line of reasoning by which Plato developed his Theory of Forms 
corresponds with an often-discussed thread running through the Early and Middle Dialogues.22 
                                                 
22 I capitalize, because I am using these terms as proper names for groups of dialogues, rather than as descriptions. I 
do this because I find the distinction between the dialogues significant, but do not want to commit to any thesis 
about their order of composition. Whenever the dialogues were written they can be divided based on their content, 
and the groups stand in a loose logical order, with later dialogues presupposing themes, concerns and theses that are 
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Let us begin, then, with Aristotle’s account. Here is a composite of what he tells us in 
Metaphysics Α.6 and Μ.4: 
Socrates sought “the universal” (τὸ καθόλου)23 in ethics and was “the first to 
concern himself with definitions (ὁρισμοί)”24 and to “define universally” 
(ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου).25 Plato agreed with Socrates that such definitions are 
necessary, but thought that the “common definition” (τὸν κοινὸν ὅρον)26 could 
not be of perceptible things, because Plato subscribed to the Heraclitean doctrine 
that perceptible things are in flux and cannot be known. Consequently, he posited 
forms (ἰδέαι) to serve as the objects of definition.27 In so doing, he made 
definitions and universals “separate” (χωριστός) from the perceptible things.28 
We must begin, then, with Socrates. The Socrates in question is the protagonist of Plato’s Early 
Dialogues. Aristotle’s discussions of the historical Socrates (in the Metaphysics and elsewhere) 
correspond almost perfectly with Plato’s portrayal. This correspondence is one of several reasons 
for accepting Plato’s characterization as historically accurate.29 For our purposes, however, we 
need not concern ourselves with the question of historical accuracy so long as we accept that 
Aristotle’s Socrates and that of Plato’s Early Dialogues are the same. I will refer to this character 
                                                                                                                                                             
introduced, motivated or argued for in earlier dialogues.  Different scholars divide the groups somewhat differently, 
but Vlastos’ classification is as close to orthodoxy as any. It is as follows (Vlastos 1991, 46-7): 
Group I.  The dialogues of Plato’s earlier period: The Elenctic Dialogues listed in alphabetical 
order: Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro,  Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, 
Republic I {...} 
Transitional Dialogues (written after the Elenctic Dialogues and before the dialogues in Group II), 
listed in alphabetical order: Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno {...} 
Group II.  The dialogues of Plato’s middle period, listed in probable chronological sequence: 
Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides, Theaetetus {...} 
Group III.  The dialogues of Plato’s latest period, listed in probable chronological sequence: 
Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Laws {...} 
When I speak of “Early Dialogues” I mean the dialogues in Vlastos’ Group I, with the exception of the final two 
thirds of the Meno (beginning with Meno’s comment at 80a), which I will group with the middle dialogues. Vlastos 
has a useful discussion of the differences in content between Early and Middle Dialogues, on 47-49. 
Discussions of the development of the Theory of Forms that have focused on the thread identified by Aristotle 
include Ross 1951, Wedberg 1971, White 1992 278-9, Dancy 2001, and Gerson 2002.  
23 Metaphysics 987b3. 
24 987b4. 
25 1078b18. 
26 987b6. 
27 987b8. 
28 1078b30.  
29 See Vlastos 1991 91-98. For an alternate view see Kahn (1992b), who holds that Aristotle naively took Plato’s 
portrayal to be accurate and based his own account on it. 
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as “Socrates” and will contrast his views and methods to the Platonic30 views and methods 
embodied by the Socrates of the Middle Dialogues. 
1.2.1 Socrates’ “What is F?” question 
Socrates does not speak of definitions or universals as such.31 When he characterizes the objects 
of his searches at all, he uses such words as “εἴδος” and “ἰδέα” (both of which I will translate 
“form”) and “οὐσία” (which I will leave untranslated).32 Even these characterizations are 
comparatively rare. Most often Socrates evinces his interest simply by posing questions. For 
example: “What is courage?” (“τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία;” Laches 190e), “What do you say is the pious 
and what the impious?” (“τί φῂς εἲναι τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον;” Euthyphro 5d) “What do you 
say that virtue is?” (“τί φῄς ἀρετὴν εἴναι;” Meno 71d), or “What do you think a sophist is?” (“τί 
ἡγῇ εἲναι τὸν σοφιστήν;” Protagoras 312c).33 In all these cases Socrates is asking what 
something is (“τί ἐστιν”). In order to speak in general about this sort of question without making 
any suppositions about the nature of the object inquired into, it is helpful to state the question as: 
“What is F?”  
When we do this, we notice that the terms for which “F” stands are grammatically 
diverse. In the examples from the Laches and the Meno it stands for abstract nouns formed from 
adjectives, in the Euthyphro example it stands for a neuter singular adjective proceeded by the 
definite article, and in the Protagoras example for a singular masculine noun proceeded by the 
definite article (though, in English, it’s more naturally rendered by the indefinite article). In each 
case, the term is singular, but the knowledge sought in terms of it is supposed to apply to 
multiple things. In each case there are many Fs (or F-things or things-with-F),34 and knowledge 
                                                 
30 In calling these ideas “Platonic”, I don’t mean to insist that Plato himself endorsed them (though that is certainly 
the most natural thing to think); I mean only that Plato was their author.  
31 The early dialogues do contain some uses of “ὅρος” (e.g. Lysis 209c7, Hippias Major 283b2) and “ὁρίσεσθαι” 
(e.g. Euthyphro 9c7, Laches 194c8, Charmides 163d7), but these occurrences are best understood as metaphorical 
usages of the word in its original, geographical meaning. 
32 In my exposition, I use “form” to denote the objects that Plato calls “εἲδη” and “ἰδέαι”. When quoting Plato (and 
Aristotle’s discussions of Plato), and in other context where it is necessary to distinguish between the two words, I 
will leave the terms in Greek. I discuss the Socratic/Platonic antecedents of Aristotle’s coinage of “καθόλου” in 
§2.1. 
33 See also Charmides 159a, Laches 190b, and Hippias Major 286d. 
34 When I speak of “Fs”, I intend to cover the whole disjunction. 
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of what-F-is is supposed to apply to all of them. Why does Socrates seek this knowledge, and 
what precisely is it to know (or to be) what F is? I will address the first of these questions in the 
remainder of §1.2.1 and turn to the second in §1.2.2. 
Socrates often tells his interlocutors why he wants to know what F is, and he sometimes 
comments on the negative consequences of lacking this knowledge. Let’s consider some of the 
relevant texts:35 
T1. Meno 71a-b: I am so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not 
that I do not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is... If I do not know 
what something is, how can I know what qualities it possesses? Or do you think 
that someone who did not know at all who Meno is could know whether he is 
good-looking, rich, or wellborn, or the opposite of these?36 
T2. Meno 86d-e: If I were directing you, Meno, and not only myself, we would 
not investigate whether virtue is teachable or not before we investigated what 
virtue itself is. But because you do not even attempt to rule yourself, in order that 
you may be free, but you try to rule me and do so, I will agree with you—for what 
can I do? So we must, it appears, inquire into a quality of something when we do 
not yet know what it is. 
T3. Meno 100b: It follows from this reasoning, Meno, that virtue appears to be 
present in those who possess it as a gift from the gods. We shall have clear 
knowledge of this when, before we investigate how it comes to be present in men, 
we first try to find out what virtue in itself is. 
T4. Laches 190b-c: Isn’t it necessary for us to start out knowing what virtue is? 
Because if we are not absolutely certain of what it is, how are we to advise 
anyone as to the best method of attaining it? (Cf. 189d-190b) 
T5. Protagoras 361c-d: Now, Protagoras, seeing that we have gotten this topsy-
turvy and terribly confused, I am eager to clear it all up, I would like us, having 
come this far, to continue until we come through to what virtue is in itself, and 
then to inquire into whether it can or cannot be taught. 
T6. Protagoras 312c: You are about to hand your soul over for treatment to a man 
who is, as you say, a sophist. As to what exactly a sophist is, I would be surprised 
if you really knew. And yet, if you are ignorant of this, you do not know whether 
you are entrusting your soul to something good or bad. 
                                                 
35 These translations from Plato are based on those in Cooper 1997. 
36 I’ve followed what seems to be a scholarly convention of taking liberties in abbreviating this passage. The portion 
before the ellipsis is part of a statement that Socrates ascribes hypothetically to “everyone” in Athens, where as the 
portion after the ellipsis is in Socrates’ own voice. But, since Socrates explicitly includes himself in the Athenian’s 
epistemic poverty, no harm is done by abbreviating the statement in this way.  
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T7. Gorgias 463c: I will not answer him whether I think rhetoric is fine or mean 
until I answer first what it is. For it would not be just, Polus. (cf. 462cd) 
T8. Republic 354b-c: The result of the discussion, as far as I’m concerned, is that 
I know nothing. For when I don’t know what justice is, I’ll hardly know whether 
it is a kind of virtue or not or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy. 
T9 Hippias Major 286c-d: Just now someone got me badly stuck when I was 
finding fault with parts of some speeches for being foul, and praising other parts 
as fine. He questioned me in this way, really insultingly: “Socrates, how do you 
know what sorts of things are fine and foul? Look, would you be able to say what 
the fine is?” 
T10. Hippias Major 304e:  How will you know whose speech—or any other 
action—is finely presented or not, when you are ignorant of the fine? 
T11. Lysis 233b: We have made ourselves ridiculous, Lysis and Menexenus—I, 
an old man, and you. For those who go away will say that we think we are one 
another’s friends—for I put myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not 
been able to discover. 
T12. Charmides 159a: To help us decide whether {temperance} resides in you or 
not, say what in your opinion temperance is.37 
T13. Euthyphro 6e: Tell me then what this form {viz. piety} itself is, so that I may 
look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or of another’s 
that is such as it is pious, and if it is not that it is not.38 
                                                 
37 Socrates stated goal in asking Charmides what-temperance-is is to determine, jointly with Charmides, whether 
Charmides is temperate; so this is a case of asking the “What is F?” question in order to determine whether a given 
thing is an F. But this may seem to be a defective case, depending on how one understands Socrates and Charmides’ 
project. At 158e-159a Socrates and Charmides accept the premise that the presence of a virtue in a person’s soul 
leads that person to have opinions about the virtue. This may make it seem that their goal is to determine whether 
Charmides is temperate directly by testing his opinions about temperance, on the premise that if his opinions do not 
stand up to scrutiny he cannot be temperate. If this is the procedure, then it is the quality of Charmides’ answers 
rather than knowledge of what temperance is that will be used to determine whether Charmides is temperate. If so, 
“What is F?” is asked in the Charmides for a different reason than it is asked in the Euthyphro and Hippias Major. 
However, this is not Socrates and Charmides’ procedure, or at least it is not what Charmides understands the 
procedure to be. When he acknowledges (at 176ab) that he does not know what temperance is,  he sees his ignorance 
as a barrier to determining whether he is temperate rather than as a proof that he is not. Socrates does not correct him 
on this, and Socrates agrees when Charmides claims (at 161c) that it does not matter that he learned the definition 
then under discussion from a wise man rather by introspection on his own state. More generally, Socrates’ 
refutations of Charmides’ accounts of temperance are not taken as evidence that Charmides lacks the virtue. So the 
inquiry into what-temperance-is is meant to be a preliminary to a discussion of whether Charmides has the virtue, 
rather than a test of whether he has it. The relevance of the premise that a virtue causes its possessors to form 
opinions about it is that this premise underwrites a method for inquiring into what temperance is—viz. probing the 
opinions of a young man who is reputed to have it. In this connection, it is worth noticing that the advice Socrates 
gives Charmides at 160d shows that he is not here supposing that what temperance is would be immediately clear to 
a temperate man, only that a temperate man would be ideally situated to think about what temperance is, because of 
his intimate acquaintance with the virtue’s effects. 
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In each case, knowledge of what-F-is is sought because of the relationship in which this 
knowledge stands to some other piece of knowledge that Socrates is seeking or which his 
interlocutor claims to possess. I’ll call this other knowledge the “target knowledge”. In some 
cases (T1-T8) it is knowledge of F’s attributes; in the others (T9-13) it is knowledge of whether a 
given thing is an F. In different texts, different relationships are asserted between the target 
knowledge and knowledge of what-F-is. In T1, T4, T6, T8, and T9-T11, Socrates claims that 
knowledge of what-F-is a necessary condition for the target knowledge.39 In T13 and T3, he may 
be claiming that it is a sufficient condition. In T2, T5, T7, and T12, he simply endorses the 
procedure of inquiring into what-F-is before seeking the target knowledge.40 
                                                                                                                                                             
38 It may be worth noting that this is not the reason Socrates gives when he initially asks Euthyphro to teach him 
about piety (at 5b). There he says that he wants to tell his accuser Meletus that he has learned about piety from 
Euthyphro. This is supposed to serve as evidence of Socrates’ abiding respect for knowledge of the divine and of his 
attempt to address Meletus’ concerns that he was a theistic innovator. Therefore, what Socrates hopes to learn from 
Euthyphro is supposed to make him pious, and the attempt to learn this is supposed to show that he is interested in 
divine things. 
39 T9 and 10 are in the form of questions rather than statements, but the questions are clearly challenges and the 
challenge is incoherent unless we take the challenger to assume that someone would need to know what the fine is in 
order to judge properly that a speech or action is fine. 
Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 51) argue that T11, if taken to contain a claim about something’s presupposing a 
knowledge of what F is, commits Socrates to the principle that even thinking about F requires knowing what F is. 
They find this principle “absurdly strong,” because it is “foolish” to suppose that that one is not even entitled to 
think that something is F without knowing what F-ness is. If this were true, there is little or nothing that anyone 
would be entitled so much as to think about any moral issue or course of action. 
But to say that one is not entitled to think that one is a friend is a quite different thing from saying that one is not 
entitled even to entertain the thought that one is a friend. To think that one is a friend is to be prepared to assert that 
one is, and this is the situation in which Socrates, Lysis and Menexenus find themselves.  It is because they are 
prepared to make the assertion that they are ridiculous and, presumably, this is because they are not in a position to 
know what they are asserting. There is no reason to bristle at the thought of attributing to Socrates the position that 
most people are not entitled to think moral propositions in the sense of being prepared to assert them. Socrates is 
notoriously skeptical of moral assertions. But it simply does not follow from the ridiculousness of someone’s 
thinking a given proposition that the person is not entitled to consider the proposition at all. Moreover, Brickhouse 
and Smith’s alternative reading of T11 is unsatisfactory. They claim that Socrates “is merely pointing out that they 
[viz. Socrates, Lysis and Menexenus] appear ridiculous for their inability to understand what they take themselves 
plainly to instantiate”. But nothing in T11 ties the friends’ ridiculousness to how “plainly” they are friends. The 
point made is that they are ridiculous for taking themselves to be friends without knowing what a friend is, and it is 
unclear why this should be ridiculous unless, in general, it is ridiculous to take something to be F without knowing 
what F is. 
40 The following table may be of some use in visualizing this information: 
 Relationship between knowledge of what-F-is and target knowledge 
Necessary condition Sufficient condition Prior in order of inquiry 
Nature of 
the target 
knowledge 
Knowledge of F’s 
attributes 
T1, T4, T6, T8 T3 T2, T5, T7 
Knowledge of whether a 
given thing is F 
T9, T10, T11 T13 T12 
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For the most part these texts assert relationships between two specific pieces of 
knowledge (e.g. knowledge of what-virtue-is and knowledge of whether virtue can be taught) 
rather than general relationships between types of knowledge (e.g., knowledge of what-F-is and 
knowledge of F’s attributes). However, it is clear that there must be some general epistemic 
principle(s) at work here. It is difficult to take T1 as anything other than an endorsement of the 
principle that knowledge what-F-is is necessary for knowledge of F’s attributes.41 The ascription 
of this principle to Socrates economically explains his reasoning in T2-T8. T6 and T8 in 
particular contain what seem to be enthymemes with this principle as their suppressed major 
premise. A second principle, that knowledge of what-F-is is necessary for knowledge of whether 
a given thing is an F, seems to be the suppressed major premise of enthymemes in T9 and T10, 
and it explains Socrates position in T11. Therefore, we can make sense of Socrates reasoning in 
T1-T11 by ascribing to him the conjunction of these two principles. This conjunctive principle, 
often called “The Priority of Definitions Principle”, can be stated as follows: 
Knowledge of what-F-is is a prerequisite for knowledge of F’s attributes and of 
what things are Fs. 
This principle goes some way towards explaining T3 and T13 in which Socrates seems to 
say that knowledge of what-F-is is sufficient for the target knowledge. Socrates can’t be claiming 
that knowing what-F-is is sufficient for knowing of every F that it is an F. It would be absurd to 
assume that by looking to the form of piety, one could determine whether a certain man’s actions 
were pious even if one did not know what actions the man took. And certainly, on Socrates 
premises, knowing what piety is could not enable one to know whether impartial prosecution 
was pious if one did not know what prosecution was. Presumably, then, it is only under certain 
conditions that knowing what-F-is is sufficient for knowing which things are F’s and what 
attributes F has. Plausibly these conditions are those under which one has already satisfied all the 
other necessary conditions for the target knowledge. 
                                                 
41 Brickhouse and Smith (1994 52) claim that T1 doesn’t actually commit Socrates to this principle because it is a 
question. “Meno makes the commitment; Socrates merely solicits it”. But Socrates does not merely solicit the 
commitment; he presupposes the principle when he sets up a challenge to the possibility of knowing F’s attributes 
without first knowing what F is, and he then argues for the principle by reducing the idea that the challenge can be 
answered to absurdity. Santas (1979 123) manages to treat T1 as ambiguous in its range only by ignoring the latter 
half of it, which is perfectly general. This sort of range-restricting argument is plausible however for Laches 189d-
190b (the passage immediately preceding T4), which does endorse a more general form of the claim made in T4 and 
could be taken as additional support for the principle endorsed by T1. 
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It was once conventional wisdom that Socrates held the Priority of Definition Principle.42 
In the past several decades, a number of scholars have challenged this attribution on two 
grounds.43 First, they maintain that texts do not require it. Second, they claim that it would be 
uncharitable to ascribe the principle to Socrates, because it has implications that are implausible 
in their own right and contrary to Socratic doctrines and methods. Some of these scholars have 
attributed the Principle to Socrates in the Meno and Hippias Major, where the evidence for it 
(T1-2 and T9-10) is strongest, while denying that the Socrates of the other Early Dialogues held 
it.44 Defenders of the attribution have worked to resolve the apparent incompatibilities with 
Socrates’ other views and have argued that the textual evidence is strong enough to bear out the 
ascription.45 For my part, I do not think that the Meno or Hippias Major texts can be plausibly 
interpreted without ascribing the principle to Socrates, and, given this and the need for some 
principle to account for Socrates’ position in the other Early Dialogues, I think the most plausible 
reading is to ascribe the Principle to Socrates throughout.46 I am not convinced by the arguments 
from the need for charity in part because I am circumspect about the proper role of charity in 
interpretation,47 and in part, because I don’t think that the Principle is as problematic as it is 
sometimes thought to be.48  
                                                 
42 See Burnet 1924 37, Shorey 1933 157, Taylor 1937 47, Robinson 1951 51, Ross 1951 16, Crombie 1962 57, and 
see Geach 1966, who famously dubbed the principle the “Socratic Fallacy”.  
43 See, e.g., Santas  1972 and 1979 115-126, Beversluis 1992, Brickhouse and Smith 1994 Chapter 2, Vlastos 1985, 
and Nehamas 1987. 
44 Vlastos 1985 23 n. 54 and Beversluis 1992 11-12. The Meno is generally acknowledged to mark a transition 
between the Early and Middle Dialogues, and the Hippias Major is also often thought to be transitional. (On this 
last, see Woodruff 1982 93.) So Vlastos and Beversluis view the Principle as a later, Platonic development. T8 poses 
a difficulty for their interpretation. It is as strong as the passages from the Hippias Major, but comes from Republic 
I, which they take to be early. Vlastos (1985 26 n.65) argues that T8 is a later addition to Republic I. I agree with 
Benson (1990 26-7) that his argument is implausible. However, as part of a larger whole, if Republic I is an early 
dialogue, it has to be treated as something of a special case, so I do not think T8 is fatal to the Vlastos-Beversluis 
position. 
45 See especially Benson 1990, also Prior 1998 and Dancy 2004 35-64. 
46 The alternative strategy is to attempt to find some weaker principle to account for T4-7 and T11-13. Typically, it 
is claimed that knowledge of what-F-is is only necessary for the target knowledge in difficult or controversial cases. 
(See Beversluis 1992 214, Santas 1972 115-135, and Nehamas 1987 278.) But there is no independent reason to 
think that Socrates distinguishes between the relevant types of cases. (Benson [990 31-33] is useful on this point, 
though I see no basis for his claim that all these distinctions “rely on an appeal to common or ordinary opinion”.) In 
general, it is hard to believe that Socrates held some determinate principle that is more subtle than the later, 
“Platonic” principle; but it is quite plausible that Socrates may have been operating with a vague implicit principle, 
which Plato later articulated too crudely. 
47 If carried too far, the demand for charity turns any refutation of a view into evidence that no one ever held it. If 
two interpretations are otherwise equally well supported, it is best to go with the one that casts the author in the best 
light, but the mere fact that a position leads to untenable consequences for a thinker does not constitute evidence that 
he did not hold it. Before it would qualify as evidence, we would also need reason to think that the untenable 
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The Principle does lead to one quite significant problem, but I think this provides 
evidence for the ascription of the principle to Socrates. According to the Principle, it would be 
impossible for a person (or group of people) to discover what F is either by considering things 
that they know to be Fs or by considering attributes that they know F to have. With these 
avenues of inquiry cut off, it is perplexing how someone who did not know what F is could 
discover it at all. Only once in the Early Dialogues do all the parties to a proposed inquiry into a 
“What is F?” question admit their ignorance, at the outset. I am referring, of course, to Meno 
                                                                                                                                                             
consequences would have been apparent to the thinker himself. Socrates was “the first to concern himself with 
definitions”, while we are the heirs to millennia of sustained inquiry into the subject; we do not insult him by 
supposing that some things that are obvious to us may not have been obvious to him. A second problem with 
charity, both monetary and interpretive, is that it can conflict with the demands of justice. In this case, by being 
excessively charitable to Socrates we run the risk of being unfair to Plato. Plato’s use of the character Socrates as the 
proponent of the theory of forms in the Middle Dialogues indicates that he saw some continuity between this theory 
and Socrates’ views in the Early Dialogues. The Meno in particular uses a problem in Socrates’ methodology to 
motivate a set of new metaphysical and epistemological theses that are central to the philosophy of the Middle 
Dialogues. If we interpret the Early Dialogues so as to rid Socrates of this problem, we rob Plato of the credit for 
noticing the problem, we accuse him of gratuitously burdening Socrates with problematic theses, and we diminish 
the motivation for some of the Middle Dialogues’ theses. 
48 Supposed problems with the Priority of Definition Principle include: (1) the Principle leads to a general 
skepticism that is both untenable in itself and inconsistent with Socrates’ claims to knowledge; (2) the Principle 
leads to a skepticism about moral claims that is inconsistent with knowledge claims that Socrates occasionally 
makes (e.g. at Apology 28d-29b and Euthydemus 296e); (3) the Principle leads to an infinite regress because before 
one could know that a given term is part of a definition of F one would need to know its definition and so on; (4) 
Socrates’ refutations of proposed definitions sometimes involve supposing that the definiendum has certain 
properties (e.g. that the fine is beneficial at Hippias Major 296c-d), when, according to the Principle, Socrates could 
not know the definiendum to have these properties before knowing its definition; (5) Socrates often refutes proposed 
definitions by giving counterexamples, and he encourages his interlocutors to consider examples in formulating 
definitions, when, according to the Principle, until one had a definition one could not know what things were 
examples of it. Space permits only a brief comment on each. (1) The Principle only leads to a general skepticism 
when combined with the premise that proper definitions are, in general, hard to come by, but there is no reason to 
suppose that Socrates holds this; when he gives a definition of “quickness” at Laches 192b, for example, he shows 
no sign of thinking this a rare accomplishment. (2) Independent of any concerns about the Principle it is difficult to 
reconcile Socrates’ occasional claims to moral knowledge with his disavowal of knowledge and with the strict 
criteria he places on knowledge claims; only if  these knowledge claims can be rendered otherwise unproblematic do 
they constitute a reason against ascribing Principle to Socrates. (3) There is no evidence that the regress problem 
occurred to Socrates, but if it did, he could have solved it (as many other philosophers later did) by claiming that 
there are certain indefinable items that serve as the starting-points for definition. In this connection, it is significant 
that the Principle requires that one know what-F-is before knowing further things about F; it does not necessarily 
require that one be able to give a proper definition of F. (4)/(5) In most of the cases where Socrates appeals to 
examples or characteristics of F in his arguments, he is dealing with an interlocutor who claims to know what-F-is. 
In such a context, Socrates need not know if putative examples and characteristics are genuine so long as he only 
raises them to test whether his interlocutor is willing to embrace the consequences of his own definition. Moreover, 
the claim that a given thing is an F or that F has a certain attribute might, while not qualifying as knowledge, still 
have a higher epistemic status for Socrates than a proposed definition of F. Consequently, Socrates might be 
justified in testing the definition against such a claim, so long as he does not regard the results of such testing as 
conclusive. 
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80c-e, and here the problem of how such an inquiry is possible is explicitly raised.49 The 
problem is solved only through the hypothesis of reincarnation and recollection. The boldness of 
this solution suggests that Plato thought there was a serious problem with Socrates’ position—
and since Plato is Socrates’ author, his opinion on the matter carries quite a lot of weight. 
On the most plausible reading of the Early Dialogues, then, Socrates held the Priority of 
Definition Principle and sought an answer to the “What is F?” question because he thought that it 
a prerequisite for knowledge of what things are Fs and of F’s attributes.50  In the terminology of 
concepts, Socrates thinks that knowing a concept’s definition enables knowledge of propositions 
in which that concept is the subject or predicate. The project of searching for definitions arises in 
the Early Dialogues because Socrates is seeking knowledge and evaluating claims to knowledge, 
because this knowledge comes in the form of propositions with concepts as their subjects and 
predicates, and because Socrates thinks that definitions are necessary for this knowledge. Why 
does Socrates think that one needs to know what-F-is before one can know what attributes F has 
and what things are Fs? How is a definition supposed to enable this further knowledge?  
Many of Socrates’ requests for definitions (e.g. T6, T9-10, T11) take the form of 
challenges posed to someone who claims to possess knowledge that Socrates thinks depends on 
the definition. This suggests that the definitions are required for the further knowledge because 
they would play some role in the justification of this knowledge. The idea would be that to know, 
e.g., that a given speech is fine, one would need to be able to defend the judgment that it is fine, 
and that this defense would be impossible without recourse to an account of what the fine is. 
Plausibly one would defend the judgment that the speech is fine by pointing out that the speech 
had some feature(s) specified in the definition of the fine. Similarly, one might use a definition of 
sophist to defend the judgment that sophists are good. If for example, a sophist is a teacher of 
virtue and virtue is good, then sophists are good (assuming that the teacher of something good is 
                                                 
49 The Socrates who answers this challenge is clearly no longer the Socrates of the Early Dialogues, but it is possible 
that some elements of his solution were held by the Socrates of the Early Dialogues. This is most plausible in the 
case of the distinction between true belief and knowledge, which a number of scholars have attributed to Socrates   
(e.g., Santas 1972 and Irwin 1977 40-41). But, while Socrates could have held this distinction, there is no direct 
evidence that he did and no reason to suppose that he was even aware of the problem. 
50 I will proceed on the premise that this reading is correct. Even if one rejects the reading, however, it is clear that 
Socrates sometimes seeks to know what-F-is because he thinks this knowledge is a necessary condition for some 
other particular piece of knowledge, and that, in general he thinks that accounts of what-F-is somehow enhance our 
abilities to identify Fs and determine their attributes. On this weaker reading, my later conclusions will still hold, but 
they may require some qualifications. 
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good). These justificatory arguments are deductive in form. And Aristotle seems to have thought 
that it was for the sake of such arguments that Socrates valued definitions: 
...it was natural that Socrates should be seeking the what-it-is because he was 
seeking to deduce (συλλογίζεσθαι) and what a thing is is the starting-point (ἀρχὴ) 
of deductions. (Metaphysics 1078b24-50) 
In fact, we often find Socrates arguing deductively from definitions. For example, in the 
Apology, Socrates’ defense against the charge of impiety consists largely in showing his actions 
to be in service to the god, where “service to the gods” is accepted as the genus of piety in the 
Euthyphro.51 His defense against Meletus’ more specific charge of atheism involves a deduction 
from what is plausibly construed as a definition of spirit (δαίμων).52 Another example can be 
found in the Protagoras (352a-6c), where Socrates reasons deductively from the definition of the 
good as pleasure to the impossibility of one’s knowledge of the good being “overcome by 
pleasure”. Socrates also reasons deductively at Meno 87b-c, where he shows that a definition of 
virtue as knowledge (along with the premise that all and only knowledge can be taught) would 
lead to the conclusion that virtue can be taught.53  
Socrates’ interlocutors are also eager to deduce answers from proposed accounts of what-
F-is. For example, Euthyphro’s first answer to “What is the pious?” is a general principle from 
which his particular putatively pious action follows: 
I say the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it 
about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your 
father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. (Euthyphro 5de) 
Similarly, Laches initially attempts to say what courage is by specifying conditions under which 
one can infer that a given man is courageous. 
If a man is willing to remain at his place in the ranks and to resist the enemy 
without running away, then you may rest assured that he is a man of courage. 
(Laches 190e) 
Neither Euthyphro nor Laches yet understands that, in asking what F is, Socrates wants an 
answer that will apply to all Fs.54 However, both already understand that the knowledge Socrates 
                                                 
51 12e, though it is controversial whether this can be taken as evidence of Socrates’ view. 
52 Apology 27c-e.  
53 Cf. Protagoras 361a-c. 
54 And their answers may not even be accurate within their narrow domains. Socrates shows signs of being skeptical 
of Euthyphro’s answer and Laches’ definition of courage admits cases of pseudo-courage—i.e. of standing one’s 
ground against one fear out of a greater (and improper) fear. Socrates sometimes makes the point that too-narrow 
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is seeking should allow one to deduce that (at least some) Fs are Fs.55 The problem with the 
interlocutors’ accounts is that they do not allow us to deduce for any F that it is an F. Moreover, 
these accounts will themselves presumably be derivable from some prior account, from which 
we will also be able to deduce that other Fs are Fs. If we found an account of F from which we 
could deduce that any F was an F, then we would indeed have a starting-point for deductions 
about what things are Fs, and this does seem to be what Socrates is seeking. Such an account 
could also serve as a starting-point for deductive justifications of judgments about F’s attributes, 
which would function like the earlier mentioned arguments from the Meno and Protagoras. 
The eagerness of Socrates’ interlocutors to deduce from their accounts of what-F-is, even 
before they have fully understood what Socrates means in requesting such accounts, brings out 
the naturalness of Aristotle’s suggestion that Socrates’ concern for definitions grows out of an 
ambition to deduce. If one makes a habit of discussing whether virtue possesses certain attributes 
and whether certain people and actions are virtuous, one will almost certainly encounter 
deductive justifications proceeding from alleged general characteristics of virtue. If one is in the 
business of evaluating these sorts of arguments, it is natural that one would eventually be led to 
seek the starting-points of this sort of argument. 
1.2.2 The Socratic View of Concepts 
What, then, constitutes a proper account of what F is, one that can serve as a starting-point for 
deductive justifications of claims that F has certain attributes and that certain things are Fs? For 
the beginning of an answer, we can consider how Socrates responds to inadequate accounts. 
Typically his interlocutors begin by giving an example of an F and Socrates replies that there are 
                                                                                                                                                             
answers to the “What is F?” question admit imposter-cases. For example, in Republic I he shows that Cephalus’ 
definition of justice as “speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred” admits the case of returning 
a maniac’s weapon (331c-d). Definitions that are too narrow turn out to be mere approximations, even in their own 
domain. 
55 Similar points are made about Euthyphro and Laches’ first definitions in Nehamas 1975 and Rabbås 2004. Both 
authors point out that the interlocutors do not confuse particulars and universals, that they have some understanding 
of what a definition is supposed to enable one to do, and that they are able to use their definitions to show certain Fs 
to be Fs. Nehamas says that Laches and Euthyphro give “ways of being” F, which are too narrow in that they do not 
cover all Fs. Rabbås considers Laches’ first definition to be a definition by Paradigm, which fails because it does not 
enable us to see how a variety of cases of courage are relevantly similar to the paradigm case. 
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other Fs and that he is looking for is what is common to all Fs.56 For example consider Socrates’ 
response to Laches’ first definition of courage: 
...I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes courage for a hoplite but 
for a horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. And I wanted to include not 
only those who are courageous in warfare but also those who are brave in dangers 
at sea, and ones who show courage in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and 
then again I wanted to include not only those who are brave at fighting fear but 
also those who are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing 
their ground or running away... So all these men are courageous, but some possess 
courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires, some in fears. And others, I 
think, show cowardice in the same respects. ...what is courage and cowardice? 
This is what I wanted to find out. So try again to state first what is the courage 
that is the same in all these cases. 
...suppose I asked what speed was, which we find in running and in playing the 
lyre and in speaking and in learning and in many other instances—in fact we may 
say we display the quality insofar as it is worth mentioning, in movements of the 
arms or legs or tongue or voice or thought? ...if anyone should ask me, “Socrates, 
what do you say it is which you call speed in all these cases,” I would answer him 
that what I call speed is the power of accomplishing a great deal in a short time, 
whether in speech or in running or all the other cases. 
...make an effort yourself, Laches, to speak in the same way about courage. What 
power is it which, because it is the same in pleasure and in pain and in all the 
other cases in which we were just saying it occurred, is therefore called courage? 
(Laches 191c-192b) 
The point here is that there are many different things that we call courageous. Socrates is looking 
for the basis of our calling them all courageous. He takes this basis to consist in their all sharing 
some identical feature, which feature is the courage.  
The same point is made repeatedly, and more explicitly, in the Meno. Here is one 
example: 
We always arrive at the many. Do not talk to me in that way, but since you call all 
these many {shapes} by one name, and say that no one of them is not a shape 
even though they are opposites, tell me what this is which applies as much to the 
round as to the straight and which you call shape, as you say the round is as much 
a shape as the straight... What is it then to which the name “shape” applies? ...I am 
                                                 
56 As we’ve already seen in the Euthyphro and Laches, the example needn’t be a particular F, but merely a narrow 
sub-set of Fs. In no case does the interlocutor give a literal particular. Hippias comes closest to doing so (at Hippias 
Major 287e) when he claims that the beautiful itself is “a beautiful girl,” notice however that he does not answer, 
e.g. “Helen”—while there are many beautiful girls there is only one Helen. The Hippias Major is also a partial 
exception to the pattern in that Socrates does not immediately respond to Hippias’ overly narrow definition by citing 
fine things excluded by the definition. 
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seeking that which is the same in all these cases... What is this which applies to 
the round and the straight and the other things which you call shapes and which is 
the same in them all? (Meno 74d-75a) 
Whenever the “What is F?” question is asked, there are many differing Fs, and the person to 
whom the question is posed calls them all by a single name. Socrates is interested in the common 
element in all the Fs, which he thinks must be the basis of this common-calling. This common 
element in the many different Fs is what Socrates is seeking. He calls it an “εἴδος” or “ἰδέα”. 
We’ve already seen examples of this usage from the Euthyphro; it is prevalent also in the Meno: 
Even if {virtues} are many and various, all of them have one and the same εἶδος 
which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to 
make clear what virtue is. (72c) 
As this last passage make clear, in asking “What is F?” Socrates is looking for a form—a 
common element in the many different F things that makes them all F and licenses us in calling 
them by a common name. The Euthyphro and especially the Meno stress that the form is 
identical in each of the many differing things in which it is found: 
Does {health} not have the same εἶδος everywhere, whether in man or in anything 
else whatever? (72d) 
If a woman is strong, that strength will be the same and have the same εἴδος {as a 
man’s strength}, for by “the same” I mean that the strength is no different as far 
as being strength, whether in a man or a woman. (72e) 
...what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as 
regards murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every 
action and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and 
everything that is to be impious presents us with one ἰδέα insofar as it is impious. 
(Euthyphro 5cd) 
Socrates’ point is that whenever there are multiple Fs or F-things, they may differ in 
many ways, but there will always be some one identical element or characteristic possessed by 
each.57 Socrates gives the example of bees. They are “many and varied and different from one 
another”, but not insofar as they are bees. They are “no different in that regard,” but differ “in 
some other respect, in their beauty, for example, or their size or in some other such way”. There 
is something common to all bees “in which they are all the same and do not differ from one 
                                                 
57 See Hippias Major (299c-303d) on the need for unity in this element.  
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another”.58 This common thing is what makes them all bees, and it is why we call each of them a 
“bee” (72b). Socrates view is, then, that when one calls multiple things by the same name, one is 
committed to the thesis that they share a form in common.  
If taken in too literal a manner, Socrates’ view would be foolish. According to it, English 
speakers would be committed to the view that honeybees and spelling bees share a form merely 
because we use the word “bee” to refer to both. Surely, this isn’t the sort of thing that Socrates 
has in mind. The concerns that motivate his position are missing in the case of mere homonyms. 
Forms are supposed to be what one specifies in answer to a “What is F?” question, and this 
question is asked because it is supposed to underwrite knowledge of Fs—i.e., knowledge that 
applies to each of the many differing Fs. Nobody seeks or claims knowledge about “bees” that is 
supposed to apply to honeybees and spelling bees. But a beekeeper’s knowledge is supposed to 
apply to queen bees, worker bees, and drones, and the form of bee is supposed to explain and 
justify his univocal speech and thought about these differing bees. The point here cannot be even 
that there is a single word univocally used; it must be that there is a single thought. Notice that in 
the relevant contexts Socrates will sometimes switch between synonyms (as in the case of 
“godly” and “pious” in the quote from the Euthyphro above).59 Socrates’ point, then, is about 
concepts—units or components of thought (expressed in language by words), each of which is 
(or enables) a unitary cognition of indefinitely many differing objects.  
When someone employs a concept, Socrates takes him to be committed to the existence 
of a form shared by all the concept’s instances. The form is supposed to be a common element 
that exists identically in each of the instances, and the concept is supposed to be an awareness of 
this common element.60 Thus when we know about bees, what we know about is the οὐσία or 
form of bee, which is shared identically by all bees. Of course, in some sense, our bee-
knowledge is about the many differing bees, but this knowledge applies to all these bees just 
insofar as the bees do not differ from one another, because it is knowledge of something that 
exists identically in each bee.  
                                                 
58 In this case, the element is referred to as the οὐσία of bee. 
59 Also, note that Socrates often distances himself from Prodicus who he sees as fussily concerned with words. (See 
Charmides 163d, Laches 197d, Protagoras 358e, Euthydemus 277e, Cratylus 384a-c, and Meno 75e.) 
60 The form is not any chance element present in all the instances, but some specific element. The instances may 
possess other identical elements, either accidentally or as a consequence of their possession of the form. In the 
Euthyphro (10e-11b), Socrates rejects “that which is loved by all the gods” as a definition of the pious, because 
being loved by the gods is a consequence of a thing’s piety; it is a mere πάθος of the pious rather than its οὐσία. 
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At this point, some clarification is in order. If a concept is a unitary cognition of many 
differing instances, the multiple instances would seem to be the objects of the concept. On some 
views of concepts, however, we manage to think unitarily of the many differing instances only 
by thinking of some other object which stands in some relation to the many instances such that 
our thoughts about it apply derivatively to them. When discussing such theories I will speak of 
the “proper object” of a concept, treating the concept’s many instances as objects only in an 
extended or derivative sense.61 The proper object of a concept needn’t be an instance of it 
(though on some views it may be an instance). On no view can the proper objects of concepts be 
their only instances, because the Problem of Concepts is precisely the problem of explaining how 
concepts can be cognitions of multiple instances. To claim that each concept has only one 
instance would be to deny that there are concepts at all. A theory only qualifies as a theory of 
concepts insofar as it attempts to explain how we can have unitary thoughts that are of or apply 
to pluralities of differing objects. Theories that explain this in terms of proper objects hold that 
our thoughts apply to pluralities of differing objects by being, in the first instance, of unitary, 
self-identical objects.  
Socrates’ view has this structure. On it, the proper object of our bee-knowledge is the 
οὐσία shared by all bees. Similarly, the proper object of the concept “virtue” is the form of virtue 
that is the same in the various virtues—in courage, justice, and wisdom and in the virtues of a 
man and of a woman. This form is virtue, and it is this form that we know about when we know, 
e.g., that virtue can (or cannot) be taught. I will call the idea that the proper object of a concept is 
an identical form shared by all its instances the “Socratic View of Concepts”. I call it a “view”, 
rather than a “theory”, because “theory” connotes a level of self-consciousness that is not evident 
in the dialogues. Socrates was not trying to account for concepts by proposing some doctrine. 
Rather, in the course of seeking ethical knowledge and of evaluating claims to it, he viewed 
concepts in a certain, distinctive way. 
Notice that this view goes some way towards explaining why Socrates might hold the 
Priority of Definition Principle. If what makes an F count as an F is its possession of the form-of-
F, then it is natural to think that one could justify a judgment that a given F is an F only by 
showing that it possesses the form and to do this, one would presumably need to know the form. 
                                                 
61 Compare this with Aristotle’s distinction between proper (ἴδιον) objects of sight in De Anima II.6. It is by seeing, 
e.g., the white that we see Diares’ son. 
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Likewise, if this form is the proper object of all knowledge about F, then so long as someone did 
not know this form, he would literally not know what he was talking about when he asserted that 
F does (or doesn’t) have a certain attribute. Such a person could no more know that F had the 
attribute in question than “someone who did not know at all who Meno is could know whether 
he is good-looking, rich, or well born, or the opposite of these”. Indeed, it is doubtful that such a 
person could even think about F, which is why it is puzzling how he could inquire about it.62 
In laying out the Socratic View of Concepts, I have emphasized the cognitive or 
epistemological role played by forms as the proper objects of concepts. In doing this, I do not 
mean to deny that the forms have a metaphysical status and play a metaphysical role. Socrates 
sometimes claims that Fs are F by the form-of-F, e.g. that “all fine things are fine by the fine” or 
that anything can be made F by adding the form-of-F to it.63 When Socrates says such things he 
is not saying that form causes its possessor to admit of being thought in a certain way, but rather 
that form causes its possessor to be a certain way (or, perhaps, that possessing the form 
constitutes its being that way). Socrates is using a metaphysical distinction between a thing and 
the forms it possesses, and his statements may contain the germ of a theory about what it is for a 
form to characterize a thing. Moreover, the assumption that it is possible for distinct things to 
share an identical form is an assumption about reality not about thought. The Socratic View of 
Concepts uses these metaphysical points to explain a cognitive phenomenon and to provide 
cognitive norms. Thus, though the View is epistemological, it presupposes a certain amount of 
metaphysics, as all epistemology must. 
However, though the presuppositions of the Socratic View of Concepts are metaphysical 
in the sense of being (prima facie at least) points about reality rather than points about cognition, 
they are not metaphysical in a more robust sense that would render Socrates a metaphysician. 
Everyone holds metaphysical and epistemological views, if we construe these terms in the 
broadest senses possible. Everyone holds views about what things exist and how they’re related 
to one another, and everyone has some views about what we can know and how we can know it. 
Wholesalers, for example, are happy to talk about the attributes of their merchandise, and they 
                                                 
62 The Platonic solution to this puzzle is, of course, already suggested in the Meno: the inquirer into F does not “not 
know at all” what-F-is; he knew what-F-is in a previous life and can draw on partially remembered fragments of this 
prior knowledge. 
63 Hippias Major 687c, cf. Protagoras 332a. At Hippias 289d Socrates refers to “the fine itself by which everything 
else is embellished and appears fine when that form is added”. 
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will insist that this merchandise is identical to that found in department stores. They also have 
views about how one can know whether twenty-dollar bills are genuine or counterfeit. There is a 
sense in which these views can be described as “metaphysical” and “epistemological”, but the 
wholesalers are not engaged in metaphysics or epistemology.  
When Socrates asks his “What is F?” question, he is doing something novel. This is 
evident in his interlocutors’ initial failure to understand him. Socrates’ new and philosophical 
question turns on a new and philosophical premise about cognition, but it does not make any 
non-standard assumptions about reality.64 Socrates assumes, where other people had not, that, in 
order to know anything about, e.g., virtue, one must know about some form that is identical in 
each virtue. However, in assuming that things possess forms and that they can be identical, he is 
not assuming anything that wholesalers do not. His uses of εἶδος and ἰδέα are ordinary Greek, 
not philosophical jargon denoting some special class of existents. (If the translation “form” leads 
us to think otherwise, then we might be better served by “characteristic”.65) It is also clear that, 
when Socrates claims that such things as the “the pious” and “justice” exist, he is not positing the 
existence of anything controversial; even Protagoras, the archetype of relativism, happily assents 
to such claims.  
Socrates’ assumptions about the metaphysics of forms are not distinctive philosophical 
positions. What is distinctive is the idea that the proper object of a concept is an identical form 
possessed by the concept’s instances. This is an idea about the cognitive role played by forms, 
and Socrates interest in it is driven by a concern about how to inquire and how to assess claims 
to knowledge. For these reasons, I take Socrates’ position to belong to epistemology rather than 
metaphysics. 
1.2.3 Plato’s Theory of Forms as a theory of concepts 
If Socrates’ forms were not special metaphysical posits, Plato’s certainly were. The Platonic 
Forms of the Middle Dialogues are explicitly contrasted with the perceptible objects whose 
                                                 
64 Allan (1970) finds an “Earlier Theory of Forms” in the Euthyphro and other Early Dialogues. Responses to his 
view can be found in Rist 1975, Vlastos 1991 59, and Dancy 2004 65-68.  
65 I favor “form” because it captures an important continuity with the Middle Dialogues, but I find it quite natural to 
refer to forms as “characteristics” and have been regularly doing so in my exposition.  
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existence non-philosophers readily acknowledge. These Forms are ὄντα or οὐσίαι, which are 
what they are and cannot appear to be otherwise,66 nor be characterized in any way by their 
opposites, change into their opposites,67 or change in any way at all.68 To each Form, there 
corresponds a host of perceptible things that are “called after” it.69 Unlike the Form, these 
perceptible things are merely “becoming”—“rolling around between pure existence and pure 
non-existence,” without being any more what anyone says they are than they are the opposite of 
that thing.70 They constantly change,71 and have or appear to have contrary qualities.72 Forms 
are simple, while perceptible things are complex.73 Where perceptible things are objects of mere 
opinion, Forms are intelligible and serve as the objects of knowledge.74  
The profound differences between Plato’s Forms and perceptible things make it unnatural 
to think of the Forms as elements in the things, so we find talk of forms being in perceptible 
things replaced by talk of the perceptible things imitating, resembling, or striving to be like 
Forms.75 It is this set of differences between Forms and perceptible things, that makes it natural 
to capitalize the “F” when speaking of Platonic Forms, and it is presumably this set of 
differences that Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of Plato’s “separating” the Forms.  
It is clear that Plato recognizes that his Forms are a controversial metaphysical posit 
because he tells us that most people (the lovers of sights and sounds) do not believe they exist,76 
and because he offers arguments that they do exist. 
Though Platonic Forms are existents of a sort that Socrates did not envision, there is an 
important continuity between Socratic forms and Platonic Forms that makes it sensible to talk of 
the latter as “separated” versions of the former. Like Socratic forms, Platonic Forms are 
supposed to be the proper objects of conceptual knowledge—they are supposed to be the F about 
                                                 
66 Phaedo 74b. 
67 Phaedo 102d-103e. 
68  Symposium 211b, Phaedo 78d. 
69 Phaedo 103b, 102b. 
70 Republic 497b-d. 
71 Phaedo 78d-79a. 
72 Phaedo 74b, Republic 497b. 
73 Phaedo 78c. 
74 Republic 479e. 
75 However, the talk of containing the form never disappears entirely, and the language of “participation” seems to 
be intentionally vague. Evidently, the exact relationship between forms and perceptible things was an issue with 
which Plato continually struggled. For a useful discussion of the terms used in different dialogues to describe the 
relationship between forms and particulars, see Ross 1951 227-231. 
76 Republic 476a-d. 
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which we know when we know about F. This function for Forms is apparent in Plato’s 
arguments for them.  
Before turning to the arguments in the Middle Dialogues, let’s recall briefly Aristotle’s 
account of Plato’s development. On this account, Plato’s Theory of Forms is the result of an 
attempt to recast Socratic epistemological commitments in the context of a Heraclitean 
metaphysics of the perceptible world. The metaphysics renders perceptible things unsuitable to 
serve as objects of knowledge, so the definitions Socrates was seeing must  
apply not to perceptible things but to other things... Existents of this sort, then, 
{Plato} called ἰδέαι, and said that perceptible things are apart from these and are 
called after them, since the things with the same names as the εἴδη are what they 
are by participation in them. (987b5-11) 
The definitions that Socrates sought were accounts of forms that are the proper objects of 
concepts. Heraclitean perceptible things are unfit to serve as objects of knowledge; therefore, the 
forms that are, according to Socrates, the proper object of a concept, must be separate from 
perceptible things. If this is Plato’s reason for positing separate Forms, then the Theory of Forms 
is a theory of concepts. It is an attempt to explain unitary cognition of indefinitely many differing 
objects—to explain how we can think about, e.g., “men” or “the fine” and have our thoughts 
apply to the many differing men or fine things. 
To see whether Aristotle’s account of Plato’s reason for positing separate Forms is 
accurate, we will need to turn to the arguments offered for forms in the Middle Dialogues. Given 
our purposes in doing this, we can bracket the difficult questions of what precisely Heraclitus 
thought, what Plato took him to think, and to what degree Plato endorsed it. Plato attributes the 
doctrine that “All things flow” to Heraclitus,77 and he is explicit in the Cratylus that this doctrine 
is incompatible with the possibility of knowledge: 
No, nor can {something which is never in the same state} be known by anyone. 
For at the moment when the would-be knower approaches it, it becomes some 
other and different thing, so that its quality and state can no longer be known. 
Surely no kind of knowledge is knowledge about that which is in no state. {...} In 
fact we cannot even say that there is such a thing as knowledge, if all things are 
changing and nothing remains fixed. For if knowledge itself does not change and 
cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there would be 
knowledge; but if the very εἶδος of knowledge changes, at the moment of the 
change to another εἶδος there would be no knowledge, and if it is always 
                                                 
77 Cratylus 401d, cf. Theaetetus 161d. 
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changing, there will always be no knowledge. So, on this account, there will be 
neither anyone to know nor anything to be known. (440a-b) 
Plato makes this point in the course of giving an argument that has much in common with 
the one Aristotle attributes to him. He begins by making Socrates ask Cratylus whether there is 
“a beautiful itself, and a good itself, and the same for each one of the things that are” (439c). 
Nothing said earlier in the dialogue indicates that an affirmative answer is supposed to signal an 
acceptance of any controversial ontological commitment, and Cratylus’ ready acceptance of the 
claim confirms that what is at issue at this point in the dialogue are the familiar forms of the 
Early Dialogues. Plato goes on to argue that if these forms exist and are objects of knowledge, 
then they cannot be in a state of flux: 
However, if there is always that which knows and that which is known—if there 
are such things as the beautiful, the good, and likewise for the other things that 
are—then it doesn’t appear to me that these things can be anything like flowings 
or motions. (440a-c) 
Plato does not argue here that the forms must be apart from the perceptible things, but he does 
argue that they must be static in order to fully be and thus to be known. Therefore, either the 
perceptible world must not be fully in flux, as Cratylus thinks, or the forms must be outside of 
the perceptible world. 
The Phaedo’s recollection argument does require Forms that are radically distinct from 
perceptible things, and it too begins from epistemological considerations. In essence, the 
argument is that when we know F, the object of our knowledge is distinct from and superior to 
each of the many perceptible Fs. The many perceptible Fs are not F in the same way the F itself 
is—there is some deficiency in their likeness to the F itself, which constitutes a deficiency in 
their being F that manifests itself in the fact that, unlike the F itself, they sometimes appear to be 
not-F. This difference between the F itself and the many perceptible Fs is such that our 
knowledge of the F itself cannot have been gleaned though perception. Yet it is perceptible 
experience with the many Fs that in some sense causes us to be aware of the F itself. Cases in 
which experience with one thing occasions awareness of another thing that is somehow like or 
related to the first are cases of recollection, and they are only possible when the recollecter has 
prior knowledge the recollected thing. Therefore, we must have knowledge of the F itself prior to 
the perceptual encounters that occasion its recollection, and since these sorts of encounters begin 
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at birth,78 we must have knowledge of the F prior to birth, which means we must exist prior to 
birth.79 The forms introduced during the course of this argument are Platonic, separated Forms. 
These are Forms to which perceptible things cannot live up, and the reason we are given for 
believing that such Forms exist is that we have a sort of cognition whose object cannot be 
perceptible things—we have knowledge of an F, which cannot be any perceptible F, because, 
unlike the many perceptible Fs, this F never appears non-F.  
Republic V argues that the distinction between knowledge, opinion, and ignorance 
requires that each state have a distinct object. Knowledge’s object is being and ignorance’s non-
being, so opinion must have an object that is in between the two. Such an object would be and 
not be. Since each of the many F’s sometimes appears to be non-F, none is any more F than it is 
non-F. These things are, then, between being and not being—or at least between being F and not 
being F. They are, therefore, objects of opinion. Objects of knowledge would have to be things 
that never appeared to be other than as they are—i.e., Forms, which must exist if knowledge 
does.80 Similarly, the Timaeus (at 51c-e) argues that forms must exist because without them 
there could be no distinction between νοῦς and true opinion.81 
Two arguments for Forms can be found in the Parmenides. Though it is a late dialogue 
and is critical of the Theory of Forms, the youthful Socrates of that dialogue is an exponent of 
the theory expounded in the Middle Dialogues. The first argument is contained in a statement of 
Parmenides’ to which Socrates consents: 
I suppose you think that each form is one on the following ground: whenever you 
believe that some number of things are large, you believe perhaps, as you look at 
them all, that there is one same ἰδέα, and from that you conclude that the large is 
one. (132a) 
                                                 
78 Notice the premise here that in perception as such recollection occurs. The idea seems to be that perception 
presupposes Form-knowledge. Plato is really the author of the Kantian cum Sellarsian argument that perception 
presupposes concepts, which are used to interpret and structure the received data. 
79 72e-77b. 
80 476e-479e. The argument does not make this conclusion explicit. Republic V has another brief argument for 
forms from opposites (476a). It is the only argument Plato offers for forms that does not follow the pattern I’ve been 
discussing. 
81 In allowing that opinion would be possible without the Forms, some of these arguments suggest that it would be 
possible to have conceptual cognition—thought not knowledge—of perceptible things even if were no Forms. 
However, it is not clear that, apart from the Forms, this sort of opinion is even rationally assessable, and, if it is not, 
it is not clear that it should count as cognition. In the Phaedo and Phaedrus, at any rate, it is clear that the Forms 
underwrite not just the sort knowledge acquired by philosopher but also the less rigorous forms of cognition enjoyed 
by normal people. 
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This line of reasoning could be endorsed even by the Socrates of the Early Dialogues 
who asked Euthyphro whether “everything that is to be impious presents us with one ἰδέα insofar 
as it impious” (5d). In fact, this text is simply a statement of the Socratic View of Concepts. It 
begins from the idea that Socrates believes many things to be large, and that what he is thinking 
about when he thinks this is a form common to all the large things. It is clear that Socrates’ 
primary concern here is with finding a basis for his unitary thinking of the large things, because 
he is willing to entertain the possibility that the form is simply a thought (νόημα) at 132b.  
The second argument in the Parmenides is also given by Parmenides himself. After 
criticizing the Theory of Forms, he says: 
On the other hand... if someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have just 
brought up and others of the same sort, won’t allow that there are εἲδη for things, 
and won’t mark off an εἴδος for each one, he won’t have anywhere to turn his 
thought, since he doesn’t allow that for each thing there is one ἰδέα that is always 
the same. In this way he will destroy the power of dialectic entirely. (135bc) 
Here, as in the Cratylus, we see the idea that we need non-changing forms to serve as objects of 
knowledge. Notice that it is thought and dialectic that would be destroyed if we abandon the 
hypothesis that the forms exist. It is the possibility of knowledge or thought or reasoning that is 
in view every time that Plato argues for the existence of forms. The forms are a posit to explain 
the possibility of a certain sort of cognition. In particular, they are supposed to explain the 
possibility of the sort of knowledge Socrates sought, conceptual knowledge consisting in 
definitions and reasoning from them.82  
Plato’s Theory of Forms is a theory of concepts in that it accounts for how we can have 
unitary thoughts that apply to pluralities of differing things.83 According to the Theory, the 
                                                 
82 The set of epistemic issues on which Plato bases his arguments for the Forms is raised also by the Athenian 
Stranger at the end of Plato’s final work (Laws XII 965b-966c), though he expresses some ambivalence about their 
ontological implications.  
83 It is unclear whether Plato held this theory about all concepts or only about some. At Republic 596a he writes: 
“Shall we proceed as usual and begin by assuming the existence of a single ousia or form for every set of things that 
we call by the same name?” and Aristotle sometimes speaks of Platonists positing Forms for “all the things that are 
spoken universally” (Metaphysics M.4 1078b33). However, Plato’s own examples are most often moral and 
mathematical qualities or else physical or logical contraries such as hot and cold or same and different. In the 
Parmenides (130b-e), Socrates seems to be certain that there are forms for these qualities, uncertain as to whether 
there are forms for man and horse, and certain that there are not forms for things like mud and hair. But Parmenides, 
who is the protagonist of this dialogue, suggests that Socrates’ reluctance to apply the theory in all cases is a result 
of his youth, so arguably the Parmenides supports the more liberal view. On the other hand, Aristotle sometimes 
tells us that there are not supposed to be forms for negations (Metaphysics M.4 1079a10, Περὶ ἰδιῶν 80.16) relatives 
(83.25), series (Nicomachean Ethics I.6 1096a18-20), perishable things (Metaphysics M.4 1079a11), and artifacts 
(Metaphysics A.9 991b6-7). There is no need to settle this question for our purposes, and the contradictory evidence 
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proper object of a concept is a Platonic Form—a unitary thing that exists apart from the 
perceptible world. Thoughts about this Form apply, though defectively, to a plurality of differing 
things within the perceptible world, because these things participate in the Form. Only true 
philosophers have knowledge of the forms, but every human being enjoys at least a dim 
recollection of them. This enables him to “refer” (ἀναφέρω) perceptions of Fs to the form of F 
and to “comprehend reasoning in accordance with form, proceeding from many perceptions into 
one, which is gathered by reason” (“συνιέναι κατ’ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς 
ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον”) (Phaedo 75b-c, Phaedrus 249b-c.). 
Of course, the Theory of Forms is not simply a theory about cognition. It is also a theory 
about what is most fully real, and, in the Phaedo especially, it forms the core of a theory of 
causation. (Aristotle certainly was aware of these aspects of the Theory, with which he engaged 
in the Metaphysics’ discussions of whether universals are substances and causes.84) In addition 
to its epistemological and metaphysical dimensions, the Theory also has an evident ethical 
dimension. Given all this, it may be thought that it is misleading to characterize it as a theory of 
concepts, because, though the Theory does contain a solution to the Problem of Concepts, this 
solution is not the Theory’s sole function or motivation. In describing the Theory as a theory of 
concepts, I do not mean to claim that it was motivated exclusively by the Problem of Concepts, 
but I do maintain that its role as a solution to that Problem deserves pride of place because of the 
dominance of epistemological considerations in nearly all the arguments Plato offers for the 
Theory. Moreover, I think, though I cannot argue here, that The Problem of Concepts generates 
or informs most of the other problems that are addressed by the Theory of Forms.   
1.2.4 Aristotle on Platonic Forms and the need for universals  
As important for my purposes as the actual motivation for the Theory of Forms is what Aristotle 
took the motivation to be. Aristotle is clear that he thinks Plato posited Forms to render Socrates’ 
definitional project consistent with Heraclitus’ metaphysics of the perceptible world, and that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
may be reason to suppose that Plato himself was undecided. In any event, the Theory of Forms explains the concepts 
for which there are Forms, and if the dialogues in which the Theory is advocated recognize the possibility of other 
concepts, they offer no account of them. 
84 Metaphysics Ζ.8, 13, Λ.3. 
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purpose of Socrates project was to find starting-points for deduction. And, like the arguments for 
forms in Plato’s dialogues, the arguments recounted in Aristotle’s Περὶ ἰδιῶν depart from 
premises about conceptual cognition. Aristotle’s Plato, then, certainly wrestled with the Problem 
of Concepts.  
Aristotle’s wrestled with the problem himself in the Περὶ ἰδιῶν, which was devoted 
entirely to evaluting the Theory of Forms. There he argues that some of the arguments offered 
for Forms do establish something, namely that there are “common things”. In other, and 
presumably more mature works, he devotes considerable attention to such “common things”, 
referring to them as universals (τὰ καθόλου)—i.e. as things that are “by their nature predicated of 
many”.85 
“Καθόλου”, which is presumably an Aristotelian coinage, is a contraction from the 
phrase “κατὰ ὁλου” (“as a whole”).86 This phrase, in turn, occurs only once prior to Aristotle, in 
the Meno: 
But come on and try to fulfill your promise to me by stating about virtue as a 
whole what it is (κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν)87, and stop making 
many from one, as jokers say when someone breaks something—rather, leaving it 
whole and sound, state what virtue is. (77a5-9)88 
The Meno is an especially significant dialogue, because it contains Plato’s most explicit 
discussion of Socrates’ commitments concerning definitions and begins to raise puzzles 
concerning them and to introduce elements of his own distinctive metaphysics and epistemology. 
It is, therefore, a natural place for Aristotle to reach back to when looking for a term to denote 
just what the Socratic commitments to definition and deduction require. 
The centrality of universals to ἐπιστήμη is a recurrent theme in the Posterior Analytics. 
See especially I.31 where Aristotle argues that universals are needed to reveal causes, which (as 
                                                 
85 De Interpretatione 17a39-b2, cf. Metaphysics Z.13 1038b11f. 
86 At any rate, the term is first used by Aristotle, and coining terms by nominalizing phrases is part of his modus 
operandi. 
87 For the  phrase “ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι”, cf. 72a, where it occurs in Meno’s initial promise. 
88 In Republic V, we find an occurrence of “κατὰ ὅλον”:  
I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher; so just as unable speakers do,  I will try to reveal what I intend to you  
not κατὰ ὅλον but rather by taking up some part.  
The meaning seems to be slightly different. The genitive in κατὰ ὅλου is presumably the same genitive one finds 
with verbs of predication—it is the case for that against which one makes an allegation, whereas in the Republic 
passage it is more natural to translate the κατὰ + accusative with some formula like “according to”. (Also worth 
looking at in connection with the etymology of καθόλου is Prior Analytics 43a39, where Aristotle speaks of what’s 
required to establish something “κατά τινος ὅλου”.) 
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of I.2) are required for ἐπιστήμη, and I.24 where he argues that one must demonstrate a 
conclusion at the most universal level possible.89 Universals are equally prevalent in the 
Metaphysics. Of the fourteen ἀπορίαι (on Ross’ count) raised in Metaphysics B, four (the 
seventh, eighth, ninth, and twelfth)90 involve worries that knowledge requires a universal object. 
The following three passages will serve as examples:  
Connected with this is a puzzle most difficult and most necessary to study, to 
which our discussion now turns. If nothing exists besides the particulars, and 
particulars are infinite, how is it possible to get knowledge of things that are 
infinite? For all things that we come to know we come to know insofar as they 
have some unity and identity, and insofar as some attribute belongs to them 
universally. But if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from the 
individuals, it will be necessary that the kinds exist apart from the individuals... 
(999a24-30, cf. K 1060a3-7)  
If principles... are not universal, but are such as individuals, they will not be 
knowable; for knowledge of anything is universal. (1003a12-15) 
If we know each thing by its definition and the kinds are the principles of 
definition, the kinds must also be the principles of definable things. (998b4-5) 
In subsequent chapters, we will have occasion to discuss Aristotle’s view of universality in some 
depth, for now it is sufficient to note its connection to the Problem of Concepts and the Socratic 
matrix from which it springs. To be a universal is to be predicable of many—to be the sort of 
thing the definition of which Socrates sought; and Aristotle regards universals as crucial because 
of the role they play in knowledge. It is due to epistemological considerations that there is 
pressure to posit forms or something like them, and Aristotle is happy to “say goodbye to the 
forms” when he thinks he can explain universal predication and deduction without them (e.g., in 
Posterior Analytics I.22 83a33-5). In Chapter 2, I will argue that what Aristotle says goodbye to 
is not only Plato’s separated forms but also the (less metaphysically committed) Socratic View of 
Concepts—the thesis that a concept requires a proper object which does not differ from instance 
                                                 
89 The connection here to the Meno is striking. The definitions that Socrates complains “break” virtue into many 
things are credited by Meno to the sophist Gorgias and consist in attempts to offer sets of less universal definitions 
in place of a single definition of virtue. In particular Meno tries to define the virtues separately and to give separate 
definitions for the virtue of a man, and of a woman, and so on for different sorts of people. Socrates is seeking the 
definition of virtue to serve as a middle term in a deduction concerning whether virtue is teachable. Were he to 
accept Meno’s definition sets he would end up with several parallel deductions, which is just the sort of thing 
Aristotle is arguing against in Posterior Analytics I.24. In I.2 he refers to a cognitive state that results from this sort 
of reasoning as mere “sophistic” or “incidental” ἐπιστήμη (71b10). 
90 Ross 1924a 235-250. 
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to instance. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will argue that Aristotle held that universality has a basis in 
reality but essentially involves the mind. To set the stage for all of this it will be helpful to put 
antiquity to one side and return to my general characterization of the Problem of Concepts and its 
philosophical and historical significance.   
 
1.3 THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS AS THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS 
The Problem of Concepts is that of explaining what a concept is—of how we can think unitarily 
about an existential plurality. Earlier, I suggested that this is the fundamental issue at stake in set 
of philosophical controversies usually referred to as the Problem of Universals. My task in this 
section is to support and develop this claim and to develop some implications of it. 
One often finds the Problem of Universals posed in terms of “concepts” or some roughly 
equivalent term (e.g., “notions”, “ideas”, etc.). For example, in his 1909 Catholic Encyclopedia 
article on “Nominalism, Realism and Conceptualism,” DeWulf writes:  
The problem of universals is the problem of the correspondence of our intellectual 
concepts to things existing outside our intellect. Whereas external objects are 
determinate, individual, formally exclusive of all multiplicity, our concepts or 
mental representations offer us the realities independent of all particular 
determination; they are abstract and universal. The question, therefore, is to 
discover to what extent the concepts of the mind correspond to the things they 
represent; how the flower we conceive represents the flower existing in nature; in 
a word, whether our ideas are faithful and have an objective reality.91 
                                                 
91 Cf. DeWulf 1909b 150: 
The problem of the Universal is none other than that of the truth or objective reality, of our 
intellectual knowledge. While the data of our sense-perceptions are manifold and individual, the 
object of our intellectual representations is abstract, universal and independent of all individuating 
conditions or determinations. The question is, whether such intellectual conceptions are faithful; 
whether they correspond adequately with the external objects which give rise to them in our 
minds; whether, therefore, they teach us anything about what exists outside our minds.  
(See also Mercier 1906 328 ff.) Neo-Scholastic logic and epistemology texts typically introduce the problem in the 
same way. Coffey, in his 1938 The Science of Logic, puts the problem as follows:  
What are those objects or entities which we apprehend as universal, common, communicable in 
our universal ideas, and what relation have they to the things revealed to us through our senses? 
(9)  
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Similarly, consider how the problem is introduced and motivated by Aaron in The Theory of 
Universals: 
The problem of universals, rightly posed, is still fundamental and urgent; for to 
understand universals is to begin to understand thinking. 
It is from this angle that I approach the theory of universals, regarding it as a 
necessary part of the theory of thinking. What we call conceptual thinking 
involves the use of general words and no explanation of the successful use of the 
general word is possible without facing and solving the problem of universals. 
(1952 vii) 
Russell, in Problems of Philosophy, introduces the Problem of Universals by 
reconstructing “more or less” how it arose for Plato: 
Let us consider, say, such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves to consider what 
justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and the other just act 
with a view to discovering what they have in common. They must all, in some 
sense, partake of a common nature, which will be found in nothing else. This 
common nature, in virtue of which they are all just, will be justice itself, the pure 
essence the admixture of which with the facts of ordinary life produces the 
multiplicity of just acts. Similarly with any other word which may be applicable 
to common facts, such as “whiteness” for example. The word will be applicable to 
a number of particular things because they all participate in a common nature or 
essence92  
Notice that his point of departure is notions and words. Consider also A.D Woozley’s entry on 
Universals in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. After a brief discussion of the term’s etymology, 
it begins: 
That in some sense or other there are universals, and that in some sense or other 
they are abstract objects—that is, objects of thought rather than of sense 
perception—no philosopher would wish to dispute; the difficulties begin when we 
try to be more precise.93 
                                                                                                                                                             
Joseph, in his 1916 An Introduction to Logic, introduces concepts as objects of thought which are “universal” and 
identifies them with the “characters” of things, before dealing with the question of whether these universal 
characters are real or merely in the mind. Commenting on the nature of the problem he writes: 
We find in reflecting on our thoughts about things, that we do think them to be things of a kind, 
instances of the same. That is why the present discussion is logical; though it is one of those 
logical problems that concerns the being of things. (27, see 22-28) 
92 Russell 1997 91-2. 
93 Woozely 1967 194. 
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Lowe’s entry on “universals” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy’s begins by telling 
us that universals are “the supposed referents of general terms”.94 In Think, Blackburn introduces 
the “ancient topic... of universals” as follows: 
To understand things and describe them requires using concepts that are rule-
governed in the minimal way just described {viz. by principles that “separate 
correct application of a term from incorrect application”}. But what is the ‘reality’ 
behind these rules?95 
The Problem of Universals, as formulated by all these authors, is a problem about 
concepts. It is either the Problem of Concepts itself, or else a department of that problem. As 
common as this way of construing the Problem of Universals is, it is rarely developed 
consistently. In particular, it has implications for how we should understand and classify 
“theories of universals” that are not often appreciated. I will develop this point in §1.3.3-5. First, 
it will be necessary to discuss an alternative way in which the Problem of Universals is 
sometimes construed. 
1.3.1 Competing construals of the Problem of Universals 
The Problem of Universals is often introduced as a problem about whether or in what sense 
properties exist,96 or about how to account for such facts as that “there is such a thing as 
recurrence in nature”,97 that “sometimes some things have something in common”,98 or that 
“two different things... can be of the same type”.99 These ways of presenting the problem are the 
same in that they all point to numerous things that are supposed to be somehow the same and 
then ask for an explanation of this sameness. For example, we might note that there are many red 
things: fire engines, roses, catsup, the window frames at Falling Water, etc., and ask: “What is it 
for all these different things to be the same color?” or “for this one color to ‘repeat itself’ in these 
many different things?” 
                                                 
94 Lowe 1995 887. 
95 Blackburn 1999 266. 
96 e.g, Blackburn 1994 387.  
97 e.g., Landsman 1971 3-4. 
98 Goldstein 1983, cf. Quine 1953 9-10, Legg 2001. 
99 Armstrong 1989 2, cf. 1978 11. 
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In fact each of the red items I mentioned differs in color from the others. The window 
frames at Falling Water, for example, are Cherokee red, while fire engines are fire-engine red, 
etc. So people who ask how it is that these things are all red might be asking what it is for 
Cherokee red and fire-engine red to both be red. To ask this question one must already 
presuppose that the two different colors both are red. To presuppose this is simply to regard both 
colors as red, even while recognizing the difference between them. Thus, the question being 
asked is: What are we doing in regarding the two colors this way, and what basis do we have for 
doing it? But this question is simply the Problem of Concepts, so we do not have here a distinct 
philosophical issue. 
Though the red things I mentioned are all different colors—different shades of red—there 
are (or at least may be) multiple things that are precisely the same color. For example, the 
window frames at Falling Water and the tile bearing Frank Lloyd Wright’s signature at Kentuk 
Knob are both Cherokee red, and (let us suppose) Cherokee red is an entirely determinate color 
that does not come in differing shades. I have no objection to taking such things as Cherokee red 
as a limiting case of universals, or to saying that there is a concept “Cherokee red”. However, I 
do not think that there is any genuine philosophical problem posed by the sort of sameness 
exhibited by two Cherokee red items. I don’t think that qualitative identity (complete or partial) 
requires or admits of explanation.100 
Philosophers puzzled by qualitative identity ask, for example, whether Cherokee red is 
many different identical existents or numerically one existent (a “universal”) which is somehow 
simultaneously present in different places.101 But once one is thinking of the color of a given 
body, rather than of the body itself, I see no sense to questions about numerical identity or 
diversity or about location. Qualities qua qualities don’t have any such attributes; when one 
abstracts away from entities to speak of existents in other categories, one has abstracted away 
from the conditions under which concepts of numerical identity and diversity apply.102  
                                                 
100 The term “qualitative identity” is not ideal because it applies not only to qualities but to quantities and relations, 
and perhaps to other sorts of existents as well. 
101 See Aaron (1952 231-234) for an example of treating identical shades of colors as “repeatables” and examples of 
universalia in rebus. Blanshard (1964 392ff) accepts the existence of “specific universals”—”qualit{ies} or 
character{s} that {are} incapable of sub-division into kinds,”  such as the shade of red that might be shared by two 
postage stamps from the same roll—while denying the existences of “generic universals” (e.g. man, horse) and 
“qualitative universals” (e.g. color, sound, and presumably red).   
102 For a defense of this position in the context of an interpretation of  Categories 2, see Jones 1972 and 1975. 
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Whether one finds anything of philosophical significance in what we might call “The 
Puzzle of Qualitative Identity” will depend in part on the position one takes on a range of 
metaphysical issues that are beyond the scope of this discussion. It is not my purpose here to 
discredit the Puzzle, but to distinguish it from the Problem of Concepts. Once we do so, I think it 
is clear that the latter problem has the better claim to be the traditional Problem of Universals. 
We’ve already seen it in Plato’s dialogues. The Medieval debate over universals, sparked by 
Porphyry’s Isagoge, was conducted (initially at least) in terms of the genera and species that we 
predicate of individual entities. Since the members of a genus (e.g. bird) are obviously not 
qualitatively identical to one another, it cannot be the Puzzle of Qualitative Identity that was at 
issue for Porphyry and his readers.103 
However, when the Problem of Universals is raised in terms of “sameness of properties” 
or “sameness of type” or “repeatables”, often both the Problem of Concepts and the Puzzle of 
Qualitative Identity are at issue, without being distinguished from one another. One can argue 
about the degree to which this is the case in various periods, but plausibly the Puzzle did play 
some role in both the Ancient and the Medieval debates (particularly later in the Medieval 
period), so the Puzzle has some claim to be a (lesser) component of the traditional Problem of 
Universals. (If, as I think, the Puzzle is a pseudo-problem that gains currency only through the 
failure to distinguish it clearly from the Problem of Concepts, then it makes more sense to 
                                                 
103 Similarly, as Sellars (1961b §26)  points out, for the British Empiricists, the problem of general ideas was the 
problem of how to form ideas like “red” whose instances differ from one another, not the problem of how to form 
ideas of absolutely determinate shades. Sellars’ sees this as a problem in their thought; he thinks that thought of 
determinate repeatables is just as problematic as thought of determinable repeatables, and that the Empiricists only 
failed to recognize this because they believed that we acquire ideas of determinate repeatables automatically in 
perception. This belief is a symptom of the Empiricists’ subscription to what Sellars derisively calls “the Myth of the 
Given”—the doctrine that there are certain foundational items of knowledge, which do not owe their status as 
knowledge to any other items of knowledge. Earlier §1.1.1, I defined a concept as a unitary awareness of a 
multiplicity of differing objects. In doing this, am I siding with the Empiricists over Sellars and falling prey to the 
Myth? I find Sellars’ arguments against the Myth unconvincing and I do believe in a perceptual given on which 
conceptual knowledge is based, but this is not my reason for defining “concept” as I do. Most of our concepts are 
not absolutely determinate, as “Cherokee Red” (ex hypothesi) is. Concepts can subsume differing instances, and 
most (if not all) of them do. If we have any concepts that are absolutely determinate, they are comparatively 
sophisticated. In the case of colors, they are concepts possessed by painters, for example, but not by normal people, 
and certainly not by everyone who has concepts like “red” and “green”. These absolutely determinate concepts are 
learned late in an individual’s life and are only useful in a context of a system of concepts which includes more 
general concepts. Thus absolutely determinate concepts constitute a special or limiting case of concepts. Moreover, 
many of the reasons why we need a theory of concepts do not apply, or do not apply as strongly, in these cases. It is 
hard to imagine what guidance a theory of concepts might offer someone who is engaged in an argument about 
whether one thing is exactly the same shade of red as another. Finally, on at least one very popular view of the role 
of perception in knowledge (the view Sellars calls a “myth”), the explanation for ideas of absolutely determinate 
attributes is fundamentally different from the explanation for concepts. 
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identify the Problem of Universals with the Problem of Concepts and to think of the Puzzle of 
Qualitative Identity as a sort of confusion that occasionally develops due to vague formulations 
of the Problem.) 
1.3.2 Why speak of the Problem of Concepts rather than a Problem of Universals? 
Though I think that The Problem of Concepts and the Problem of Universals are one and the 
same, much is gained by thinking of it as a problem about concepts. The term “universal” is 
ambiguous. In one sense, as we will see, it denotes a sort of object posited by a theory of a 
certain sort in order to serve as the proper object of a concept. It would be parochial to define and 
name the Problem in terms of this one answer to it. In doing so we would obscure the purpose of 
the posit and, therefore, the work that must be done by a theorist who denies it.  
“Universal” also has the more generic sense, used, e.g., by Woozley when he says that 
everyone agrees that “in some sense or other” there are universals. I think it is this sense that 
Aristotle intended in coining the term “καθόλου”. There was already a perfectly satisfactory term 
for posits of the relevant sort; this is what Aristotle (and other academics) meant by “ἰδέαι”. In 
Metaphysics A.9 and M, at least, Aristotle does not limit that term to separated Platonic Forms, 
but lets it range widely enough to cover all the things believed in by the people who now call 
themselves realists about universals.104 
Using the generic (Aristotelian) sense of “universal”, one can speak of the Problem of 
Universals and ask about the nature and location of universals: are they in things? prior to 
things? in the mind? in the voice? etc. (This is what Porphyry did, though instead of “universal” 
he used the narrower terms “genus” and “species”.) However (at least in English), this way of 
posing the problem tends to stifle the imagination by encouraging one to think of each 
“universal” as an item to be pigeonholed within one’s ontology. What is to prevent a concept 
from resting on a complex relationship between, say, its instances, the mind, and linguistic 
practices? On such a view, where would we say that “the universal” was? I don’t think that, in 
Aristotle’s own context, “καθόλου” would have had this stifling tendency. For him and his 
immediate audience, the term would likely have retained the feel of a prepositional phrase, and 
                                                 
104 See, for example, 991a8-19. 
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this may have encouraged more complex and creative answers to the question of “what is the ‘as 
a whole’ thing”—answers of the sort that I will argue Aristotle offered. 
1.3.3 Realism as a theory of concepts 
For now, however, let’s put aside the generic sense of “universal”. This leaves us with a range of 
“brand name” senses on which universals are types of existents posited by some theory (or 
school of theories). This is the way in which both Russell and Armstrong use the term. Russell 
tells us that he means by “universal” what Plato meant by “εἶδος” and “ἰδέα”—something which 
is “opposed to the particular things that are given in sensation,” which “not being particular 
cannot exist in the world of sense,” and which “is not fleeting or changeable”, but is “eternally 
itself, immutable, and indestructible”.105 Armstrong says that people who hold that the tokens of 
a type “have something strictly identical” are “called Realists and are said to believe in the 
reality of universals”.106 Presumably, then, the strictly identical thing is the universal in whose 
reality the realists believe.   
Since “universal”, in the non-generic sense is a theoretical term for a sort of posited 
entity, how it is to be defined differs somewhat from theory to theory. This may be evident from 
the excerpts from Russell and Armstrong above, and is more evident if one considers, for 
example, the literature on whether Platonic forms are universals or particulars.107 In the generic 
sense, Platonic Forms are clearly supposed to be universals: they are supposed to be the subjects 
and predicates of such thoughts as “Bees like honey” or “The pious is just,” which thoughts are 
supposed to apply (though perhaps defectively) to myriad perceptible particulars. The questions 
with which the literature on this topic is concerned are really questions about whether Plato 
posits the same sorts of existents as certain other philosophers or about where Platonic Forms 
should be classified within some favored ontological scheme. This approach is parochial. It 
would be better to look at the various existents posited by different theories to explain concepts 
and then to define “universal” by generalizing over these posits. 
                                                 
105 Russell 1991 92. 
106 Armstrong 1991 3. 
107 For discussion of differing conceptions of “universal” and related terms as they relate to determining whether 
Platonic Forms are universals see Fine 1993 21-25. 
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We have already looked at two such theories in §2’s discussion of Plato’s Theory of 
Forms and the Socratic View of Concepts. Plato’s Theory is, of course, the paradigm case of so-
called “Extreme Realism”.108 It holds that the proper objects of concepts are unitary Forms that 
exist independently of, and in some sense prior to, the instances of the concepts, which instances 
stand in some ontological dependence relation to the Forms. Socrates’ position has significant 
structural similarities to Plato’s in that it too explains the unitary nature of a concept on the basis 
of a unitary and self-identical proper object. On both views, a concept refers to a plurality of 
differing instances in virtue of some relationship between these instances and the concept’s 
proper object. In general, the theories called “realist” conform to this model. “Realism” is an apt 
name for this sort of theory because it explains a concept’s unitary nature by positing a real (i.e. 
mind-independent) unitary object. If we are going to use “universal” in its non-generic sense as a 
noun, we should use it for these proper objects. 
A universal, then, is a one over many (as its etymology suggests), it is a unitary and self-
identical thing that can serve as the proper object of a concept because it is related to a plurality 
of things in some way such that thoughts about it apply to all of the others. Different varieties of 
realism differ about the sort of unity possessed by the universal and the sort of relation in which 
the universal stands to the particular instances of the concept whose proper object it is.  
The two historically prominent varieties of realism are Extreme Realism and Moderate 
Realism.109 Extreme Realism holds that the universal is a numerically singular object that 
somehow exists independently of the particulars, which somehow “imitate” or “participate” in it. 
The position that has most often been advocated under the name “Moderate Realism” is simply 
the position that I earlier called “The Socratic View of Forms”. On it, universals are not 
numerically singular and they do not exist apart from particulars. Rather, each of the instances of 
a concept has a component or characteristic which is qualitatively identical to some component 
or characteristic in each of the other instances. By virtue of this qualitative identity, the 
                                                 
108 This view is also called “exaggerated”, “transcendent”, “complete”, or “Platonic” realism. See, e.g., DeWulf 
1909a, Armstrong 1978a 140, Grote 1872 252, and Marenbon 1998 13, respectively.  
109 Moderate and Extreme Realism do not exhaust the domain of possible realist theories. One can conceive of as 
many varieties of realism as one can of relationships in which universals might stand to instances. Indeed Realisms 
that do not qualify as either “Moderate” or “Extreme”, are prominent in contemporary discussions of concepts. 
Milliken, for example, holds that the objects of substance concepts, e.g. “milk”, “mouse”, and “table”, have the same 
sort of unity that individual entities do; both sorts of objects are four-dimensional space-time wholes. This view 
qualifies as realist. On it, the proper object of a concept is the whole of which its instances are spatiotemporal parts 
(see Millikan 1999). Similar views have been advocated by philosophers of biology (e.g, Hull 1978 and Ghieselin 
1997) who describe species as “individuals”. 
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component or characteristic is said to be one and is thought to serve as the proper object of the 
concept. If this view is only implicit in the Early Dialogues, it has since been advocated 
explicitly by the Scholastics and their descendents. (Aristotle is, of course, often taken to be the 
fountainhead of Moderate Realism, and I will consider the merits of attributing this position to 
him in Chapter 2.)  
Notice that “universal”, as I have defined it does not denote a type of existent. Rather the 
term denotes any existent insofar as it plays (or is suited to play) a certain role in cognition. If, 
for example, there are paradigms of created things existing in God’s mind or in a non-
spatiotemporal heaven, these will qualify as universals only if they explain and justify concepts 
by serving as their proper objects. Likewise, uncontroversial items like the color of a certain 
Cherokee red object will be universals (in reality or on some theory) only if they make concepts 
possible by serving as their proper objects. This point must be stressed. Universal and particular 
are not ontological taxa; much less do they comprise a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
taxonomy of existents. On Extreme Realism (and perhaps on some other varieties or Realism as 
well), the distinction between universal and particular may map on to a distinction between types 
of existents, but is not the case for Realism as such. 
It is worth pausing to make a related point concerning the relation of universals, (as I use 
the term) to the “universals” believed in by the “realist” about the Puzzle of Qualitative Identity. 
These latter “universals” are supposed to be existents of a special type, each of which is a 
numerically singular thing that underwrites qualitative identity by being “repeatable” or capable 
of existing or being instanced in many places at once. A “particular”, in the sense of the term 
corresponding to this sense of “universal” can only be in one place at once, and the opposition 
between such “particulars” and “universals” is supposed to constitute a taxonomy of beings.  
One can affirm or deny the existence of universals in my sense, whatever one’s position 
on “universals” in this other sense, and vice versa. Moderate Realists claim that there are always 
qualitative identities between the instances of concepts. They are not thereby committed to any 
position at all on the Puzzle of Qualitative Identity, though the reasons that lead them to embrace 
Moderate rather than Extreme Realism will usually lead them to reject “universals” in the 
Qualitative-Identity Theorist’s sense (and likely, they will regard his problem as a pseudo-
problem). By the same token, if one is already committed to Extreme Realism and is therefore in 
the business of positing numerically singular existents of a controversial sort in order to explain 
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the relationship between the instances of concepts, then it is natural to construe the relationship 
between qualitatively identical things in terms of these existents. 
Since my overarching topic is Aristotle’s position on the Problem of Concepts, and 
Aristotle is so often taken to be a Moderate Realist, Moderate Realism deserves special attention. 
I discuss it in greater depth in the next section. Before doing so, however, it is worth making a 
few connected points about Realism in general, which derive from the nature of the Problem of 
Concepts.  
The formation and use of concepts is partially under our control and the Problem of 
Concepts is as much a problem about how we should form and use them as it is a problem about 
how we do form and use them. Because of this, we should take any theory of concepts as, in the 
first instance, a theory about proper or legitimate or healthy concepts. A theory can allow for the 
possibility of pseudo-concepts, which are not concepts at all and of defective concepts of various 
sorts. Therefore, when the Realist claims that each concept has as its proper object some self-
identical, unitary thing that stands in a certain relationship to all of the concept’s instances, he 
need not be committed to positing the existence of some such proper object for every putative 
concept. He is free in the case of any given putative concept to deny that there is a proper object 
and thus to deny that the concept is genuine, or he can be agnostic as to whether a given putative 
concept has a proper object and is genuine. 
There is nothing to prevent a Realist from denying that most of our putative concepts are 
genuine concepts and holding that most thought is some sort of confusion—perhaps a confusion 
that somehow approximates to proper thought. Arguably, this is Plato’s position, and variants of 
it are not uncommon. Armstrong for example is a moderate realist who holds that the only 
concepts with proper objects are those used in the formulation of scientific laws.110 Of course, if 
one holds this sort of position one will still need to give some account of the concepts (or 
pseudo-concepts) that people use in ordinary thought.111 He might classify them as defective 
concepts, or he might think of them as concepts of a completely different sort, to be explained 
(and judged) by some theory other than Realism. Thus, it is possible to be a Realist about some 
                                                 
110 Armstrong 1978b. 
111 Or at least one will need to do this if one is to have a complete theory of concepts. A theorist may be interested 
only in explaining and developing norms for some subset of concepts. 
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concepts while accepting some other theory (or even having no theory at all) about other 
concepts. 
1.3.4 Moderate Realism as a theory of concepts 
The most explicit recent proponents of Moderate Realism are the Neo-Scholastics of the Louvain 
school, and I will take them as my paradigm Moderate Realists.112 It will be instructive to 
consider their own statements of their position. I quote at some length to give the flavor of their 
view:  
The universal is not a thing in itself; it is immanent in individuals and is 
multiplied in all the representatives of a class. As for the form of universality of 
our concepts... it is just a product of our subjective consideration. (DeWulf 1909a) 
Why are manifold individuals classified under a common or universal concept? 
...because they are similar.... {S}imilarity is a partial conceptual or logical 
identity: each individual of the manifold is so constituted that some factor of each, 
isolated by the abstractive power of the intellect from the other factors, appears to 
intellect as one definite self-identical object, and is apprehended as universal or as 
“common to all”. (Coffey 1958 277-8) 
{T}he real objective foundation for the universal concept {lies} in the perfectly 
similar natures of the members of the same class.  (Maher 1900 249) 
John is a man, so is James also a man: man can be attributed to both and to an 
indefinite multitude. And it can be attributed to them truly, for each assertion 
means only that object of my universal idea—human nature—is really in each 
and every one of the individuals, though not in the same way as it is conceived by 
my mind. (Coffey 1938 7-8) 
When the mind apprehends the essence of a thing... the external object is 
perceived without the particular notes which attach to it in nature... and it is not 
yet marked with the attribute of generality which reflection will bestow on it... 
The abstract reality is apprehended with perfect indifference as regards both the 
individual state without and the universal state within... Now what is thus 
                                                 
112 I leave aside the question of how closely these thinkers’ ideas correspond to those of Aquinas and the original 
scholastics, of whose teachings they take themselves to be faithful followers. The distance between us and the 
medieval texts makes them less accessible than the writings of the neo-Scholastics and so less serviceable as a 
paradigm. Also, the term “Moderate Realist,” does not date back to the Medieval period, and it is applied to Aquinas 
et al. insofar as they are understood a certain way by modern scholars. It should, then, make sense to ask whether 
Aquinas (or Duns Scotus, etc.) really was a moderate realist—i.e. whether he held what his neo-Scholastic, 
Moderate Realist followers take him to have held.  
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conceived in the absolute state... is nothing else than the reality incarnate in any 
given individual: in truth, the reality, represented by my concept of man, is in 
Socrates or in Plato. There is nothing in the abstract concept that is not applicable 
to every individual; if the abstract concept is inadequate because it does not 
contain the singular notes of each being, it is none the less faithful, or at least its 
abstract character does not prevent it from corresponding faithfully to the objects 
existing in nature. As to the universal form of the concept, a moment’s 
consideration shows that it is subsequent to the abstraction and is the fruit of 
reflection... Whence it follows that the universality of the concept as such is the 
work purely of the intellect. (DeWulf 1909a) 
And when {Scholastics} say that “universals” are “fundamentally” in things or 
reality... they mean that it is this abstract thought-object which, as to its content, is 
real or in things independently of our thought. {…} And when scholastics say 
that “universals” are “formally” in the mind... they mean that the object of thought 
or conception considered as a universal,—i.e. as something common or 
communicable to, and realizable in, and predicable of, many things,—is only in 
the mind, and is, as such, not independent of thought. In other words, it is because 
the object is a thought-object... that it is a universal. As it really exists in any 
individual datum of sense... it is individualized, singular, incommunicable; only 
as it is apprehended in the abstract by intellect... is it “common to many things” or 
“formally universal”. (Coffey 1958 270-271)113 
In each quote, we see what I earlier called the Socratic View of Concepts. Over and over 
we see the idea that each of the instances of a concept contains something that is identical or 
“perfectly similar,” to something in each of the other instances, such that, when one thinks of this 
identical thing in abstraction from any instance’s other characteristics (its “singular notes”), 
one’s thought applies equally to each of the other instances. The basis of the concept is the 
identical characteristic or element, and this is what I have called the “proper object” of the 
concept.  
According to Moderate Realism, one forms the concept by considering an instance and 
performing a certain “screening operation” of “context-omission”: one focuses on the proper 
object to the exclusion of the instance’s other attributes.114 Kant articulates the essence of this 
view of concepts in his lectures on logic, when he says that a concept is “a partial representation, 
                                                 
113 See also Joseph 1916 31-2, 70-71, Veatch 1952 105-115, and Parker and Veatch 1959 52-4. 
114 I borrow the phrases “screening operation” and “context omission” from Reese (1960) and Linnell (1956) 
respectively. Both authors were writing about  Locke, to whom I will turn shortly.  For an illuminating discussion 
and critique of this theory of concept formation see Geach 1971 11-38. Geach uses the term “abstraction” for what 
I’m calling “context-omission” and uses the term “abstractionism” for the theory that concepts are formed or 
acquired in this way. I use “abstraction” more widely for any process by which concepts are formed on the basis of 
perceptual data. On this view context-omission is a (putative) type of abstraction. (Cf. Binswanger 1967 and 1989.) 
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which can be common to several” objects and that a thinker “consider{s} this partial 
representation as a ground of cognition, insofar as {he} ignore{s} all other partial 
representations”.115 The same idea can be found in Locke who holds that “general natures or 
notions are... abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular 
existences” (Essay III.3.9). Indeed Locke’s account of abstraction is strikingly similar to the neo-
Scholastics: 
{T}he mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become 
general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such 
appearances,—separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real 
existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called 
Abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general 
representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable 
to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise, naked 
appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others 
they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to 
them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these 
patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same colour being 
observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, 
it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; 
and having given it the name whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality 
wheresoever to be imagined or met with; and thus universals, whether ideas or 
terms, are made.116 
It is worth noticing, that neither Locke, nor any of our neo-Scholastics (in the passages 
quoted at least) is in the least bit concerned with the “Puzzle of Qualitative Identity”. Their 
statements presuppose that things can have identical characteristics and assume no more than 
this. Their Realism consists in the claim that concepts are the result of regarding such 
characteristics in a certain way. The universals in which the neo-Scholastics believe are not, in 
themselves, universals at all. Thus the neo-Scholastics sometimes speak of their universals as 
being particular in the particular instances or as being neither universal nor particular in the 
“absolute state”. The relevant existents are universals just insofar they are capable of being 
regarded in a certain way and so provide a basis for unitary thought of indefinitely many objects. 
Any characteristic shared by all the instances of a concept that serves as the basis and 
proper object of the concept is an immanent universal (or universalis in re), and any one who 
                                                 
115 The Dohna-Wundlacken Logic 753 (as translated by Young 1992 486-7), cf. Vienna Logic 904-5 (Young 348-9). 
The relation of the views Kant expresses in the various lectures on logic to the views expressed in the Critique of 
Pure Reason is a matter of some difficulty, with which we needn’t concern ourselves here.  
116 Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.11.9. 
 50 
holds that concepts have such universals as their proper objects is a Moderate Realist. 
(Remember, though, that a thinker can be a Moderate Realist about a sub-set of concepts while 
denying that other concepts have imminent universals as their proper objects.) I add “basis” to 
“proper object” in the above statement to indicate that the identical characteristic must exist 
mind-independently and be part of what makes the concept possible. This rules out views on 
which the partial identity of the objects would derive from (or be coeval with) our 
conceptualization of them. Such a view would be too different from that of the neo-Scholastics to 
fall under the same heading. 
It is essential to Moderate Realism that the proper object of a concept is real—i.e., is in 
no way constituted by the mind—and really exists in the instances. What the mind contributes is 
only a way of focusing on the proper object and regarding it in such a way that thoughts of it 
apply to many distinct things. Any theory on which the mind does more than omit context will 
not be Moderate Realist. Thus, for example, Locke departs from Moderate Realism in the case of 
“complex ideas”, which he thinks the mind creates by conjoining simple ideas and compounding 
them into a unit through the introduction of a word.117 In doing this, the mind partially creates, 
rather than discovers, the concept’s proper object (though it does so from discovered 
material).118  
For the Moderate Realists, the proper object needs to exist prior to and independent of the 
conceptualization, because it is only by becoming acquainted with this object in perception that 
we are able to omit its context and form a universal concept. Notice that Coffey, in the last 
quoted passage above, equates the way in which the universal characteristic “really exists” with 
how it exists “in any individual datum of sense”. He stresses that “the content of our universal 
concepts is really in the data of sense” and says that this accounts for concepts’ “real objective 
validity” (290). Similarly, Mercier claims that 
                                                 
117 See Essay Concerning Human Understanding III.5.10. 
118 On the whole, Locke’s position is best classified as a sort of conceptualism rather than as a sort of realism. The 
concepts about which he’s a moderate realist are only those of simple ideas, which he thinks are formed 
automatically and  automatically satisfy the norms of realness and adequacy. Since these are a small subset of 
concepts and are the ones about which we’re the least in need of epistemic guidance, his treatment of them is of less 
significance for classifying his theory than his treatment of other ideas.  
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The intellect finds in the data of sense experience its proper object, viz. the 
essences of things; it reads or deciphers in the core of the sense fact ‘that which 
the thing is’...119  
We can, then, flesh out moderate realism by adding that the identical element which is to be 
screened out to form the concept must somehow be available in the sense-perception of each of 
the instances—at least for concepts whose instances are perceptible. 
This completes my account of the Moderate Realist theory of concepts. I will consider 
whether Aristotle held it in the next chapter. If, as I will argue, he did not hold it,  we will be 
faced with the task of identifying and classifying his view. To this end, I will conclude this 
chapter with some comments on the general topic of classifying theories of concepts.  
1.3.5 Classifying theories of concepts 
Discussions of the “Problem of Universals” often suppose that any theory is either realist or 
“nominalist” (i.e., anti-realist), as though this division stood at the basis of a taxonomy of 
theories.120 But, if a universal is simply a certain sort of existent posited to explain concepts, then 
there is no prima facie reason why the central issue in classifying theories should be whether 
they make this particular posit. Consider a parallel: Some accounts of the ultimate nature of 
reality posit a single omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent God who created the 
universe, while other accounts do not. Nevertheless, someone who classifies all accounts of the 
ultimate nature of reality as either monotheistic or heathen is as misguided as he is parochial. 
Hindus do not posit such a God, conventional Greek religion did not, Aristotle did not, and 
neither do atheists. These various “heathens” are just as different from one another as they are 
from the monotheists. In the same way, two theories of concepts that do not posit universals may 
nonetheless be as different from one another as either is from a theory that does make the posit. 
Therefore, the fact that some theories of concepts posit universals and others do not is not a 
sufficient basis for grouping all the non-realist theories together under some common heading, 
                                                 
119 Mercier 1906 380 (quoted in translation in Coffey 1958 290). Mercier is not using “proper object” in my 
technical sense, rather he’s using it to mean, the object proper to intellect as opposed to the object proper to sense, 
but these two senses come to the same thing. 
120 For example, Armstrong (1989  6) treats “nominalist” and “anti-realist” as synonyms.  See also Loux 1998. 
Philosophy texts books often define nominalism simply as the view that only particulars exist. See for example Earl 
1992 95. 
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much less for treating the distinction between these two putative camps as the fundamental issue 
in the debate.  
To get a sense of what the sorts of similarities and differences there can be between 
theories of concepts, let’s compare briefly the four traditionally recognized “Theories of 
Universals”. They are Moderate and Extreme Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. I have 
already discussed the two forms of Realism and will treat them as a unit. Since none of my 
substantive theses will depend on how “Conceptualism” and “Nominalism” are to be defined (or 
even on whether they are valid categories), I will just sketch brief accounts of archetypal 
versions of the theories, cast in the vocabulary of concepts that I have been using. 
Conceptualism is the doctrine that the proper object of a concept is a mental construct, 
which is distinct from any of the concept’s instances and from anything that could exist in the 
world of perceptible objects. A paradigm case of this view would be Locke’s view of concepts 
like “triangle”.121 We have, he famously thought, a “general idea” of triangle that, unlike any 
particular triangle, is “neither isosceles, nor equilateral, not scalene”.122 Nominalism is the 
doctrine that, when we use a concept, we are always thinking of some particular, perceptible (or 
imaginable) object—typically either an instance of the concept or a word. The concept is an 
ability to utilize a cognition of a single particular object in a manner that renders thoughts of it 
applicable to a plurality of objects. Thus, on one common version of the view, when a man 
thinks about “triangles” he may be thinking about a given triangle which he has drawn or 
imagined, but he thinks about it in such a way that the conclusion he reaches about can be 
transferred to other triangles as well.123 On another version of the view, when a man thinks about 
triangles, he is engaged in a series of machinations involving the word “triangle”, which word he 
has learned to use in such a manner that he will be able to apply the outcome of these 
machinations to many different triangles. 
Conceptualism and Nominalism, contra Realism, agree in not positing universals. 
Realism and Conceptualism, contra Nominalism, agree that concepts involve a type of mental 
content that could not occur in perception. Conceptualism, contra Realism and Nominalism, 
holds that a concept involves some sort of fiction in that it represents a sort of object that (at least 
                                                 
121 Locke’s thought on concepts is complex and he does not treat all types of concepts in the same way. 
122 Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV.7.9. 
123 See Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §16. 
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as far as the subject knows) does not exist outside the mind. We have, then, some basis for 
grouping any pair of the theories together as opposed to the third. And we have seen no reason to 
think that these three theories exhaust the possible theories of concepts. 
Developing a taxonomy of theories of concepts, then, is no mean feat. To do it, we would 
need to survey a range of different theories and determine the comparative significance of the 
various issues on which the theories differ. I will not embark on this project here. My aim is 
merely to warn against assuming a taxonomy without an adequate basis. I stress this point 
because the next chapter will be devoted to the question of whether Aristotle is a Realist, and it 
must be kept in mind what turns on this issue and what does not. If Aristotle is not a realist, then 
he need not thereby be in the same camp as Ockham, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 
Wittgenstein, or anyone else. If we determine that Aristotle is not a Realist, we will still have the 
considerable task of determining what he does hold about concepts, and how his views, whatever 
they may be, relate to a host of more familiar positions.  
This said, I do think there is a similarity between Conceptualism and Nominalism (at 
least as these views have typically been held) which is significant enough to justify grouping 
them together as opposed to Realism. Both views treat concepts as arbitrary or conventional, 
either denying that concepts are answerable to any standards, or else setting standards for them 
solely in terms of social custom or pragmatic utility, which depend as much on the subjects’ 
interests as on facts about the objects. Therefore, on both views, but not on Realism, concepts 
have a subjective character. Given the epistemological context in which the Problem of Concepts 
arises, I think this difference is quiet significant. However, developing it is not central to my 
project so I will not pursue it here. I mention it only to further clarify what it would and would 
not mean for Aristotle not to be a Realist. It may be that the dominant non-realist theories of 
concepts in the history of philosophy all render concepts subjective, but it does not follow from 
this that all non-realist theories must. There is room for theories that hold that concepts have an 
objective basis, without having universals as their proper objects. I will argue  that Aristotle’s 
held such a view. 
Whatever non-realist, objectivist elements may be present in Aristotle’s thought, his 
discussion of Plato’s realism does suggest that Aristotle is sympathetic to the moderate realism 
implicit in the Socratic dialogues. Aristotle’s focuses on how Heracliteanism drove Plato to 
“separate” his forms. The implication is that if we reject Heracliteanism, as Aristotle does, we 
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can retreat to the moderate realist view of “imminent forms”. This is, of course, the position on 
the problem with which Aristotle is usually associated, and the constant use he makes of the 
Platonic concept “εἶδος”, including in the context of discussions of the universality of knowledge 
(e.g., De Anima III) offers some support for it. Let us, then, turn our attention to the merits of this 
traditional interpretation. 
2.0  WAS ARISTOTLE A MODERATE REALIST? 
Aristotle... formulated the main doctrines of Moderate Realism... The universal is 
not a thing in itself; it is immanent in individuals and is multiplied in all the 
representatives of a class. As to the form of universality of our concepts (man, 
just), it is a product of our subjective consideration... It was through this wise 
doctrine that the Stagyrite exercised his ascendancy over all later thought. 
(DeWulf 1909a) 
In this passage, we find what might be called the “standard” or “conventional” interpretation of 
Aristotle’s position on the Problem of Universals: Aristotle authored a Moderate Realism 
according to which universals are immanent in perceptible particulars and isolated in thought. 
They are fully real in the sense of existing independently of the mind, but are not self-subsistent 
objects—not οὐσίαι—, but are dependent features or elements of particulars. This interpretation 
is so entrenched that “Aristotelian Realism” is at least as common as “Moderate Realism” as a 
name for the thesis it ascribes to Aristotle.1 
The form Aristotle’s Moderate Realism is supposed to take is captured in the textbook 
slogan that “Aristotle brought Platonic forms down to earth”: 
Aristotle was a realist about universals; in addition to individuals there exist 
forms. But universals do not transcend individuals. Unlike Platonic forms, 
Aristotle’s forms exist in individuals, and good observation, which includes the 
use of reason, can discern the forms that exist in individuals. For Aristotle, forms 
are immanent in individuals, and thus Aristotle elevated nature and human affairs 
by bringing Plato’s forms down to earth. (Geirsson and Losonsky 1998 18, cf. 
Roochnik 2004 161, Pojman 1997  246, and Clay 2000 215.) 
                                                 
1 DeWulf (1909b 151) speaks of “Moderate or Aristotelian Realism”. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western 
Philosophy (Bennin and Yu 591) reports that: “Aristotelian realism argues that a universal has no separate existence 
of its own but is a structure embedded in things (a universal in re)”. See also the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Blackburn 1994 287), which tells of “the Aristotelian belief that universals exist in things (in re) but not 
independently of them”. Similar accounts can be found in Aaron  (1952 23),  Woozley (1967) and Geirsson and 
Losonsky (1998 18). Moderate realism is also sometimes referred to as “Thomistic realism,” “Scholastic realism,” 
or “immanent realism” (which last Armstrong [1978a 36] treats as synonymous with “Aristotelian Realism”). 
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If taken in its most straightforward sense, the claim that Aristotle thought that Platonic 
Forms exist in individuals cannot be true. In Metaphysics A.9 (991a12-19) he attributes this 
position to “Eudoxus and others” (adding that it was anticipated by Anaxagoras), and says that it 
is “very easily upset; for it is not difficult to collect many insuperable objections to such a 
view”.2 Though something called “εἴδη” figure prominently in Aristotle’s ontology and serve 
some similar functions to those played by Plato’s Forms in his ontology, Aristotle introduces and 
motivates his conception of form independently of Plato, and on several occasions he tells us 
flatly that the Forms posited by Plato do not exist.3  
Aristotle didn’t see himself as accepting a moderated version of Plato’s Theory. But he 
may not have been correct in this assessment. Whether he was depends in part on what Aristotle 
held and in part on what we should understand as essential to Plato’s Theory, considered as a 
theory of concepts. In my last chapter I argued that Plato’s solution of the Problem of Concepts 
is the positing of ontological universals to serve as the proper objects for concepts. In the Middle 
Dialogues at least Plato characterizes these universals as transcendent and characterizes a 
concept’s instances as related to the corresponding universal by a relationship of imitation or 
participation. Following the tradition, we called this theory “Extreme Realism” and saw it as a 
version of Realism, which holds that a concept is a cognition of some unitary mind-independent 
“universal” object, and that it applies to its instances derivatively because of some relation in 
which they stand to the universal. “Moderate Realism” identifies the relation between the 
instances and the universal as some sort of containment. In this chapter I take up the issue of 
whether Aristotle held this view. I argue that he did not, and I sketch the sort of ontological basis 
that he does think that concepts do require. 
                                                 
2 The same point is made in M.5 (1079b15-23). One can get a sense of what objections Aristotle has in mind by 
considering B.2 (998a7-19) and M.2 (1076a38-b11) where Aristotle  discusses the similar idea that mathematical 
objects exist in perceptible things. For useful discussion of the A.9 passage see Dancy (1991, 23-8) and Ross (1924a 
198). Both scholars are concerned to show how the position Aristotle ascribes to Eudoxus is different from (what 
they take to be) Aristotle’s view of immanent forms. Ross takes Eudoxus’ position to be that forms are immanent 
“substances in the fullest sense” and Aristotle’s position to be that universals are “not substances in the proper sense 
of the word”. Since Platonic forms are supposed to be οὐσίαι—indeed the only true οὐσίαι—this reading makes 
Eudoxian forms re-located Platonic forms in a way that Aristotelian forms are not. Dancy’s thinks that the 
relationship between the three thinkers is more complex, but he agrees with Ross that Aristotelian forms and 
Eudoxian forms are imminant universals and that Eudoxus’ view is closer than Aristotle’s to Plato’s “High Theory 
of Forms”. 
3 See especially Metaphysics Λ.5 1071a17-29 and Posterior Analytics I.11 and 22. 
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This chapter can be seen as offering a down payment on a refutation of the Moderate 
Realist interpretation. A complete case would require considering a number of texts that seem to 
support the interpretation but which I will postpone until Chapters 3 and 4, where I discuss the 
psychological and epistemological dimensions of Aristotle’s thought on concepts. In the present 
chapter I limit my attention to the ontological basis of concepts, and especially whether an 
immanent universal is a necessary condition for a concept. 
The first step in answering this question is reformulating it in terms that bring us closer to 
his texts. This will be the task of §2.1, where we will see how the answer to our question turns 
primarily on whether Aristotle conceives of kinds (or genera, “γένη”) and forms (or species, 
“εἴδη”) as immanent universals. It should be no surprise that our question comes to this; we have 
already met with the idea that Aristotelian forms are universals, and the Medieval debate over 
universals was sparked by Porphyry’s mention of an ἀπορία concerning the ontological status of 
forms and kinds.4 I focus on the case of kinds in §2.2 and §2.3, arguing first against the 
Moderate Realist interpretation, and then bringing out some of the metaphysical and 
psychological implications and presuppositions of Aristotle’s position. In §2.4, I turn to the case 
of forms, before concluding, in §2.5 with a brief general discussion of the ontology of 
Aristotelian universality. 
2.1 REFORMULATING OUR QUESTION IN ARISTOTELIAN TERMS 
2.1.1 Concepts as simple thoughts of non-numerical unities 
In De Interpretatione 1, Aristotle speaks of affections of the soul that are likenesses of objects, 
and he distinguishes these affections from both the objects themselves and from words. Words 
symbolize the affections in the way that written words symbolize spoken ones. It is only through 
symbolizing these affections that words manage to signify objects.5 Aristotle refers to the 
relevant affections of the soul as thoughts (νοήματα), and in particular as thoughts “without 
                                                 
4 Isogage 1 10-13. 
5 De Interpretatione 1, cf. De Anima III.6.  
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combination or division” (16a14), such as the thought of a man or of running, as opposed to the 
thought that a man runs. This latter thought involves the combination of the thoughts of man and 
running and is expressed linguistically by a sentence (λόγος) formed by combining the words, 
“man” and “runs”, which symbolize those uncombined thoughts.6  
In the Organon, Aristotle deals only with declaratory (ἀποφαντικός) sentences, which, as 
opposed to (e.g.)  prayers, are true or false. Each declaratory sentence is either a proposition 
(πρότασις) or else made up of propositions joined by connectives.7 A proposition is “a sentence 
affirming (καταφατικὸς) or denying (ἀποφατικὸς) something of something”,8 and each 
proposition can be broken down into two terms (ὁροί), “that which is predicated and that of 
which it is predicated”—i.e. the predicate and the subject.9 
We are told repeatedly in the De Interpretatione that a proposition asserts or denies “one 
thing of one thing”.10 A sentence might fail to do this, even if it has the same grammatical form 
as another sentence that does express a proposition. For example: 
If a single name is given to two things, out of which there is not one thing, then 
there is not a single affirmation. E.g., if someone were to posit the name “cloak” 
for horse and man, {and say}: The {statement} “A cloak is white”. This is not a 
single affirmation nor a single denial; for this is no different from saying, “A 
horse and man is white, but this is no different from saying “A horse is white” and 
“A man is white”.11 So if these signify multiple things (πολλά) and are multiple 
{affirmations}, surely it is clear that the initial {statement} signifies either 
multiple things or nothing (for no man is a horse). (8 18a18-25) 
Affirming or denying one thing of multiple things or multiple things of one, 
unless some one thing is composed (συγκείμενον) from the multiple things, is not 
a single affirmation or denial. I do not call it one if one name is posed (κείμενον) 
                                                 
6 Though Aristotle does not say so here, it is negative thoughts or sentences that are formed by division. For 
example, “The man is not white” divides man from white. This is the view taken in Metaphysics E.4 and Θ.10. By 
contrast, De Anima III.6 (430b1ff), treats such thoughts as combinations including “not white” as one of the terms to 
be combined, but it allows that these cases (or perhaps that all complex thoughts) can also be treated as divisions. 
On this issue, see below §3.1.1. 
7 De Interpretatione 5 17a8. Aristotle speaks here of κατάφασεις and ἀποφάσεις, rather than of προτάσεις, which is 
the generic term embracing the two. 
8 Prior Analytics I.1 24a16. 
9 Prior Analytics I.1 24b16-18. 
10 See De Interpretatione 8 18a12, Prior Analytics I.23 40b35, Posterior Analytics I.2 72a9, I.22  83b17-31, and 
Sophistical Refutations 6 and 30; cf. Metaphysics Γ.7 1011b24. 
11Aristotle’s Greek, of course, lacks quotation marks. In English, where we do have them, it is ungrammatical to 
omit them, so I’ve supplied them. Occasionally deciding where to place them requires an interpretation, with which 
someone might take issue. For example, perhaps the “and” belongs in the quotation marks, yielding the long 
sentence “A horse is white and a man is white”. My punctuation brings out the plurality of the affirmation, but I 
don’t think much turns on this.   
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but there isn’t any one thing from them. E.g., man is, perhaps, animal and biped 
and tame, and yet some one thing comes from these; but there is not one thing 
from white and man and walking. So, if {someone} affirmed some one thing of 
these, there would not be a single affirmation (rather, while the vocalization 
(φωνή) would be single, the affirmations would be multiple), and likewise, if 
{someone affirmed} these multiple things of one thing. (11 20b12-22)12 
If either term in a sentence signifies a multiplicity of things, Aristotle treats the sentence as 
expressing multiple propositions, unless the multiple things somehow constitute a unity.  
The two passages quoted above concern different sorts of multiplicities. In 11, the two 
multiplicities considered are “animal, biped, and tame” and “white, man, walking”. In both 
cases, we have sets of terms that could apply to a single thing, but only in the first case does the 
set compose a new term because it is (ex hypothesi) the definition of man.13 The De 
                                                 
12 See also Posterior Analytics II.10 93b36 and Sophistical Refutations 6 169a6ff, 17  179a39ff, and 30. The issue of 
what constitutes “one proposition” is of special significance to Aristotle, especially in the Sophistical Refutations 
because of the common sophistic tactic of “making two questions into one” by asking a question with an equivocal 
term and taking the answer to apply to both of the term’s senses. 
13 Ackrill (1963 145) regards Aristotle’s position on this issue as “clearly unsatisfactory” because: 
He fails to recognize that a statement which contains a name (or verb) which does not stand for a 
genuine unity may nevertheless be itself a unitary statement, incapable of decomposition into 
simpler statements. ‘Some men are musical cobblers’ and ‘no musical cobblers are wise’ cannot 
be construed as conjunctions of simpler statements containing no such compound terms as 
‘musical cobblers.’ 
It is unlikely that Aristotle would have been moved by this criticism. He is concerned less with providing an analysis 
of every possible sentence than with providing an understanding of terms and propositions that can explain their 
function in argument and ultimately in knowledge. Consider how one would argue to or from Ackrill’s statements 
about musical cobblers. To prove that some men are musical cobblers one would first have to argue that some men 
are musical and then give a separate argument that some of these men are cobblers. There are no unitary 
propositions that would count as evidence that someone is or is not a musical cobbler. Similarly, if propositions 
about musical cobblers are used as premises in an argument, they will not be used as propositions about musical 
cobblers. For example, consider a putative demonstration of the (imagined) fact that no musical cobblers are wise: 
Musical cobblers are manual laborers, but no manual laborers are wise, therefore no musical cobblers are wise. Here 
the musicality of the cobblers would be wholly irrelevant; for it is simply qua cobbler that a musical cobbler is a 
manual laborer. Could there be a demonstration that employed both the musicality and the cobblerhood? Perhaps: 
Musical cobblers are busy, busy people cannot acquire wisdom. But here again it is not qua musical cobblers 
specifically that the musical cobblers are busy, but qua people engaged in sets of disparate activities. There’s 
something defective about statements about musical cobblers with respect to their ability to function in our cognitive 
economy. It is worth observing how Aristotle himself proceeds when he needs to record facts that might be 
expressed with sentences like “No musical cobblers are wise”. This situation often arises in the History of Animals 
where he makes observations about what features are and are not found together. Typically instead of writing 
something to the effect that “no musical cobblers are wise” he will write something like “Of men, whichever (ὅσα) 
are cobblers are not wise”. The Organon does not offer any analysis of this form of speech, which preserves a 
unitary term as the subject and introduces two distinct unitary predicates, and must be understood as a sort of 
compound or conditional. Aristotle thinks that conditionals do not function as premises in arguments, but play some 
other role, and are not present in wholly mature bodies of knowledge. 
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Interpretatione puts off the question of how this composition works.14 It is taken up in the 
Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics, and we will have occasion to discuss it in §2.2.2.  
More relevant for our immediate purpose is the sort of multiplicity Aristotle has in mind 
in 8 and how these multiplicities can constitute unities. Here the multiplicity in question is “horse 
and man”. Here the two terms cannot apply to the same subject (at least not at the same time and 
in the same respect), so the contrast case in which the multiplicity constitutes a unity, cannot be 
“biped animal”. Rather, as the context of the passage makes clear, the contrast is cases in which a 
single term is applied non-homonymously to a range of mutually exclusive objects—for 
example, “animal”. Whereas animal applies to men and horses and birds and fish etc., there is no 
term that applies in this way to all and only horses and men.15 
Thus we can think of a concept as a cognition of a multiplicity of things that constitutes a 
non-numerical unity.16 Thus we can reformulate the question of this chapter as follows: 
Does Aristotle think that a set of things must share an identical element or 
characteristic in order to constitute a non-numerical unity of the sort that can 
serve as a term in a proposition?17 
                                                 
14 “Stating why ‘bipedal, footed animal’ is one thing rather than many (for it certainly won’t be one by being spoken 
together) is for another work” (5 17a13-15). 
15 See the texts cited in n. 10, above. 
16 We need to add “non-numerical” before “unity” to exclude, e.g., an individual shoe. If we defined a concept as 
merely as a thought of a multiplicity that constitutes a unity, then the thought of the shoe would qualify as a concept, 
because the shoe is one thing made up of many parts. But the thought of the shoe is unlike a concept, because what 
one thinks about the shoe doesn’t apply to its components individually. For example, the proposition that the shoe is 
comfortable or expensive does not imply that the laces are comfortable or that the sole is expensive. 
17 One might wonder whether the term is (a) the unity comprising the multiplicity, (b) the thought of this unity, or 
(c) the word denoting it; and in most contexts Aristotle does not take care to distinguish between these three, likely 
because he assumes an isomorphism between objects, thoughts, and words that makes the ambiguity benign in most 
contexts. If one wishes to force a choice between the three, one can find some support in the text for each, but no 
answer can be strictly correct to the exclusion of the others. First consider the possibility that ὅροι are linguistic. 
This follows from Aristotle’s definitions of προτάσις, λόγος, and ὅρος; for a ὅρος it is a component of a προτάσις 
(Prior Analytics I.1 24a16), a προτάσις is a type of λόγος (24a16) and a λόγος is a type of φωνὴ (De Interpratione 4 
16b26). However, it is clear that λόγος is not normally limited to linguistic items, and in both parts of the Analytics, 
Aristotle most often treats terms as objects rather than as words. Even here, one might be able to understand “term” 
linguistically, if one took predication to be a linguistic relation, but even if so, terms could not be words simpliciter, 
but words insofar as they signify unitary objects; for we’ve seen that Aristotle recognizes the possibility of a word 
which fails to do this. Since words only signify objects by symbolizing thoughts, a word can only qualify as a term 
qua symbol of a thought, and the logic of his position in several key passages (e.g. Metaphysics Θ.10 1051b22-a4 
and De Anima III.6, 8) suggests that the terms are the thought primarily and words only by extension. There are 
passages in which Aristotle treats objects as terms, but one cannot construe all his talk of terms this way, and it is 
doubtful that a term is ever an object simpliciter. The problem here is clearest in the case of mathematicals, which 
Aristotle regards not as objects in their own right, but as attributes of οὐσίαι regarded as though they were 
independent οὐσίαι. On this view, the terms of mathematical propositions are not objects qua thought about in a 
certain way. Below (in §2.3.3, §2.4, §3.3) I argue that Aristotle understands universality to be in part a matter of 
how we (need to) understand and express beings, rather than a fact about those beings themselves. If it is correct, 
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Given that the vocabulary of “concepts” and “instances” can be translated into Aristotelian idiom 
in this manner, we can use this vocabulary where it aids economy. Thus we can say that Aristotle 
holds that a concept is based on the unity comprised by its instances, and we can ask whether this 
unity consists in the sharing by the instances of a universal. Clearly the answer to this question 
will depend on Aristotle’s conception of the ways in which a multiplicity of things can constitute 
a non-numerical unity.  
 
2.1.2 Five varieties of non-numerical unity recognized by Aristotle 
Aristotle’s corpus contains several discussions of unity—most notably, Metaphysics Δ.6 and I. 
Since sameness is said in as many ways as unity (Δ.9 1018a4), we can add several discussions of 
sameness to our list. These include Topics I.7, Metaphysics Δ.9, and I.3, Parts of Animals I.4 
(with parts of 5) and History of Animals I.1 (486a15-487a1). I will freely alternate between 
discussing unity and sameness, on the premise that multiple things constitute a unity (i.e., are 
one) in any respect in which they are the same and are the same in any respect in which they 
constitute a unity.  
Most of the discussions listed above treat numerical unity, and some treat accidental 
unity. Neither of these types of unity is relevant to our present question. Numerical unity’s 
irrelevance is obvious; accidental unity is irrelevant because Aristotle does not think that 
accidental unities like “white man” can serve as subjects or predicates for unitary affirmations or 
denials. Putting these varieties of unity aside, we have three recurrent varieties of unity and 
                                                                                                                                                             
then, any universal term cannot be an object simpliciter but only insofar as it is thought or expressed in a certain 
manner.  
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sameness which might be taken as possible bases for concepts: unity in form (εἴδει), unity in 
kind (γένει), and unity by analogy.18  
Topics I.7, which recognizes only sameness in number, in form, and in kind, 
distinguishes these three varieties of sameness as follows: 
First of all, one must distinguish in how many ways same is said. One may think 
of the same as divided, in outline, into three parts. For we are accustomed to 
calling {things} the same either in number or in form or in kind: {we call things 
the same} in number which are many by name but are one object (πρᾶγμα)—e.g., 
cloak and coat. {We call the same} in form whatever is many beings 
undifferentiated with respect to form (ὅσα πλείω ὄντα ἀδιάφορα κατὰ τὸ εἶδος), 
as a man is to a man and a horse to a horse; for such things are said to be the same 
in form—whatever falls under the same form (ὅσα ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ ἐστιν).  Similarly 
too, {we call} the same in kind whatever falls under the same kind—e.g., horse 
{comes under the same kind} as man. (103a6-14)19 
As Aristotle’s example indicates, each kind subsumes several different forms. It is clear 
from the Topics and other works that “kind” and “form” do not designate fixed levels in a 
taxonomy. Rather, a given kind may be a form relative to some higher kind, and a given form 
may be a kind relative to some narrower form.20 Thus walking is a form of the kind locomotion, 
which, in turn, is a form of the kind motion (Topics IV.2 122a18-30). Similarly, justice is a form 
of the kind virtue (Topics IV.6 127b18-25), while virtue and its contrary, vice, are members of 
the kind state-of-character (Nicomachean Ethics II.5 1106a12-14). 
However, not every form can be subdivided into further forms: there are “uncuttable 
forms” (ἄτομα εἴδη, traditionally “infimae species”), which cannot be further divided. Man is 
often given as an example of such a form, but it is not entirely clear which (other) forms 
Aristotle regards as uncuttable and why he thinks that they cannot be divided.21 For now it is 
sufficient to note that, uncuttable forms must have some type or degree of unity, which is lacked 
by their superordinate kinds. This is presumably why Aristotle distinguishes between sameness 
                                                 
18 A possibly distinct variety, mentioned in Δ.6 (1016a17-23), is sameness in form of matter, but this seems to be a 
derivative case based on sameness in form, and Aristotle doesn’t often discuss it, so I won’t treat it separately. It is 
sometimes maintained that this sort of unity is identical with unity in kind. 
19 Aristotle seems to regard this list as exhaustive; indeed he argues (103a15-23) that a putative fourth variety of 
sameness is in fact an example of sameness in form. (On this argument see §2.3.1.) The contradiction between this 
passage and Aristotle’s recognition of other forms of sameness in other works can be explained by (and, therefore, 
supports)  the widely held hypothesis that the Topics is an early work.  
20 For the case that “γένος” and “εἴδος” do not denote fixed taxonomic levels in Aristotle’s zoological writings see 
Balme 1962, and Pelligran 1986 and 1987. 
21I discuss one explanation for the uncuttability of forms below in §2.4.2, and defend it in that and the following 
sections. 
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in form and in kind; so, as a working hypothesis, we can suppose that sameness in form is 
exhibited only by the uncuttable forms.  
Classes of things which are not the same in form, may yet constitute a kind, but not every 
group of things constitutes a kind. For example, Aristotle insists that there is no kind subsuming, 
οὐσία, quality, quantity, etc. as forms, and he denies that there is a kind subsuming all and only 
those animals that either fly or swim.22 The members of a kind, then, qualify as members by 
exhibiting a type of unity, lacked by other classes of things. 
It is clear that Aristotle thinks forms and kinds can serve as the subjects and predicates of 
propositions, and therefore there is no doubt that thoughts of them are concepts; for these sorts of 
unities constitute the terms of the demonstrations that constitute an Aristotelian science. There 
are three other sorts of unity recognized by Aristotle that seem also to be able to underwrite 
concepts.  
The first of these, which I’ll call “focal unity”, forms the basis for the concept “being”. 
There is no kind subsuming οὐσία, quality, quantity, etc., but the concept, “being” subsumes 
these as instances. There must be such a concept because being can be the subject of thoughts; 
indeed Metaphysics Γ.2 argues that being qua being is the subject of an entire science. This 
science is possible, Aristotle tells us, because all the things that are called “beings” are so called 
relative to one thing (πρὸς ἕν). In particular, all beings stand in some relation or other to ὀυσία, 
which is a kind, and, because of this relation, they all qualify as beings and as objects of a single 
science.23 
I’ve already mentioned that Aristotle considered analogy a type of unity.  He says that 
two things are one by analogy when they are “related as are two further things” (Metaphysics Δ.6 
1016b35). A common example from the zoological works is feathers and scales, which are to 
one another as bird is to fish.24 Usually a group of analogs will not share a common name, and, 
                                                 
22 Parts of Animals I.4 644a12-16. Presumably this is a reference to the kind “swimmers” which appears in a 
division in Sophist 220b. 
23 I derive the name “focal unity” from Owen’s (1979) phrase “focal meaning”, which was meant to describe the 
type of meaning enjoyed by words like “being” or “health”. I know of no place where Aristotle clearly says that the 
many beings or healthy things constitute some sort of unity, though it is natural to suppose that he would think this. 
In Metaphysics Δ.6 1016b6-8, he does list “relative to something that is one” (πρὸς τι εἶναι ἕν) as one of several 
ways in which something is called a unity, but the context does not make it clear whether he has this sort of case in 
mind. 
24 Parts of Animals I.4 644a20-21. It may be more natural to think of the analogy as holding that feather is to bird as 
scale is to fish, but since proportions alternate, the ways of formulating the relationship are equivalent, and in some 
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in the case of animal classification at least, Aristotle thinks this is for the best.25 This might lead 
us to suppose that analogy cannot provide a basis for concepts, and that, when one affirms 
something about, e.g., blood and its analogue in bloodless animals, one is making two 
affirmations rather than one. However, there seem to be cases of concepts based on analogies, for 
in Metaphysics Λ.3, Aristotle says that the respective instances of “actuality” and “potentiality” 
are one by analogy (1071a5, 33).26 
 A final variety of Aristotelian unity is that exhibited by a succession (ἐφεξῆς), such as 
the number sequence or the figures (triangle, quadrangle, pentagon, etc.). Platonists seem to have 
held that members of successions cannot be united by sharing in a single form, and Aristotle 
exploits this concession in several of his general arguments against the Theory of Forms (or 
applications of it).27 His interest in the distinctive character of successions is not merely 
polemical. On at least three occasions, he tells us that some subject requires special treatment 
because it is a succession.28 Several terms that figure prominently in Aristotle’s thinking denote 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances the (arguably) less natural formulation is preferable because it brings the relation between the 
analogues (bird and fish or feather and scale) to the foreground.   
25 Parts of Animals I.4 644a12-23. 
26 One might have expected metaphysical concepts like “actuality” to be based on focal unity, as “being” is. This 
raises questions about the relation between focal and analogical unity. Perhaps focal and analogical unity are the 
same, perhaps one is a variety  of the other, or perhaps analogical unity is only a sufficient basis for a concept in 
certain contexts in which focal unity is operative. Henn (1999 186) treats the two varieties of unity as identical; 
Wilson (2000) sees them as distinct but related. 
27 Metaphysics Β.3 999a6-13, Nicomachean Ethics I.6 1096a17-23, cf. Eudemian Ethics I.8 1218a1-15. 
28 Consider the following two passages: 
Such, roughly, is the definition that most fits all those called citizens, but we must not forget that 
in cases (πραγμάτων) in which the subjects differ in form, and in which there is a primary and a 
secondary and so on, either nothing at all or hardly anything is common to them as such. But we 
see that constitutions differ in form from one another and that some are posterior and others 
prior… So too [we see that] the citizen  is necessarily different according to each constitution. 
That’s why, while the {citizen} we described is most of all the citizen in a democracy, in the 
others {the definition} may indeed apply, but is surely not necessary. (Politics III.1 1275a33-b5) 
So it is clear that an account of soul can be single in the same way that [an account] of figure too 
will be. For, in the latter case, there is nothing besides the triangle and its successors; neither, in 
the present case, is there a soul besides those mentioned [viz., the nutritive, the perceptive, the 
desiderative, the locomotive, and the rational]. There could be a common account of figures also, 
which would fit all but be peculiar to no one of the figures. Likewise with the aforementioned 
souls. That’s why, in these cases and others, it’s ridiculous to seek a common account, which will 
neither be peculiar to any of the beings, nor in accordance with the proper and uncuttable form, 
{while} passing up such {an account—i.e., one that is peculiar to a being and in accordance with a 
proper and uncuttable form}. The things in accordance with soul are similar to those concerning 
the figures; for in the case both of figures and of ensouled things, the prior always is present in 
potentiality in its successors—e.g., a triangle in a quadrilateral, and the nutritive in the perceptive.  
Therefore, one must investigate, in accordance with each (καθ ἕκαστον), what the soul of each 
is—e.g., what a plant’s [soul] is, and what a man’s is, and a beast’s… So indeed it is clear that that 
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(or were thought by Aristotle to denote) successions. The most notable is “soul”, but in some 
contexts he also treats “good” and “friend” and “citizen” as successions.29 Since Aristotle 
endorses what seem to be unitary affirmations about each of these subjects, it is likely that he 
regarded what we might call “successive unity” as a possible basis for a concept. 
We have, then, five varieties of non-numerical unity, which Aristotle seems to regard as 
distinct from one another,30 and there is some reason to think that he acknowledges concepts 
grounded on each. Whether he is a Moderate Realist about the concepts based on each of these 
varieties of unity is a matter of whether he thinks that the unity consists in or amounts to the 
sharing of an immanent universal.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the account concerning each of these is also the most proper account concerning soul. (De Anima 
II.3 414b20-33, a12-13) 
Unlike the members of a kind, the items in a succession only admit of a common account in a defective manner. 
Either the account is vague and uninformative (like De Anima II.1-2’s “most common account” of soul as “the first 
actuality of a natural body with organs” [412b4ff]), or else it does not quite fit all of the items (like Politics III.1’s 
definition of citizen as a someone with a share in rule [1275a18-32]). Thus a succession seems to constitute a unity 
in a different way, and perhaps to a lesser degree, than a kind. 
29 Good is treated as a succession in Nicomachean Ethics I.6 at 1096a17-23; friend is treated as a succession in 
Eudemian Ethics VII.2, see especially 1236a15-30 and 1236b21-26. 
30 There is some question as to how focal, analogical, and successive unity relate to one another and to unity in form 
and in kind, so it might be doubted that the five are distinct. Aristotle sometimes treats as members of a kind things 
that he elsewhere treats as items in a succession (see Metaphysics Δ.5 1024a36ff, Topics IV.3 123b11 and possibly 
Metaphysics B.3 999a10), and he says things that may imply that the items in a succession must be in the same kind 
(compare Politics III.1 1275a33-b5 with the idea from Metaphysics I.3 and 8 [discussed in §2.2.1.2 below] that 
things that differ in form must be in the same kind). A succession might, then, be thought of either as a special sort 
of kind or as a sort of subgroup of kind-members that does not constitute a form. (This is the view taken by A. C. 
Lloyd [1962 76] and Wilson [2000].) However, Aristotle sometimes speaks of the categories as forming a 
succession (Nicomachean Ethics I.6 1096a22, Metaphysics Λ.1 1069a20ff), and, since the categories are not 
members of a single kind, he cannot have consistently held that the items in a succession must be members of a 
single kind. The idea that the categories form a succession suggests a close connection between successive, focal, 
and analogical unity. (This suggestion might take some support from Eudemian Ethics VII.2, which uses terms and 
premises usually associated with succession to argue that there is a focal unity amongst forms of friendship. This 
may tempt us to simply identify focal and successive unity.) But the identification of the two sorts of unity leads to 
some problematic consequences. Since an item in a succession contains in potentiality its predecessors, quality and 
quantity would need to contain οὐσία in potentiality, and it is not clear whether any sense can be made of this 
notion. The connections between these sorts of unity is, then, complicated and worthy of study. Wilson 2000 is the 
only book-length study of this issue of which I am aware. He maintains that focal, analogical, and successive unity 
are themselves united by successive unity, but little argument is offered for this integrative thesis and less for the 
idea that Aristotle regarded the types of unity in this way. 
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2.1.3 Moderate Realism and the five varieties 
It is forms that people most often have in mind when they speak of Aristotle’s belief in 
immanent universals; and, of the five varieties of unity and sameness, there is the most reason to 
think that sameness in form consists in the sharing of immanent universals. A central doctrine in 
Aristotle’s physical works and in the Metaphysics is that each perceptible οὐσία—each, man, 
horse, plant, etc.—is a composite of matter (which is potentially the οὐσία) and form (which 
causes the composite to actually be the οὐσία it is). It is no coincidence that the same word, 
“εἶδος”, is used both for that in virtue of which a given οὐσία  actually is what it is, and for the 
species which we would have to name in stating what the οὐσία is. Callias’ matter is not, in its 
own right, either Callias or a member of the species man; in making Callias what he is, his form 
(εἶδος) makes him a member of the species (εἶδος). It’s natural to suppose that the form does this 
by being an identical characteristic or element in all the members of the species and that the 
members differ from one another only in their matter. Aristotle appears to commit himself to 
precisely this in Metaphysics Z.8 when he writes of Socrates and Callias that: 
while they are different because of the matter (for it’s different), they are the same 
in form (for the form is uncuttable). (1034a7-8) 
Thus the traditional interpretation of Aristotelian forms as immanent universals is quite 
plausible, even compelling. Nevertheless, there are reasons for doubting it, and a growing 
number of scholars have come to view forms as particulars rather than universals (though they 
do not all mean the same thing in doing this). I will defend a version of this view in §2.3. 
Kind-concepts predominate our vocabulary and figure prominently in science, so the 
question of whether Aristotle thinks that these concepts are based on immanent universals is at 
least as important to the question of whether he is, on the whole, a Moderate Realist as is the 
corresponding question about form-concepts. If one thinks of forms as universals, then the most 
obvious way to explain sameness-in-kind is to employ the same technique used in the case of 
sameness-in-form. Just as perceptible οὐσίαι are analyzed into universal and particular elements, 
one might analyze a given form into a universal element that it shares with other members of its 
kind and another element which differentiates it from the other kind-members. Aristotle’s 
endorsement of the method of definition by genus and differentia (i.e., by kind and difference) 
might be taken to suggest that an Aristotelian kind is some identical element existing in each of 
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its forms.  In §2.2, I argue that Aristotle has a quite different understanding of the relation 
between a kind and its forms, one that is incompatible with any variety of Realism.   
There is less initial plausibility to the idea that analogical, focal, or successive unities 
consist in the sharing of immanent universals. It would be difficult for Realist interpretations of 
these types of unity to avoid collapsing the distinction between them and sameness in kind. 
Moreover, in the cases of focal unity and succession, Aristotle is quite clear that the unified 
things needn’t share any common characteristics.31 This needn’t trouble the standard interpreter 
much,  since Aristotle treats these sorts of unity as unusual and sees them as posing particular 
philosophical challenges. If the Moderate Realist interpretation fails in just these cases, they may 
be the exceptions that prove the rule. It is to kinds and forms that we must look to assess the 
merits of the Moderate Realist interpretation. 
2.1.4 Aristotle’s generic sense of “universal” 
When considering which, if any, of Aristotle’s varieties of unity involve the sharing of immanent 
universals, we are using “universal” in the “brand-name” sense to denote the things Realist 
theories posit as proper objects and bases for concepts. I suggested earlier (in §1.3.2) that 
Aristotle used the word “universal” primarily in a more generic sense. My reasons for thinking 
this will become clear as we proceed. At this point, however, I can note that he regards forms 
and kinds and sometimes analogous, successive, and focal groupings as universals. The evidence 
we will encounter below that sameness in form or kind does not require the existence of realist 
universals will confirm my identification of his “καθόλου” with the generic sense of our 
“universal”. 
As an advance on this argument, however, it is possible to point now to a passage to 
which I’ll return later.  
It is not necessary that there be forms or some one thing besides the many if there 
is to be demonstration; however it is necessary that it be true to state one thing of 
many; for there will not be a universal if this is not so, and if there is not a 
universal, there will not be a middle, so that there won’t be a demonstration. 
Therefore, there must be some one and the same thing applying to many non-
homonymously. (Posterior Analytics I.11 75a5-9) 
                                                 
31 Though, see Owens (1951 274) for a Moderate Realist account of focal unity. 
 68 
Notice that here Aristotle treats the existence of a universal as dependent on its being true 
to state one thing of many. This is precisely the opposite of what we would expect if universal 
were being used in the Realist sense. Realist Universals are grounds for something’s being 
predicable of many, so predicability is supposed to depend on the existence of such universals. 
Aristotle is in this passage at least using “universal” in a quite thin sense. If it is the case that one 
thing can be truly predicated of others—whatever the basis for this turns out to be—then, there is 
thereby a universal. Of course, this usage doesn’t show that Aristotle isn’t a Realist. He may hold 
that the basis for universality in this sense is the existence of an immanent universal. It shows 
merely that his use of the term universal does not commit him to any such thesis. 
The contemporary usage of “universal”, even in its generic sense, differs from Aristotle’s 
usage in at least one important respect. Today universal and particular are often treated as 
contradictories, or at least as constituting a mutually exclusive and often jointly exhaustive 
division of some domain. Call this the “taxonomic conception”. It is often assumed that Aristotle 
must have regarded universality in this way. For example, Sykes argues that Aristotle’s 
definition of the universal as that which is predicated of many and of the particular as that which 
is not commits him to “a dichotomy between particular and universal which appears to be both 
exclusive and exhaustive”.32 But this cannot be right, because Aristotle never hesitates to call 
things particular that he elsewhere calls universal,33 and he happily uses comparative phrases 
like “most universal”, which would be inapplicable if universal was one of a pair of 
contradictories.34  
As Aristotle uses the terms, universal and particular are contraries rather than 
contradictories, and more exactly they’re relatives like “parent” and “child”. To be a universal is 
to be predicated of some multiplicity, and the thing is universal relative to that multiplicity, with 
each of the multiple things being particular relative to it. This general usage is consistent with 
Aristotle occasionally using “particular” in a more restricted way to refer to that which is not 
predicated of any multiplicity at all (as he, perhaps, does at De Interpretation 7 17a39-b2)—
                                                 
32 Sykes 1975 313. Cf. Albritton 1957 n.2. 
33 For example: health, sickness, justice, injustice, courage and cowardice are each called καθ’ ἕκαστα in Categories 
10 (13b37), fire and earth in Metaphysics Λ.1 (1069a29), and isosceles and scalene in Posterior Analytics I.5 
(74a25-30). In De Anima I.1 (402b6-7), dog, man, and horse are καθ’ ἕκαστα, but, in II.4 (414b32), man, plant, and 
beast are καθ’ ἕκαστα. For further discussion, see Cooper  (1986 28-31) and Owens (1981c 64-5). 
34 Metaphysics B.12 999a21-2, cf. Posterior Analytics I.2 72a4. 
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stretching terminology is par for the course for Aristotle.35 And of course, universal’s being a 
relative, does not prevent Aristotle for making claims about what holds of universals as such 
without making specific reference to the multiplicities relative to which they are universal, just 
as parent’s being a relative doesn’t prevent us from saying, e.g., that all parents are over seven 
years old. 
The difference between Aristotle here and the contemporary view is a function of the 
advent of the predicate calculus where the distinction between universal maps neatly on to the 
difference between the subjects represented by lower case letters and the predicates represented 
by capital letters. A universal is a predicate and a predicate is a different type of thing than a 
subject. For Aristotle too, a universal is a predicate, but since he has a term logic in which the 
same term can play the role of subject in one proposition and predicate in another, he regards 
universality too as relative. 
Aristotle does, however, have informal terminology that approximates to the taxonomic 
senses of “universal” and “particular”. He distinguishes “suches” from “thises”.36 A this is an 
individual entity and a such is a way that an entity is—a way in which some other entity might 
also be. In Metaphysics Z.13 (1039a1) he tells us that all universals or “common predicates” 
signify “suches” rather than “thises”.37 Suchness unlike (Aristotelian) universality does not 
admit of degrees. 
                                                 
35 Elsewhere, Aristotle uses a more precise idiom to refer to the things that De Interpretatione 7 treats as particulars: 
It’s clear, then, that some beings are not said by their natures (πέφυκε) of any others; for nearly 
each of the perceptible things is such as not to be predicable of anything, except by accident; for 
sometimes we say that this white [man] is Socrates and the approaching [man] is Callias.  (Prior 
Analytics I.27 43a32-6) 
This passage also sheds light on the use of πέφυκε in the De Interpretation’s definition of universal. The contrast the 
term makes is between natural and accidental predication (on which cf. Posterior Analytics I.22). It needn’t, then, be 
taken to imply that universals have a nature in any more robust sense than is required to make sense of this contrast. 
36 See Metaphysics B.6  1003a9-12, Z.13 1039a1-6, Posterior Analytics I.31 87b28-30. 
37 It is worth noting however, that he does not say the converse that all suches are universals, and it is not clear that 
he would hold this, for being “such as Socrates is” (i.e., white, a man, snub-nosed, ironic, etc.) may qualify as a 
such, though it lacks the unity necessary to qualify to be a predicate and a fortiori to be a universal. 
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2.2 ARISTOTLE’S REJECTION OF MODERATE REALISM ABOUT KINDS 
Kinds are the paradigm examples of universals in Aristotle’s generic sense.38 What would it 
mean for them to be universals in the “brand name” Realist sense and specifically to be  
immanent universals? An immanent universal is a qualitatively identical element or 
characteristic that exists, independently of the mind, in a number of different existents and can be 
abstracted by context-omission from their other (differing) characteristics and so serve as the 
proper object for a concept subsuming all the existents as instances. A kind, by contrast, is, in its 
most literal sense, a group or family of things, and a group cannot as such be an element or 
characteristic of its individual members. Clearly, then, in asking whether a kind is an immanent 
universal, we cannot be thinking of the kind primarily as the group. In fact, Aristotle defines 
kind, not as a type of group, but as a predicate:  
A kind is what is predicated in the what-it-is of many things which are different in 
form. (Topics I.5 102a32-1) 
The question of what a predicate ultimately is for Aristotle is just the Problem of 
Concepts as it applies to him. For Aristotle to be a Moderate Realist about kinds would be for 
him to take this predicate to be a characteristic that exists identically in each of the forms. This 
immanent universal would then be the basis for each form’s being a member of the kind 
(considered as a group). In asking whether kinds are immanent universals, we are asking whether 
predication and kind-membership are to be explained in this way. 
 
 
2.2.1 Zoological kinds 
Aristotle’s most extensive discussions of kinds and their the relationship to forms are found in 
the Metaphysics I, Parts of Animals I.4, and History of Animals I.1. As is often the case with 
topics treated in both the Metaphysics and the zoological treatises, the Metaphysics’ discussion is 
more abstract and (as Aristotle would say) more intelligible by nature, while the zoological 
                                                 
38 For example, Metaphysics B.3 998b14-33. 
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discussions are more concrete and, therefore, more intelligible to us. For this reason, I will 
introduce Aristotle’s conception of kinds through a discussion of zoological kinds (in §2.2.1) 
before turning (in §2.2.2) to the general account of the kind-form relation in Metaphysics I.  
By “zoological kinds”, I mean kinds of animals and of animal parts, behaviors, etc.—kinds 
whose study is part of the study of animals. We can begin our discussion of these kinds with a 
passage from Parts of Animals I.4 in which Aristotle rejects a proposed kind embracing flying 
and swimming animals. 
Nevertheless, they are correctly defined in this way {viz. without a wider kind 
subsuming them}. For, while, of kinds, whatever differs in accordance with 
degree and the more and the less has been yoked together under one kind, 
whatever is analogous {has been kept} separate. I mean, for example, that bird 
differs from bird by more or by degree (for one has long feathers, another short 
feathers), while fish differs from bird by analogy (for what is feather in one is 
scale in the other). (644a16-23) 
It is striking that in this passage Aristotle treats kinds as manmade groupings, and I will return to 
this point in Chapter 4. What matters for our present purposes, however, is the more-and-less 
relationship between the forms of a kind. This relationship is elaborated in History of Animals 
I.1, where Aristotle contrasts sameness in form with sameness in kind: 
While some animals have all their parts the same as one another, some {animals 
have} different (ἕτερα) {parts}. Some of the parts are the same in form. E.g., a 
man’s nose and eye are the same as {another} man’s nose and eye, and {a man’s} 
flesh {is the same} as {another man’s} flesh, and {a man’s} bone {is the same} as 
{another man’s} bone, and the same goes for horse and the other animals—
whichever ones we call the same as one another in form; for as the whole is to the 
whole, likewise each of the parts is to each {of the parts}. In other cases the 
{animals} are indeed the same but they differ with respect to excess and defect, 
whenever the kind is the same. By “kind,” I mean, e.g., bird and fish; for each of 
these has difference with respect to kind, and there are many forms of fishes and 
birds. But, roughly {speaking}, the majority of the parts differ in themselves by 
oppositions of their affections—e.g., color and figure—one thing being affected 
more in a way that another is affected less (τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον αὐτὰ πεπονθέναι τὰ δ’ 
ἧττον); still, {other parts differ} by multiplicity and fewness, and by largeness 
smallness, and, generally, by excess and defect. For some {animals} are soft-
fleshed in the same {parts} in which others are hard-fleshed (τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι 
μαλακόσαρκα αὐτῶν τὰ δὲ σκληρόσαρκα), and some have a long beak and others 
a short one, and some are many-feathered and some few-feathered. Furthermore, 
even amongst these very {animals}, some differ in having different parts (ἔνιά γε 
καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἕτερα ἑτέροις μόρια ὑπάρχει)—e.g., some have spurs while others 
do not, and some have crests while others do not. But, so to speak, most parts, and 
the ones out of which the entire mass is composed, are either the same or differ by 
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opposition and by excess and defect—for we can count the more and the less as a 
sort of excess and defect. (486a15-b17) 
A hawk, then, is the same in kind, though not in form, as a duck, and the hawk’s various 
parts—its beak, feathers, legs, etc.—are the same in kind with the corresponding parts of the 
duck. Qua same-in-kind, the hawk and duck (and their respective parts) differ in the more and 
the less—i.e., in the degrees of their various characteristics.39 These more-and-less differences 
include differences in the shapes and sizes of the birds’ parts, and differences in the parts’ color, 
texture, location, composition, etc. The birds’ activities, characters, and lifestyles (βίοι) also 
differ by the more-and-the-less. For example, hawks fly higher and swifter than ducks, and the 
different birds fly by subtly different motions.40 
If we follow this line of thought through, it seems unlikely that there is any respect in 
which all and only birds—or, in general, all and only the forms of any kind—are exactly alike. 
More importantly, even if it happens that all forms of bird share some exactly identical 
characteristic, Aristotle gives us little reason to think that this is what makes them constitute a 
kind. He does say that a kind has “both a single common nature and forms that are not too far 
apart” (644b3), but this nature too must differ in the more and the less from form to form; for 
Aristotle finds more-and-less differences even in characteristics, like flying, which he tells us are 
part of the οὐσία of bird (693b12). If one removes all the characteristics in which Aristotle thinks 
birds differ in the more and the less, one is left with no remaining characteristics that could 
constitute the common bird-nature.41 Thus the unity of the kind bird must lie, not in some 
identical characteristic shared by birds, but rather in something about the way in which birds 
differ from one another. 
                                                 
39 Lennox 1985 and 1987b contain extensive and illuminating analysis of sameness-in-kind and the more-and-less 
relationship in the zoology and on the relationship between the zoology and the central books of the Metaphysics. I 
draw heavily on his account throughout §2. For a different interpretation of sameness in kind, see Charles 2000, 
Chapter 12. 
40 Parts of Animals IV.12 693b28-a8 tells us that characteristics of wings vary according to whether the birds fly and 
that different birds fly for different reasons, some because they’re predators and others to escape danger or to 
migrate. This and other differences leads to different ways of flying. Predatory birds fly with their legs drawn up 
into bellies, ready to grasp at prey (694b25), but longer-legged, marsh-dwelling birds stretch their legs out behind 
them in flight to compensate for their shorter tail feathers (694b19-20 cf. History of Animals II.12 504a32-4 and 
Progression of Animals 10 710a3-b3). See also, Parts of Animals IV.13 on the differing movements and parts by 
which the different forms of fish swim, and History of Animals VII 588a16ff (especially a25, b8, b22, and 589a1) 
and VIII 606a11-20, b1-18. 
41 On the possibility that the single nature could be a common matter from which all birds are formed see below 
§2.3.1. 
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We can bring out this point by contrasting Aristotle’s view on sameness-in-kind with the 
Socratic View of Concepts.42 Recall the following passage from the Meno (72b-c): 
Socrates: …if, when I asked what the ὀυσία of bees is, you said that they are 
many and varied, what would you reply to me, if I asked you: “Do you claim that 
they are many and varied and differ from one another in being bees (τῷ μελίττας 
εἶναι)? Or do they not differ at all (οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν) in this way but in some 
other way—such as in their beauty or their size or in some other such way?” Do 
tell, what would you answer when questioned in this way? 
Meno: That’s {what} I {would say}, that they do not differ at all from each other 
in their being bees. 
Socrates: If, after this, I said “Then, tell me, Meno, this thing itself, in which they 
do not differ at all but are wholly the same (ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι), what do you 
claim it is?”, perhaps you would have something to say to me? 
Meno: I would. 
If Aristotle thinks that bees are one in form,43 he might answer Socrates’ questions as Meno 
does. But Socrates would expect the same sort of answer to the corresponding questions about 
birds and fish. In these cases, Aristotle would have to answer differently. There need be no 
respect in which all birds are “wholly the same and don’t differ at all from one another”. 
Aristotle seems to think that birds exhibit more-and-less differences from one another in every 
respect relevant to their being birds. If there is no identical characteristic shared by all and only 
birds, then there is no Socratic Form of bird—no immanent universal that can serve as a the 
proper object for the concept “bird”.  
When we move from the zoology to the metaphysics, as we will in earnest in the next 
section, we can see Aristotle repeatedly and explicitly contradicting Socratic position. For 
example, where Socrates expected the instances of concepts to share some “thing itself, in which 
                                                 
42 See §1.2.2. 
43 Whether he does is not clear. In History of Animals V.22 (554b8-22), Aristotle briefly discusses different bees 
from different regions and he may intend these to be forms of bee, in which case bee would be a kind rather than an 
uncuttable form. Aristotle does not refer to these different sorts of bee as forms, and most likely he does not regard 
them as such because he elsewhere attributes these sorts of differences to differences in diet (624b28-31). 
Interestingly, in the same chapter, he speaks of there being several kinds of bees, where he has in mind the 
difference between, e.g., drones and workers. If these differences are due to material factors (as Aristotle thinks the 
difference between male and female is) then they would qualify as distinct kinds in the relevant sense. But Aristotle 
does find it remarkable that such different bees are generated by the same parents, and he may think of bee as a kind 
with drone and worker as its forms (or sub-kinds). 
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they do not differ at all but are wholly the same”, Metaphysics I.8 defines a kind as a same thing 
which is non-accidentally different. He continues: 
not only must the common {thing} belong—e.g., both are animals—but this same 
animal must be other for each—e.g., horse for this one, but man for that one. 
(1057b38-a4) 
In taking this stand and rejecting the position assumed by Socrates in the Meno, Aristotle rejects 
Moderate Realism about zoological kinds, and indeed about kinds generally—he rejects the view 
that (e.g.) birds constitute a kind by possessing some characteristic in which they do not 
(qualitatively) differ at all. 
Of course there are many characteristics which are (and were recognized by Aristotle to 
be) shared by all birds. Birds all have a head, a beak, two wings, two legs, feathers, etc. But each 
of these shared features is the same only in kind. Feather, for example, is itself a kind, with each 
form of bird having its own form of feather, which differs from other feathers in breadth, color, 
texture, oiliness, numerousness, etc. The same is true for all the significant features common to 
birds. Far from being identical characteristics shared by all birds, these are the very respects in 
which each form of bird differs from the rest. And, just as we need to account for how it is that 
the many differing forms of bird are all birds, we need to account for how their many differing 
forms of feather or beaks are all feathers or beaks. Aristotle refuses to give the answer Socrates 
would have demanded. We have seen that he denies that there need be any characteristic in 
which the members of a kind do not differ at all. In the next section we’ll see that he has deep 
reasons for this. 
For now we can conclude that Aristotle must conceive of the characteristics possessed by 
birds or feathers in general as ranges within which (or axes along which) the specific 
characteristics of each form fall. He implies this when he tells us that part of what makes several 
forms constitute a kind is that they are “not too distant” (Parts of Animals I.4 644a3). Such 
ranges cannot qualify as an immanent universals for two reasons. First, it is doubtful that 
something’s length (i.e., its merely being long) can be distinguished from how long it is, in the 
way that an immanent universal was supposed to be distinguishable from the “individuating 
notes” that accompany it in an individual. More importantly, however, even if length were an 
immanent universal, it would provide a basis for the concept “length” (or maybe “long thing”) 
but not for the concept “feather”. It is not length in general that is characteristic of feathers but 
only a certain range of lengths, and even if we supposed that length-as-such could be found in 
 75 
each long thing by an act of analysis, the range-as-a-whole would not be present in each of the 
items within it and could not be abstracted from any one of the items taken in isolation.  
Of course, neither length nor feather-length is likely to be put forward as the immanent 
universal corresponding to the concept “feather”. I focus on length because the point about 
ranges is easiest to see in this case. What holds for length holds also for all of the general 
characteristics of feather, including those (e.g. shape and function) that are more likely to be 
identified with the Socratic form of feather. All these characteristics are ranges, and ranges are 
unlike immanent universals ontologically and epistemologically.  Thus there can be no Socratic 
form of feather; and, in general, there can be no immanent universals corresponding to concepts 
of Aristotelian zoological kinds. 
2.2.2 Kinds as determinables 
The relationship that holds between Aristotelian kinds and their forms is well expressed by a set 
of terms popularized in 20th Century logic by W. E. Johnson.44 A kind is a determinable of 
which its forms are determinates. Johnson explains the distinction as follows:  
                                                 
44 The idea that Aristotelian kinds are determinables is now relatively common, though I do not think that its full 
significance is often appreciated. To my knowledge Granger (1980 and 1992) was the first to describe the kind-form 
relation in Johnson’s terminology. My position differs from Granger’s in two important respects: (1) Granger thinks 
that Aristotle “treats the genus as though it were a determinable of its differentiae,” without having “a clear idea of 
the determinable-determinate relation” (1992 82), but I see no reason to think that Johnson’s or Granger’s idea of the 
relation is any clearer than Aristotle’s. As I argue below, Aristotle makes every essential point about the relation that 
Johnson does. (2) I disagree with Granger’s thesis that the determinable-determinate conception of the genus-
differentia relation is the last of three incompatible views of the relation that Aristotle held during different periods 
of his career. The three views are: (i) that the genus is an οὐσία and the differentia an attribute, with the genus being 
the more “important” element in the definition, (ii) that the genus and differentia are both attributes and of equal 
importance, (iii) that the genus is a determinable attribute of which the differentia is a determination and that the 
differentia is the more important element in the definition. In fact there is no conflict between the texts that Granger 
takes to belong to these different stages (many of which he finds only lines apart from one another). A genus marks 
out a class of οὐσίαι by a determinable attribute, and a differentia is a determination of that attribute. The appearance 
of conflict is caused by engaging in vague talk about the “importance” the different parts of the definition and by 
ignoring Categories 5 3b18-21 where Aristotle tells us that a secondary οὐσία (i.e. a kind or form) signifies neither a 
τόδε τι nor a quality simplicitor, but rather a quality that marks off an οὐσία or an οὐσία of certain qualification. Not 
only is there no conflict that needs to be explained away by Granger’s dubious developmental thesis, but adopting 
the thesis would force us to conclude that there are serious logical problems with Aristotle’s metaphysical project. 
Had Aristotle rejected the premise that a genus and its differentia fall in different categories, he would have 
undermined his argument that being and unity cannot be γένη, for that argument turns on the premise that a genus 
cannot be said of its differentiae (Metaphysics B.3 998b21-27). The idea that being and unity are not genera, is 
central to Aristotle’s metaphysical enterprise, and to his reasons for asking the questions that lead him to the 
determinable-determination view of the genus-differentia relationship. 
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I propose to call such terms as colour and shape determinables in relation to such 
terms as red and circular which will be called determinates; and, in introducing 
this new terminology, to examine the distinction between the relation of red to 
color and the relation of Plato to man... 
{W}e have, then, to contrast the significance of the relation ‘belonging to’ when 
applied in one case to a determinate and its determinable and in the other to an 
individual and its class. If it is asked why a number of different individuals are 
said to belong to the same class, the answer is that all these different individuals 
are characterized by the same adjective or combination of adjectives.45 But can 
the same reason be given for grouping red, yellow and green (say) in one class 
under the name colour? What is most prominently notable about red, green, and 
yellow is that they are different, and even, as we may say, opponent to one 
another; is there any (secondary) adjective which analysis would reveal as 
characterizing these different (primary) adjectives? In my view, there is no such 
(secondary) adjective; in fact, the several colours are put into the same group and 
given the same name colour, not on the ground of any partial agreement, but on 
the ground of the special kind of difference which distinguishes one colour from 
another; whereas no such difference exists between a colour and a shape. Thus red 
and circular are adjectives between which there is no relation except that of non-
identity or otherness; whereas red and blue, besides being related as non-identical, 
have a relation which can properly be called a relation of difference, where 
difference means more than mere otherness. What is here true of colour is true of 
shape, pitch, feeling-tone, pressure and so on: the ground for grouping 
determinates under one and the same determinable is not any partial agreement 
between them that could be revealed by analysis, but the unique and peculiar kind 
of difference that subsists between the several determinates under the same 
determinable, and which does not subsist between any one of them and an 
adjective under some other determinable. If this is granted, the relations asserted 
in the two propositions ‘Red is a colour’ and ‘Plato is a man,’ though formally 
equivalent, must yet be contrasted on the ground that the latter but not the former 
is based on an adjectival predication. For the latter is equivalent to predicating 
‘human’ of ‘Plato,’ while, without denying that some adjectives may properly be 
predicated of (the adjective) red, yet the proposition ‘Red is a colour’ is not 
equivalent to predicating any adjective of red. (Johnson 1921 174-6)46  
                                                 
45 By “adjective”, Johnson means the predicate of a proposition, as opposed to subject (which he calls 
“substantive”). When I speak of kinds as determinables, I mean kinds-qua-characteristics. To say that a kind is a 
determinable is equivalent to saying that the characteristic(s) in virtue of which forms belong to the kind-qua-group 
is a determinable, determined differently in the kind’s different forms. This is in keeping with the way that Aristotle 
treats kinds and forms in Categories 5 (see previous note). 
46 Interestingly, Johnson thinks that: 
The distinction and connection between substantive and adjective correspond to—and, in my 
view, explain—the distinction and connection between particular and universal. Ultimately a 
universal means an adjective that may characterize a particular, and a particular means a 
substantive that may be characterized by a universal. The terms particular (or substantive) and 
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There are three key points  that we should take from the Johnson passage; I will label 
them J1-J3: 
J1. Certain things are not merely other than one another—as blue is other than 
both loud and inflation—but are different from, or “opponent to” one 
another, as blue is different from red.  
J2. Things that differ from one another in this way can, on the basis of this 
difference, be grouped together as alternative determinates of a single 
determinable. 
J3. The grouping of determinates of a single determinable together is not based 
on any qualitatively identical characteristic that is shared by each determinate 
and revealed by an analysis of it. 
J3 is implicit in J1 and J2, and it captures the difference between determinables and immanent 
universals—the difference between Aristotelian kinds and Socratic forms. This point is easily 
illustrated if one keeps in mind that the determinable-determinate relationship can be iterated. 
Red is a determinate of color, and scarlet a determinate of red. In the last section, I entertained 
the possibility that a widest determinable (e.g., length or color) is an immanent universal and 
suggested thinking of it as an axis that it could somehow be discovered by an analysis of the 
items situated along it. But even if we allow that color is an immanent universal shared by red 
and blue, red will still not be a second immanent universal shared by scarlet and crimson and 
discoverable by analysis of them. Thus the concept “red” cannot be formed by context-omission 
and there must be some other process by which it is formed.47 Once we admit the existence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
universal (or adjective) cannot be defined as functioning in isolation, but only as they enter into 
union with one another. (11)  
He goes on to attribute the idea that particulars lack character to a confusion between an epistemological and a 
metaphysical sense of “characterize”. 
47 In the literature on determinables one finds the points that a determinate cannot be understood as a conjunction of 
the determinable and some other feature and that the determinate cannot, therefore, be analyzed into the 
determinable and this other component as bachelor can (supposedly) be analyzed into “man” and “unmarried”. 
However, neither this literature nor the literature on Aristotelian kinds (insofar as it recognizes them as 
determinables) has much to say about the logical or psychological operation by which we comprehend a 
determinable. In both literatures determinables are often characterized as “disjunctive” (Sellars 1961b 26, Armstrong 
1978b 119-20, Balme 1987c 304-527 n.1, Sanford 2000). This creates an impression that one thinks of a 
determinable by thinking disjunctively of its various determinations, e.g. that to think “red” is to think “scarlet or 
crimson or Cherokee red or ...”, but this clearly cannot be right. First, this gives determinable thoughts a complex, 
disjointed character that they introspectively lack. More importantly, such disjunctive strings could never exhaust 
determinables like length, which cannot be resolved into discrete uncuttable units. Similarly, in the case of color, 
though it may ultimately be resolvable into discrete, uncuttable shades, one clearly does not form the concept 
“color” (or a concept of a particular color) by disjoining each shade singly; for, as Hume famously pointed out, one 
can form the concept “blue,” even if there are shades of blue that one has not seen (Essay Concerning Human 
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such a process, it is natural to suppose that “color” also was formed by it. This supposition is 
more economical than positing two distinct processes of concept-formation, and it remains 
doubtful that even “color” could be formed by context-omission.  
As we will see in a moment, Aristotle commits himself to J1 and J2 about kinds in 
Metaphysics Ι. Since these two points define the determinable-determinate relation, there is no 
anachronism in saying that Aristotelian kinds are determinables. Indeed, we can go further, 
since, as we’ll see, Aristotle took these points to define what it is to be a kind, we ought to 
recognize Aristotle as the originator of this distinction.48 
J1, the distinction between otherness and difference, can be found in Metaphysics Ι.3-4: 
But difference (διαφορὰ) and otherness (ἑτερότης) are distinct (ἄλλο). For, while 
the other and that which it is other than are not necessarily other in something (for 
everything that is some being is either other or the same), the different differs 
from something in something, so that it’s necessary for there to be something the 
same in which they differ. This same thing is a kind or form; for every different 
thing differs either {i} in kind or {ii} in form: {i} in kind, those things of which 
the matter is not common and there is not coming-to-be into one another 
(ἄλληλα)—e.g., whatever is in another (ἄλλο) figure of predication; {ii} in form 
those things whose kind is the same (kind meaning that same thing which both of 
the different things are said to be with respect to οὐσία). 
Contraries are different, and contrariety is a certain difference. The rightness of 
this supposition is clear from induction; for all are evidently different and they are 
not merely other—rather, in some cases, the kind is other and, in other cases, it’s 
in the same column of predication, so that they’re in the same kind and are the 
same-in-kind. (It’s distinguished in other works {what is} the same or other in 
kind.) Since the differing things can differ from one another in the more and the 
less, there is some greatest difference, and I call this contrariety. It is clear from 
induction that contrariety is the greatest difference. For, while things that differ in 
kind do not have a way to one another (rather, they keep entirely apart and are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Understanding 20-21).  Clearly, then, the formation of these concepts must involve a projection, from a set of  
discrete instances, of the entire range, as a single whole. There is an interesting discussion of this issue, though in 
different terms, in Rand 1990 (cf. Peikoff 1991 Chapter 4 and Gotthelf 2003). Gotthelf explores the relation between 
Rand and Aristotle’s views of concepts in his 2005. In his 2002, he discusses both views, and that of Locke, in light 
of the literature on determinables. However this paper pays little attention to the issue that I am taking pains here to 
stress (and on which I find Rand’s account valuable), namely the logical and/or psychological operation(s) by which 
determinables are conceptualized. Consequently, in that paper, Gotthelf treats concepts of determinables along 
essentially Realist lines, whereas I am arguing that concepts of determinables do not admit of Realist analysis. 
48 Johnson’s conception of determinables and their determinates almost certainly derives from the closely related 
scholastic conception of determinables and their determinants, which they thought of as deriving from Aristotle. On 
the relation between Johnson’s view and the Scholastics’  see A. N. Prior 1949 and the references therein. The 
details of this history need not concern us here. Johnson did initiate a renewed discussion of the relation and drew 
attention to features of it that had been under-emphasized by the scholastic tradition. It is these very features that, 
I’m arguing, make it incompatible with Moderate Realism. 
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incommensurable), comings-to-be for things that differ in form are from 
contraries as extremes; and the distance between extremes is greatest, so that 
between contraries must be as well. (1054b22-a12 cf. 1018a9-15) 
It is clear that “kind” is being used here in the same sense as it appears in the zoological 
passages discussed in the last section; for Aristotle tells us here that the differences between 
kind-members are “in the more and the less” (1055a3).49 And the reference to contrariety as the 
limiting case of difference makes it clear that such things stand in the same sort of “opponent” 
relation described by Johnson. Before we can take much more from this passage, however, it is 
necessary to deal with a confusing inconsistency in its terminology. 
Initially, Aristotle seems to say that, for two things to differ (as opposed to being merely 
other), they must be the same in some respect, either in form or in kind, and that  the respect in 
which the things are the same is the very respect in which they differ. For example: unlike the 
relationship between red and sweet, which is mere otherness, the relationship between red and 
blue is one of difference, because there is a respect in which red and blue differ. The respect, of 
course, is color; so, red and blue are the same in that they are both colors and it is color in which 
they differ. Since color is the kind, red and blue differ by being the same in kind. Since this same 
kind is the respect in which red and blue differ, they can be said to “differ in kind”. This is a 
quite different sense of “differ in kind” from the one that would be the contrary of “same in 
kind”; for it is only things that are the same-in-kind (i.e., things of the same kind) that can differ-
in-kind (i.e., have their same kind serve as the respect in which they differ). If understood in this 
way, the terminology is confusing but coherent. However this coherency breaks down when 
Aristotle explains what he means by things that differ in form and in kind. We would expect, 
e.g., man and horse (two forms of the kind animal) as examples of things that differ in kind, and 
two men as examples of things that differ in form. Instead, he tells us that the things that differ in 
form are “those things whose kind is the same” (e.g., man and horse); and, as an example of 
things that differ in kind he gives us “things whose figure of predication isn’t the same”—
presumably, members of different categories. So, by the end of the passage “different in kind” 
                                                 
49 Also in  H.2 (1042b25) Aristotle also speaks of the excess-and-defect in the way that forms of a kind differ, 
though it is not absolutely clear whether he means to say that the forms themselves differ in this way or, as Ross 
(1924b 229) thinks, only that their perceptible affections do. Rorty (1974 75-6) argues in support of Ross’ reading 
by picking up on one of the examples in the passage and asking: “How could a lintel be said to differ from a 
threshold in respect of more and less?” The answer is simple. Aristotle has just told us that a lintel differs in position 
from a threshold. This amounts to the lintel’s being higher up—i.e., more distant from the ground.   
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seems to mean “in different kinds” and “different in form” seems to mean “in different forms”. 
But this is a poor fit with the passage, according to which things cannot differ unless they have 
something in common. What is it that the members of two different categories have in common 
in virtue of which they differ?  
In short, it is unclear whether, in this passage, the locution “difference in X” (where X 
stands for “form” or “kind”), refers (a) to the relation between two differing members of a single 
X or (b) to the relation between two different Xs. The two interpretative options make the 
passage say quite different things about how the members of a form relate to one another and 
how the members of one kind relate to the members of other kinds. However, for our immediate 
purposes we can set the interpretive difficulty aside, because either reading yields the same 
account (though in different terms) of the relation between the forms of a kind. The difference 
between two forms of a given kind is underwritten by their sameness-in-kind. The fact that a 
man and a horse are both animals provides a respect in which man and horse can differ, whereas 
two entirely disparate items, like a horse and inflation, cannot differ (at least not in the relevant 
way). 
In other contexts, Aristotle refers to the relationship between two differing forms of the 
same kind as “otherness in form” (rather than mere otherness). With this in mind, we can turn to 
the opening of Ι.8:  
That which is other in form than something is other in something, and this thing 
must belong to both—e.g., if an animal is other than an animal, both are animals. 
Necessarily, therefore, things other in form are in the same kind. For this is what I 
call a kind: the one same {thing} said of both that is different, not by accident 
(whether matter or otherwise). For not only must the common {thing} belong—
e.g., both are animals—but this same animal must be other for each—e.g., horse 
for this one, but man for that one. That’s why the common {thing} is other in 
form {for one} than {it is} for the rest (ἀλλήλων). In themselves, then, this one 
will be such an animal and that one will be such {an animal}—e.g., this one {will 
be} a horse, and that one {will be} a man. Necessarily, therefore, this difference is 
an otherness of the kind. For I call a “difference of the kind” an otherness that 
makes this itself different. (1057b35-a8) 
Pellegrin comments that Aristotle’s formulations in such passages “ring with a Hegelian 
sound in our modern ears”.50 To ancient ears, they may have had a more Heraclitean ring.51 For 
                                                 
50 Pellegrin 1986 56. 
51 Cf. DK 51: διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει, “differing it agrees with itself”.  
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all three philosophers, the air of paradox is due to the attempt to articulate the intimate 
connection between differing things that makes them different rather than disparate.  For 
Aristotle, the forms of a kind aren’t disparate phenomena but variations on a theme, alternative 
versions of the same thing. But the sameness they share isn’t something that exists identically in 
each of them that can be contrasted to their differing forms as the control in a scientific 
experiment can be contrasted with the variables. Rather the thing that is the same, the kind, is the 
very thing in which the different forms are other than one another—it is the respect in which the 
various forms of the kind vary. 
The kind is, thus, the determinable embracing its forms as alternative determinates. 
Indeed being determinable in this way is what it is to be a kind; “for that is what I call a kind: the 
one same {thing} said of both that is different, not by accident”. This definition of amounts to an 
endorsement of J2, which effectively defines the determinable as that which is predicated of each 
of a group of things because they differ from one another (as understood in J1).  
J3—that the determinable (or kind) cannot be discovered in its determinations (or forms) 
by analysis—is implied by thinking of kinds as determinables. As I stressed in the last section, if 
“animal” does not designate something that exists identically in men and horses, but is itself 
different in a man than it is in a horse, then man cannot be discovered by an analysis of 
Socrates.52 
2.2.3 The kind-form relationship as allowing for the unity of definition 
The intimate determinable-determination relationship that Aristotle thinks holds between a kind 
and its forms allows him to resolve a puzzle about definition that is intractable if one accepts 
Plato’s Theory of Forms, but which must be solved if one is to have an adequate theory of ὀυσία. 
The puzzle is laid out in Metaphysics Ζ.12 and again in Η.6: 
Now let us speak first of definition, to the extent that it has not been discussed in 
the Analytics; for the puzzle that’s been spoken of there is applicable to our 
accounts about substance. I mean this puzzle: that whose account we call a 
                                                 
52 For useful discussion of the relation between determinables and universals as those two terms are understood in 
the recent literature, see Johanssen (2000). His arguments that there can be determinable immanent universals, 
however, depend on a conceptions of the Problem of Universals and of realism which I rejected in §1.3. 
 
 82 
definition, why in the world is this one thing? Take, e.g., man, i.e., biped 
animal—let this be its account. Why, then, is this one thing and not many, animal 
and biped? (1037b8-15) 
Yet whatever is in the definition must be one, for the definition is a certain  single 
account and of an ὀυσία, so that it must be an account of a single thing; for ὀυσία 
signifies a certain one and a certain this, as we say. 
Now a definition is one account, not by a bond in the manner of the Iliad, but by 
being of a single thing. Well, then, what is it that makes man one? Why is it one 
thing, not many, e.g., both animal and biped?—especially, indeed, if there are, as 
some say, a particular animal-itself and biped-itself? Why aren’t those 
“themselves” man, and the man will exist by participation not in man—not in one 
thing—but in two, animal and biped, and generally animal won’t be one, but more 
than one: animal and biped? Clearly, then, for  those who purse defining and 
giving accounts as they’re accustomed, it’s not possible to answer and solve this 
puzzle. (1045a12-22) 
The puzzle can be restated as follows: given that a definition has parts—a genus (kind) 
and at least one differentia (difference)—how can either the definition or its definiendum be 
unitary? This problem is inherent in Realism as such—in the view that a concept is an awareness 
of a mind-independent unitary object. While one can posit such an object as the basis for any 
given concept, one cannot posit a second such object as the basis for a superordinate concept 
without jeopardizing the unity of the initial object. Suppose for example that man is a Platonic 
Form; if animal and biped are also Platonic forms, and man is biped animal, then man is a pair of 
Platonic Forms (or perhaps a trio) rather than one.  
The problem faces Moderate Realism no less than Extreme Realism. Suppose that, 
having analyzed some particular bee, we have isolated the bee-form—the element or 
characteristic shared by all bees which serves as the proper object of our bee-knowledge.  Since 
one of the things we know about bees is that they are animals, being an animal would have to be 
part of the bee-form. If it’s not, then it’s not something we know about bees as such. Animal in 
particular must be part of the bee-form, since animal is part of the definition of bee and 
definitions are accounts of forms. But, if animal-form is part of bee-form, then the bee-form isn’t 
one thing after all, because it will have to be itself analyzable into animal-form and some distinct 
form that differentiates bees from other animals. How then does this pair of forms qualify as a 
unitary object? It would seem to be no more of a unity than the pairing of animal-form with the 
distinctive size or beauty of some particular bee. Thus Moderate Realism undercuts itself as soon 
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as one tries to apply it to the concepts in terms of which we know things about the universals that 
are the supposed object of any given concept. Realism was developed to account for the 
possibility of unitary knowledge of a swarm of bees, but it leaves us no better off, groping with 
the swarm of forms into which it requires us to analyze each bee. 
To answer this objection, a Realist would have to posit some special relationship between 
any given form and the other forms in terms of which it is known or defined. Aristotle is 
dismissive of such posits. He regards them as ad hoc, complaining that terms in which the 
Realists describe the relevant relationship are empty or absurd.53 His own view is that the puzzle 
is a sign that there was something wrong with the conception of the kind-difference relationship 
that led to it. The puzzle dissolves when we abandon the Socratic/Platonic notion of an identical 
universal cohabitating with differentiating features. 
Aristotle introduces his solution to the problem in Ζ.12 and elaborates on it in Η.6. In both 
passages he proceeds by assimilating the kind to matter: 
If, then, the kind does not exist simpliciter besides the forms (as {the forms} of a 
kind)—or, if it does, it exists as matter (for voice is the kind and matter, but the 
differences make the forms and the letters out of this)—, then it’s clear that the 
definition is the account out of the differences. (1038a5-9) 
But if, as we say, one {part of the definition/definiendum} is the matter and the 
other is the form, and the one potentially and the other actually, then the topic of 
investigation would no longer seem a puzzle. For this puzzle is the same even if 
the definition of cloak were rounded bronze; for then this name would be a sign of 
the account, so that the topic of investigation is: what’s the cause of the unity of 
the rounded and the bronze. But then it’s clear that there’s no puzzle any longer, 
because the one is matter and the other form. (1045a22-30)54 
                                                 
53 Z.14 1039b5-7, H.6 1035b8-21. 
54 I am assuming the generally accepted interpretation of these passages, according to which Aristotle explains how 
genus-differentia definitions (and their definienda) constitute unities by assimilating, comparing, or identifying the 
genus with matter and the differentia with form. Bostock (1994 280-3) advocates an alternative interpretation, 
according to which H.6’s point is that we ought to abandon genus-differentia definitions altogether and replace them 
with definitions whose components are form and matter. Bostock finds three problems with the more standard 
interpretation of the passage that lead him to prefer his alternative (though he recognizes that it too is problematic). 
Bostock’s problems are: (1) he thinks the standard interpretation requires us to understand 1045a20-2 “in an 
unnatural way”; (2) the standard interpretation relies on the identification of genus with matter which isn’t stated in 
H.6 and which he thinks is “by no means a standing feature of Aristotle’s thought”; (3) Bostock doesn’t see how the 
example of the unity of bronze and sphere can be used to explain the unity of genus and differentia. I submit that 
these are not problems with the standard interpretation, but failures to appreciate the significance of the view of 
kinds that Aristotle advocates throughout the Metaphysics and which I’ve been explicating. I’ll address Bostock’s 
problems briefly in turn: (1) 1045a20-2 reads: φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὕτω μὲν μετιοῦσιν ὡς εἰώθασιν ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, 
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 A thing’s matter is not something distinct from the thing, but is rather the thing itself 
insofar as it is capable both of being what it is (i.e., of realizing its form) and of being other than 
what it now is (i.e., of lacking the form). It is the thing qua potential, where the potentiality for 
any given thing is also the potential for certain alternatives. Matter is potential or ability; it is the 
ability to be formed—i.e., specified or determined—in any of several competing ways. To 
assimilate kind to matter, then, is precisely to say that a kind is a determinable.55 Since a 
                                                                                                                                                             
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀποδοῦναι καὶ λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν, “Clearly, then, for  those who pursue defining and giving accounts 
as they’re accustomed to, it’s not possible to answer and solve this puzzle”. Bostock thinks that if we accept the 
standard interpretation, then we are forced to take the λέγειν to refer to explanations that Aristotle’s predecessors 
give of definitions on which Aristotle and the Platonists agree (e.g. “biped animal”). This reading would indeed be 
unnatural, but the standard interpretation doesn’t call for it. Aristotle’s targets in this passage are presumably the 
Platonists and Aristotle disagrees with their method of defining by division, which he criticizes in Z.12. At each step 
in a division, the Platonists introduce a new, independent differentia, where Aristotle thinks they need to divide by a 
differentia of the differentia from the previous stage in the division. Unlike the Platonists, Aristotle treats the old 
differentia as a determinable and seeks a new differentia that is a determinate of it. Thus his definitions are of a 
different sort from the Platonists’, and he is able to account for the unity of all the differentiae in one of his 
definitions. Once we accept this approach, though, it is easy by the same tactic to unify the differntia(e) with the 
genus if we understand the genus too as a determinable. If, on the other hand, we define as the Platonists do, by 
introducing independent characteristics at each stage, we will not get unitary definitions and will not be able to solve 
the ἀπορία. (2)  The assimilation of γενός to matter is not nearly so unusual as Bostock would have us believe. 
We’ve already seen several cases of it and we’ll see more as we proceed. More importantly, the assimilation of 
γενός to matter is a means of expressing the determinableness of γένη, and this issue is in the forefront whenever 
Aristotle discusses γένη in the Metaphysics, whether or not matter is mentioned. (3) As Bostock acknowledges, his 
third problem is a problem for his interpretation, as well as (he thinks)  for the standard interpretation, so it is no 
reason to prefer his to the standard. I don’t think that it is a problem for the standard interpretation.  
55 Ironically Aristotle’s account of the unity of definitions is recapitulated in a distinction drawn by some 20th 
Century logicians between genera and determinables. Searle explains the distinction:  
{The relation of determinable to determinate} is logically distinct from the relation of genus to 
species. The denotation of a species term is marked off within the denotation of the genus term by 
the possession of properties known as the differentia. The species is thus to be construed as 
formed by the conjunction of two logically independent terms... Both the genus-species relation 
and the determinable-determinate relation are relations of the less specific to the more specific, but 
in the former case the specification is provided by some property logically independent of the 
genus, whereas in the latter case the determinate cannot  be specified by adding additional 
independent properties to the determinable. 
This characteristic has been emphasized by Johnson, Cook-Wilson, Prior, and Searle; and it is this 
feature which chiefly justifies the introduction of this terminology to the traditional arsenal. 
(Searle 1967 357-8, cf. Granger 1980 37-8) 
Aristotle has no use for alleged genera that are logically independent of their differentia. A “definition” reached by 
combining such components would yield only an accidental unity like white man, and Aristotle would not accept it 
as a definition at all. He maintains that only forms of a kind (species of a genus) can be defined, and this  claim 
would be empty if just any class wider than a prospective definiendum qualified as a kind. (See Metaphysics Z.4 
1030a11-16.) A kind for Aristotle must be logically related to its forms as a determinable. Thus, Aristotle would not 
agree with Searle that there is a justification for the adding the determinable-determination relation to one’s arsenal. 
He had already given this function to the γενός, having debunked the Platonic notion that Searle attaches to the word 
“genus”. (Searle’s reference to Cook-Wilson and Prior is somewhat misleading. While both stress the difference 
between determinables and the conception of genera which Searle assumes, neither sees this conception of genera as 
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determinable itself differs in each of its determinations it cannot be discovered by analysis and 
abstracted by context-omission—it cannot be the proper object of a concept, it cannot be an 
immanent universal. Thus Aristotelian kinds cannot be immanent universals and Aristotle could 
not have been a Moderate Realist  about kinds.  
2.3 ARISTOTLE’S ASSIMILATION OF KINDS TO MATTER 
The distinction between matter and form is introduced in the context of natural science as a 
device for explaining coming to be and passing away.56 Throughout the corpus the paradigmatic 
case of matter is that out of which an οὐσία comes to be, and this is certainly the case in the 
central books of the Metaphysics, which grapple with (amongst other things) ἀπορίαι generated 
by Aristotle’s hylomorphic ontology of the natural world. When, in these same books, Aristotle 
describes kinds as matter, he is clearly assimilating them in some way to this “physical matter”. 
What is less clear is the exact nature of this assimilation. Is Aristotle saying that kinds are 
physical matter or merely that they are like it? And, if the latter, like in what way? Answering 
these questions is necessary both for a general understanding of sameness in kind and, more 
specifically, to dispel any remaining doubts that Aristotle rejects Moderate Realism about kinds. 
For, arguably, if the kind is physical matter, then this matter is something identical shared by the 
many forms, and so may qualify as an immanent universal. Similar arguments might be made 
even if the kind is merely like physical matter, depending on the nature of this likeness. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
obligatory. Prior recognizes the presence of determinable genera in the Aristotelian tradition and does not think it is 
obligatory to view the “genus” as independent from its differentiae. Wilson [1926 §§155-160, §§406-414], echoing 
Aristotle, insists that a true genus must be a determinable.) 
56 Physics I.7-9, Generation and Corruption I.1. 
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2.3.1 Is something’s kind its physical matter? 
The view that Aristotle means to identify something’s kind with that out of which it comes to be 
has been argued for (most notably by Richard Rorty) largely on the grounds that any other 
reading would yield only a “vague analogy” between kind and matter, whereas Aristotle says 
that the kind is matter (rather than that it is merely like it).57 This is a bad argument because it 
takes the literal meaning of the term “matter” to be exhausted by the stuff out of which οὐσίαι 
come to be, whereas Aristotle has no qualms about ascribing “intelligible matter” or even 
“matter for change of place” to things that he is adamant do not come to be or possess the sort of 
matter out of which something might come to be.58 Matter extends more widely than physical 
matter.59 Someone might try to argue that all non-physical matter is matter only by analogy to 
physical matter; but this would be presupposing that physical matter is not itself an analogical 
concept, and to call the seed or menstrual fluid from which plants and animals come to be matter 
is already to speak analogously.  
In its original sense, ὕλη refers to timber; it refers in an extended sense to other materials 
like bronze,60 and it is a further extension to apply it to the stuffs out of which plants and animals 
come to be. Consider the sort of reasoning involved at each stage in this progression. Bronze is 
called ὕλη because it stands to (e.g.) statues as timber (to which the term is initially restricted) 
stands to (e.g.) beds. We now have a wider concept than “timber” call it “craft matter”. We get to 
the concept of “physical matter” by noting that there are things that stand to plants and animals 
as craft matter stands to the products of crafts. Each stage denotes a broadening of the concept of 
matter to admit things that are analogous to already recognized varieties of matter. This is, 
presumably, what Aristotle means in telling us that (physical) matter is “known by analogy”.61 
This process does not introduce “vagueness”. Quite the reverse, indeed, it often allows us to 
understand more deeply the initial referents of the newly extended concept. (We will see in 
Chapters 3 and 4 that this is part of how Aristotle thinks we achieve precision in our knowledge.) 
                                                 
57 Rorty 1974 72, on which see more below. 
58 See Metaphysics H.1. 
59 And “physical matter” is even a slight misnomer insofar as the star’s matter for change of place is no less natural 
than the matter out of which plants and animals come to be. 
60 Liddell, Scott, and Jones 1940 1847-8.  
61 Physics I.7 191a7-9. 
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Notice, that at each stage in the progression, the relationship between the instances is more 
abstract than at the previous stages. Timber is worked up into beds by a particular craft, but craft 
matter generally is that which can be worked up by any craft into a product, and this matter and 
seed and menses have in common only that they can be worked on by some agency to yield 
something else. In the De Anima we find matter defined even more abstractly: it is “that which in 
itself is not a this” (De Anima II.1 412a7, Metaphysics H.1 1046a26). This conception of matter 
may already be broad enough to include such things as matter for change of place and kinds 
understood as something distinct from physical matter, and if it is not, then the further extension 
to include them, need be no vaguer or less “literal” than its narrower predecessors.62 
There is no reason to think that the only way to read Aristotle literally is to interpret him 
as identifying kinds with physical matter. But might he nonetheless have held this? What would 
such an interpretation amount to? A given thing’s kind couldn’t be the parcel of matter that made 
it up (which wouldn’t be shared with its members), it would have to be something like matter of 
a certain form.63 Nor could the kind be the matter in any sense that would demand us to give a 
single answer to the two questions “What kind of thing is this?” and “What is it made of?”.64 The 
                                                 
62 Moreover, in arriving at his conception of physical matter, Aristotle makes use of the concept of a subject or 
“underlier” (ὑποκείμενον) which belongs as much to logic or metaphysics as it does to physics. Matter is a 
potentiality that underlies something without independently being something in its own right. Understood, as such, it 
makes as much sense to apply the term “matter” to kind that underlies contrary differences (1016a24) as it does to 
apply it to a nature which underlies contrary forms. Rorty dismisses this as a “vague and diffuse sense of matter as 
ὑποκείμενον for contraries, which is harmless enough” (1974 75), but, this sense cuts to the very heart of what it is 
to be matter—even what it is to be the matter out of which a plant or animal develops. (Pellegrin [1987 322 n.12] 
makes a similar criticism of Rorty’s position.) 
63 Aristotle discusses the sort of unity that we’re now contemplating in Metaphysics Δ.6: 
In yet another way, [something] is called one from its subject’s being undifferentiated in form; the 
undifferentiated is that the form of which is indivisible with respect to perception, and the subject 
is either the first or the last relative to the end—for wine is called one and water too is one, in that 
they are indivisible with respect to form, and all the juices (e.g., oil and wine) and the soluble 
things are called one, since the ultimate subject is the same—for all these things are water or air. 
(1016a17-23) 
Aristotle does not here call this form of unity unity-in-kind. Quite the opposite, when he goes on to discuss the unity 
of things “whose kind is one being differentiated by contrary differences”, he says that they are said to be unities “in 
nearly the same way, indeed, as things whose matter is one” (1016a28). It follows that there are two related but 
distinct varieties of unity. Nevertheless, there are other passages that give credence to the identification of kind with 
physical matter so it is worth considering this possibility further. 
64 Interestingly Aristotle does seem to countenance single answers to such pairs of questions in some cases. He tells 
us that “voice [φωνὴ] is the kind and matter and the differences make from this the forms of voice and the phonemes 
[or “elements”, στοιχεῖα]” (Ζ.12 1038a5-9). (His use of “rounded bronze” as a hypothetical definition in the Η.6 
1045a22-30, quoted above, might be taken as another example, but it should not be. “Rounded bronze” is not 
offered as an actual definition of anything. Aristotle’s point is that if “rounded bronze” were a definition, we would 
have no trouble understanding its unity (and the unity of its definiendum), because we understand the way in which 
matter and its form are one. Since a kind and its differences enjoy the same sort of unity, we should not be puzzled 
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view would need to be that sameness-in-kind is the relation that holds between things whose 
physical matter is of the same form. This is Rorty’s own position and versions of it have been 
maintained by Balme, A.C. Lloyd,  and Furth.65 Rorty puts the view as follows: 
…Aristotle is now thinking of the genus {of man} as referring to the kind66 of 
matter—animalish goo, so to speak—which is suitable for making men out of 
(and also suitable for making horses out of), and thus is thinking that besides the 
vague analogy between form and matter based on their common role as 
ὑποκείμενα there is the literal truth that the genus-term denotes the kind of 
proximate material cause out of which the individuals of the species can be 
formed. (1974 72, cf. 1973, especially 409-416)67 
In fact, however, Aristotle does not think that men or anything else are made out of 
“animalish goo”. The proximate material out of which animals are generated is the menses 
                                                                                                                                                             
over the unity of a definition.) However, it is bizarre to think that the two questions should yield the same answer in 
all cases, and Aristotle shows no sign of thinking this. He always gives man’s kind as animal and never as flesh or 
seed. In fact, one would not need to hold that the two questions should have the same answer to identify kind and 
physical matter. One could distinguish, as we did earlier, between kind-qua-group and kind-qua-characteristic. The 
answer to the question “What kind is this?” would then be the name of the kind as a group, but the characteristic that 
would qualify something as a member of that group would be being made of a certain matter. 
65 Balme’s clearest statement of this position (to my knowledge) is in an excerpt of a letter which was published by 
Grene as the final end note to her 1974:  
Therefore the definition of a genus cannot be a list of determinations (as a species is) but a list of 
alternative possibilities which can be more or less vague and far-reaching according to the 
taxonomic level at which you put the genus…  The proximate matter of bird is stuff capable of 
these differences; it may be stuff merely capable of developing wings rather than forelegs, or it 
may be worked up to a point where it is capable of long or short wings, but not this that or the 
other—i.e., it is nearer the specific definition. {…} the definition of genos at each level of greater 
or less precision will be the same as the definition of the proximate matter at corresponding levels. 
Lloyd (1962 86-8) maintained that a hierarchy of kinds represents a succession of physical changes. Thus bald eagle 
would be a form of the kind, eagle which is a form of the kind, bird which is a form of the kind animal, because in 
the generation of a bald eagle some generic animal matter would first acquire the generic bird form, and then the 
generic eagle form before finally acquiring the specific bald eagle form. Furth (1988 §14) advocates the same view, 
and cites Generation of Animals 736b2-3 in support of it. It reads: “For an animal does not become at the same time 
an animal and a man or a horse, and likewise with the other animals; for the end comes to be last and the peculiar is 
the end of the generation of each thing”. This is suggestive, but it does not say that embryological development 
neatly recapitulates a taxonomic structure. 
66 Rorty uses “genus” rather than “kind” to translate “γενός”, and uses “kind” as I’ve been using “sort” and “type”. 
The “kind” of  matter of which he speaks would have to be an εἴδος (rather than a γενός) if his position is to avoid 
circularity.  
67 Rorty continues:  
I am tempted to take this latter step because I think that the passages in which Aristotle wants to 
say that most so-called substances are not really substances, but only potencies have to be given a 
firmer and more literal sense than they are usually given, and that to do so we must see Aristotle 
as trying (inconsistently with much else in his thought) to see the sensible world as blocked out 
into two quite different sorts of things—full-fledged substances and ἀόριστον goo. 
But one needn’t consign such non-substances as puddles, artifacts, hands, or mules to the status of indefinite goo to 
take full account of Aristotle’s claim that they are not really substances. These things lack the unity, stability, and 
organization characteristic of substances, but insofar as they exist there is nothing indefinite about them.  
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contributed by the female, and there is reason to think that each form of animal is generated from 
a distinct menses. Certainly very different forms of animals—e.g., men and bees—must have 
different matter: human menses is a sort of concocted blood, whereas bees lack blood altogether, 
so it is hard to see how there can be any stage in the generation of a bee where what is 
developing could come to be a man rather than a bee, and the doctrine of kind as matter ought to 
apply in this case every bit as much as in the case of man and horse (where it is somewhat more 
plausible that there is any stage at which the developing offspring could go either way). 
(The menses of more similar animals must be more similar, so it is not implausible that 
all the animals belonging to a narrowest kind above the uncuttable forms [say all horses and 
donkeys] should have menses that is the same in form. Indeed the sameness of the menses might 
be used to explain the ability of such animals to produce offspring. Starting from this conjecture, 
one might go on to reason that the members of the next kind up would have menses that differ in 
form but derive from a single proximate matter, and so on, with each higher level in a taxonomy 
of animals corresponding to a more remote material cause.68 However, this position is not 
tenable for a number of reasons. First the proximate matter of menses seems to be blood, and 
there’s no reason to think that this is any less form-specific than the menses is, and [to return to a 
difficulty alluded to earlier] it is not clear that Aristotle thinks that blooded and bloodless 
animals share any materials that are not shared by non-living things. Second, I know of no 
evidence that Aristotle thinks that, even in the cases like that of the horse and donkey, the 
menses are one in form.69 Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary. If they were the same in 
form, then, given Aristotle’s theory of generation, we’d expect the offspring to be the same in 
form as the father, whereas, in fact, he thinks it resembles both parents without being the same in 
form with either. For example, in Metaphysics Z.8, we’re told that mules are neither horses nor 
donkeys but belong to the “next kind” above these two [1033b33-4].70)71 
                                                 
68 Balme and A.C. Loyd (see n. 65) could perhaps be read as holding this view, but it is more natural to take them as 
agreeing with Rorty (though for quite different reasons). 
69 According to Generation of Animals II.7 it is possible for a pair of different animals of different forms to produce 
offspring if they have similar natures and forms and if their size and gestation period is similar (746a30-b11).  
70 Rorty (1973 413-4) takes this to imply that a given mule is not an οὐσία because it is somehow indeterminate—
since it belongs to the kind common to horse and donkey but not to either form. But he points to no evidence that 
Aristotle regards mules as indeterminate, nor is there any such evidence to point to. The natural way to read the 
passage is that mule is simply another (fully determinate) form of the kind to which horse and donkey belong.  This 
is confirmed by History of Animals I.6 490b34-a2 which identifies the kind as λοφοῦρος and tells us that Syrian 
half-asses are not ἁπλῶς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος as mules, implying that mules are a form  (cf. 577b24 and 580b1 where mule 
is described as a kind). (On the genuineness of this passage see Balme’s [forthcoming] commentary.) Aristotle has a 
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Whatever plausibility the identification of kind with physical matter may have for 
zoological kinds, and, more generally, for the kinds of composite οὐσίαι, it makes no sense when 
applied to things in other categories. For example, gift is a form of the kind transfer and jeering a 
form of the kind insolence.72 If these actions can be said to have matter, that matter will 
presumably be the agents and patients. But these agents can perform actions of different kinds on 
these same patients. A person who is able to give a book as a gift, for example, could instead do 
a variety of other things with it, not all of which will be transfers. He can read the book or use it 
to prop up an uneven piece of furniture. Also, consider the kind virtue, of which justice and 
bravery are forms.73 There is no virtuous stuff in the human soul that can be worked up 
differently so as to become one virtue or another. If a virtue has matter, that matter is a capacity 
of the non-rational part of the soul to feel certain emotions to a greater or lesser degree. The 
matter of bravery, for example, would be the capacity to feel fear in the face of a fine death, 
since it is by having this capacity that one is able to be either brave or cowardly. But, if so, 
bravery’s kind would be not virtue but state-concerned-with-fear.  
As soon as we step beyond the category of οὐσία, we stop being able to make sense of 
the idea that the matter out of which something is made is somehow its kind. Since beings in the 
other categories are not supposed to be definable in the strict sense that οὐσίαι are, they might 
not fall into kinds in the strictest sense, but they are supposed to be definable in some analogous 
sense, and Aristotle often defines non-οὐσίαι by giving their kinds and differences.74 We should 
expect him to want to assimilate these kinds to matter just as he assimilates οὐσία-kinds to 
matter, because the unity of definition problem will arise in these cases as well.  
                                                                                                                                                             
relatively extended discussion of mule sterility in Generation of Animals II.8, and it contains nothing that would 
make us think that mules are somehow indefinite. Quite the contrary. The only defective feature of mules that 
Aristotle mentions is their sterility. Since reproduction is a central feature of life this might be taken to diminish a 
mule’s claim to be an οὐσία, but in fact Aristotle argues that is not per se a result of the mule’s being produced from 
two different forms, since there are other such crosses which are fertile. Mules’ sterility is a result of the near-
sterility of horses and donkeys being exacerbated by the cross. On Rorty’s reasoning any cross would have to be 
indefinite, since it too would belong to the kind common to both parents without belonging to either. But there is no 
sense to talk of any animal being indefinite, nor is there any reason to deny that the results of crosses are οὐσίαι. 
Matter is indefinite in that it can be any of a number of contrary things, and, taken in its own right, is not any one of 
these things as opposed to another. But there’s nothing a mule can be other than a mule, and taken in its own right it 
is a mule. 
71 For further objections to the identification of animal kinds with physical matter, see Grene 1974. 
72 Topics IV.4 125a17ff, VI.6 124a6. 
73 See Topics VI.6 127b19-25 on justice as a form of virtue. 
74 See Metaphysics Z.4 on the way in which non-οὐσίαι do and do not have definitions and H.2, where we find 
definitions for a number of clear non-οὐσίαι. 
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For example, someone might whistle while he’s giving a book to a friend, but accidental 
unity of whistling and giving ought not to be a definable action. Worse, a person might wax 
wroth over the seizure of his concubine and withdraw from battle resulting in the death of his 
beloved friend, his vengeful slaying of an enemy warrior, and his own demise. If this accidental 
unity constitutes a single, definable action, then the Iliad will be a definition, and this is 
Aristotle’s paradigm case of a λόγος that lacks the sort of unity necessary for a definition:  
A definition is one account not by conjunction (συνδέσμῳ) like the Iliad, but 
rather by being of one thing. (Metaphysics H.6 1045a12-14)75 
The only suitable form of unity in Aristotle’s repertoire is the kind-form relationship that 
Aristotle expresses by assimilating kind to matter. Therefore, this relationship must apply across 
the categories, even if definition in the strictest sense is reserved for οὐσίαι. Besides, 
metaphysics is not just the study of οὐσία but of being qua being, of which οὐσία is the primary 
and focal case, therefore we should expect Aristotle’s key metaphysical conclusions about οὐσία 
to apply to the other categories as well, though in some derivative or analogous manner.76 
Thus we must reject the interpretation on which a thing’s kind is its physical matter. 
There is no positive evidence for it and it does not fit the full range of cases in which Aristotle 
needs to assimilate kind to matter in order to solve the unity of definition problem. When 
Aristotle says that the kind is matter, he using the term in a broad sense that extends beyond 
physical matter. The need for such a concept is attested to by the fact that still, over two 
millennia after Aristotle’s death, logicians feel pressed to coin terms like “determinable”, which 
are no less bold than Aristotle’s talk of matter, in order to capture the very relationship that 
Aristotle intended.77 
                                                 
75 Cf. Posterior Analytics II.10 93b35-7:  “A λόγος is one in {either of} two ways: either by conjunction (συνδέσμῳ) 
as the Iliad is, or by revealing one thing non-incidentally”. 
76 It should be kept in mind that Aristotle does not hesitate to speak of the οὐσιαι of things like motions (Physics V.4 
228b13), numbers (Posterior Analytics II.13 96a34), and tragedy (Poetics 6 1449b24), and, as  Balme (1987c  297 
n.37) observes, Aristotle talks of the essence of non-οὐσιαι at 1030a29, 1031a27, 649b22, and 429b17.  
77 Johnson (1921 174), for example, speaks of determinates as “emanating” from determinables. 
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2.3.2 Kinds as intelligible matter 
I mentioned intelligible matter at the beginning of §2.3.1 as an indication that Aristotle’s 
conception of matter is not exhausted by physical matter. Aristotle uses the phrase three times, 
including once in Metaphysics H.6, shortly after he identifies kind and matter: 
Of matter, on the one hand there is the intelligible and on the other the 
perceptible. And always of the account, there is on the one hand the matter and on 
the other the actuality—e.g., the circle is plane figure. (1045a33-5) 
This passage is most often understood to identify something’s kind and its intelligible 
matter.78 On this reading, the circle’s intelligible matter and kind is “plane figure”, and Aristotle 
neglects to specify its actuality or difference. Similarly, we can take man and horse to have 
intelligible matter (in addition to their perceptible matter) and identify this with the kind animal. 
The point of referring to the kind as intelligible matter would be to make it clear that, like 
perceptible matter, the kind is not some determinate thing distinct from its forms, but rather 
something indeterminate that can be determined in different ways to yield the forms. Just as 
water can be formed into wine and wine de-formed back into water,79 animal can somehow be 
specified into man or horse and man or horse can be de-specified into animal. We will turn to the 
question of what exactly it would be to specify or de-specify animal later, after first considering 
an alternative reading of the H.6 passage, based on a different understanding of “intelligible 
matter”. 
Aristotle’s other two uses of the phrase occur in Z.10-11 during a discussion of whether a 
thing’s parts are parts of its essence.  There are certain cases in which they are not, he concludes. 
For example a man’s hand is a part of him but no part of his being a man—quite the reverse 
since the definition of hand will make reference to man. Similarly a semi-circle is a part of a 
circle but not part of its being a circle—indeed, again, semi-circle will be defined in terms of 
circle, rather than the reverse.80 Aristotle refers to these sorts of parts as “parts of the matter” a 
description that applies straightforwardly in the case of the man whose hand is a part of his body 
and would apply straightforwardly to a brazen circle, since the bronze can be divided to yield 
                                                 
78 Scholars who read the passage this way include Ross (1924b 199-200, 238) and Grene (1974 65-66). 
79 Cf. Metaphysics H.5 1044b32-a6. 
80 1035b3-1036a11. 
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two semi-circles. However mathematical objects (even particular ones) are abstracted from 
matter and therefore cannot have material parts. The mathematician would be interested not in 
the particular round piece of bronze, but the circle into which it is formed, a part of this circle 
could not be a portion of the bronze. The notion of intelligible matter is introduced in this context 
to name that in virtue of which the mathematical circle is divisible. One can think of it as 
something like the region encompassed by the circle. We can call Z’s intelligible matter 
“constituent intelligible matter” and group it together with physical (“perceptible”) matter under 
the general label “constituent matter”.  
If we took H.6’s “intelligible matter” to be constituent matter, we would have to see 
“plane figure” as either the constituent matter of circle or else as a formula giving both the 
constituent matter and the actuality. The second option is more natural. We can take the plane as 
the intelligible-constituent-matter and “figure” as standing in for a specification of the shape 
which is the actuality of a circle.81 If we take the “plane figure” example in this way, then the 
passage gives us no reason to suppose that man also has intelligible matter; rather it suggests the 
equation of man’s kind with his physical (“perceptual”) matter. Thus the example is made to 
cohere with Rorty’s understanding of the assimilation of kind to matter, and, indeed, this is how 
Rorty takes the example.82 
Several of the arguments advanced in §2.3.1 against the view that Aristotle identified 
kinds with physical matter generalize into arguments against understanding kinds as constituent 
matter and so speak against this reading of “intelligible matter” in H.6. 83 The assimilation in H.6 
is a means of solving the unity of definition problem, and, given the range of cases in which this 
problems arises, it could not be solved by identifying kind with constituent matter. Neither, 
however, is it likely that the phrase “intelligible matter” would be used in entirely independent 
senses in Z and H. The passages should be read, if possible, in a way that gives the phrase a 
single sense, while enabling it to refer to constituent matter in Z and determinable kinds in H.  
                                                 
81 This reading garners support from Metaphysics 1024a36ff, where we’re told that, on one sense of kind, plane is 
the kind of the plane figures.  
82 1974 76; cf. Bostock 1994 284-5. 
83 As an extension of this point, Rorty’s reading of “intelligible matter” in H.6, makes it unintelligible how there can 
be kinds of shapes. The kind of all shapes would be plane, because that would be their matter. But there’d be no 
basis for a kind, “triangle”, subsuming isosceles and scalene, for there’s nothing that could constitute in this way all 
and only triangles. 
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This is not difficult, since matter is a relative term. Something is matter in relation to 
something else which it has the potential to be, and perhaps relative to some way in which in 
which it has the potential to become it—as e.g. bronze is matter relative to a sculpture into which 
it can be sculpted. In Z, the semicircles are material parts of the circle insofar as they can be 
spatially combined to form it, and a circle has matter insofar as it is subject to division into parts 
of this kind. The matter is perceptual if the division in question is into perceptually distinct 
objects as in the case of cutting a brazen circle in half, and the matter is intelligible if the division 
in question is of a sort that can be performed only in thought to yield different thinkable 
components.  
In H.6, where there is no issue of dividing things up into material constituents the 
distinction between perceptible and intelligible matter must be applied in light of the relations 
and operations that are under discussion—namely how a differentia applies to genus to yield a 
unitary definition and how a  predicate applies to a subject to yield a unitary proposition. In both 
cases we have something indeterminate becoming determinate, as in the case of a lump of bronze 
of indeterminate shape being shaped into a statue. But unlike in the case of the bronze, there is 
no change leading to a new perceptible object. Rather the indeterminate matter (the subject 
without its predicate or the genus without its differentia) is an object only of thought, and the 
operation by which it is made determinate occurs only in thought. Thus the matter is intelligible 
rather than perceptual in just the respect that it is in Z.10-11, even though it is not constituent 
matter. 
The upshot of the preceding is that kinds are matter relative to their ability to be specified 
into forms by the process of division. The matter is intelligible in that the process is an inherently 
intellectual one, and the matter is matter in that there is a sense in which, through the process, 
new objects of thought come to be. In this connection, consider the following passage, which 
comes shortly after a portion of I.8 that we looked at in §2.2.2: 
This, then, is the meaning of calling things other in form—that they are contrary, 
being in the same kind and being indivisible (and those things are the same in 
form, which have no contrariety, being indivisible); for in the process of division 
contrarieties come to be even in the intermediate stages before we come to the 
indivisibles. Evidently, therefore, with reference to that which is called the kind 
none of the forms which belong to the kind is either the same as or other than it in 
form (rightly so, for the matter is indicated by negation, and the kind is the matter 
of that of which it is called the kind, not as in {the kind} of the Heraclidae, but as 
the {kind} in nature), nor is it so with reference to things which are not in the 
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same kind, but it will differ in kind from them and in form from things in the 
same kind. For the difference between things which differ in form must be a 
contrariety; and this belongs only to things in the same kind. (Metaphysics I.8 
1058a16-28) 
Here we see kinds treated as matter in connection with a discussion of division from 
which differences and forms are said to come to be, and we see the emphasis on contrariety that 
we met in our initial discussion of kinds as determinables. The kind is matter precisely in that it 
is indeterminate able to be divided in thought into contrary determinate forms.  
2.3.3 The ontological status of intelligible matter 
The kind is intelligible matter from which forms are generated by division, but, someone might 
ask, what is this matter itself and in what manner does it exist? In particular, is it a mind-
independent object? If so, then it is seemingly the same object in each of its differing forms and 
so kinds are immanent universals after all. 
Physical matter is, of course, mind-independent, and the analogy between kinds and it 
does suggest that there is some same thing in each form of a kind, which accounts for the 
possibility of that form or one of its contraries being arrived at by a division. As noted earlier, 
this Moderate Realist model is strongly implied by much of Aristotle’s language. However we 
have also seen numerous passages in which Aristotle resists the Moderate Realist construal, and 
it is difficult to make sense of the idea of mind-independent intelligible matter existing in 
objects.  
Matter, after all, is that which is capable of becoming something and into which that 
thing can pass away, and there is no bird-as-such into which an eagle can pass away and from 
which a sparrow can come to be—except, that is, in thought. As we will see in the next chapter, 
one can decompose a thought of an eagle into a thought of a bird; and, from this thought, one can 
compose a thought of a sparrow. This ability of an object to be manipulated in thought in this 
way is mind-dependent at least in the sense that it is a potentiality relative to thought. 
Nevertheless Aristotle does seem to think that there is something about forms which enables 
some and not others to be decomposed into kinds. At the very least he councils us against trying 
to think in terms of such pseudo-kinds as the Sophist’s “swimmers”, and he thinks that cloak 
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defined as “man and horse” doesn’t have the unity needed to qualify as a term. There is then 
some basis in the forms that makes it possible or proper for us to subsume them under kinds, and 
perhaps this should be identified with the intelligible matter. 
To get clearer on the ontological status of this intelligible matter, we need to ask what 
precisely it is about the objects that underwrites our grouping them into kinds; this amounts to 
the question “What is sameness in kind?” One possible answer is that it is a basic, unanalysable 
relation. On this view, the kind would in a fairly strong sense exist independently of the mind 
(though not as a universal element in the forms),84 and talk of intelligible matter would tell us 
nothing about the kind as such, only about its role in thought.  
However, in §2.2, we have already seen what is plausibly a (partial) analysis of 
sameness-in-kind. It consists in, or at least requires, the relationship commensurability or 
difference in the more and the less, which is epitomized by contraries. (This already suggests a 
significant role for the idea of intelligible matter, insofar as this same relationship is a necessary 
condition for change and thus has an obvious connection to physical matter.) In §2.4.2, we will 
encounter a further ontological relation that is necessary for there to be a kind, and, in §2.4.4, I 
will suggest how sameness-in-kind can be analyzed into commensurability and this other 
relation. In Chapters 3-4, we will see how these relations form a basis for certain psychological 
and epistemological actions, and so constitute a real basis for concepts without serving as proper 
objects for them. Understanding these actions will also give us a purchase on the respects in 
which Aristotle does and does not think that thoughts have universal objects and on why he so 
often uses language that lends itself to a Moderate Realist construal. 
We have now seen reason to think that this construal should be rejected—that 
Aristotelian kinds cannot be imminent universals. If they cannot, then neither can focal, 
analogous or successive unities, because these forms of unity are weaker than and derivative on 
sameness-in-kind. Aristotle could still hold that uncuttable forms are immanent universals, but 
since these represent such a small sub-set of concepts, I don’t think this position would constitute 
Moderate Realism, at least not without significant qualification, because the sort of unity enjoyed 
by forms and lacked by kinds will not be needed as the basis for a concept. 
                                                 
84 This is, in essence, the position defended by Creswell (1975). 
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2.4 ARE ARISTOTELIAN FORMS PARTICULARS? 
There are reasons to doubt that Aristotle regarded even uncuttable forms as immanent universals. 
Since the 1950’s, a growing contingent of scholars have been arguing that each member of a 
species possesses its own particular form. If they are right, it seems to follow that Aristotle 
cannot be a Moderate Realist about forms. I say “seems to follow” because, according to the 
most prominent “particular forms” interpretation, Aristotelian forms are universals in the sense 
in which I’ve been using that term. The literature on the universality or particularity of 
Aristotelian forms is expansive. I will touch on this literature here, but I cannot do justice to it 
and will not try to. My goal will be, rather, to present the interpretation that I think is most 
plausible, distinguishing it from alternative interpretations and commenting on its evidential 
status and implications for Aristotle’s view of concepts. The presentation and defense of this 
interpretation will raise a number issues that will come to the fore in subsequent chapters in my 
positive account of Aristotle’s view of concepts.  
The contemporary discussion of the possibility that forms are particular began with a pair 
of papers by Sellars and Albritton, respectively, published in 1957. During the course of a more 
general discussion of the Metaphysics, Sellars made the following remark: 
Certainly the form of a materiate substance is not a universal, for, as Aristotle 
reiterates, the form is “the substance of” the composite, and the substance of a this 
must be of the nature of a this and never a universal.85 
Picking up on this suggestion, Albritton devoted his paper to an assessment of the textual 
support for “particular forms” in the Metaphysics. Because “what Aristotle calls ‘the form’ of a 
particular thing is sometimes certainly the universal form of its species (e.g., at 1034a5-8),” 
Albritton proposed and defended a more conservative reformulation of Sellars’ initial remark: 
A particular material substance not only shares with others of its species a 
universal form, but has a particular form of its own, an instance of that universal 
form, which is not the form of any other thing.86 
In addition to Sellars’ point that the argument of Z requires that the forms be particular 
since they are οὐσίαι, Albritton finds two other reasons to attribute the belief in particular forms 
                                                 
85 Sellars 1957 691. 
86 Albritton 1957 700. 
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to Aristotle: (1) “the explicit testimony of Λ to a general theory of particular forms”—especially 
at Λ.5 1071a27-29 where Aristotle distinguishes between “your matter and form and moving 
cause and mine”, which “are the same in their universal formula”—and (2) “very nearly explicit 
attributions of particular forms to animate substances in Z, H, and more tentatively M”.87 
It is worth noticing that Albritton’s version of the particular-forms thesis does not pose 
any threat to the idea of Aristotelian forms as immanent universals, because Albritton’s Aristotle 
believes in particular forms in addition to, not instead of, universal forms. Later proponents of 
particular-forms have dispensed with this two form approach. Frede is representative:   
things of the same kind have the same form only in the sense that for things of the 
same kind the specification of their form is exactly the same... It is a basic non-
trivial fact about the world that things come with forms which are exactly alike, 
and not just sufficiently similar to class them together in one kind. The reality of 
kinds amounts to no more than this, that the specification of the form of particular 
objects turns out to be the same for a variety of objects. But for this to be true 
there is no need for a universal form or a universal kind, either a species or a 
genus. And in fact the import of Z13 seems to be that there are no substantial 
genera or species in the ontology of the Metaphysics.88 
For Frede’s Aristotle, a given man has only one form, and it is numerically distinct from the 
forms possessed by other men. However, each man’s form is qualitatively identical to (“exactly 
alike”) the form of every other man. Frede is not alone in this position, it is shared by Witt, 
Tweedale, and A.C. Lloyd amongst others.89 
“Fredeian forms”, as we might call them, are qualitatively identical elements or 
characteristics shared by the differing members of a species.90 As such, they can serve as the 
                                                 
87 Albritton 1975 707. 
88 Frede 1985 23. Frede uses “kind” here not as a translation of γένος, but in a wider sense, which would embrace 
εἴδη as well as γένη. 
89 See: Tweedale (1988 520)—”each individual form taken in itself is indistinguishable from every other individual 
form of the species on question”; Witt (1989 179)—”{Socrates and Callias’} individual forms have the same 
features, and so differences between them must be explained by their matter”; and A.C. Lloyd (1981 2)—“In my 
view neither the form of pale possessed by an individual man Socrates nor the form of man with which... Socrates is 
in some sense identical is a universal, for neither is one and the same, that is numerically the same, form as either of 
those possessed by or identical with any other pale man”. (Note that Lloyd 1981 is a significant departure from 
Lloyd 1970.) 
90 One might object to characterizing a form (Fredean or otherwise) as a “characteristic” or even as an “element” on 
the grounds that something’s form is its οὐσία, and therefore is the thing itself rather than a part of feature of it. 
Though there is some justice in this objection and one must take care in applying terms like “element” or 
“characteristic” to forms, I do think these terms are apt, if construed broadly enough. While in an important sense 
Socrates is his form, he is not only his form. Certainly, on Frede’s view, Socrates must be more than his form 
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proper objects of concepts. Thus they qualify as universals, as I’ve been using that term. Frede 
and others think of these forms as particulars because they are numerically distinct; but, as I 
argued in §1.3.3, there is no need for an immanent universal to be numerically identical across its 
instances, and, as we saw in §1.3.4, my paradigm Moderate Realists, the Neo-Scholastics of the 
Louvaine school, did not suppose that their immanent universals were numerical unities. 
These same neo-Scholastics and their descendants are among the traditional interpreters 
of Aristotle in contrast to whom the proponents of particular forms define their positions.91 Other 
                                                                                                                                                             
because Socrates is wise and snub-nosed whereas his form cannot be either of these things since it is exactly alike 
Alcibiades’ form and Alcibiades is neither wise nor snub-nosed. The identity between Socrates and his form is 
incomplete, and the form can be seen as a characteristic of the compound at least in the sense that, in stating the 
form, one gives a partial but not complete characterization of the compound. This is so even though the relationship 
between Socrates and his form is quite different (and more intimate) than the relationship between Socrates and his 
attributes—even though the form is what Socrates is while the attributes are merely things he has. 
91 When  DeWulf, in the passage that stands at the head of this chapter, described Moderate Realism as “one of the 
finest pronouncements of Peripateticism”, he had in mind the doctrine to which he himself subscribed (DeWulf 
1909a) according to which the universal immanent in a species-member is not a universal in itself but only insofar as 
it is identical to a something that exists in every other species-member and is consequently capable of being isolated 
by the mind and considered in a certain manner. This interpretation of universal Aristotelian forms is held almost 
unanimously (though not exclusively) by Thomist historians of philosophy, so let us call it the “Thomistic 
Interpretation”. We find it espoused for example by Copleston in his 1946 History of Philosophy, and by Joseph 
Owens in his 1951, The Doctrine of Being: 
The universal is real, it has reality not only in the mind but also in the things, though the existence 
in the thing does not entail that formal universality that it has in the mind. Individuals belonging to 
the same species... do not partake in an objective universal that is numerically the same in all 
members of the class. The specific essence is numerically different in each individual of the class, 
but, on the other hand, it is specifically the same in all the individuals of the class (i.e., they are all 
alike in species), and this objective similarity is the real foundation for the abstract universal, 
which has numerical identity in the mind and can be predicated of all the members of the class 
indifferently. (Copleston V1. 301) 
Apparently, though itself neither singular nor universal, [“the form of a sensible entity <οὐσία>“] 
is the cause of both individuality in the singular thing and universality in the definition. (Owens 
1951 233) 
The form as seen in this thing is not universal. It is this definite form. That same form, however, is 
seen in other singular things, indefinitely numerous. Yet the knowledge of the form as seen in the 
one definite instance in a singular, is able to be applied indefinitely to all things in which that form 
happens to be found... 
...the same definite form is found indefinitely multiplied in singulars. Matter and indefiniteness are 
therefore the explanation of universality both from the side of things and in knowledge. The actual 
knowledge and knowing are definite and a ‘this’. But though actually definite in one singular 
thing, the form—as form—could just as well have been that of any other singular of the same 
species. Its possibility, as a form, of being the form of such other individuals, is indefinite. (Owens 
195 1273, cf. 1981c.) 
It is present also in Green, who is clearly following Owens, and whom Witt (1989 2 n. 3) cites as an exponent of the 
“standard interpretation” : 
A thing’s nature is its form... Moreover, its form is its own form, as this frog or this octopus. There 
is no ‘frog’ or ‘octopus’ as such. Yet it is the form of this individual which we, as knowers, 
universalize, so that we understand not this particular specimen, which we perceive and do not 
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early 20th Century interpreters who claimed that forms were universals differed from the 
Scholastics on many counts, but most of them did not differ in their understanding of what it 
would mean for forms to be universal or particular.92 Frede et al. differ from the pre-1957 
                                                                                                                                                             
wholly know, but the universal inherent in the particular, the potential universal which in our 
minds we actualize. What we know is the specific form, a frog, an octopus, what it is to be a frog, 
what it is to be an octopus. (Grene 1967 55) 
The Thomistic interpretation can be found in Windelband (1899 257-8), and its popularity is further attested by Alan 
Donagan who references Owens (and Veatch [1952 105-115]) when he writes (in 1963) that “the most familiar form 
of ‘moderate’ realism is that commonly ascribed to Aristotle”; he characterizes it as follows: 
an essence exists in two distinct ways: in rerum natura as a many, and in the mind as a one. The 
universal term “man” stands for the essence man as it exists in the mind abstractly. The essence 
itself, being neutral with respect to universality and particularity, can exist in rerum natura as 
individuated in Socrates, Plato and other men. (Donagan 1971 108.) 
The dominance in 20th Century metaphysics of the ontological taxonomic conception of universality caused this 
interpretation to seem unintelligible and so to recede out of scholarly consciousness as the literature stemming from 
Sellars and Albritton’s 1957 papers developed. Albritton himself dismisses the interpretation with a note: “I doubt 
that Aristotle would have understood any better than I do the suggestion that a thing may be neither universal nor 
particular” (1957 699 n.2). Thirty years later the view was so far forgotten that Guthrie (1981 213 n.2) could refer to 
“Owens’s subtle conclusion that form is neither singular nor universal,” as though Owens’ interpretation was novel. 
This scholarly amnesia accounts for the hazy generality that attends most recent references to the “traditional” or 
“standard” interpretation of Aristotle on this issue. 
92 By in large, these scholars saw Aristotle’s position as inconsistent. For example Zeller writes that a form is 
“always a universal in comparison to that which is a compound of form and matter” and thinks that this view, when 
combined with Aristotle’s other metaphysical and epistemological positions, generates a contradiction, the results of 
which “can be observed throughout the whole Aristotelian system” (1951 174, cf. 1897a 204 and 334). Ross, though 
more sympathetic than Zeller, also finds inconsistencies. When Aristotle speaks of “universals” and “common 
things,” Ross takes him to refer to things that are common (or universal) to different uncuttable forms, thus Ross 
thinks that Aristotle regards “the genera next above the infimae species” as “the narrowest universals” (1924a cxi). 
However, Ross thinks that Metaphysics Z.13’s argument against any universal being an οὐσία applies to the 
uncuttable forms as well: 
...the logic of the this chapter should have led {Aristotle} to conclude that only the individual, or 
the immaterial element in the individual, is substance, and it is only the doctrine of infimae species 
that prevents him from drawing this conclusion. (ibid cxv). 
Here “individual” renders καθ’ ἕκαστον, so the “immaterial element in the individual” would be the form of, e.g., a 
particular man, and Ross is here saying that Aristotle should regard this as a substance. For Aristotle to think this, he 
would have to think that each man has his own particular form. But, according to Ross, Aristotle does not think this; 
rather, he “usually... represents the form of each infima species as being identical in every member of the species” 
(1995 175, cf. 192 n.63. and 1923a  cxvii, where he notes some exceptions). Thus Ross thinks that if Aristotle were 
to attribute particular forms to particular men, he would mean that each man had a form that was not identical—not 
even qualitatively identical—with that of his neighbor. That this is Ross’ understanding is clear from the following 
passage: 
...whereas things in different species differ in form (as well as in matter), things in the same 
species differ in matter only. The dominating idea is that of the infima species, the notion that 
there are fixed combinations of characteristics which form the core of the individuals in which 
they are present; these alone nature seeks to secure and to perpetuate. All differences of less 
importance and permanence than these are deemed unworthy of the name of form and are treated 
as the result of the union of identical form with different matter. ...if two parcels of flesh and bone 
with which the form [of man] unites are qualitatively alike, they are no more capable of producing 
two distinguishable men then if they had been prime matter. They must differ in character, i.e. in 
form. Socrates and Callias must therefore, while agreeing in their specific form, differ in the 
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tradition, not in having a new view of forms, but in pairing the traditional interpretation with the 
ontological taxonomic conception of universality, so as to yield new resolutions to some 
seemingly contradictory passages in the Metaphysics. If I am right, however, that this conception 
of universality was not Aristotle’s, these resolutions fail and the passages pointed to by Sellars 
and Albritton constitute some evidence that forms are particular, in the sense of the term that I 
endorse. However, the evidence is far from decisive, because it remains possible to interpret 
these passages in any of the ways that the pre-1957 commentators did.  
The case for particular forms is strengthened considerably when we look beyond the 
Metaphysics. As Balme, Lennox, and Cooper have argued, the theory of animal reproduction 
expounded in the Generation of Animals requires that the form of a given animal be qualitatively 
distinct from the forms of other members of its species. I take up this case in the following 
sections. In §2.3.1, I lay out the view of Aristotelian form found by Balme and Lennox in the 
zoological works, especially Generation of Animals; in §2.3.2, I defend this view as an 
interpretation of that treatise; and in §2.3.3, I show that it has the resources to meet the strongest 
objections to the view that forms are (in any sense) particulars. 
                                                                                                                                                             
quality or form of their matter. Now this difference in the quality of their matter may be reckoned 
to the side of form or essence, and if this is done we get the notion of an essence of the individual 
which includes besides the specific form such further preeminent characteristics as spring from 
differences in the matter with which the specific form is in different individuals united. (1923a  
cxviii) 
Ross does not think that Aristotle held that there were such particular forms, at least not consistently, though he 
notes Metaphysics Λ 1071a27-29 as an occasion on which Aristotle may have unselfconsciously slipped into this 
position (cxix). Nevertheless, Ross thinks that Aristotle should have held that particular species-members have 
particular forms—forms which, unlike ersatz-particulars, would have to qualitatively differ from one species-
member to the next. Russell (1945) takes a view similar to Ross’. He writes that “a form is intended by [Aristotle] to 
be something quite different from a universal, but it has many of the same characteristics,” with the result that 
Aristotle is vulnerable to many of his own criticisms of Platonic forms (166). After quoting Zeller on Aristotle’s 
failure to “emancipate himself from the Plato’s tendency to hypostatize ideas,” Russell considers what defense 
Aristotle, might take against this criticism: 
The only answer that I can imagine would be one that maintained that no two things could have 
the same form. If a man makes two brass spheres (we should have to say), each has its own special 
sphericity, which is substantial and particular, an instance of the universal “sphericity” but not 
identical with it. (166-7) 
However, Russell thinks that this “answer” would be incompatible with a number of Aristotelian doctrines, and he 
does not think that the texts in which Aristotle discusses forms can be plausibly read as endorsements of this 
position. The particular forms that Russell imagines Aristotle desperately turning to might be ersatz-particulars, and 
Russell might understand the universality of Aristotle’s forms to consist in something more than qualitative identity, 
but he does not say enough to make it clear. Several other historians from the same period are equally ambiguous on 
the point or find ambiguity in Aristotle. See Fuller 1945 176, Jones (1952 506, cf. 183-5, 201-202, 423), and Stocks 
(1925 36-7). 
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2.4.1 Balme’s embryological argument for particular forms 
Balme (1987c) was the first to argue for particular forms on the basis of the Generation of 
Animals. In essence his argument is quite simple: On Aristotle’s view, a father’s contribution to 
his offspring is a set of movements that carries his form and is conveyed to the offspring through 
the semen.93 All the matter is supplied by the mother, who also has a secondary influence on the 
offspring’s form insofar as her own movements are present in the matter she supplies. Since the 
father contributes only form and no matter, any characteristics inherited from father to child must 
be due to the father’s form. Since Aristotle recognized that a child can inherit characteristics that 
distinguish his father from other men,94 Aristotle must have understood these characteristics to 
be part of the father’s form. Therefore, the form which a father passes on to his child must be a 
particular form unique to him, rather than a universal human form,95 and indeed, in Generation 
of Animals IV.3, Aristotle speaks of movements that come from the particular fathers insofar as 
they are the particular men they are. Cooper, who argues along the same lines as Balme, explains 
their shared conclusion nicely, differentiating it from the view of forms as Fredeian-particulars: 
some have thought from reading just the Metaphysics that an Aristotelian form is 
a non-repeatable instance of some general specific type, differing from other 
instances not internally… but only by the accidental historical facts about the 
individual whose form it is by which we mark that individual off from others of 
the same species. The GA makes it clear that, on the contrary, each form… 
includes… all those distinctive characteristics of structure and organization for 
which in the individual whose form it is it is directly responsible… Thus 
Aristotelian forms are particular in that each form contains within itself the basis 
for its differentiation from (as well, of course, as its affiliation with) other forms 
of the same specific type. (Cooper 1990 83-4)96 
                                                 
93 Generation of Animals I.22. 
94 Generation of Animals IV.3. 
95 It may be that two men have the same form—the case of identical twins comes to mind and Balme thinks that a 
perfect Aristotelian reproduction would yield a duplicate of the father—but this would not make that form a 
universal, because the identity would not be what makes the identical men men, nor would it make them both 
instances of any other concept.  
96 Though Cooper does allow that these forms may still be “universals of a much lower order of generality that has 
been thought” (84). The ellipses in the quoted passage conceal elements of Cooper’s view that are in disagreement 
with Balme. The differences concern two points: first, which characteristics are hereditary and (therefore) part of a 
man’s form, second, how the distinction between essential and accidental characteristics is to be drawn given that 
members of the same species have different forms.  Regarding the first point, Aristotle makes clear at 767b28 that 
such accidental characteristics as being grammatical or someone’s neighbor are not part of anyone’s  form. The 
dispute between Balme and Cooper concerns a set of seemingly hereditary characteristics for which Aristotle gives 
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If the forms of particular men differ from one another, then how are they related to one 
another, and what does Aristotle mean in saying that the men are the same in form? Balme and 
Lennox think that men vary from one another in much the same way as the forms of a kind vary 
from one another. Lennox puts the point as follows: 
To be a form is to be a determinate realization of a kind. Socrates is a determinate 
realization of human nature, as water-fowl is a determinate realization of bird…  
Organisms which differ in form can be seen as different progressive 
determinations of a more general kind. To refer to a parrot and a blue jay as birds 
is to ignore (i.e., remove from my account) the way in which beak, feather, wing, 
legs, crop, etc., are differently realized in each. Similarly when I refer to two 
individual birds as parrots; in doing so I leave out of the account the peculiar 
ways in which each realizes his parrot features. (1987b 348, Cf. Balme 1987c 
296-7) 
In short, the members of a form differ from one another in the more-and-the-less.97 (Or at least, 
they can do so without this posing any threat to their sameness-in-form; there’s nothing to 
prevent there from being some forms whose members are exactly alike one another.) There are a 
number of passages that support this view of form-members. Metaphysics I.3 gives as one sense 
                                                                                                                                                             
material-causal explanations in Generation of Animals V: eye-color, height, pitch of voice, and a number of traits 
involving hair or feathers. Balme explicitly includes these characteristics in the form, whereas Cooper argues that 
Aristotle’s material-causal accounts of these features shows that he did not regard them as hereditary or (therefore) 
as parts of the father’s form. The disagreement turns on whether the material-causal accounts allow no role for the 
father’s distinctive form in causing the child’s traits. I don’t see why this should be the case. Consider the example 
of eye-color. According to V.1, it is a result of the quantity of liquid in the eye—the more liquid the darker the eye. 
What is to prevent a father’s form from including some characteristic (e.g., a certain shape of the eye cavity) which 
has as a necessary consequence the accumulation of a lot of liquid in the eyes? (For Balme’s own response to this 
sort of objection see his 1990 51.) Turning now to the second point of disagreement, Cooper identifies the 
essence/accident distinction with the distinction between characteristics caused by the form and characteristics 
caused by the matter. Thus, for him, my eye-color is accidental but the shape of my face essential. In this way 
Cooper maintains a very traditional view of the relations between form and matter on the one hand and essence and 
accident on the other. The tradition regards form and matter as wholly distinct causal components the former 
causing the characteristics common to the species, the latter the characteristics distinctive to the individual. Cooper 
agrees, but includes some distinctive traits with the form because of the differences he recognizes between the forms 
of members of a single species. Balme cannot take this position because he includes features that are normally 
considered accidental as part of an organism’s form and because he does not think that matter and form have the 
kind of independence that would be required to draw the essence/accident distinction in the traditional manner. I 
discuss his view of the essence-accident distinction (and Lennox’s development of it) below. Though the two points 
on which Balme and Cooper disagree are related as we have seen, they are separable. In principle, one could agree 
with Cooper that eye-color is not inherited while maintaining (with Balme and Lennox) that the inherited traits 
which distinguish one man from another (such as, perhaps, shape of nose) are accidents. Also, there is a way to hold 
that seminal motions convey some characteristics which are not parts of the father’s form (and which would 
therefore qualify as accidental on Cooper’s view). This last position, constitutes an objection to the argument for 
individual forms on which Balme and Cooper agree, and I take it up in this connection below.  
97 History of Animals IX.1 608a19-b19 discusses the differences between males and females in terms of the more 
and the less.  
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of similarity, the relationship between things that, though they “have the same form and are {the 
sort of} things in which more and the less occurs”, “are neither more nor less” (1054b7-9). 
Nicomachean Ethics VIII.1 (1155b11-16) also contains evidence of quantitative difference 
between the members of a form. There Aristotle counters an argument that, because friendship 
differs in the more and the less, it must be one in form; he notes that more-and-less differences 
can also occur between things that differ in form, thus acknowledging that they do occur between 
the members of a form.98  
We find quantitative variation between form members also in Topics I.7. After discussing 
sameness in number, in form, and in kind, Aristotle entertains and rejects another possible 
variety of sameness:  
It might seem that  the manner in which water from the same spring is called {the 
same} differs from the aforementioned manners {of being the same}; nevertheless 
it is such as to be in the same group as the things that are called the same 
somehow in accordance somehow with a single form. For they are kindred 
(συγγενῆ) and are nearly alike each other. For, every {quantity of} water is said to 
be the same in form as every {other quantity of water} because it has a certain 
similarity (τινὰ ὁμοιότητα), and water from the same stream is no different except 
that it is a more vehement similarity. That’s why we don’t separate it from the 
things that are called {the same} somehow in accordance with a single form. 
(103a14-23) 
It is only because water is supposed to be an uncuttable form that the suggestion of a 
fourth variety of sameness has any plausibility; it is because water is uncuttable that water from a 
single stream cannot be a form of water as man is a form of animal. Therefore, in this passage 
Aristotle identifies the sameness of the members of an uncuttable form with a similarity that 
admits of degrees, such that there can be a more vehement version of the similarity than is 
required for sameness-in-form.99 
                                                 
98 This example and the last are cited by Lennox (1987b 354 n. 37). 
99 Read in this way the passage denies that sameness-in-form requires the sharing of any identical characteristics and 
therefore is a rejection of forms as immanent universals, but there is an alternative reading. Metaphysics Δ.9 
(1018a15-18) and I.3 (1054b11-13) tell us that things are similar if they have more affections the same than 
different, and if this is the sense of “similar” being used in the Topics passage, it is compatible with forms’ being 
immanent universals. Any two quantities of water would count as the same in form because they share an identical 
universal form, and two quantities of water from the same spring would also share additional identical features. Still, 
I don’t think this is the most natural way to take the Topics passage, especially since (as mentioned above) 
Metaphysics I.3 (1054b7-9) gives us a sense of similarity that is tied to more-and-less difference. If samples of water 
differ in the quantitative specification of the very traits that make them qualify as water and samples from the same 
spring are quantitatively alike, then it would be quite natural to describe their sameness as a more vehement form of 
the relationship that makes all water the same-in-form. Saying this is less natural on the other sense of “similar”, 
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2.4.2 Balme and Lennox on the uncuttability of the uncuttable forms 
If the members of an uncuttable form differ from one another quantitatively, as the forms of a 
kind do, what becomes of the distinction between sameness-in-form and sameness-in-kind? 
What makes the uncuttable forms uncuttable? Balme and Lennox answer that when one 
successively divides an animal kind into narrower and narrower forms, one eventually reaches a 
point after which further determinations of the animals’ characteristics become insignificant to 
their lives and do not figure in or admit of teleological explanations.100 It is at this point that 
further specification of differences ceases to reveal the essence of anything and division 
terminates in an uncuttable form.101 
To use an example that Lennox develops,  forms of bird differ in (amongst other things) 
the lengths of their legs, the lengths of their necks, and the shapes of their beaks, but these three 
differences are not independent of one another. It is no accident, for example, that swamp-
dwelling birds, which have long legs, have correspondingly long necks and broad beaks. The 
birds need the long legs to wade through their environment; and, given the length of their legs, 
they need long necks to reach the ground, where they use their broad beaks to dig food out of the 
mud.102 Thus, the several features, along different axes, which distinguish a given form of 
animal from the others in its kind constitute “a fully coordinate set of structures and activities” 
suited to its particular life and environment.103  Contrast this with an individual crane. His neck 
may be slightly longer than the necks of some members of his form, and slightly shorter than the 
                                                                                                                                                             
because the similarity of the samples from the same spring would be less intimately connected to the relationship in 
virtue of which all water is one. 
100 Teleological causation is the relevant form of causation because we are talking here about animals, in which 
teleology is the dominant sort of causation. In other domains the essence may be determined by some other sort of 
causality. (On this point, see Balme 1990 50-51.) 
101 Balme 1987c 298 and Lennox 1985 80-81 and 1987b 353-358. Though I treat Balme and Lennox as a unit, they 
differ in certain respects. Most importantly, Lennox’s treatment of the relation between kinds, forms, and individuals 
is more developed and (I think) more consistent than Balme’s. (I discuss what I take to be the inconsistency in 
Balme’s version of the position below in n. 1151.) For this reason, I primarily follow Lennox in my discussion. Also 
Balme denies that Aristotle’s biology was “essentialist” whereas Lennox thinks Aristotle’s position constitutes a 
kind of essentialism. I think this difference is primarily terminological. Both reject the traditional, Moderate Realist, 
interpretation of zoological forms, and both think there is an ontological basis for animal groupings and, in 
particular, for the uncuttability of the uncuttable forms. Whether a view of the sort they both attribute to Aristotle 
qualifies as “essentialist” depends on what we should mean by “essentialist”, and this depends partly on the history 
of that term in philosophy and biology—issues which need not concern us here.  
102 Parts of Animals IV.12 693a15-17 and 694b12-16. See Lennox’s discussions in 1987b 356 and 1985 80-81. 
103 Lennox 1987b 358. 
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necks of other members, likewise with the width of his beak. While there is a teleological 
explanation why crane-range leg-lengths go along with crane-range beaks-widths, there is no 
such explanation why a neck of this absolutely determinate length should be found in a bird with 
a beak of this absolutely determinate width. The conjunction of these determinate characteristics 
is either a matter of chance or else due to an efficient cause (if the characteristics were both 
inherited from the father) or a material cause (e.g., if the characteristics are all results of being 
earthy).104 If the neck-length and beak-width are heritable (as at least some such characteristics 
are), then they constitute part of the particular crane’s form, but differences at this level of 
specificity between him and other cranes do not constitute otherness-in-form because they are 
teleologically irrelevant.105 Lennox explains: 
Every individual of a kind will have its organs and tissues completely 
differentiated—they will have a precise hardness or softness, texture, hue, 
temperature, viscosity, width, length, and so on. But there will only be a range of 
these precisely determined qualities relevant to the organism’s life. Individuals 
which differ within this range do not differ essentially or in form, but only 
‘incidentally’. Two individuals may be one in form while having every qualitative 
property instantiated to a different degree within the appropriate range. But these 
individuating differences will not be relevant to a functional account of the 
organism’s nature…  
If to be one in form is to be indivisible in account in the way specified, then 
numerically many individuals will be indistinguishable with respect to that 
account. If that account names only teleological features, those individuals will be 
identical with respect to those features required for each of them to exist. Those 
features, however, will vary from individual to individual in ways which do not 
entail altering their functions in ways crucial to the organism’s life. Such variation 
between individuals is compatible with their being one in form. (1985 81-2) 
To support this view of essence, both Balme and Lennox point to Generation of Animals 
V.1, which limits teleological explanation to (determinable) features common to all the members 
of species: 
About these {viz. eye-color, height, voice-pitch and qualities hair or feathers} and 
such things, we must no longer think that there is the same manner (τρόπον) of 
cause. For whichever features (ἔργα) are neither common to nature nor distinctive 
of the particular kind, none of these either are or are generated for the sake of 
                                                 
104 It follows that it is possible to give explanation of such determinate characteristics, along the lines given in 
Generation of Animals V, but these will not be explanations of why some kind of animal should possess the relevant 
characteristic, but rather why any animal should possess it, if its matter happens to be constituted in a certain way. 
105 Balme 1987b 298.  
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anything. For, while the eye is for the sake of something, {its being} blue is not 
for the sake of anything, unless the affection is a distinguishing characteristic of 
the kind. In some{animals}, it is not connected with the account of the οὐσία; but, 
since it comes to be by necessity, one must reduce (ἀνακτέον) {it} to the matter 
and the moving principle. (778a30-6) 
Thus each thing is for the sake of something; through this cause and through the 
remaining {causes} everything is generated that either belongs in the account of a 
particular thing, or is what the thing is for the sake of, or else is for the sake of 
something. And, whatever generation there is amongst things that are not such, 
the cause of such things must be sought in their movement and in their generation, 
since the differences occur in the very composition  (σύντασις) {of the animal}. 
For, while it has an eye from necessity (for an animal is supposed to be such), 
though such an eye is from necessity, it is not from the same necessity but another 
manner {of necessity}: that it is such as to act such by nature or to be affected. 
(778b10-19) 
  
2.4.3 Sameness in kind revisited 
If Balme and Lennox are correct that an uncuttable form coheres into a unit in the same way that 
a kind does, with its only distinction being its indivisibility, then forms are a limiting case of 
kinds, and the indivisibility of these forms tells us something significant about the sameness-in-
kind relationship. 
We observed earlier that commensurability (or difference in the more and the less) is a 
necessary condition for sameness-in-kind, but now we can see that it is not sufficient. There also 
needs to be a causal unity between the various commensurable features. So we can speculatively 
analyze Aristotelian sameness-in-kind as follows: 
A set of objects are the same in kind when there is a set of ranges along “more-
and-less” continua such (1) that each object has a characteristic within the 
relevant range along each continuum and (2) being within the relevant range 
along each continuum is causally connected to being within the relevant range 
along each other continuum.  
The kind then, can be seen as a field, constituted by commensurability and causal 
relations, which can be subdivided into smaller fields. This field is the intelligible matter out of 
which the forms are generated by this process of subdivision. An uncuttable form is a field that 
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contains no subfields of the appropriate sort, and so cannot serve as intelligible matter for a 
division. No narrower concept is possible, because the result of any further attempted division 
would lack the unity among its characteristics necessary for it to function as a term in a 
proposition. 
2.4.4 An objection to the embryological argument 
If a given characteristic, say snubness of nose, can be inherited from father to child, it must be in 
some sense a formal rather than a material feature, but must this mean that the characteristic is 
included in the father’s form—that it is a component of that very form which makes the father a 
man rather than a heap of flesh and bone? Why couldn’t the father possess both the form of man 
and also a distinct form for snubness? Aristotle sometimes uses “form” quite broadly to denote 
any characteristic acquired in a change. If the father causes his child to be snub-nosed, it will be 
by passing the snub-nosed form onto him; therefore the father must have a snub-nosed form, but 
this needn’t mean that the father’s form itself includes being snub-nosed and differs on this 
account from the form of his roman-nosed neighbor.  
In general, each man may possess, in addition to the form that makes him the οὐσία he is, 
any number of accidental forms, which he possesses not qua being a certain οὐσία but qua being 
made of a certain parcel of matter. Though these accidental forms would be describable in some 
contexts as forms, and though they would be the sort of thing that can be conveyed to offspring 
through seminal motions, they would not be part of the man’s form. If this is correct, then the 
form that makes a given man the οὐσία he is could after all be a universal human form shared by 
all men. Each man could possess (and pass on) both the human form and the many accidental 
forms that distinguish him from other men. One might draw support for this view from 
Aristotle’s talk of there being motions, rather than a motion, in the semen, and from the fact that 
he distinguishes between the different powers (δυνάμεις) in the semen corresponding to different 
traits that can be passed on (767b24ff).106  
                                                 
106 This argument is related to one made by G.E.R. Lloyd (1990 21ff). He responded to Balme that that a father can 
pass his distinguishing characteristics to his offspring qua efficient cause  rather than qua formal cause. However, 
Lloyd stresses the fact that the efficient cause need not always possess the form it imparts in a change. To use 
Lloyd’s own example:  an oven can cook eggs into a soufflé though the oven does not possess a soufflé-form. As the 
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This position becomes implausible, however, when one considers in detail what it would 
mean. The human form must include having a nose—not just any nose but a human nose, which 
differs from the noses of other animals in size, shape, and other features along more-or-less 
continua. Men’s noses differ from one another along these same continua: Cyrano’s nose is 
longer than Christian’s and a snub nose is differently shaped than a roman nose. The view we’re 
entertaining would have to hold that the human-form is responsible for getting a particular man’s 
nose within the range of human noses and that, after it has done this, another form steps in to 
cause the nose to assume its particular place within this range. This is a strangely 
unparsimonious theory and it is not the most natural reading of Aristotle’s text. It is more 
plausible to hold that the precise shape of a man’s nose is caused by the precise form-conveying 
motion communicated by his father, and that this shape falls within a certain range because the 
motion also fell within a certain range.  
Moreover, although Aristotle does sometimes speak of multiple movements and of 
different powers in the semen, his treatment emphasizes the unity of these movements and 
powers rather than their distinctness. Consider the following passages, for example: 
So it’s especially natural for {the motion or potential}  due to maleness (ᾗ ἄρρεν) 
and {the motion or potential} due to the father (ᾗ πατὴρ) to master or be mastered 
simultaneously; for the difference is small, so it’s no task for both to result 
simultaneously—for Socrates is a man of a certain sort (ἀνὴρ τοιόσδε τις). That’s 
why, for the most part, the males are like their father and females like their 
mother—for {in this last case} {1} displacement came about simultaneously for 
                                                                                                                                                             
oven makes the soufflé by cooking it rather than through being a soufflé itself, so the father may make the child 
have a snub-nose through causing certain motions in the embryo rather than through himself being snub-nosed. I 
think Lloyd’s argument is besides the point. The explanandum in IV.3 is resemblance of children to their parents. So 
ex hypothesi the father is snub-nosed, and what must be explained is how his being snub-nosed (rather than merely 
some motion imparted by him) causes his child to be so. The seminal motion is only relevant insofar as it serves as a 
conduit for his snub-nosed form. Indeed seminal motions are postulated precisely as means of form-transference. 
Moreover, even in the soufflé case, the oven as efficient cause passes something that it itself has into the eggs: heat. 
As a consequence of some of their material features, the eggs respond to this heat by becoming a soufflé. The 
motions in the semen are analogous to the oven’s heat (indeed they’re a kind of heat), but it is only very specific 
motions that cause that which can be “cooked” into a man to develop a snub rather than a roman nose. These very 
same motions in the father’s blood cause the nutrient he eats to be “cooked” in such a fashion that he continues to 
exist as the snub-nosed man he is. So if these motions are reproduced in the child’s blood through the semen it is the 
father’s snubness of nose that it passed on, with the seminal motions serving as a tool to produce this form in the 
child. In the same way, the oven when it passes heat into eggs, serves as a tool by which the cook reproduces in the 
eggs the soufflé-form that he has in his soul. Because IV.3’s explanandum is the resemblance to the father and not 
(e.g.) the child’s snub-nose as  such, the chapter’s question is analogous to that of how the cook causes the soufflé 
not how the oven or the heat causes it. (Questions of the latter sort are addressed in V.)  The primary value of 
Lloyd’s argument, in my opinion, is the questions it raises about the nature of efficient causes and form-
transference. Reflection on these questions leads to the question of what makes the many features reproduced 
through (seemingly distinct) seminal motions qualify as a single form reproduced rather than many distinct forms.  
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both {the male way and the paternal way}, and {2}, while female is opposite to 
male, the mother is opposite to the father, and {3} displacement is into the 
opposites. But if, while the movement from the male masters, the {movement} 
from Socrates does not master, or if the latter {movement} does {master}, while 
the former doesn’t, then it results that males come to be resembling the mother, 
and females resembling the father. (768a22-27) 
The patient displaces {the affecting thing} and is not mastered, either through a 
deficiency of the potency of the concocter and mover or through the abundance 
and coldness of what is being concocted and defined; for, while the mover, 
mastering here but not there, makes the conception (συνιστάμενον)  multi-shaped, 
as happens in the case of athletes through their overeating—for due to the 
quantity of the food, the nature is not able to master it so that it grows 
proportionately and remains the same shape; the parts become other  (ἀλλοῖα), 
sometimes almost so much that none looks like it did before. (768b25-32) 
Notice that, though the movements that make the offspring resemble Socrates are 
distinguished from the movements that make the offspring male, the difference between them is 
said to be small, and the resemblance to Socrates is treated as a unitary thing, rather than as a set 
of independent characteristics. Why would this be if, in addition to the human form, Socrates 
transmits a host of accidental forms? In the second quote we see that a special explanation is 
required for the fact that a form can master in one part but not another. Presumably the 
explanandum here is supposed to be how a child can have, e.g., its father’s eyes and its mother’s 
nose. That an explanation is required shows that Aristotle thinks of the transmitted motions as a 
unity carrying a single form. Whenever motions or powers of motions are distinguished, 
Aristotle guards against the implication that they are entirely distinct. He treats the set of 
movements emanating from the father as a single, if multi-aspectual, form-conveying efficient 
cause. This cause can succeed or fail to master the matter in any of several respects, but it 
remains one motion-set that has these several successes and failures. 
For these reasons, I think Balme and Cooper are right to read the Generation of Animals 
as maintaining that the movements contributed by the father to generation convey a single form 
which is distinctive to him.107 When I refer to “particular forms” henceforth I will mean forms of 
the sort required by this theory, and I will assume that such forms are related to one another and 
to the uncuttable forms in which they fall in the ways described by Balme and Lennox. I turn 
                                                 
107 I say of the Generation of Animals as a whole and not just of IV.3, though some commentators (e.g., Furth 1988 
133-7, 1990) have argued that the IV.3 is an anomalous chapter. For a response to this argument see Balme 1987c 
293 n. 14. 
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now to the question of whether particular forms so conceived are consistent with the texts that 
are usually called upon to show that Aristotelian forms are universals. 
2.4.5 Can any particular forms interpretation be maintained? 
In essence, there are two main reasons to think that forms must be universal rather than 
particular: (1) forms can be defined, but definition is always of the universal rather than the 
particular; (2) sometimes Aristotle identifies form-matter composites with particulars and their 
forms with universals. 
 To deal with both issues, it will be helpful to distinguish between what I’ll call the 
“logical” and “physical” senses of “form”—the senses in which it is customary to use “species” 
and “form” respectively as translations for εἶδος. Balme and Lennox stress the relation between 
the two senses. In the logical sense, form is the determination of a kind (or genus) into a species. 
In the physical sense, it is the determination of matter into an actual thing. In each sense, form is 
the determination of a determinable; it is what something actually is considered in contrast to 
alternative possibilities admitted logically by its kind or physically by its matter. Moreover the 
same thing is often form in both senses. The human form is what determines the kind animal into 
the form man, and it is what actualizes human matter into a man.  
When I say that the human form actualizes human matter into a man, I’m speaking about 
man in general. If I ask what actualizes Socrates’ particular matter into Socrates, the answer is 
Socrates’ form, and if this form is a particular, it differs qualitatively from Callias’.  There 
remains, however, an important way in which Socrates’ form is the same as Callias’—for 
Socrates and Callias’ are the same in form. It follows from the conception of essence discussed 
in the last section that this sameness-in-form does not consist in the two men sharing a 
determinate identical characteristic or element. Instead, it consists in their being determinably 
alike at the lowest level of determination at which each of them remains a teleological unity 
rather than an aggregate of accidentally related characteristics. Socrates’ whiteness and the 
snubness of his nose are parts of one unitary οὐσία, but only qua determinations of wider, 
essentially human determinable characteristics. Considered as  Socrates’ distinctive form—
which he can pass on to his children—Socrates’ form is particular and absolutely determinate; 
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but, considered as an essence, Socrates’ form is καθόλου and determinable—indeed its 
universality may be said to consist in its very determinability. It is only insofar as it is an 
instance of the relevant determinable that Socrates’ form is a unity, and only as a unity that it 
counts as a single form unifying his matter, rather than as a host of distinct characteristics 
possessed by (portions of) that matter. 
Thus it becomes a subtle question whether it is the determinable human form or the 
determinate Socratic form that makes Socrates the οὐσία he is. The answer cannot be either the 
determinable or the determinate form simpliciter. It must be the determinate Socratic form qua 
determination of the human form. In most contexts, if asked what Socrates’ form is, we would 
have to respond with an account of the determinable human form. There are two reasons for this. 
First, Socrates’ form is a unity just insofar as it is a determination of the human form. Second, 
and in part because of this, we do not have words in which we could describe Socrates’ particular 
form as such. To give an account of it, one would need to list his many characteristics. Even if an 
exhaustive list could be produced, it would not make clear how the characteristics constitute a 
unity.108 Thus it is doubtful that there could be any such thing as an account of Socrates’ 
distinctive form.109 What Socrates is can only be formulated universally, but this need not mean 
that his form is itself universal—that it is identical to the other forms covered by the same 
universal account.110 
The subtlety of this account and the ambiguity it reveals in the question about whether 
Socrates has a particular form (or essence or definition) recommends it as an interpretation, for 
we should expect Aristotle’s view on this issue to be difficult and nuanced. Consider the role of 
                                                 
108 On this issue (though in somewhat different terms) see Posterior Analytics I.24. 
109 On this point, I am disagreeing with Balme. See n. 115 below. 
110 As Lennox has suggested in private correspondence, this point can be reinforced by considering a possible 
objection: “What if it were the case that the bios of each individual of a species were subtly different in every crucial 
respect; for example each member of a species of salamander were keyed into slightly different prey, leading to 
slightly different vision, digestion, locomotion, etc.?” As this case is formulated, the life-styles and attributes of the 
differences within the salamander-ranges along different axes are distributed not randomly, but systematically in a 
way teleologically unified by a subtly different salamander life-styles. On the view I’m advocating, if this is the 
case, then salamander would not be an uncuttable form; rather, each individual salamander (along with any others 
that happened to be just like him) would constitute his own uncuttable form. For the very uncuttability of a form 
consists in the fact that these sort of systematic causal connection cannot be found between further determinations of 
its attributes. Since Aristotle seems to think that the uncuttable forms are narrow types rather than individual 
specimens, this interpretation of uncuttability would be ruled out if the evidence was that Aristotle thought that the 
differences between the individual specimens admitted of this sort of systematic explanation, but there is no 
evidence that he held this, and the explanations he gives in Generation of Animals V give us every sign that he 
thought the contrary.  
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the question in the Metaphysics. Z.13 ends in perplexity over whether οὐσίαι can be defined, 
suggesting that they can in one way but not in another. This suggestion is not further developed 
in Z, which concludes without any substantive solution to the ἀπορία. However, Z.17’s “fresh 
start” paves the way for a solution by reminding us that, as metaphysicians searching for the 
principles of being, we should be thinking of οὐσίαι as causes. With this orientation in mind, and 
now with more context, it is worth looking again at the Λ.5 passage that is generally regarded 
providing the strongest evidence for particular forms in the Metaphysics. 
Further one must see that, while some {causes and principles} can be stated 
(εἰπεῖν) universally, others cannot. Indeed, of everything, the first principles 
(πρῶται ἀρχαὶ) are the first this in actuality (τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρωτον τοδὶ) and {2} 
another {this} in potentiality (ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει).  So, then, these are not 
universals;111 for the particular is a principle of particulars; for man {is the 
principle} of man universally, but there is none; for Peleus {is the principle} of 
Achilles, and your father of you, and this B of this BA, but B {is the principle} of 
BA simpliciter. Therefore if indeed the {principles} of οὐσίαι are {their} causes 
and elements, but other {principles are causes or elements} of other things,  as has 
been said, {the principles} of what is not in the same kind—of colors, of sounds, 
of οὐσίαι, of qualities—{are different from one another} except by analogy; and 
the {principles} of things that are in the same form are other, not in form but 
because of different particulars—{there’s} both your matter and form and mover 
and mine, but their universal account is the same. (Metaphysics Λ.5 1071a17-29) 
Most of the discussion of this passage has focused on the (seeming) claim at 1017a27-9 
that different people have different formal causes in addition to their different material and 
efficient causes, but the preceding lines are at least as interesting.112 The passage is part of a 
more general discussion of whether the causes or principles of different things are the same or 
different. Our quote begins with the point that some causes can be stated (εἰπεῖν) universally. 
The context suggests that the cases Aristotle has in mind are those in which the causes are one in 
form or kind rather than merely one by analogy, but, whichever cases he’s talking about, it is 
significant it is only the statement of the causes that is said to be universal. We’re told that (in 
these cases at least) there are not any universals as such. 
                                                 
111 Or: “the universals do not exist”. 
112 I say “(seeming) claim”, because it is controversial whether the possessive pronouns at 1071a28 and 29 apply to 
the form and mover or only to the matter. See Konstan and Ramelli 2006 for a useful summary of the controversy 
and for philological considerations in favor of the narrower construal. I think the context requires the wider 
construal. We have just been given the example of different fathers as an example of different causes, and fathers are 
moving causes, so it would be odd for the moving cause of two (non-brothers) to now be treated as the same. And it 
does no good to say that it is the same universally because the point of the passage, on the whole, is that the 
statement of a cause can be universal even when there are different particular causes in different particular cases. 
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The upshot of this is that universality is a way of stating beings, especially causes. For all 
Aristotle says here, it may be the only way in which causes can be stated, and we have reason to 
think that this is the case. But, indispensable as they are as a means of expression, universals are 
not themselves beings, causes, or principles. This reading coheres nicely with beginning of 
Posterior Analytics I.11: 
It is not necessary that there be forms or some one thing besides the many if there 
is to be demonstration; however it is necessary that it be true to state (εἰπεῖν) one 
thing of many; for there will not be a universal if this is not so, and if there is not 
a universal, there will not be a middle, so that there won’t be a demonstration. 
Therefore, there must be some one and the same thing applying to many non-
homonymously. (75a5-9)113 
Demonstration is, for Aristotle, our means of comprehending things in light of their 
causes, and we’re told that it requires not existing forms—i.e., moderate realist universals—but 
only the ability to state one thing truly of many, and he implies that universals derive from such 
truths, rather than the reverse. 
The key term in these passages is “εἰπεῖν”, which significantly is also the verb Plato uses 
at Meno 77a6 where he has Socrates ask Meno to “state of virtue as a whole what it is” (“κατὰ 
ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν”). It is a linguistic word, but Aristotle’s point needn’t be 
merely linguistic. Evidently something is stated universally when the universal λόγος of multiple 
things is the same, and “λόγος” does not just mean speech. The point must be that certain beings, 
and, in particular principles and causes can only be formulated, thought, or conceived 
universally.114  Putting aside for the time being questions of the relation between thought and 
language, the outlines of the position are clear: though (at least some) causal accounts are 
formulated universally, the causes they describe are particular beings that cause other particular 
beings. Thus, Z.17’s advice to consider forms and οὐσίαι as causes may require considering 
them universally, and Λ.5 shows us that we can do this even if the forms and οὐσίαι  are not 
                                                 
113Modrak overlooks this passage, amongst others, when she writes that 
Aristotle makes no attempt to derive the capacity for reasoning from the ability to apprehend 
universals—although a case can be made that a creature lacking universal concepts would be 
unable to draw inferences. (2001 252) 
Aristotle’s point here is that universals are necessary for demonstration, because they are required as middle terms 
for deduction. And the Prior Analytics as a whole can be taken as a treatise on the role of universals in deduction 
and of deduction in all forms of reasoning.  
114 And, indeed, Aristotle tells us just this about causes in Posterior Analytics I.31, where we learn (amongst other 
things) that “the universal is honorable because it reveals the cause” (88a5-6). 
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themselves universals, because universality is (or at least can be) a feature of our mode of 
describing something, rather than a feature of the thing itself. 
If the preceding is correct, it is not difficult to understand why Aristotle would often 
identify form with universality, even if he thinks of forms as particulars. However, it may remain 
surprising that he should account for a thing’s particularity by citing its matter as he does. The 
most notable example is the passage from Metaphysics Z.8 mentioned several times above. Here 
it is in context: 
Consequently it’s clear that there’s no need to construct a form as a model (for 
they were sought in these cases {viz. those of animals} most of all—for these 
things are most of all substances) but the generator is sufficient for production and 
is the cause of the form’s being in the matter; but already {there’s} the full thing, 
such a form in this flesh and bone, Callias and Socrates; and, while they’re 
different through the matter (for it’s different) they’re the same in form (for the 
form is uncuttable). (1034a2-8) 
Balme points out that the passage says that Socrates and Callias differ through rather than 
in their matter.115 This could mean that there are material (and efficient) causes for the difference 
                                                 
115 Balme 1987c 305. Balme’s own account of the passage is brief and enmeshed in an exploration of the possibility 
that a full definition and demonstration can be given of a particular at a given moment, including all of its matter. He 
writes: 
If the differentiae are all applied together to the genus, as Aristotle says they should be (643b24), 
they can only be applied disjunctively, for as he often points out the genus divides into opposed 
differentiae: fish is not simultaneously scaly and not-scaly, but either/or. The material accidents 
could be added in the same way: man is blue-eyed or brown-eyed or… The definition would be of 
human, common to both Socrates and Callias, and at the same time it would define each 
individually if certain disjunctives were selected in each case. If the differentiae that are 
particularly applicable to Socrates were proved by a causal explanation, then the result would be a 
rigorous apodeixis of Socrates’ own form, as perceived in a certain moment in the changing 
actualization of his matter. The definition itself would be both general and particular, and it would 
still be true to say that Socrates and Callias are the same in form. They differ because that form 
has been actualized in separate and different proximate matters, so that each has an individual 
form. Aristotle does not say that they are other in matter but because of matter (1034a7). 
Otherness must be formal, even when it is caused by matter and movement. (1987c 304-5) 
Balme goes on to note that Aristotle never does engage in this sort of division below the level of the uncuttable 
forms but instead treats the details as a result of “bringing matter into the account” and cites Generation of Animals 
V.1 to the effect that Aristotle proceeds in this manner because below the level of the uncuttable forms 
distinguishing features are not “teleologically necessary to the animal” but “due only to matter and movement”. 
Balme thinks that nevertheless it would be possible at least in principle to perform the rigorous demonstration of 
Socrates form (including his matter) at a given moment, and that there is something optional about the tack Aristotle 
takes here. But I don’t think this is right. If the snubness of Socrates’ nose is not teleologically united with his other 
characteristics, then, even if the snubness can be demonstrated from its material or efficient cases, its co-occurrence 
with the other characteristics will be an indemonstrable, chance event. Even if some set of Socrates’ distinguishing 
characteristics could be demonstrated of him qua possessor of a certain type of material nature (e.g., if they turn out 
to be effects of being unusually dry), these features would remain accidental to him qua unity and so accidental to 
him as the οὐσία that he is. A complete definition of Socrates’ individual form that included his accidents would 
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between Socrates and Callias but no formal or final cause for the difference. Of course, each 
individual characteristic in which Socrates differs from Callias will have a formal cause, and 
these causes may be part of Socrates’ particular form; however, insofar as one of Socrates’ 
characteristics differs from the corresponding characteristic in Callias, there will be no final 
cause for Socrates’ possession of it, and in particular there will be no final-causal unity between 
it and Socrates’ other characteristics. There will be no single account of why the determinable 
human form is determined in Socrates in the distinctive way it is along all the various axes along 
which it is determined. At the level of specificity at which Socrates differs from Callias’, each of 
Socrates characteristics will have to be explained separately by material and efficient causes, 
even though these same traits, considered less determinately, are teleologically explicable, and 
even though the very same cause is at work at both levels of determination, because the unity of 
this (multi-aspectual) cause is obscured when it is stated too determinately.116 
I am not entirely satisfied with this reading of the Z.8 passage. It makes Aristotle’s point 
remarkably subtle for something that is never made fully explicit. However, I know of no 
reading that sits perfectly with all of the texts, and I think this reading sits with the sum of them 
better than any other. If we accept this account, we needn’t suppose that Aristotle has all its 
subtleties in mind whenever he speaks of forms as universals and composites as differing 
through their matter. He may sometimes treat the form of man as though it were an immanent 
universal, for the sake of simplicity. Aristotle regularly uses simplified examples that he regards 
as factually incorrect. Most notably, he does not think that “biped animal” is the definition of 
man, that bronze spheres are οὐσίαι, or that thunder is caused by the extinguishing of fire in the 
clouds.117 
                                                                                                                                                             
lack the unity proper to a definition: the ultimate determination of each of the determinable human characteristics 
would be unified with each of the determinable under which it falls, but it would not be unified with the ultimate 
determinations along the other axes. It is not clear to me how Balme’s manner of bringing matter into the 
explanation is supposed to cohere with the idea of particular forms of the sort that he thinks fathers pass on through 
the motions in their seamen. He speaks as though the human form as a complex set of disjunctions existed in every 
man and that each man’s constituent matter is responsible for which disjuncts are actualized; but, if this were right, 
the father could not pass on his distinctive features without passing on his matter.  
116 One can, of course, explain the resemblance between child and parent considered as a resemblance. That’s what 
IV.3 does. What one cannot unitarily explain is the of conjunction (in either father or son) of the specific 
characteristics in which the holistic resemblance consists. 
117 See Meteorology II.9, where Aristotle gives his own account of thunder and rejects the view that it is due to the 
extinguishing of fire in the clouds, which view he attributes to Empedocles and Anaxagoras.  
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2.5 UNIVERSALS AS INTELIGIBLE MATTER 
I have argued that the relationship between the members of an Aristotelian kind is such that 
kinds cannot be immanent universals, and I have presented an interpretation of Aristotelian 
forms on which they do not differ from kinds in the respects that exclude kinds from being 
immanent universals. If kinds and forms are intelligible matter—i.e., if they are the susceptibility 
of their members to be manipulated in certain ways in thought—, then kinds are not wholly 
mind-independent. And we have seen other evidence that Aristotle regards universality as a 
feature of the manner in which we express or understand reality rather than as a feature of reality 
in its own right. Surely there is a mind-independent basis for this way of understanding reality 
and for our being able to perform the relevant mental manipulations. But if, as we’ve seen, this 
basis consists in commensurability relations between the kind’s members (as well as causal 
relations between each members features), then it cannot be that each member possesses, qua 
member, an element or characteristic that is qualitatively identical to an element or characteristic 
in each other member. Aristotle did not, therefore, believe in the metaphysics of Moderate 
Realism. The epistemology of Moderate Realism—chiefly the theory that concepts are formed 
from perceptual data by a process of context-omission—cannot stand without this metaphysical 
basis. So Aristotle cannot have consistently held Moderate Realism. Indeed we’ve seen several 
passage in which he contemplates and rejects the position, the most notable here being 
Metaphysics H.6 and I.8 and 10. 
What Aristotle is rejecting in these passages is not only the Moderate Realist’s immanent 
universals, but, more broadly, the Realist program of accounting for the universality of 
knowledge by seeking or positing mind-independent, universal, proper objects for our concepts. 
He is an opponent of Platonic Forms including the immanent versions of them posited by other 
Academics. This inclusive notion of Platonic Form (viz. of  ἰδέα), which he employs in the 
critique of the Theory of Forms in Metaphysics A.9 and M, corresponds to the “brand-name” 
Realist sense of universal, and it is the existence of any such objects that Aristotle rejects in 
saying “goodbye” to the forms. 
Recall that Plato’s arguments for the existence of forms turned on the requirements for 
knowledge, and that Aristotle takes these arguments quite seriously. In Chapter 1, we saw 
Aristotle acknowledge that the Platonic thesis that e-knowledge requires universal objects, when 
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combined with what Aristotle takes to be powerful reasons for rejecting the existence of such 
objects, generates what Aristotle calls in Metaphysics B.4 “the hardest ἀπορία of all, and the 
most necessary to examine” (999a24-5). Aristotle gives his solution in Metaphysics M.10, by 
qualifying the premise that e-knowledge requires universal objects. 
That all knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is universal, so that it is necessary also for the 
principles of existents to be universal and not separated substances, does contain 
the greatest puzzle of those we have discussed. However, though the statement is 
true in one way, it is not true in another. For knowledge is twofold, as knowing 
(ἐπίστασθαι) also is: one is {knowing} in potentiality and the other in actuality. 
While the potential, being as matter, is universal and indefinite and is of the 
universal and indefinite, the actuality is definite and of the definite, being a 
certain this of a certain this. It is rather incidentally that sight sees the universal 
color, since the color that it sees is a color, and what the grammarian 
contemplates, a certain A, is an A. If the principles are universal, it is necessary 
for what is from them also to be universal, just as in the case of demonstration; 
but if this is so, nothing will be separate or a substance. It is clear rather that, 
while e-knowledge is universal in a way, in a way it is not. (1087a10-25) 
A distinction is drawn between ἐπιστήμη in potentiality and in actuality, and Aristotle 
maintains that only the former has universal objects. Ἐπιστήμη in actuality, is a state of the sort 
that a geometer is in when he is busy appreciating a proof, whereas ἐπιστήμη in potentiality is 
the ability to come into such a state. Normally Aristotle uses “ἐπιστήμη” to refer to the 
potentiality, as we do with our “knowledge”. A geometer, for example, knows the Pythagorean 
theorem even when he is not entertaining thoughts of it. 
In general, for Aristotle, actuality is prior to potentiality, which is to be understood in 
terms of its actualizations. Ἐπιστήμη, then, in its most fundamental sense, is the active 
contemplation of a particular in a certain way. Ἐπιστήμη in potentiality is just the ability to 
contemplate certain objects in this way. Since the actual knowing is of a particular, the 
potentiality must be an ability to know particulars, it cannot have separate universal objects. 
Rather its being “of universals” must amount to its being a single potentiality which can be 
actualized into knowing of many different things, as a single parcel of matter can be worked up 
into many different forms.  
The potentiality is “as matter” and indeterminate in that it is not in its own right any  
particular knowing, as such it is not of any particular thing. It is merely an ability to know, as 
physical matter is an ability to be something. And, as physical matter—e.g., bronze—cannot be 
actualized into anything whatsoever but can only into any of a certain set of contrary forms, so 
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ἐπιστήμη in potentiality cannot be actualized into any ἐπιστήμη whatsoever of any object 
whatsoever, but can only be actualized into ἐπιστήμη of any of member a certain set of contrary 
objects. This is what it is for it to be “of the universal and indefinite”. To be a universal then is to 
be intelligible matter.  
Notice that M.10 makes this point about all universals, not only about kinds. This 
supports my earlier provisional conclusion (following Balme and Lennox) that forms are a 
special case of kinds and enjoy the same sort of (non-realist) unity. And M.10 and the 
discussions of kinds are not the only contexts in which Aristotle casts the relation between 
universal and particular knowledge in terms of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. 
A similar move can be found also in a passage from Posterior Analytics I.24, which I will quote 
shortly. The topic of that chapter is whether partial (κατὰ μέρος) demonstrations (e.g., a 
demonstration that an isosceles triangle has an angle sum equal to that of two right angles) or 
universal ones (e.g., a corresponding demonstration with “triangle” as the minor term), are 
superior. The discussion is naturally read with Metaphysics M.10, since one of the arguments in 
favor of partial demonstrations rests on such premises as that “the universal is not something 
besides the particulars”, universal premises are “less about an existent” (περὶ ὄντος ἧττον) than 
partial ones, and universal demonstrations are about “non-existent” things and create the 
impression that they exist  (85a31-b3).118  
If I am correct in my speculations above (in §1.2.4) about the inspiration for the term 
καθόλου, then this chapter has a special relevance to Aristotle’s view of universality. Recall that 
Plato’s Socrates uses the phrase “κατὰ ὅλου” to describe the way in which he wants Meno to 
                                                 
118 The argument runs as follows:  
Again, if, while the universal is not something besides the particulars, the demonstration instills 
the belief that in accordance with which it demonstrates is some such thing and some natural thing 
that pertains among the existents (e.g. a triangle besides the several {triangles}, a figure besides 
the several {figures}, a number besides the several numbers), and a {demonstration} about an 
existent is better than one about a non-existent (βελτίων δ’ ἡ περὶ ὄντος ἢ μὴ ὄντος), and one by 
which one is not fooled {is better} than by which one is, and the universal is such—for, in 
proceeding, {universal demonstrations} show as they do with proportion: e.g., that anything that’s 
a certain such is a proposition, which {such} is neither line nor number nor solid nor plane, but 
rather about this something; now if this, while more universal, is less about an existent than the 
partial and{if} it instills a false belief, then the universal will be worse than the partial. 
Parts of Animals I.4 (644a23-b7) also considers an argument in favor of (what would amount to) partial 
demonstrations on the grounds that the uncuttable forms are or are nearer to the οὐσίαι. Interestingly the reasons it 
gives against it are more pragmatic and less a matter of epistemic principle than those given in the Posterior 
Analytics I.24.  
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state what virtue is (at Meno 77a). Meno’s earlier attempts to state what virtue is consisted in sets 
of definitions, taught to him by Gorgias, of individual virtues or virtues for types of people. 
Since Socrates is seeking a definition of virtue in order to use it as a premise in a deduction about 
whether or not virtue is teachable, Meno’s initial definitions would have led to a set of particular 
demonstrations concerning whether different virtues were teachable, and not to any universal 
knowledge of virtue—except “in the sophistic manner”, as Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics 
I.5 about someone who deduces separately about each sort of triangle that it has an angle sum 
equal to that of two right angles (74a25-32, cf. I.2 71a9). I.24 focuses on this same triangle 
example and defends Socrates approach over that of Meno and his sophist teachers. After a series 
of arguments in favor of universal demonstrations, that chapter concludes as follows: 
But some of these remarks are rationalistic (λογικός); it is most clear that the 
universal is more authoritative, because, {in} having the prior of the propositions, 
one knows {εἰδέναι} somehow also the posterior, and we have {it} potentially; 
e.g. if someone knows that every triangle {has} two rights, then {he} knows also 
that isosceles {does} because {it’s} a triangle; but one who has this premise in no 
way knows the universal, neither potentially nor actually. And while the universal 
is thinkable, the partial terminates in perception. (86a22-30) 
Here, as in Metaphysics M.10, the possessor of universal knowledge has in potentiality 
the particular knowledge subsumed by it. There are two differences. First, Aristotle does not go 
so far here as to identify the universal knowledge with a potentiality as he does in M.10, but his 
point does not require this, and he says nothing that tells against this identification. Second, in 
this passage, the contrast to universals is lower universals rather than individuals, as it is in M.10. 
However, it is because partial demonstrations are supposedly more about particulars, which are 
the only things that exist, that they are favored by the argument to which Aristotle is 
responding.119 Presumably, then, someone who knows something about animals will thereby 
know it in potentiality about Socrates as well as about man.  
                                                 
119 Also, I.24’s immediately preceding arguments in favor of the universal demonstration recalls Metaphysics’  
initial statement (in B.4) of the puzzle solved in M.10. Compare: 
Again, to whatever extent {a demonstration} is partial, it tends towards the infinite, and the 
universal [tends] towards the simple and the finite. But, while, qua infinite {things} are not 
knowable (ἐπιστητόν),  qua delimited they are knowable. Therefore things are more knowable qua 
universal than qua partial.  (Posterior Analytics I.24 86a3-8 ) 
Attached to these things {viz. principles} is the most difficult puzzle and the most necessary to 
study, to which the λόγος now turns. If there is nothing besides the particulars, and the particulars 
are infinite, how is it possible to get ἐπιστήμη of infinite things? For it is qua some one and the 
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While the Posterior Analytics I.24 passage does not provide independent evidence that 
Aristotle thinks that universal knowledge is a potentiality to which knowledge of particulars 
corresponds as the actuality, when combined with the material on kinds and matter, it does show 
that Metaphysics M.10’s  doctrine to this effect is continuous with a strand of thought running 
through a number of Aristotle’s significant discussions of universality. We can conclude from 
this doctrine that Aristotelian universals are mind-dependent, though based in mind-independent 
relations. This means that, instead of explaining the universality of thought and knowledge in 
terms of universal objects, Aristotle understood universality in terms of its role in thought and 
knowledge. Whereas Plato’s solution to the Problem of Concepts is metaphysical, Aristotle’s is 
primarily psychological and epistemological. In the remaining chapters we will look at the role 
concepts play in knowledge, their nature as psychological states, and the processes and standards 
by which they are formed. 
Based on our findings in this chapter, we can form certain expectations about what we 
will find. Since the instances of Aristotelian concepts are alternative determinations of a 
determinable, we should expect him to understand concept-formation as a process of utilizing the 
relationships between the alternative determinations to achieve a unitary awareness of them. 
Since Aristotle is concerned with the unity of each instance as well as the collective unity of the 
instances, we should expect his understanding of this process to cohere with an account of the 
factors that unify the parts of a being and of our knowledge of these factors. And, since there is 
evidence that Aristotle views universality as a feature of our means of stating or understanding 
causes, in particular, we should  expect his view of concepts to be an integrated component of a 
view of explanation. 
 
same {thing} and qua something belonging universally to it that we come to know (γνωρίζειν) 
everything. (Metaphysics B.4 999a24-9) 
3.0  ARISTOTLE ON CONCEPTUAL COGNITION 
In Chapter 1, I defined the Problem of Concepts as the question of how it is that we can have 
unitary cognitions of (or applying to) pluralities of differing objects; and in Chapter 2, I argued 
against the traditional interpretation of Aristotle’s answer to this question. In the course of doing 
so, I made a start on a positive account of Aristotle’s solution to the problem. In particular I 
explained the nature of the relationships that must hold mind-independently between instances 
for them to be embraced under a concept, and sketched in the function of concepts as a means of 
apprehending causal relationships. The task of the remaining two chapters is to continue this 
positive account. The division of labor is as follows. The present chapter treats concepts as 
mature states and describes their role in cognition. The next and final chapter treats the processes 
and methods by which concepts are formed and perfected. 
I begin where we began in Chapter 2, with De Interpretatione 1’s idea of thoughts 
without division and combination, which I now (in §3.1) trace through a set of connected texts in 
the Metaphysics and De Anima to shed light on how concepts serve as units of thought. Special 
attention is paid to those concepts which are not only undivided but indivisible, and which 
Aristotle treats as a sort of knowledge (γνῶσις). This raises more general questions about the 
nature of concepts and knowledge, which are addressed in the remainder of the chapter. §3.2 
begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s conception of γνῶσις, which it then uses to shed light first 
on the status of indivisible concepts as γνώσεις and then on their role in ἐπιστήμη. §3.3 then 
takes up the sort of γνῶσις in which concepts consist, with an emphasis on its relation to 
perception and other γνώσεις. 
Before making a start on this agenda, it is necessary to introduce and motivate some 
terminological conventions. Translation of Aristotle’s technical vocabulary can sometimes be 
more confusing than clarifying, especially where he draws distinctions between a number of 
terms that are synonymous in normal Greek. Inevitably alternative renderings proliferate, often 
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with the same English word being used for different Greek terms by different translators (or even 
by the same translator). In such cases, serious study requires thinking of the term in the Greek, so 
commentators who translate the terms impose on their readers the burden of translating back in 
their heads. Accordingly, I’ve been leaving such terms as “φρόνησις” and “νοῦς” untranslated. 
This policy works well for nouns, but it is unmanageable for verbs because of the many 
grammatical transformations they must undergo in order to function in a sentence. Thus a 
problem is presented by several verbs naturally translated “know”, which will come in for 
discussion in this chapter. 
I have found an unhappy solution, which I will resort to only in those cases where the 
grammar makes it impossible to simply retain the Greek. I will prefix  “e-”, “g-”, or “o-”, to the 
verb “know” (and its derivatives) depending on whether it stands for “ἐπίστασθαι”, 
“γιγνώσκειν”, or “εἰδέναι”.1 I take it that “γνωρίζειν” means coming into “γνῶσις”, so I usually 
translate it either “getting to g-know”, though in some contexts I do not distinguish in the 
translation between it and γιγνώσκειν.2 I use “know” without a prefix only when speaking in my 
own voice. I take it to be roughly equivalent to “γιγνώσκειν” but not to “ἐπίστασθαι”, which has 
no English equivalent (though “understand” comes close).3 The results of these policies, which 
include speaking of “e-knowledges”, “o-knowables” and “g-ignorance”, are barbarous, but 
                                                 
1 The prefixes are derived from Irwin and Fine (1995) who use the same letters as subscripts to mark the differences 
between the terms in their translations. Prefixes are more intrusive than the subscripts and this makes them more 
suitable for my purposes. Whereas subscripts subtly provide information about the Greek while enabling you to 
think of the terms in English, my purpose is to leave the words effectively untranslated while availing myself of the 
grammatical transformations possible to an English verb. 
2 Though this pair of words seems occasionally (e.g. in Physics I.1) to be used in a different relationship analogous 
to that between “ἐπίστασθαι” and “γιγνώσκειν”. 
3 On the meaning of “ἐπιστήμη” in Aristotle, especially as it relates to “γνῶσις”, see Burnyeat 1981, though I think 
he somewhat overstates the similarity between “ἐπίστασθαι” and “understand” (cf. Barnes 1994 81, Irwin 1988 530 
n. 24). Also, Burnyeat is mistaken to follow Barnes (1975 97, cf. 1993 82) in applying to Aristotle Lyons’ (1963 
177) taxonomy of the knowledge verbs in Plato, according to which “εἰδέναι” is a genus subsuming “ἐπίστασθαι”, 
“γιγνώσκειν”. This cannot be correct, because there is at least one state—viz. perception—that qualifies as γνῶσις 
but not εἴδησις (Posterior Analtytics II.19 99b38-9, I.31 87b39-a1). As opposed to both this view and Barnes’ later 
(1993 82) skepticism that Aristotle “intended or felt any semantic differences” between “εἰδέναι” and “γιγνώσκειν”, 
I think there is considerable evidence that “εἰδέναι” falls between the other two verbs in strength, being a bit 
stronger than “γιγνώσκειν” (and the normal English “know”) without being as demanding as “ἐπίστασθαι”—for one 
can have εἴδησις of an object without γνῶσις of its cause (I.2 71b10-17, II.1 89b29-31, II.8 92a35-37). If one term is 
the genus, then, it is γνῶσις, with εἴδησις being universal γνῶσις, which (unlike perception) is independent of a 
“this” and a “now” (I.31 87b30-33), and ἐπιστήμη being an εἴδησις of something by inference from its causes. 
However, while this likely gets the relation of ἐπιστήμη and εἴδησις right, I don’t think it can be quite correct for the 
relation between γνῶσις and the others, because Aristotle’s view of the relation between the perceptual and 
intellectual faculties requires that γνῶσις be a succession rather than a γενός (see below §3.2.1). 
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barbarism can be a virtue when more natural modes of expression make it difficult to avoid 
imposing alien presuppositions on a text. 
3.1 CONCEPTS AS UNITS OF THOUGHT 
In §2.1.1, De Interpretatione 1 served a bridge between the vocabulary of concepts and 
Aristotle’s texts. It will be instructive to begin again with that chapter, which I quote in full (with 
Bekker numbers at the end of each paragraph for ease of reference):  
First, we must posit what a name is and what a verb is, then what a denial, an 
affirmation, an assertion, and a λόγος are.  (16a1-2) 
Things in the voice (φωνή) are symbols of affections in the soul, and written 
things are {symbols} of things in speech. And just as written things are not the 
same for everyone, neither are vocalizations (φωναί) the same; however, the 
things of which these are primarily signs—the affections (παθήματα) of the 
soul—are the same for everyone, and the things of which these are likenesses, the 
objects (πράγματα), are the same as well. (3-8) 
These things have been discussed in the De Anima—for they belong to another 
work—but, just as in the soul there are some thoughts without truth or falsehood 
and also others to which it is necessary for one of these to belong, so too with 
vocalizations; for the false and the true are about combination and division. (8-13) 
The names themselves and the verbs are like thoughts without combination 
(σύνθεσις) and division (διαίρεσις), e.g. man or white when nothing has been 
added, for they are not yet true or false. There is a sign of this, for even goatstag 
signifies something, but it is not yet true or false, unless existence or non-
existence is added (either simpliciter or with regard to time). (13-18) 
It is the “thoughts without combination and division” that we identified with concepts. 
They make appearances in other texts as well. Aristotle refers us to the De Anima’s discussion of 
thought (III.3-8),4 and indeed in III.6 Aristotle speaks of “the thought of undivided things” and 
                                                 
4 A note to Edghill’s Oxford translation (cf. Modrak 2001 219) comments that “Great difficulty has been found in 
discovering any passage of the De Anima to which this can refer” and approves of Maier’s transposition of the 
reference to 16a13 (after ἀληθές). But there is no difficulty unless one takes the De Anima to be cited on the relation 
between words, παθήματα, and objects; and this interpretation is neither required nor recommended by the context. 
Aristotle’s stated topic is names and verbs (and later denials, affirmations, etc.). He gets purchase on these “things in 
the voice” by relating them to “παθήματα in the soul” and their objects. It is for a discussion of these παθήματα that 
he refers us to De Anima. Παθήματα (or at least πάθη) of the soul are a central topic throughout that work, being 
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tells us “the false and the true are amongst things in which there is already a sort of combining of 
thoughts” (430a26-8). The same idea can be seen also in a passage from III.8: 
But imagination (φαντασία) is different from claim or denial; for what’s true or 
false is a complex (συμπλοκὴ) of thoughts. But how will the primary thoughts (τὰ 
πρῶτα νοήματα) differ from being images (φαντάσματα)? (432a10-13) 
The context makes it clear that by “primary thoughts” Aristotle means those that, unlike 
claims and denials, are not complexes composed of other thoughts and are not, therefore, true or 
false.5 This is why the reasoning used to distinguish the claims and denials from φαντασίαι fails 
in the case of the primary thoughts.6 Such thoughts and their objects are discussed in a number 
of passages in the Metaphysics, to which we will turn after looking more closely at the material 
in De Interpretatione and De Anima. 
                                                                                                                                                             
introduced in its first chapter (at 403a3) and returned to throughout. It is clear from 16a9-10 that the specific 
παθήματα Arisotle has in mind are thoughts, which are discussed in De Anima III.4-8, and the points De 
Interpretatione 1 proceeds to about φωναί closely parallel points made in De Anima III.6 about thoughts. Kretzmann 
(1974 8-9) has argued that the παθήματα in question are φαντάσματα rather than thoughts. He points out that  in De 
Anima I.1, Aristotle includes “sensing generally” (which would presumably include φαντασία) among the πάθη of 
the soul, and argues that only if De Interpretatione 1’s παθήματα are perceptual states does the claim that they are 
likenesses of πράγματα have “a chance of being true”. This argument turns on an unduly narrow construal of 
“likening” (see Tselmanis 1985 196-8 and Charles 2000 80-82), and Aristotle’s inclusion of “sensing generally” 
amongst the πάθη counts for little since Aristotle’s next words (at 403a7-8) include thought also amongst the soul’s 
πάθη. Modrak (2001 219) agrees with Kretzmann that the talk of likening at least strongly suggests that the 
παθήματα are φαντάσματα, though she ultimately endorses a more complex view on which νοήματα must also be 
involved in signification. In support of the identification of the παθήματα with φαντάσματα, she cites De Anima II.8 
420b-27-33. This passage does establish that Aristotle thinks that φαντασία is necessary for φωνή to signify and it 
implies that some animals can signify on the basis of φαντασία without thought. However, other animals accomplish 
by φαντασία alone many things that human beings do by means of thought. And since νοήματα require φαντασία 
(for human beings at least), there is no tension between φωναί symbolizing thoughts and De Anima II.8’s claims. 
And, in my opinion, the De Interpretatione’s easy move from παθήματα to νοήματα settles the case, especially 
when taken with the naturalness of the De Anima reference if we understand the text in this way. 
5 Not so clear, however, as to be devoid of scholarly controversy. In essence, there are two competing readings: (1) 
the “primary thoughts” are the most universal ones (which I identify in §3.1.3 as indivisible); (2) the “primary 
thoughts” are the first thoughts formed from perception. The first reading was proposed by Trendelenburg (1877), 
and the second is championed by Torstrik (1970) and Ross (1961). Freudenthal (1863) and Hicks (1907) support the 
reading I assume in the text. Against the first reading, Ross and others have noted that the most universal thoughts 
are least likely to be confused with φαντάσματα. The second is  implausible because there is never any suggestion in 
Aristotle that the least universal thoughts generate more universal ones by combination and division. These and 
other considerations on all sides are weighed in great detail by Wedin (1988 125-128), who settles on the 
interpretation I regard as correct (though he then though he goes on [128-132]  to discuss some considerations of 
dubious relevance that he thinks may tip the scales for some readers in favor of the second of the two alternative 
readings. 
6 Though we needn’t stop over it here, it is worth noting the tension between the present passage’s seeming 
presupposition that only claims and denials can be true or false and III.3’s insistence that φαντασίαι can be (and 
usually are) false. (428a12, 18, b17). I suggest a resolution in n. 23 below. 
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Most of the attention given to De Interpretatione 1 has focused on 16a3-8, specifically on 
whether it presents “a theory of meaning”, and, if so, whether this theory is adequate.7 For our 
purposes it will be enough to note that the passage says that verbal items signify objects only by 
symbolizing psychological items which in turn symbolize objects and that, whereas the verbal 
items are conventional and may vary from one community to another (or perhaps even from one 
person to another), the psychological items and their objects are “the same for everyone”.  
The psychological items are soon identified with thoughts; and, when Aristotle says they 
are the same for everyone, he cannot mean that if one person thinks a certain thought everyone 
else must also do so. His point must be that, as objects exist independently of anyone’s thought 
or language, so what it is to think a certain object is determined by the nature of that object and 
(perhaps) by general psychological facts, rather than by idiosyncrasies or decisions of any 
particular person or community.  
The description of the psychological items as “likenesses” (ὁμοιώματα) of the objects 
implies that likeness is the relationship in virtue of which thoughts signify objects. Likeness 
plays a pronounced role in the De Anima and in Aristotle’s natural philosophy generally, where 
efficient causation is often analyzed as a process of “likening” or form-transference.8 
Until 16a8, Aristotle writes only of a general relation between speech, thought, and 
objects, without yet mentioning words or specifying the sorts of thoughts and objects to which 
they correspond. For all he has said, the described relation may apply only at the level of whole 
sentences or even entire bodies of discourse, or it may extend down to the level of individual 
phonemes.9 In 16a8-13 he distinguishes types of thought and of speech, by reference to whether 
they involve “combination and division” and consequently bear of truth or falsity, and in 16a13-
15 he associates “thoughts without combination or division” with individual words (specifically 
names and verbs).  
Before exploring the nature of these thoughts, it is worth noting how Aristotle’s use of 
the analogy between them and words (and, more generally, between thought and speech) differs 
from both the way such analogies are often used by contemporary philosophers of mind and to 
                                                 
7 On this topic see especially Modrak 2001 and Charles 2000. 
8 Thus Charles (2000, 80-1) reasonably takes “likeness” here to allude to a causal relation between a thought and its 
object in virtue of which the signification of the thought is fixed. 
9 There is precedent for this last sort of view in the Cratylus, where Plato suggests, e.g., that  the phoneme “ρ” 
signifies motion by being somehow like motion (426c). Aristotle has already ruled out the second conjunct of this 
suggestion but not the first. 
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the use to which I am putting the analogy in my own exegesis. Twentieth Century philosophy, 
especially in the Anglo-American tradition, was characterized by a preoccupation with language 
and a discomfort with the mental, which it regarded as occult and unscientific. In this context, 
which still colors much contemporary literature on the mind, it is natural to seek to explain 
thought (or to explain it away) by relating it to language. A striking example of this approach is 
Sellars’ “myth of Jones”, in which psychological vocabulary is only introduced into a language 
as part of a theory that there is an internal analog to speech.10 Something resembling this sort of 
reasoning can be found in ancient philosophy—for example, in Plato’s Sophist where “what we 
call διάνοια” is identified as λόγος that “occurs in the soul in conversation with itself without 
φωνή” (287e, cf. Theaetetus 190a)—, but this is not Aristotle’s own approach.11 Instead, he 
relies on a prior understanding of thought to illuminate the components of speech. The De 
Interpretation’s account refers back to the De Anima’s discussion of thought to get purchase on 
the way in which words are “without combination and division”. There is much to be said for 
Aristotle’s approach. Indeed, without some prior understanding of thought, I do not think that it 
would be possible to attain the sophisticated, self-conscious knowledge of grammar that it is now 
easy to take for granted when analyzing thought in linguistic terms.12 However, Aristotle’s use 
                                                 
10 Sellars 1961b XIV-XV. 
11 Modrak (2003) seems to be of mixed mind as to whether this was Aristotle’s approach: she writes, first, that 
“Aristotle analyses thought on a model that is developed in relation to language” (237) and, later, that “he does not 
explicate the structure of thought by appealing to that of language” (245-6). 
12 In particular, I think that the concept of “language” itself and all our linguistic knowledge presupposes 
psychological concepts. Language is sound (or some other suitable perceptible medium) structured so as to be a 
vehicle for thought and the communication of thoughts, and the concept “language” depends on a recognition of this 
fact. Of course language’s external character makes it easier to study than non-verbalized thought, and the results of 
this study can shed light on the nature of thought, but I maintain that the study of language depends on prior 
knowledge about thought and that one could learn nothing of value about language if one regarded it wholly from a 
third-person perspective as a complex of marks and noises emitted by certain animals interacting in certain 
circumstances. Much reflection in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly in the 20th Century, was motivated by 
the premise that such third-personal accounts of language are possible and indeed that they are needed to lend a 
rigorous, scientific character to talk of the mind (or else to replace it entirely). As far as I know, this premise makes 
no appearance in Greek thought, which is why I think that reasoning such as that found in the Sophist only 
resembles the contemporary approach. It is significant in this connection that Plato analogizes διάνοια to λόγος 
rather than φωνή, while Aristotle’s analogy is between thoughts and φωναί. Where λόγος is ambiguous between 
speech and thought, applying to anything with a linguistic structure (and even to some things, like ratios, which lack 
it), φωνή clearly refers to the sounds emitted. The view exemplified by Sellars can be seen as the thesis that λόγος is 
to be understood on the basis of prior knowledge of φωνή without any psychological knowledge. The Sophist 
passage doesn’t commit to any such position. It merely uses knowledge of the type of λόγος that involves φωνή to 
shed light on a type that does not. The De Interpretatione passage is closely related to this part of the Sophist, which 
includes discussion of the names and verbs and (immediately after the portion quoted above) φάσις and ἀπόφασις. 
Where Plato is neutral, Aristotle effectively comes out against the Sellars-type view by appealing to knowledge of 
the soul to explain the “things in φωνή” in virtue of which a φωνή can constitute a λόγος. 
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of the analogy is relevant to our present concerns because of the role it plays in establishing that 
what Aristotle calls “thoughts without combination or division” or “primary thoughts” are the 
same things that I, speaking in my own voice, call “concepts”. I take this identity to have been 
established in §2.1, so hereafter I will often substitute “concept” in my exposition for the longer 
Aristotelian phrases. 
3.1.1 Concepts as undivided thoughts  
So far we have seen that vocalization primarily symbolizes thought which symbolizes 
objects and that both vocalization and thought are made up of components. In the case of 
vocalization, these components are words (nouns and verbs); in the case of thought, they are 
concepts. The “combination” or “division” of these components gives rise to the alternative 
between truth and falsity, which does not apply to the components considered individually. 
Aristotle often distinguishes between concepts and assertions on the grounds that only the latter 
involve combination and division and so admit of truth or falsity. In addition to De 
Interpretatione I, the distinction can be found in De Anima III.6 (430a27-32) and III.8, and I 
have already mentioned its presence in the Metaphysics. Before turning to these texts, however, 
it is necessary to say something about the language of “combination” (σύνθεσις) and “division” 
(διαίρεσις), which is used differently in the different treatises. 
In the De Interpretatione and the Metaphysics, combination and “compounding” 
(συγκεῖσθαι) refer to the act of affirming one term of another. Thus “Man sits” would involve 
combination, whereas “Man does not sit” would not; rather it would involve division. This 
terminology is extremely unnatural if one is modeling one’s conception of thought on language, 
because a spoken denial involves no less of a combination of words than does an affirmation, 
indeed it typically involves at least one additional word. The terminology is natural, however, if 
one’s purpose is to account for truth and falsehood and one thinks of thought primarily in 
relation to its objects and only secondarily in relation to speech. If each concept stands for an 
object, then it makes sense to regard an affirmation as uniting the concepts in a manner that 
purports to correspond to a real union of the objects. The complex thought will be true if the 
objects are so united, and false otherwise. Since a denial is true precisely when the corresponding 
affirmation is false, it must represent a separation of the objects and so consist in some sort of 
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segregation of the corresponding concepts from one another. This use of the terminology of 
combination and separation is particularly suitable in the Metaphysics, where the issue of 
combination and division arises in connection with the senses of existence and non-existence that 
correspond to truth and falsehood; for example: 
…existence and non-existence are said with reference to… truth or falsehood, and 
this applies to the objects by their being compounded or divided, so that while one 
who deems the divided to be divided and the compounded to be compounded has 
truth, and one who holds {something} in opposition to the objects has falsehood 
(Θ.10 10541a34-b5) 
…existence as truth and non-existence as falsehood are dependent on combination 
and division, and these are about the partitioning of a contradiction, for truth has 
the affirmation in the case of the compounded and the denial in the case of the 
divided, whereas falsehood has the contrary of this partition. (E.4 1027b18-22) 
We can call the sort of division and combination exhibited by the objects of a denial 
“existential division” and the sense in which the concepts constituting the denial are divided 
“representational division”, likewise for the corresponding senses of combination. 
The De Anima’s alternative idiom can be seen clearly at the beginning of III.6, where 
Aristotle describes the role played by combination and division in truth and falsity: 
The n-thought of undivided things (ἀδιαιρέτων) is amongst those things about 
which there is not falsehood, while the false and the true are amongst the things in 
which there is already a sort of combining of n-thoughts as though {they were} 
one existent—just as Empedocles said “as heads of many sprouted neckless” and 
were then combined by love, so too these things, having been separate, are 
combined (e.g., the incommensurable and the diagonal) {…}. For the false is 
always in a combination; and if <someone says> “White is not white”, he 
combines <white and> “not white”; it is possible to say all these are divisions 
also. {…} It is νοῦς that makes each {combination} one. (430a26-b6)13 
Though Aristotle acknowledges the propriety of describing a denial (or perhaps any 
assertion) as a division, he here prefers to treat it as a combination involving a negative predicate 
term. This enables him to use divisional language to describe the decomposition of a complex 
thought like “Man runs” into its components (“man” and “runs”). Let’s call division in this sense 
                                                 
13 The material in angle brackets represent words added by Ross to the manuscript text. As Hamlyn suggests, I think 
the text can bear the meaning Ross wants without these emendations, though this material has to be supplied in a 
translation to make it idiomatic. The elided portions of the passage concern the way in which, in past or future tense 
assertions, time is combined. 
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“intensional division”.14 Division in this sense applies to objects as well as to thoughts, since the 
thoughts into which a given thought can be divided will have objects that stand to the initial 
object as the divided thoughts stand to the initial thought. For example, if the object of the 
thought “Man runs” is a running man, by dividing it one arrives at separate thoughts whose 
respective objects are man and running. (However, as we will see in the next section, this sort of 
division of the objects is something that can only take place in thought.) 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to make another terminological point. The words 
“διαίρετον” and “ἀδιαίρετον” are ambiguous between meaning “divided” and “undivided” on the 
one hand and “divisible” and “indivisible” on the other. Worse, these are not two fully distinct 
senses of the term. Rather, something is διαίρετον if it has parts and ἀδιαίρετον if it is unitary.15 
And, of course, there are many respects in which a thing might be said to have parts. There are 
parts into which the thing has been divided, from which it has been combined, and into which it 
could be divided, and of course, there are the various sorts of division we’ve discussed with their 
corresponding parts. Accordingly I will often leave these terms in the Greek, where there’s 
reason to preserve the ambiguity. 
We can see in the present passage that Aristotle thinks that a concept is ἀδιαίρετον 
insofar as it is not, like an assertion, composed by νοῦς from components into which it can be 
divided. However, there is a respect in which at least some concepts are intensionally διαίρετα. 
Immediately after the passage quoted above, Aristotle writes that “the ἀδιαίρετον is twofold: 
either in potentiality or in actuality”, and he illustrates this with the example of a length that can 
be, but has not yet been, divided. One thinks of the length as ἀδιαίρετον if one thinks of the 
whole length for the duration of the thought, and one thinks of it as διαίρετον if one successively 
contemplates the segments into which it could be divided, thus dividing it in thought. Aristotle 
continues:  
That which is ἀδιαίρετον not quantitatively but in form is n-thought in an 
undivided time and by an undivided {part} of the soul. (430b14-15)16  
Clearly we are meant to apply the distinction between actual and potential ἀδιαίρετα to 
things that are ἀδιαίρετον in form; and, given the context, “ἀδιαίρετον in form” must here mean 
                                                 
14 Neither of these senses of “division” should be confused with the taxonomic sense of the term (discussed in §2.2-
3) whereby a kind is divided into its forms. We will meet with two additional senses before the end of this chapter. 
15 Thus Ross, in his commentary, recommends “unitary” as a translation for “ἀδιαίρετον” in De Anima III.6. 
16 There is some controversy about where exactly these lines belong in the text, but this need not concern us here. 
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intensionally ἀδιαίρετον. Thus concepts, considered as components of assertions, are ἀδιαίρετον 
in that they function as units. 
Aristotle does think that there are absolutely indivisible concepts, which we will discuss 
later, but the implication of the present passage is that some concepts can be intensionally 
divided into components that can be recombined into assertions. There is additional evidence 
elsewhere in the corpus that this is Aristotle’s position.  
De Interpretatione 1 tells us that before “goatstag” could assert anything it would have to 
be combined with “exists”; but when we look to the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle treats 
existence claims, we find that they do not include “existence” as a term. Consider for example, 
the following demonstration that ice exists:  
What is ice? Assume that it is solidified water. “Water” is in the C position; 
“solidified” is in the A position; the middle, “total absence of heat”, is the cause 
in the B position. Now B belongs to C, and “having solidified”, which is in the A 
position, belongs to this. (Posterior Analytics II.12 95a16-18)17 
Here Aristotle recasts the definition of ice as a proposition predicating one element in the 
definition of the other, and he demonstrates ice’s existence by finding a middle term uniting the 
two elements.18 
It makes sense that Aristotle should proceed in this way, given the passages we saw 
earlier from Metaphysics E and Θ. If ice is a complex object—an existential combination of 
water and solidification—then for it to exist is simply for these two components to be combined 
in the proper way (i.e., in some way analogous to the way in which the concepts “water” and 
“solidified” are representationally combined in the concept “ice”).19 It remains the case, 
                                                 
17 I put the terms of the demonstration in quotes, because it offsets them and makes the grammar of the sentence 
more perspicuous.  I do not mean to claim that the terms are linguistic items rather than ontological or psychological 
ones. As I discuss in Chapter 2 there is a pervasive and mostly harmless ambiguity in Aristotle’s terminology on this 
point. 
18 That this is intended as a demonstration of ice’s existence, is made clear by the context. Aristotle is illustrating the 
point that “the cause of something’s coming about and of its  having come about and of its being in the future is the 
same as {the cause} of its existing” (95a10-11), and immediately after the passage quoted above he writes: “and ice 
is coming about when B is coming about, and it has come about when it has come about, and will be, if it will be” 
(95a18-21). What B is the cause of in the present passage, then, is Ice’s existence, which Aristotle treats as 
equivalent to the solidification of water (cf. Metaphysics H.2 1042b27, where he also treats these two as equivalent). 
19 Aristotle may be alluding to a point made in De Interpretatione 3 16b22-5:  
“Existence and non-existence are not signs of an object; not even if you just say ‘what exists.’ For, 
while it isn’t anything itself, it denotes (προσσημαίνει) some combination, which cannot be 
thought without the compounded things”.  
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however, that the concept “ice” is neither true nor false, because, though it does involve a 
combination of its elements (both representationally and intensionally), it does not assert this 
combination. To assert the combination would be to take the elements, considered as distinct 
items, and unite them. This would be a mental act analogous to a geometer’s joining of two lines 
(or points).20 The complex concept by contrast would be analogous to a line, which may once 
have been formed by uniting smaller lines and could now be divided into them but is presently a 
continuous whole. 
A similar point is made in Posterior Analytics I.10, in the course of distinguishing terms 
from suppositions (ὑποθέσεις): 
Terms are not suppositions (for they’re not said to be or not be anything); rather 
suppositions are {found} among the assertions, while terms only need to be 
grasped (ξυνίεσθαι), and this is not supposing (unless you’ll say that hearing too 
is a sort of supposing); rather {suppositions are} whatever things {are such that}, 
when they exist, a conclusion arises by their existing. (76b35-39)21 
Taken on its own, “ice” or even “solidified water” is not an assertion because it is “not said to be 
anything”. We can see this by considering the case of someone who utters the word “ice” or even 
the phrase “solidified water”. He has not yet asserted anything; rather, as Aristotle writes in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
He can hardly be unaware of the possibility of such compound concepts in De Intepretatione 1, when he uses the 
example of the goatstag.  The word itself  (“τραγέλαφος”) is compounded from the words for goat (τράγος) and stag 
(ἐλάφος), and Plato cites the fictitious creature to make the point that artists create things by mingling (μίγνυμι) 
elements from many sources (Republic IV 488a6). 
20 I use “line” here in the Greek sense, to mean what modern geometers call a “line segment”.  
21 However, both the text and its interpretation are disputed. In some contexts ὅρος is translated “definition” rather 
than “term”, as I have translated it. Some translators and commentators take it that way here (e.g. Mure 1928). 
Indeed, as Barnes (1993 142) notes, it would make good sense for Aristotle to be speaking of definitions here. 
However, if one understands the passage in this way, the parenthetical remark at b35-6 is unintelligible as it stands 
in the manuscripts: “οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι ἢ μὴ λέγονται”. This is the text I translated above “for they’re not said to be or 
not be anything”. To solve this problem, Ross (1949) emends οὐδὲν for οὐδέ and λέγεται for λέγονται. These 
emendations would yield: “for they do not say that anything is or is not”, which makes sense whether Aristotle is 
talking about definitions or terms. However, given that we can make sense of the manuscript reading if we take the 
passage to be about terms, I do not think the emendation is warranted.  Indeed, though the discussion of axioms, 
suppositions, and postulates (αἴτημα) that immediately precedes the quoted passage, makes “definitions” seem like 
the more likely reading, the wider context supports understanding the passage as about terms. 76b11-22 discusses 
the things that an ἐπιστήμη is “about”. These include the kind and the affections demonstrated of it, both of which 
are surely terms. Barnes accepts the same reading for different reasons. He thinks that definitions must be assertions, 
since they constitute a species of thesis; if so, the ὅροι which Aristotle here contrasts with assertions cannot be 
definitions. I don’t find this reasoning persuasive. Aristotle could not allow that a definition is an assertion, at least 
not without qualification. He often identifies the definition with the definiens which is not an assertion, and treats 
statements of things’ essences as neither true nor false because they don’t involve the kind of combination that 
assertions (normally) do. Stepping back from this particular controversy, I think it is doubtful that the term “ὅρος” in 
Aristotle really has two fully distinct senses corresponding to our “term” and “definition” anymore than his “εἴδος” 
has fully distinct senses corresponding to our “form” and “species” (on which issue see above §2.4.5). I suggest a 
more unitary reading of “ὅρος” below in §4.2 n. 31. 
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related context, “the speaker stays his διάνοια and the audience pauses”.22 The word or phrase 
denotes ice considered as a subject of which something can be predicated, and the speaker has 
not yet predicated anything of it. This remains the case even though the thought of ice, which is 
here functioning as a prospective subject, can be analyzed into other concepts that can be 
recombined to assert ice’s existence. Moreover, it is no problem for this view if there are 
concepts, such as “goatstag”, which have no objects because they representationally combine 
elements that are not existentially combined. In such a case, any assertion made by recombining 
the constituents into which the concept can be intensionally divided would be false, and the 
concept itself might be said to have some property analogous to falsity, but it will not be false 
because it does not itself make any claims.23 
A concept, then, is an intensionally undivided thought, but it need not be an indivisible 
one. Since “ice” (probably even if articulated into “solidified water”) is undivided in the relevant 
way, it is worth remembering a point made in §2.1.1, that not just any phrase that grammatically 
qualifies to be the subject or predicate of a sentence qualifies as a concept for Aristotle; rather an 
Aristotelian term must be “one” in a way that “white man” or “man and horse” is not (and would 
not be even if a single word were introduced to stand for it). We have discussed the type of unity 
necessary for a concept at some length in Chapter 2; for the moment, it is sufficient to recall that 
                                                 
22 De Interpretatione 3 16b20-21. 
23 This point suggests a possible resolution to the tension,  noted in n. 6, between De Anima III.3’s statement that 
φαντασίαι can be false and III.8’s position that, unlike φάσεις and ἀποφάσεις, φαντασίαι cannot be true or false 
since they are not συμπλοκαί of νοήματα. A φαντασία is a picturing of something, which may be complex or simple; 
if it is complex, it may not exist (though its ultimate constituents must). In this sense a  φαντασία might be said to be 
false, as a complex concept could also be, but this is not Aristotle’s normal sense of “false”, nor is it ours. In this 
specialized sense, for example, works of fiction would be false, whereas we normally do not take the alternative of 
truth or falsity to apply to them. As a sort of picturing, a φαντασία cannot do what  φάσεις do and concepts do not: it 
cannot consider two objects separately and then predicate one of the other. One can picture a red chair, but not the 
belonging of the redness to the chair.  In the context of III.3, Aristotle is differentiating φαντασία from perception 
and related states on the ground that, while perception is always of what is, φαντασία may represent things that are 
not. In such contexts he’s happy to describe perception as true and φαντασία as (often) false, but in so doing he uses 
the terms more loosely than he does in III.8 and in De Interpretatione. In III.3 the alternative between truth and 
falsehood is between contents that do and do not correspond to reality, regardless of whether the contents are in any 
way aimed at such correspondence. Thus, when Aristotle says that most φαντασίαι are false, he is not saying that 
they represent any sort of failure. They may in some cases—for example, if a seagull drops a crab, visualizing it 
cracking open on the rocks below, but instead it lands safely in the sea; in such a case, something has gone wrong. 
By contrast, nothing has gone wrong when someone engages in fantasy without supposing that the fantasy 
corresponds to reality. It is clear that Aristotle means to include such cases as φαντασίαι in III.8, for he writes that 
φαντασία is “up to us when we wish” whereas δόχα is not because “it must either have truth or falsehood”  (427b17-
24). Aristotle’s point about the non-voluntary character of δόχα cannot be that the possession of a truth or falsity 
eliminates δόχα from being up to us (since he has just told us that φαντασίαι can be false); rather it must be the point 
associated with Bernard Williams (1973 136-51) that one cannot believe something at will because doing so would 
entail a sort of indifference to truth or falsity which is incompatible with belief. 
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Aristotle recognizes concepts for forms, kinds, successions, focal unities, and perhaps groups of 
analogs, and that concepts are usually symbolized by single words while other thoughts are 
usually not. 
 
3.1.2 The Composition of thoughts and their objects 
Some of the passages we looked at may create the impression that complex objects are composed 
of their constituents in something like the way that a house is composed of bricks and timbers, 
with each of the constituents existing independently of the others. Accordingly, a complex 
thought would be a concept if it was already put together out of the simpler thoughts, and an 
assertion would be a process in which the simpler thoughts are combined to form more complex 
ones. This impression is especially pronounced in the passages that employ the representational 
and existential senses of “division”, such as the one in Metaphysics Θ.10.  
Suppose this impression represents Aristotle’s view. Now, if “biped animal” is the 
definition of “man”, then the object(s) of this concept would have to be made of two distinct 
existents, corresponding to the concepts “biped” and “animal” which are independent of one 
another as each timber of a house is independent of the next. But in Chapter 2 we saw Aristotle 
deny just this. Moreover, the most emphatic denials were found in the central books of the 
Metaphysics, where we also find the existential sense of “division” employed. Because of the 
proximity of the passages within a single treatise, a developmental explanation of the 
discrepancy would be implausible, and the incompatibility is too obvious for Aristotle to have 
missed. There is, then, every reason to resist the impression created by Θ.10 and allied texts, and 
it is not difficult to do so if one takes them in the context of H.6, where Aristotle comes out most 
clearly against the view in question. The chapter is one of the highpoints of the corpus, and I 
quote it in full, except for 1045a36-b7, which we will come to later: 
Concerning the puzzle that’s been stated about definitions and about numbers: 
what’s the cause of their being one? For of all things—whatever has many parts 
and the entirety isn’t e.g. a heap, but rather is some whole besides the parts—there 
is some cause; since even among bodies, in some contact is the cause of their 
being one, in others stickiness or some other such affect. A definition is one 
account not by conjunction like the Iliad, but rather by being of one thing. So, 
what is it which makes man one, and why one rather than many (e.g. both animal 
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and biped) especially if, as some claim, there is some animal itself and biped 
itself? For why isn’t man those things themselves, and men will exist in respect of  
participation not in man nor one thing, but rather in two: animal and biped, and 
generally man would not be one but rather many: animal and biped? (1045a7-20) 
It’s evident that for those who pursue defining and speaking as they’re 
accustomed, it is not possible to respond and solve the puzzle; but if, as we say, it 
is on the one hand matter and on the other shape, and the former potentially but 
the latter actually, what’s sought would no longer seem a puzzle. For it’s the same 
puzzle if the definition (ὅρος) of cloak were rounded bronze; for this name would 
signify the account, so that what’s sought would be some cause of the rounded 
and the bronze’s being one. It’s indeed apparent that it’s no longer a puzzle, since 
the one is matter and the other shape. (1045a20-29) 
Then what’s the cause of this, of what exists potentially existing actually, besides 
the creator in whichever cases there is coming to be? For there’s no other cause of 
the potential sphere actually being a sphere, but rather this was what it is for each 
of the two to be what it was. One {sort} of matter is intelligible, the other is 
perceptible, and always one {part} of the account is matter and the other 
actuality—e.g. circle: plane figure. (1045a29-35) 
It’s due to this puzzle that some speak of “participation” and puzzle over what the 
cause of participation is and what it is to participate, while others {speak of} a 
“communion”, as Lycophron claims there is of e-knowledge and soul, and others 
{claim} that life is a combination or conjunction of soul and body. Further, the 
same account applies to all, for even being healthy will be either a communion or 
conjunction or combination of soul and health, and the bronze being a triangle 
{will be} a combination of bronze and triangle, and being white, a combination of 
surface and whiteness. The cause is that they seek a one-making account and a 
difference for potentiality and finality. But, as has been stated, the last matter and 
the form are the one and the same, {the former potentially}, the latter actually, so 
that seeking some cause of oneness and {seeking a cause} for existence are alike; 
for each thing is a certain one, and potentiality and actuality are one in a way, so 
that there’s no other cause except the thing, if any, that moved {it} from 
potentiality into actuality. But whatever things do not have matter, all are 
simpliciter just a certain one. (1045b7-b23) 
From 1045a29-35 it is as clear as can be that that Aristotle does not regard matter and 
form as independent components like the timbers of a house. Rather each is implicated in the 
very being of the other. The matter of an object is that object insofar as it is able to be what it is, 
and the form is that same object insofar as it is what it is able to be. Since Aristotle regularly 
speaks of things being compounds or composites or combinations of form and matter, we have to 
construe this sort of language broadly enough to embrace the unique hylomorphic relationship. 
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In 1045a20-29 Aristotle makes it clear that he thinks the components of a definition stand to one 
another as matter and form and that he regards this as of the utmost importance.  
1045b7-b23 applies the same analysis to the objects of assertions, e.g. to a man’s being 
healthy. Aristotle pillories views that posit any relationship between the man and health of the 
sort that holds between timbers in virtue of which they constitute a house. Rather part of what it 
is to be a man (or any organism) is to be matter for health, which is just a certain actualization of 
a certain potential of men (or of organisms generally). More generally, to be an οὐσία is in part 
to be a subject in which existents in other categories are actualized, and to be an existent in 
another category is to be an actuality of certain potentialities of certain οὐσίαι. 
Indeed, as of the Categories, predication is never a relationship between independent 
existents on an ontological par—things that might be combined as timbers are to produce a 
house. The predicate is either “in” or “said of” the subject. In the former case, the predicate is a 
non-οὐσία, incapable of existing except as a characteristic of a subject, in the latter it is a form or 
kind (either a secondary οὐσία or an analogous member some other category), in which case also 
its existence is derivative on the existents it characterizes, and ultimately on primary οὐσίαι, like 
“this man” or “this horse”. On whatever points the Metaphysics may depart from the Categories 
(and I think these are fewer than is often supposed), there is no sign that Aristotle wants to level 
the ontological playing field. What Metaphysics H.6 offers is a more sophisticated account of the 
relationship whereby a predicate is “in” the subject. This issue and the unity of definitions issue 
are one, since a definition can always be reconfigured into an assertion that the differentia is “in” 
the genus.24 
Moreover, if, as I argued in §2.4, the genus exists only as matter or potentiality, and in 
particular if it exists as a potentiality of the object relative to thought, then there will be no such 
thing as the existential combination and division that Aristotle seems to envision in Θ.10. Or 
rather there will be such combination and division only insofar as the objects involved are 
considered in relation to thought. This is just the position Aristotle takes in E.4: 
Falsehood and truth are not in the objects (e.g., the good being true while the bad 
is straightaway false), but rather in διάνοία {…}But since there is complexity and 
division in διάνοία rather than in the objects, and this sort of existence {viz. 
                                                 
24 Recall however that not all predications can be reconfigured into definitions. As we have seen, Aristotle insists 
that that there is no definition “white man” corresponding to the assertion “Man is white”, and we learned the reason 
for this in §2.3.  Man is not strictly speaking matter for whiteness because whiteness isn’t a determination of man as 
a whole but only of the attribute of color in isolation. 
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existence as truth} is different from {existence} speaking strictly (for the διάνοία 
connects (συνάπτει) or subtracts (ἀφαιρεῖ) either what something is or that {it’s} 
qualified or that {it’s} quantified), one must put aside existence… as truth; for… 
its cause is a certain affection of thought, and… {it depends on} the remaining 
kind of existence… (1027b25-a2) 
This claim that existence in the sense of truth is caused by an affection of thought might 
make E.4 seem to endorse a wholly different position from Θ.10. After all, the later chapter 
insists that 
it’s not due to our truly deeming you to be white that you’re white, but rather due 
to your being white that we, in claiming this, have the truth. (1051b6-9) 
But E.4’s claim does not contradict this point from Θ.10, and Θ.10’s language of existential 
combination and division can be read in light of E.4 and H.6.  
E.4 does not say that our truly thinking that a man is white is the cause of his being white. 
What it says is that composition and division, understood as processes of διάνοία, give rise to the 
alternative between truth and falsity. Independent of διάνοια, there are not two items, the man 
and his whiteness, between which a relation of combination or division might obtain; there is 
only the white man. It is through the advent of διάνοια that there come to be such distinct units 
as man-considered-without-regard-for-color and whiteness. Once διάνοια has come on the scene, 
the original white man remains as he was. What διάνοια introduces is a perspective from which 
he can now be considered as a combination of man and whiteness—the perspective of a mind 
stocked with concepts for subjects and attributes in terms of which it cognizes the world. From 
this perspective, which is the one we normally take on the world, and which Aristotle takes in 
Θ.10, combinations like “white man” represent combinations in the world (or, in the case of 
falsehoods, fail to represent them). From the more external perspective of E.4, the combinations 
still represent a grasp of the way the world is but that way is not fundamentally to be described in 
terms of combination and division. According to E.4, the existence of a white man or of ice 
consists in the combination of man and white or of water and solidification, but only in a 
derivative sense of existence. Discussion of existence in this sense must be postponed until the 
end of Θ, at which point it can be understood in light of H.6’s recasting of predication in terms of 
matter and form and potentiality and actuality (and in light of Θ’s account of potentiality and 
actuality).  
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Moreover, although E.4 tells us that διάνοια is responsible for the combination and 
division, it does not say that an object can be thought in any way one pleases—for example, that 
there is nothing to prevent a green emerald from being thought as grue rather than green. There 
may be facts about thought as such or about the objects that prohibit this, and it is clear that 
Aristotle thinks there are such facts, or else he could not deny that, even if they are given a single 
name, putative terms like “man and horse” (or, by extension, “grue”) fail to signify one thing. If 
διάνοια achieves a conceptual perspective by performing divisions, it is not free to divide the 
world in any way it pleases. Its divisions must somehow demarcate thinkable objects each of 
which has the unity that we’ve seen (in §2.1.1) is required to function as a predication. Though 
there is some sense in which such an object owes its separateness to διάνοια, there must be an 
ontological basis for its coherence and to the divisibility of the whole comprising it. We 
encountered this basis in Chapter 2 in the form of the doctrine of intelligible matter, and I will 
have more to say about it in Chapter 4 in connection with the norms it gives rise to for 
conceptualizing a domain. 
3.1.3 Indivisible thoughts 
We observed earlier that a concept, though undivided, need not be indivisible. “Ice”, for 
example, is divisible into “water” and “solidified” and man (for the sake of argument) into 
“animal” and “bipedal”. In both cases, the two terms are not related as independent existents, but 
rather as matter to form. There are however, thoughts that are not only undivided but indivisible. 
This is clear in many of the same chapters that we’ve considered already in connection with the 
respects in which both thoughts and their objects can be combined and divided.  
In De Anima III.6 (shortly after the passage we discussed earlier about the differing 
respects in which a line and the thought of it are διαίρετον and ἀδιαίρετον) Aristotle writes: 
The point and every division, and what’s ἀδιαίρετον  in this way, is revealed just 
as the privation {is}. And the same account applies to the rest, e.g. how one gets 
to g-know evil or black; for one gets to g-know them in a way by their contraries. 
What gets to g-know must be potentially {what it gets to g-know } [and {it} must 
be in this]. But if there is anything [of the causes] that doesn’t have a contrary, 
this will g-know itself and is an actuality and separate. (430b20-26) 
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There are a number of noteworthy things about this passage, some immediately relevant to our 
present concerns and others that we will return for in §3.2.2. It is best to at least mention all of 
these points now. 
Since lines have just served as the paradigm of things that are only potentially διαίρετον, 
the transition to talk of points and similarly ἀδιαίρετον things is a transition to the topic of 
indivisibility. And, since the discussion of the ways in which lines are and are not ἀδιαίρετον 
was supposed to apply also to things that are ἀδιαίρετον in form (i.e., intensionally ἀδιαίρετον), 
the present remarks about how ἀδιαίρετα are known must also be meant to apply to these objects.  
We might wonder why Aristotle feels a need to give a special account of how indivisible 
things are known. He has not yet spoken specifically about how divisible things are known nor 
does he go on to do so. There seems to be some presumption at work to the effect that the ability 
of something to be known depends on its ability to be divided, so that Aristotle has to go out of 
his way to explain how it is that indivisibles can be known. We will discuss why this is in §3.2. 
For now, our focus is on the claim that there are indivisible thoughts of indivisible objects. 
What would an indivisible thought or object in this sense be? We have seen that divisible 
concepts are divided into concepts that can then be recombined to form an assertion, and that 
assertions have a subject predicate structure which Aristotle understands in terms of the relation 
between matter and form. An indivisible thought, then, would be one whose object cannot be 
analyzed into matter and form or subject and predicate.25 And we can see that this is the case in 
the lines that immediately follow those quoted above: 
While a claim (φάσις) is “something of something”, just as an affirmation 
(κατάφασις) also  is,26 and all {claims} are true or false, not every thought is {this 
                                                 
25 It is also worth noting, though I will not pursue this issue here, that nothing Aristotle says here commits him to the 
view that indivisible thoughts ever occur in isolation as episodes of thinking.  Wedin (1988 128-32) is likely right 
that they only occur in actual thinking as components of complex thoughts. These complex occurent thoughts, 
however, are combinations of simpler thoughts and are exercises of (perhaps amongst other things) acquired 
potentialities corresponding to these simpler thoughts. It is these simpler thoughts in potentiality that I have been 
calling “concepts”. 
26Torstrik replaces the manuscripts’ “φάσις” and “κατάφασις” with  “κατάφασις”  and  “ἀπόφασις”, respectively. 
Ross accepts the second of these emendations while rejecting the first. His apparatus and commentary give no basis 
for either of these emendations, and both his reading and Torstrik’s seem inferior to the manuscript reading. It is an 
affirmation (κατάφασις) that is paradigmatically “something of something”, so “κατάφασις” makes good sense in 
the “ὥσπερ” clause. Granted, the “και” in that clause is awkward, but not terribly so. “Φάσις” is more general than 
“κατάφασις” insofar as it subsumes affirmations and denials, and so the sentence as written makes sense. The point 
is that all claims, not just affirmations, claim “something of something”. My only hesitation is that it is not clear that 
Aristotle does think this about all φάσεις. Metaphysics Θ.10 1051b24-5 may imply the contrary in its contrast 
between φάσις and ἀπόφανσις (see discussion below). If this is right, Aristotle should use “ἀπόφανσις” in the 
present passage. Still, it is not unusual for Aristotle to ignore in one work a fine distinction drawn in another. 
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way}. Rather, the {thought} of what something is with respect to its being what it 
is (ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) is true, and it’s not “something of something”. 
Rather, as the sight of the [distinctive] object is true, though whether it’s a 
<white> man or not is not always true, so it holds with whatever things lack 
matter. (430b26-30) 
This passage too raises questions that we will have to postpone. Most notably: how can 
an indivisible thought be true if the alternative between truth and falsity arises from the 
combination of thoughts and their objects? We will address this question in §3.2.2. I quote the 
passage here only to confirm that an indivisible thought would lack subject-predicate structure—
that it would not be “something of something”. We are told that a thought of τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν 
εἶναι qualifies as indivisible in this way, and Aristotle seems to regard this as the least 
controversial case of simple thought, but there is a simpler example that it is worth our taking up 
before it.  We can see this in Metaphysics H.6, where Aristotle mentions objects that lack even 
the intelligible matter that makes possible definition and predication:  
Whatever doesn’t have matter, neither intelligible nor perceptible, is straightaway 
just a certain one, just as it is also just some existent: τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν 
(that’s also why neither existence nor one inheres in their definitions), and its 
being what it is (τί ἦν εἶναι) is straightaway a certain one, just as it is a certain 
existent; that’s also why there is not any other cause for any of their being one nor 
{for any of their} being a certain existent; for each is straightaway (εὐθύς) a 
certain existent and a certain one (not as in the kind existent and one, nor as being 
separate, besides the particulars). (1045a36-b7) 
I take it that “τὸ τόδε”, “τὸ ποιόν”, and “τὸ ποσόν” here refer, respectively, to the 
categories of οὐσία, quality and quantity—to the highest kinds, rather than to their individual 
members. As highest kinds, they cannot be analyzed into kind and difference, and this is what it 
means for them to lack even intelligible matter. An intelligible matter for these kinds would be a 
determinable kind of which each category is a determination, and there is no such kind.27 Each 
category is a being and a one, without having being or one as its kind—i.e., as a determinable of 
which it is a determinate. The categories are not the only things that entirely lack matter. 
Presumably, the (perceptible) matter from which the elements are made is this way as well, as it 
                                                 
27 It might seem counterintuitive to say that these highest determinables lack intelligible matter, since to be matter is 
precisely to be determinable. But that’s just the point: relative to its various determinates, a category is matter—it is 
the intelligible matter that the determinate has. What the category lacks, in not having matter, is anything that stands 
to it as it stands to its determinates. In this respect it is pure actuality. There is no such thing as being potentially the 
category of quality. 
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seems is Aristotle’s God. However, the categories are the example given here, and I think they 
are the clearest case.28 
With an example of an indivisible object now in hand, let’s consider some of what De 
Anima III.6 has to say about how such objects are known or thought. Recall that it says that they 
are  
revealed (δηλοῦτι) just as the privation {is}. And the same account applies to the 
rest (e.g., how one gets to g-know evil or black); for one gets to g-know them in a 
way by their contraries. (430b21-3) 
The contraries in question must not be contrary to the indivisible itself as white is contrary to 
black. Only a member of a kind can have a contrary at all, and kind-members are intensionally 
divisible (into kind and difference). Since a category has no kind, it cannot have a contrary by 
contrast with which it might be known. This same argument would apply to any other sorts of 
indivisibles there may be (e.g., to the matter that underlies the four elements). Thus the contraries 
by which an indivisible is revealed can be contrary to the indivisible only in this sense: that they 
are divisible in just the way the indivisible is not. The message of this passage, then, is that an 
indivisible thing (e.g., the category οὐσία) is revealed by contrast with the things by dividing 
which we arrive at it (e.g., by contrast with the various οὐσίαι whose kind it is).29 
                                                 
28 Modrak (2001 64) takes an opposite reading on which the uncuttable forms are the indivisible objects of thought. 
But, uncuttable forms are indivisible only taxonomically (i.e. they cannot be subdivided into species), they are a 
paradigm case of things that can be intensionally divided (into kind and difference). In support of her view she cites 
Metaphysics Z.4 1030a7-17, where Aristotle says (amongst other things) that there is definition only of the forms of 
a kind because only these do not involve one thing’s being said of another. Presumably she takes this to mean that 
these objects are therefore not intensionally divisible. This doesn’t follow. All the passage prohibits is a definition in 
which one thing is said of another (and at 1030a18ff it even allows this for non-οὐσίαι).  But the items (kind and 
difference or matter and form or subject and predicate) into which a form is divided are not one thing and another 
but the same thing in potentiality and actuality. This is the lesson of H.6. It is not mentioned in Z.4 because Z is 
preliminary and aporetic, advancing positions only tentatively which will be rejected or qualified later. In any event 
there is nothing in Z.4 to indicate that by “form of a kind” Aristotle means only the uncuttable forms.  
29 A more general version of this same idea can be found (though in significantly different terms) in Metaphysics I.8: 
This, then, is the meaning of calling things other in form—that they are contrary, being in the 
same kind and being indivisible (and those things are the same in form, which have no contrariety, 
being indivisible); for in the process of division contrarieties arise even in the intermediate stages 
before we come to the indivisibles. Evidently, therefore, with reference to that which is called the 
kind, none of the forms which belong to the kind is either the same as or other than it in form 
(rightly so, for the matter is revealed by negation, and the kind is the matter of that of which it is 
called the kind, not as in [the kind] of the Heraclidae, but as the {kind} in nature), nor is it so with 
reference to things which are not in the same kind, but it will differ in kind from them and in form 
from things in the same kind. For the difference between things which differ in form must be a 
contrariety; and this belongs only to things in the same kind. (1058a16-28) 
Here the divisional language is used in  connection with the taxonomic division by which one moves from a kind to 
its forms. The kind, because it is matter, is revealed by negation. The talk of multiple stages to the division, suggests 
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Aristotle goes on to tell us that any indivisible that “doesn’t have a contrary” “will g-
know itself and is an actuality and separate” (430b24-6).30 Such an indivisible would be 
something that can neither be divided nor discovered as a result of divisions of other things. Thus 
it makes sense to say that it would have to be separate. The remark is surely an allusion to the 
God about which Aristotle tells us so little. 
Let us now consider the example present in the passage’s own example of a thought that 
isn’t “something of something”—namely, the thought of “τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι” (430b28). I 
take it that the point of this complex phrase is to distinguish between two things that might be 
meant by the phrase “the thought of what something is (τοῦ τί ἐστι)”. It might mean, e.g., to 
think about some ice cube that it is ice; or it might mean to think about ice as such that it is 
solidified water. Similarly if Aristotle had spoken simply of the τί ἦν εἶναι, he might not have 
been referring to the τί ἦν εἶναι in relation to the object whose τί ἦν εἶναι it is. There is, after all, 
a respect in which ice’s τί ἦν εἶναι can be divided. For ice to exist is for water to be solidified, 
and so its being can be divided into water and solidification, as we saw earlier. What is 
indivisible is the connection between ice and solidified water. While the thought “solidified 
water” may be broken down into “water” and “solidification”, “ice is solidified water” cannot be 
broken down into “ice” and “solidified water”, because ice and solidified water are not two 
distinct things, even in thought.31 
                                                                                                                                                             
that one could, when proceeding in the opposite direction, get to know a kind as a kind by contrast with its various 
forms. It is that which can be (in thought), but is not yet, any of the forms. One might then come to see this same 
kind as a form relative to a higher kind, at which point one will then know it by a taxonomic division of the higher 
kind (i.e., an intensional combination of that kind with a difference). 
30 The context makes it clear that he is still talking about indivisibles. Ross’ text reads “εἰ δέ τινι μηδὲν ἔστιν 
ἐναντίον [τῶν αἰτίων], αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ χωριστόν”. The “τῶν αἰτίων”, which Ross 
brackets, is controversial, though it is in almost all the manuscripts, because it seems out of place here, since 
Aristotle has not been speaking of causes per se. However, since (as we will see later) indivisibles are causes, the 
manuscript reading makes sense. And there is a reason why Aristotle might wish here to mention that the objects in 
question are causes. One of the aims of III.4-8 is to explain how thought comes about at all. Aristotle’s answer 
involves the reception of form in perception. This makes it puzzling how something that is entirely separate from 
perceptible things can be known. (Thus the remark at the end of III.7 that “whether or not it’s possible to think some 
of the separate things, {when} one is not oneself separate from spatial-magnitude must be considered later” 
[431b17-19]—a later that never comes.) Plausibly our cognitive access to these objects is by inference from their 
effects on perceptible things. This is in fact how Aristotle reasons about God in Metaphysics Λ. Thus the point that 
separate indivisible objects are causes would not be out of place in the present discussion, and, though Aristotle does 
not develop it here, he may be alluding to what seems to be his own solution to the question raised at the end of the 
following chapter. 
31 In effect, I am agreeing with Sorabji (1982 298) that definitions do not require predication of one thing of another 
because they are statements of identity. 
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 If the preceding is correct, then “τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι” in the present passage means 
something that in other contexts Aristotle may be content to express by either “τί ἐστι” or “τί ἦν 
εἶναι”. One such context is Metaphysics Θ.10, where Aristotle discusses the specialized way in 
which the alternatives between truth and falsity and existence and non-existence apply to 
uncombined things. 
In the case of an uncombined thing, what are existence and non-existence and 
truth and falsehood? For it’s not a combination so as to exist when compounded 
and not to exist if it’s divided, as it is with the white wood or the diagonal being 
commensurate; nor will truth and falsehood still belong in the same way as they 
apply also in those cases. Instead, just as truth is not the same in these cases, so 
existing is not {the same}. Rather, truth and falsehood are {as follows}: truth is 
touching (θιγεῖν) and claiming (φάναι) (for an affirmation (κατάφασις) and a 
claim (φάσις) are not the same), while falsehood is being g-ignorant and not 
touching. For there is no erring about what something is (τὸ τί ἐστιν), except 
incidentally; likewise also in the case of the οὐσίαι that aren’t combined (for 
there’s no erring, and everything is actually, not potentially (for {otherwise} they 
would have come to be or passed away, but in fact it neither comes to be nor 
passes away, for {if it did} it would have come to be from something). In the 
cases of whatever is just what something is and an actuality there is no erring; 
rather either one thinks or one does not. However, about these things, one can 
seek what they are and whether they are this way or not. (1051b17-33) 
In §3.2.3, we will take up the sense of truth and falsehood discussed here and the topic of 
why there can be no error about the uncombined things. I quote the passage here because we can 
see from it that there are two types of uncombined thing: τὸ τί ἐστιν and uncombined οὐσίαι. 
These must be distinct cases because, having made the point that error is impossible about the 
former, he goes on to say that it is likewise impossible about the latter. I take it that “τί ἐστιν” 
here refers to what De Anima III.6 calls “τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι”. Recall that “uncombined” 
in Metaphysics Θ.10 means not combined existentially, whereas “indivisible” in De Anima III.6 
means intensionally undivided, and existentially uncombined things are intensionally indivisible. 
Notice also that both texts speak of there being truth but no falsehood about the objects in 
question. Θ.10 takes this as the more familiar case of thing about which there can be no error. 
Aristotle leads us from it to the case of the uncombined οὐσίαι. I take it that these οὐσίαι are the 
same as the things that Metaphysics H.6’s tells us lack even intellectual matter—e.g., the 
categories. Notice that both texts identify their objects as lacking any matter or potentiality. 
Thus there are two sorts of indivisible thoughts: thoughts of what things are and 
apprehensions of indivisible objects. Some indivisible objects (such as the highest kinds and 
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probably the ultimate physical matter) are apprehended through divisions of perceptible things, 
while others (like gods) are entirely separate from perceptible things and apprehended in some 
other way.  
In §3.2.3, we will see that these indivisible thoughts constitute the sort of γνῶσις that 
Aristotle calls νοῦς and thinks is the principle of ἐπιστήμη (Posterior Analytics II.19 100b5-17). 
We have much ground to cover, however, before we will be in a position even to make sense of 
this claim, for indeed there is a seeming incoherence in what we have said already. We began 
§3.1 by identifying undivided thoughts, and a fortiori indivisible thoughts, with concepts, but of 
the two sorts of indivisible thoughts we have identified in this section, neither seems like it could 
be a concept. An indivisible thought consists either in thinking of an object that it is what it is or 
in apprehending an indivisible object. In either case it is not clear how the thoughts could be 
terms in a proposition, whereas we earlier identified concepts with such terms. The indivisible 
thoughts cannot be predications because they do not “say something of something”. The plot 
thickens when we notice that Metaphysics Θ.10 describes both indivisible thoughts and 
predications as claims (φάσεις) and informs us that the alternative of truth or falsity does 
somehow apply to them. This alternative is not normally thought to apply to concepts, and 
Aristotle tells us in the passages we looked at in §3.1.1 that it does not apply to thoughts without 
division or combination. In order to resolve these tensions, and for other reasons as well, we 
need to turn to Aristotle’s view of knowledge—that is, of γνῶσις. 
3.2 ΓΝΩΣΙΣ AND INDIVISIBLE THOUGHTS  
3.2.1 Γνῶσις 
“Γνῶσις” is the term in Aristotle’s vocabulary closest to the normal English usage of 
“knowledge”. The most significant points of departure are that Aristotle speaks of γνώσεις, 
whereas we use “knowledge” as a mass noun and so would have to speak of “items of 
knowledge”, and he speaks of γνῶσις as coming in degrees in a way that may strike English 
speakers as counterintuitive. The first of these differences is unimportant, and I’ll come to the 
idea of degrees of γνῶσις in §3.3.3. For the present, I’d like to contrast Aristotle’s “γνῶσις” to 
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“knowledge” as used not in ordinary English but in the dominant tradition in Anglo-American 
epistemology since the middle of the Twentieth Century. This tradition concerns itself almost 
exclusively with propositional knowledge, which it understands as a species of belief 
distinguished from other species by being true and justified, and perhaps by the possession of 
other features as well.32 By contrast, γνώσεις needn’t be beliefs at all, for Aristotle speaks more 
than once of perception, which he does not think involves belief, “a sort of γνῶσις”,33 and he 
sometimes uses the term for acquaintance with people or objects, which also presumably need 
not be constituted by beliefs.34 
                                                 
32 There are strong reasons to reject this view of knowledge, which have been garnering more attention recently. 
First, the account of knowledge as a species of belief, though it makes sense for propositional knowledge, does not 
seem to be applicable to other states that are normally described as knowledge, but which do not seem to have 
propositional contents (e.g. , knowledge of people, places, things, skills, etc.), and it is reasonable to expect a 
unifying account of these phenomena. This criticism is put forth by McGinn (1984), who argues in favor of a 
general account of knowledge in terms of an ability to discriminate, and propositional knowledge in terms of an 
ability to discriminate between true and false propositions. On this view, propositional knowledge will, of course, 
involve belief, but it will not be a species of it. I think there is much truth in McGinn’s general analysis, and his 
general conception of knowledge is clearly much closer to Aristotle’s conception of γνῶσις than is that of more 
conventional 20th Century epistemologists. Note that Aristotle speaks of perception as a “δύναμις σύμφυτον 
κριτική” (Posterior Analytics II.19 99b35). I find McGinn’s specific analysis of propositional knowledge less 
persuasive, and the distance between modern conceptions of propositions and Aristotle’s own, make it difficult to 
compare McGinn and Aristotle on this point. A second line of argument against defining knowledge as a species of 
belief is most associated with Williamson (2000), who argues that the concept “knowledge” is logically prior to 
“belief” (and to several of the other concepts in terms of which it is traditionally defined). Williamson’s book has 
done a great deal to displace what had become a dogma of contemporary epistemology. Guttenplan (1994, see  
especially pp. 296-300) proposed a similar view of the relation between knowledge and belief, and argued that this 
understanding of the relationship (especially when paired with a suitably broad conception of knowledge), helps to 
solve some paradoxes concerning propositional attidudes. For an earlier 20th Century account of “knowledge” that 
construes the term as having similar breadth, see Wilson 1926 34-47. 
33 Generation of Animals II.23 731a33-4,  Protrepticus 76.  See also Posterior Analytics II.19 99b37-98a1, where 
we’re told that animals that lack λόγος do not have “γνῶσις outside of perception”, thus indicating that in perception 
they do have γνῶσις. And, in On Dreams 1, Aristotle writes of the αἰσθητικόν and νοητικόν: “τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις 
τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνωρίζομέν τι” (458b2-3). That perception does not involve belief is clear from De Anima III.3, 428a19-
4, where we are told that δόξα requires λόγος which most animals lack. It might be thought that the reason Aristotle 
is comfortable thinking of perception as a type of “knowledge”, though it is not a belief, is that he thinks that 
perceptual content, like the contents of beliefs have “propositional structure”. At best this interpretation is extremely 
misleading. It is true that Aristotle does not think there is the sort of disconnect between perceptual and 
propositional contents that is common on many contemporary views, but this is not because he assimilates the 
content of perception to propositions, quite the reverse. He uses his understanding of perception to shed light on the 
structure of thought or language as often as he reasons in the other direction. He thinks of both propositions and 
complex perceptual states as “combinations” of simpler states, and he thinks of their objects as combinations of 
simpler objects. In general a γνῶσις is an apprehension or awareness of an object, which may be simple or complex. 
By contrast, contemporary philosophers who ascribe propositional form to perception do so in order to give 
perception conceptual content.  
34 E.g. at Politics V.11 1313b5. Interestingly, Grote (1865, 60), when he first introduced the distinction between 
“knowledge of acquaintance” and “knowledge of description”, cited the difference between “γνῶναι” and “εἰδέναι” 
as an example of the distinction in natural language. (His other examples were noscere/scire, kennin/wissen, and 
connaître/savoir in Latin, German, and French respectively.) Since some later inheritors of this distinction proceed 
as though it is a mere accident that English uses a single word “knowledge” where these other languages have two, it 
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Interestingly, γνῶσις itself never comes in for sustained discussion in the corpus; indeed 
it is overlooked in a number of places where we might expect to see it discussed. Most notably 
there is no chapter on it in Nicomachean Ethics VI, and it is absent from VI.6’s list of states by 
which “we have truth and cannot be deceived”.35 It is absent also from Posterior Analytics I.33’s 
list of states that can be true, which includes only “νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη and δόξα and what’s called 
after them” (88b37-a2).36 However, there can be no doubt that γνῶσις is distinct from these other 
states. Since it includes ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς, it can’t be identical to either, and they cannot jointly 
exhaust it, because it also includes perception and perhaps other states as well.37 Nor can it be 
identical to δόξα, which does not include perception, ἐπιστήμη, or νοῦς.38 More importantly, 
unlike δόξα, γνώσεις must be true. This is clear from I.2, were ἐπίστασθαι is defined in terms of 
the possession of γνῶσις of its object’s necessitating cause, and we’re told that it is possible to 
think that one has such γνῶσις when one does not (71a10-17). 
The likely reason for γνῶσις’s absence from at least Nicomachean Ethics VI’s list is that 
that book is concerned specifically with the virtues of the part of the soul that has λόγος. Γνῶσις, 
which includes perception, cannot belong per se to this part of the soul.39 Like “virtue”, it 
denotes something that can belong to either the perceptual or intellectual parts of the soul; and, 
                                                                                                                                                             
is worth pointing out that the Greek words also span the distinction. Aristotle uses “γνῶναι” for propositional 
knowledge in Posterior Analytics II.1 (89b38, 90a8), and he uses εἰδέναι for both sorts of knowledge in Posterior 
Analytics I.24 (85a21-31, other uses of εἰδέναι for knowledge by acquaintance can be found at 87b40, 97a7-18,  and 
Rhetoric I.2 1355b8.) (It is worth observing also, in this connection, that other English knowledge verbs like 
“aware”, can take objects or propositions as their grammatical objects.) Because Grote himself took the distinction 
to be more fluid, with the two sorts of knowledge differing from one another in degree along several axes, his view 
is not necessarily contradicted by Aristotle’s usage. Aristotle is happy to pair any of his knowledge verbs with either 
a proposition or an object as its grammatical object. Indeed, as we’ve seen, he takes knowledge that (e.g.) water is 
solidified to be equivalent to knowledge of solidified water. 
35 The word appears only once in VI at 1141b34, were we’re told that γνῶσις of what’s good for oneself is part of 
φρόνησις. 
36 He goes on, in that chapter to use the verb εἰδέναι and its derivatives as though it were equivalent to ἐπίστασθαι 
(89a11-15), but no form of γνῶσις appears. The taxonomy here may be compared with one in De Anima III.3, where 
“ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις and their opposites” are given as varieties of ὑπόληψις (427b24-6). This is no a a 
slight, however, to γνῶσις, because γνῶσις extends more widely than ὑπόληψις, in that it includes perception 
(Posterior Analtytics II.19 99b38-9, cf. Metaphysics A.1 980a26-7), whereas ὑπόληψις is a variety of νόησις (De 
Anima 427b27-9) and requires λόγος (427b8-15). 
37 See the two previous notes for references to perception and (part of) φρόνησις as γνώσεις. In Metaphysics A.1 
981a12-24 both ἐμπειρία and τέχνη are described as γνώσεις. 
38 See Posterior Analytics I.33 on how one cannot have δόξα of the objects of one’s ἐπιστήμη or νοῦς. That 
perception cannot be a sort of δόξα, follows directly from (amongst other things) Aristotle’s arguments against 
identifying φαντασία with δόξα see (De Anima III.3 428a21-b9, cf. Nicomachean Ethics VII.3 1147bff). 
39 It is worth noting that VI.2 begins by listing perception, along with νοῦς and ὄρεξις, as a κύριον of action and 
truth. This at least suggests that here, as in the De Anima, he acknowledges a way in which perceptual states can be 
true, and therefore an important similarity between perception and ἐπιστήμη. 
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as the different parts of the soul have different types of virtue, so they have different types of 
γνῶσις.40 It is natural that, in Posterior Analytics I.33 also, Aristotle should limit his attention to 
states of the intellectual part of the soul, since that treatise is concerned with ἐπιστήμη and the 
demonstrations on which it rests, both of which belong to the intellectual part of the soul. 
(However, as we learn in the treatise’s final chapter, our γνῶσις of the principles from which 
these demonstrations proceed arises from prior γνώσεις belonging to the perceptual part of the 
soul.) 
Given the range of states that qualify as γνώσεις, we would expect to find insight into the 
nature of γνῶσις in passages where Aristotle is attending to similarities between perception and 
intellectual states. Consider in this connection De Anima III.3’s introduction to the discussion of 
νοῦς: 
{People} especially define the soul by two differences—by movement in place 
and by νοεῖν and φρονεῖν, and perceiving; but both νοεῖν and φρονεῖν seem as 
though they’re a sort of perception; for by both of these the soul discerns (κρίνει) 
and gets to g-know some existent. (427a17-21)41 
The idea of discerning (κρίνειν) goes on to play the central role in the following chapter’s 
argument for νοῦς as a faculty distinct from perception (and φαντασία).42 It also makes an 
appearance at a crucial juncture in Posterior Analytics II.19, where perception is described as a 
“connate discerning capacity” (“δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν”) that plays a crucial role in our 
getting to g-know principles (99b35). 
                                                 
40 Presumably, the concepts “virtue” and “γνῶσις” are underwritten by the same sort of unity amongst their objects 
that unites the concept “soul” itself—namely successive unity. Indeed, the relations between the parts of the soul (as 
characterized in De Anima II.3 and III.11-13) is parallels both the relation between the virtues of character and of 
thought (as explained in Nicomachean Ethics VI.13 and VII) and the relation between the types of γνῶσις that 
belong, respectively, to the perceptual and intellectual parts of the soul. However, since pursuing these parallels 
would take us into ethics, and thus far afield of our purpose, I confine myself here to discussing the types of γνῶσις. 
41 Cf. De Sensu 445b15-16, where Aristotle asks about certain hypothesized bodies “By what would we discern and 
g-know them?” A case could be made for reading the “καὶ” in  both passages exegetically. I think doing so would 
portray the relation between g-knowing and discerning as only slightly more intimate than Aristotle actually takes it 
to be.  
42 The term can be found in many of the De Anima’s broad discussions about the way in which perception or νοῦς 
functions. In addition to the two passages mentioned here, noteworthy occurrences include 418a14 where we learn 
that touch discerns multiple pairs of contraries, 431a20-24 where Aristotle discusses differentiation between 
sensibles in different modalities, 424a5 where we learn that the senses are able to discern contraries by being means, 
and at 422a31and 425b21 which explain how sight discerns both light and dark. (We’ve already seen that a 
generalized version of  this last point is made about γνῶσις at 430b20-23; Metaphysics Θ.2 makes the same point 
about ἐπιστήμη [in a broad sense that includes τέχνη] at 1046b7-25.) 
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Though Aristotle is well known for regarding perception (and, like it, thought) as a sort 
of reception of information (literally of form) from objects, “κρίνειν”, with its root meaning of 
“picking out”, connotes an activity directed outwards at objects in the world—the activity of 
discriminating objects from their backgrounds. This sort of object-directed activity on the part of 
perception is not incompatible with its being a reception of information, but it is easily 
overlooked when the emphasis is placed on receptivity, and it is important for making sense of 
Aristotle’s position.43  
If one thinks of discriminating even the simplest element within one’s sensory field, say a 
tone in a hearing test, it is immediately evident that it would take many propositions to capture 
what one knows in virtue of that discrimination: where the tone is located, how loud it is, how 
high or low, etc. If we think of the γνῶσις of indivisibles by analogy to the discrimination of 
such perceptible objects, we can understand how it is that such γνώσεις (e.g., our γνῶσις of the 
category quality) can be simple, even if articulating it would require many propositions (viz., 
perhaps, the propositions that constitute Categories 6).  
In §3.3.1, we will discuss the sort of discernment involved in specifically intellectual 
γνῶσις, but first there is some unfinished business to attend to. We have said just enough about 
γνῶσις already to see our way through the confusions raised at the end of §3.1.3. Let us turn to 
them now. 
3.2.2 Truth and error without division or combination   
Whatever confusions we may have about how the indivisible thoughts qualify as claims and 
about how some of them can serve as terms in propositions, we can see how Aristotle thinks that 
thoughts of, e.g., individual οὐσίαι can be divided into the thought “οὐσία” and the thought of 
some differentiating characteristics which make the οὐσία in question the οὐσία it is, and we can 
see how he thinks that “οὐσία” itself cannot be further analyzed in this matter. With this in mind 
let us return to some of the texts we considered in §3.1. I begin with the passage from De Anima 
III.6. 
                                                 
43 Contemporary accounts of perception that combine these elements can be found in Gibson 1966 and 1986, 
Dretske 1999 153-168, and Noë 2004.  
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While a claim (φάσις) is “something of something”, just as an affirmation 
(κατάφασις) also  is,44 and all {claims} are true or false, not every thought is {this 
way}. Rather, the {thought} of what something is with respect to its being what it 
is (ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) is true, and it’s not something of something. 
Rather, as the sight of the [distinctive] object is true, though whether it’s a 
<white> man or not is not always true, so it holds with whatever things lack 
matter. (430b26-30) 
Since the indivisible thoughts are said to be true in the way that (a certain sort of) sight is, 
we must start by discussing in what sense perception can be true. The language of truth and 
falsity is applied to perceptions and to φαντασίαι (which are states of the perceptual part of the 
soul) frequently in the De Anima’s discussions of these faculties, where it is evidently being used 
in a looser sense than it is in the discussion of thought. The thoughts singled out in the present 
passage are not being said to be true in the way that perceptions can be; the point is rather that, 
with respect to the alternative between truth and falsity, these thoughts stand to other thoughts as 
the perception of proper sensibles stands to the perception of incidental objects—e.g., as the 
perception of white stands to the perception of Diares’ white son.45 The composition of some 
thoughts from others generates the alternative between truth and falsehood because it introduces 
the possibility of error—of miscombination. Since each of the units corresponds to something 
real, a miscombination or falsehood is a combination of psychological units which fails to 
correspond to any combination of the existents to which the units correspond. A true 
combination, by contrast is one that corresponds to a real complex object, and its truth consists in 
the preservation in the complex of the correspondence to reality already exemplified in its units. 
Thus we can see the respect in which indivisible thoughts are true if they serve as the units from 
which complex thoughts are composed. Indeed, though the truth of the complex thoughts is more 
familiar to us, it is ultimately to be understood in terms of the relation the unit-thoughts bear to 
                                                 
44Torstrik replaces the manuscripts’ “φάσις” and “κατάφασις” with  “κατάφασις”  and  “ἀπόφασις”, respectively. 
Ross accepts the second of these emendations while rejecting the first. Ross’ apparatus and commentary give no 
basis for either of these emendations, and both his reading and Torstrik’s seem inferior to the manuscript reading. It 
is an affirmation (κατάφασις) that is paradigmatically “something of something”, so it makes good sense in the 
“ὥσπερ” clause. Granted, the “και” in that clause is awkward, but not terribly so. “Φάσις” is more general than 
“κατάφασις”  insofar as it subsumes affirmations and denials, and so the sentence as written is makes sense. The 
point is that not all claims, not just affirmations, claim something of something. My only hesitation is that it is not 
clear that Aristotle does think this about all φάσεις. Metaphysics Θ.10 1051b24-5 may imply the contrary in its 
contrast between φάσις and ἀπόφανσις (see discussion below). If this is the right, Aristotle should use ἀπόφανσις” in 
the present passage. Still it is not unusual for Aristotle to ignore in one work a distinction drawn in another; “φάσις” 
in the present passage may be interchangeable with “ἀπόφανσις” in the present passage, despite being is reserved for 
thinner meaning in the Metaphysics passage. 
45 See De Anima II.6. 
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their objects: it is only because the units correspond to objects that combinations of them can 
represent objects at all, and, therefore, that they can misrepresent them. 
This more basic sort of truth, which does not require combination, comes under 
discussion in Metaphysics Θ.10, which I quote now with an embedded outline for ease of 
reference.  
{A} In the case of an uncombined thing, what are existence or non-existence and 
truth and falsehood? {A1} For it’s not a combination so as to exist when 
compounded and not to exist if it’s divided, as it is with the white wood or the 
diagonal being commensurate; {A2} nor will truth and falsehood still belong in 
the same way as they apply also in those cases. {A3} Instead, just as truth is not 
the same in these cases, so existing is not {the same}.  
{B} Rather, truth and falsehood are {as follows}: {B1} truth is touching (θιγεῖν) 
and claiming (φάναι) ({B1a} for an affirmation (κατάφασις) and a claim (φάσις) 
are not the same), {B2} while falsehood is being g-ignorant and not touching. 
{B3} For there’s no erring about what something is, except incidentally; {B4} 
likewise also in the case of the οὐσίαι that aren’t combined ({B4a} for there’s no 
erring, and {B4b} everything is actually, not potentially, {B4b1} for {otherwise} 
they would have come to be or passed away, {B4b2} but in fact it neither comes 
to be nor passes away, {B4b2a} for {if it did} it would have come to be from 
something). {B5} In the cases of whatever is just what something is and an 
actuality, there is no erring; rather either one thinks or one does not. {B6} 
However, about these things, one can seek what they are and whether they are this 
way or not.  
{C} Existence as truth and non-existence as falsehood are {as follows}: {C1} in 
one case, if there’s compounding it’s true, and if there’s not compounding it’s 
false; {C2} and in another case, {C2a} if it even exists, it is thus, and if it’s not 
thus, it doesn’t exist, {C2b} and truth is thinking these things, {C2c} and there is 
not falsehood nor error, {C2c1} but rather g-ignorance ({C2c2} not like 
blindness, for blindness is as if someone wholly didn’t have the intellectual 
{faculty}). (Metaphysics Θ.10 1051b17-a4) 
Aristotle gives his account of the truth of uncombined things in the sections I have 
labeled B and C2. For an uncombined thought to be true is for it to touch its object or to “claim” 
it. Given the context, φάναι here cannot mean to claim anything about the object, nor can it be 
“something of something” as De Anima III.6 430b26 tells us φάσεις are, because then it would 
not be simple. This is, presumably, the point made by contrasting φάσις and κατάφασις, so φάσις 
must here be used quite generally for any expression, including the expression of what one 
knows in virtue of “touching” a simple object.  
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The metaphor of touching here denotes the relationship in which the soul stands to an 
object when it knows it. It is especially apt in the cases under discussion, because what is known 
involves no combination so that there is no way to misapprehend the object without failing to be 
in touch with it at all. Thus, in the case of the indivisibles, what we might call semantic failure 
(or non-representation) is possible, but misrepresentation is not. Aristotle is ambivalent about 
whether to call the sort of failure that is possible “falsehood”: he does so in B2, but says the 
opposite in C2’s concluding summary. Throughout, though, he characterizes the relevant state as 
a sort ἄγνοια, thus implying that a successful thought about an indivisible is a γνῶσις.  
His view, then, is that an indivisible thought is an instance of knowledge and thereby in 
touch with the world. This contact with the world is inherited by the complex thoughts composed 
from it, which are thereby about something; but the complexity of these thoughts prevents the 
aboutness they inherit from their constituents from being sufficient for knowledge, and this gives 
rise to a new possibility: misrepresentation of the objects. The advent of combination introduces 
a gap between truth and meaningfulness that cannot arise in the case of indivisibles. Without this 
gap, with respect to any given object, one is either knowledgeable or wholly ignorant. 
We can restate the point by drawing a contrast to the predominant contemporary view, 
which holds that semantics precedes epistemology in that before something can be knowledge, it 
must first have semantic content—i.e., it must represent the world or something in it as being a 
certain way. On this view being a thought precedes being an item of knowledge. The thought’s 
content can either be true or false (or more broadly veridical or non-veridical) and if it is true and 
certain other conditions are satisfied, the thought qualifies as knowledge. By contrast, an 
Aristotelian γνῶσις needn’t have any content that could be false. To be a γνῶσις is to stand in a 
certain relation to existing objects. It is by standing in this relation that the basic γνώσεις are 
contentful and qualify as νοήματα. But they are νοήματα that cannot fail to be true. Other 
νοήματα derive from these basic ones and inherit their content from them, but the mechanism of 
transmitting content does not necessarily transmit truth. Thus the derivative νοήματα, like 
thoughts on the contemporary conception, have content that may be false, and therefore they are 
not necessarily γνώσεις.46 
                                                 
46 My interpretation on this point may be usefully compared with Charles’ account of how complex but not simple 
names can be significant while lacking referents. He writes: 
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I wrote earlier that Aristotle’s conception of γνῶσις differs from contemporary 
epistemologists’ conceptions of knowledge as a sort of belief, in that γνῶσις is broader, including 
perceptions which are not beliefs. We can see now, that the issue is not just that there are 
perceptual as well as conceptual γνώσεις, but that at either level, there is an important structural 
difference between Aristotle’s account and the contemporary view. Contemporary 
epistemologists (by in large) view knowledge as a species of a genus whose members need not 
be true (or veridical), and they differentiate knowledge within this genus by (amongst other 
things) truth. A structurally similar account could be given of perception, and indeed just such an 
account is part of standard representationalist theories of perception. But Aristotle’s 
understanding of perceptual and conceptual γνῶσις is different, and it makes it more natural to 
group them together as one sort of thing. To g-know is to be in a certain sort of relation to the 
world. One aspect of this relation is the feature we call “truth” when contrasting it with falsity; 
but, though this feature belongs to all γνώσεις, the contrast with falsity arises only in the case of 
certain derivative νοήματα that are capable of inheriting content from γνώσεις without standing 
in the relation to objects that a γνῶσις must. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The significance of the simple and compound names is fixed in radically different ways . As a 
consequence, while simple thoughts must signify one object or kind in the world, compound 
names need not. For the significance of the latter is fixed in a way which does not depend on their 
being one kind in reality  which brings them about in the likening way. (2000 89-90) 
Later (135-6) he recalls this distinction between simples and complexes to explain the falsehood of propositional 
thoughts.  The major difference is that Charles does not address the questions about the relation between thought and 
γνῶσις, that are driving me here, and is instead focused on the relation between language, thoughts, and objects. 
Despite this difference in focus and orientation, there are important commonalities. I agree that Aristotle gives a 
single explanation for the falsehood of propositions and the emptiness of concepts. However, I disagree with his 
treatment of the difference between the types of thoughts as a consequence of the difference in the ways the 
significance of simple and compound names is fixed. He draws on Aristotle’s remarks about compound names in De 
Interpretatione (at 16a21-5 and 16b32), to suggests that complex names signify complex thoughts, which are 
composed of simpler thoughts placed into some relation by the thinker. The referents of these names is then 
determined by a function in which these simple thoughts serve as input. I more or less agree with Charles on the 
nature of complex thoughts (though whereas Charles seems to think that there are many possible relations in which 
the component thoughts can stand, I doubt that Aristotle recognizes any relations other than that of subject to 
predicate). However, I think he is mistaken to take the De Interpretatione passages as evidence that Aristotle thinks 
he needs a special theory of the signification of complex names. Since he never gives such a theory, the more natural 
reading is that he thinks that they signify just as simple ones do and that he mentions them only to make it clear what 
he means in saying that the parts of a name do not signify. For all Aristotle says here, there may be simple thoughts 
corresponding to complex names, and there is reason to think that there are: the concept “ἐνέργεια” is likely  to be 
indivisible, whereas the word is composed from “ἐν” and “ἔργον”. Similarly, the concept “ὀστρακόδερμος”, though 
it is probably divisible,  is surely not composed of thoughts of pottery and skin. Finally, Charles recognizes, there 
can be complex thoughts (such as that of “void”) which have simple names. Given all this, I don’t think there’s any 
interesting connection between the complexity of names and of thoughts.  
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According to this approach to knowledge and truth, any conception of a mental state 
which can fail or succeed at being knowledge is derivative on a prior conception of knowledge. 
Thus (g-)knowledge must be recursively defined. In Aristotle’s terminology, it forms a 
succession, and only for derivative forms of knowledge is there a contrary, erroneous state. The 
situation is complicated, however, because (as we’ll discuss in some detail later), different 
γνώσεις are primary in different respects. For our present purposes, however, we can identify the 
primary γνώσεις with the two sorts of indivisible thoughts that we met in §3.1.3. 
An indivisible thought is a primary γνῶσις and cannot be in error. A proposition, which 
combines such thoughts can be true and a γνῶσις or false and fail to be one.47 Matters are 
complicated somewhat by the category of thoughts that are divisible but undivided, such as 
thoughts of ice or goatstags, especially since the thought of what such an object is with respect to 
its being what it is does qualify as indivisible. This latter sort of thought qualifies because ice is 
solidified water “straightaway” or “per se” (to borrow the idioms of Metaphysics H.6 1045a36-
b7 and the Posterior Analytics respectively); and, likewise, if there were goatstags, they would 
be straightaway animals with certain features. However, neither ice nor goatstags exist 
“straightaway” or “per se”.48 Whereas οὐσία and quality are straightaway certain existents. 
goatstags do not exist at all, and ice’s existence amounts to something’s else being a certain way 
(viz. to water’ being solidified). The grasp of ice’s existence, therefore, isn’t indivisible and 
basic, as the grasp of οὐσία’s is. The thought of ice, therefore, is not a primary γνῶσις and the 
thought of goatstags is not a γνῶσις at all, but a sort or failing analogous to falsehood. Its 
difference from falsehood lies in that the thought is not an active combining of elements 
conceived first as distinct, but rather begins by thinking them as a unity. In the normal use of a 
concept we assume rather than assert that is has instances, and within the context of this 
assumption, the concept stands to the proposition as truly indivisible thoughts stand to all other 
thoughts. 
Divisible concepts, then, though composed from other concepts, are not combinings of 
concepts in the way that propositions are combinings of concepts. It is of such combinings that 
Aristotle says in De Anima III.6 (just prior to distinguishing potentially from actually ἀδιαίρετον 
                                                 
47 The derivative thought’s status as a γνῶσις likely requires more than mere truth (which might be accidental), but 
we can leave this aside for the moment. 
48 On existing per se, see Posterior Analytics I.4 73b6-9. 
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thoughts): “It is νοῦς  that makes each {combination} one.” (430b5-6) The implication is that 
νοῦς is not responsible for the composition of divisible concepts—that the mind does not 
construct them from the indivisible ones. Rather, as we’ve already seen, we divide out our 
concepts from things that are presented to us as wholes—e.g. from white men, we divide out 
white and man, and then we further divide man, into biped and animal. The indivisible concepts 
represent the terminus of this process. In this respect, they are something that we reach rather 
than something that we begin with. But in another respect we have them all along, they are 
present in potentiality in the concepts from which they can be reached by division—indeed this 
is what it is for those concepts to be divisible. And as implicit constituents of them, the 
indivisible concepts, enable the divisible ones to (fallibly) represent the world.  
We have seen how indivisible thoughts can be true and how they are impervious to error. 
Aristotle does tell us, however, of two respects in which error concerning indivisibles is possible. 
First, B3 (1051b25-6) allows that there is error (ἀπατή) about what something is κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός.  There is some interpretive controversy about what such incidental error would 
consist in. Alexander and Bonitz interpret this to mean there is error only in an extended sense of 
the term that includes ignorance. Ross argues that “κατὰ συμβεβηκός” cannot be read in this way 
and suggests instead that Aristotle is speaking of error that is incidental to the object’s being 
uncombined. On this view, insofar as the object is a single term, it impervious to error, but, 
considered as combination of its genus and differentia it may be false.49 Ross’ interpretation is 
superior to the one he criticizes, but I doubt that it is correct. Given the role of the remark in the 
passage, we should expect it to be making a familiar point and there is a familiar point which it 
can naturally be read as making. 
The subject of the passage is οὐσίαι without combination. Aristotle explains how error is 
not possible in their case by reference to the more familiar point that there is no error about what 
something is. It is in this context that he says that we can err about what something is only κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός. The most natural reading of this is that we can err about its incidental features. For 
example, we can erroneously think that a given man is white, that a given white thing is a man, 
or that some men have horns. There is an analog in perception to the sort of error that is possible 
                                                 
49 Ross (1947 v.2 p. 277) refers to De Anima III.6’s discussion of the way in which some ἀδιαίρετα are divisible as 
possibly offering support for his reading, because the ἀδιαίρετα are there said to be divisible κατὰ συμβεβηκός 
(430b16-17), but he calls the interpretation of this comment on which it would support his present interpretation 
“very doubtful” (without giving any reasons for this judgment either here or in his commentary on the De Anima). 
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in indivisible thought, and it too is called κατὰ συμβεβηκός: one cannot erroneously see white as 
black, but one can err κατὰ συμβεβηκός by taking the white thing you see to be (e.g.) Diares’ son 
when it is not.50 What we cannot do is err about what it is to be something per se. We cannot, 
e.g., think that what it is to be a man is to be a quadruped, because anyone who we might 
describe as “thinking” this would fail to make even the sort of cognitive contact with men that 
would be required to say something false about them. However, Aristotle must acknowledge that 
one can get something’s definition wrong, because he spends a great deal of time refuting 
putative definitions, and devotes much of Topics VI to giving advice on how to do this. This sort 
of concern is likely what prompts him to qualify the claim that one cannot err about what 
something is, and the idea of incidental predication does make room for him to explain this sort 
of error, by saying that the mistaken definer makes contact with the definiendum only 
incidentally. One cannot think that man, the biped animal, is quadruped, whereas one can think 
that man, the white thing, is quadruped; in this latter case, however one isn’t thinking about man 
except incidentally, insofar as the white things about which one is thinking happen to be men.51 
We’ve seen, then, at least an indication of how one can err κατὰ συμβεβηκός about what 
something is. The passage may suggest that there is a parallel error possible about indivisible 
things. Whether or not this suggestion is intended, I think it is correct. The possibility of error for 
Aristotle presupposes a combination, and an indivisible is not itself a combination, so one’s 
thought of what it is cannot be in error, but an indivisible object can serve as a unit in a 
combination, and thoughts of any such combination, which can be in error, are κατὰ συμβεβηκός 
about the indivisible object. For example, someone who thought that two was a factor of seven 
would be mistaken about two κατὰ συμβεβηκός, whereas someone who (per impossible on 
Aristotle’s view) thought that two was odd would be mistaken about it per se (assuming that 
being even is part of what it is to be two). Similarly, consider the case of the categories, which 
we took earlier as our paradigm of indivisible things: one cannot by Aristotle’s lights be in error 
                                                 
50 On incidental objects of perception, see De Anima II.6 418a20-25, on the possibility of error with respect to them, 
see II.3, 428b17-25. 
51 I will treat this issue in greater detail in §4.2.1, but it is worth observing now that in Posterior Analytics II.8, 
during a discussion of how we come to know definitions, Aristotle distinguishes between knowing that something 
exists “κατὰ συμβεβηκός” and knowing this by having “something of the object itself” (93a21-24). He goes on to 
say that to seek the “what it is”, when one is in the former situation is “to seek nothing”. Presumably, then, to assert 
some definition as the result of such a search is to assert nothing—or at least nothing that is non-incidentally about 
the object. 
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about, e.g. what it is to be a quality or quantity, but one certainly can make category errors—i.e., 
one could assign a given existent to the wrong category. Indeed, Aristotle thinks that such errors 
were common amongst his predecessors, who had not yet explicitly distinguished the categories.  
Turning now to a second issue, how should we understand the ignorance or failure to 
“touch” with Aristotle identifies as the contrary of knowledge of ἀδιαίρετα? If a grasp of what 
something is qualifies as an uncombined thought, then the ignorance in question cannot be a total 
lack of content. Just as one can think that ice is solidified water, one can think that a goatstag is 
an animal with goat and stag parts, and this thought is both contentful and somehow erroneous. 
On Aristotle’s view, the sort of error involved could not be a misrepresentation, because there is 
no such object as a goatstag to misrepresent. Thus the thought of goatstag is out of touch with 
reality without misrepresenting anything. As we have already seen, the thought of a goatstag is 
able to have content despite being out of touch with reality only because there is a respect in 
which it does involve combination. The non-existence of goatstags amounts to no animal’s being 
such as a goatstag would by definition be—it amounts to animal’s not being combined with the 
distinctive goatstag features. Thoughts of indivisible objects, cannot be out of touch with reality 
even in this way. Such thoughts are necessarily γνώσεις of real objects. (However, there is 
nothing to prevent one from taking some thought to be this way when it is not.52) 
Thus, at B6, Aristotle says about “whatever is just what something is and an actuality” 
that “one can seek what they are and whether they are this way or not” (1051b30-3). “This way” 
refers to the content of the account Aristotle has just given of the uncombined thoughts. What it 
is possible to investigate is whether the account indeed applies. In order to investigate this, one 
                                                 
52 Charles (2000 136-7) makes this point as well. He thinks such errors occur when the thinking faculty is 
functioning improperly with the result that something other than a given simple object affections the thinking faculty 
in the way that the simple object normally would. There are a number of problems with this view. First, I know of 
no direct evidence in Aristotle for the view that the thinking faculty could function improperly and so be affected by 
its objects abnormally. Charles, suggests that involvement of φαντάσματα in thought could lead to this, because the 
φάντασμα the thoughts “identity conditions”, but again I don’t see any evidence of this in Aristotle. (Charles refers 
to On Memory 450b25-9 as showing that one needn’t always know the processes that give rise to one’s thoughts, but 
this passage does not support his case, because in those cases where one does not connect the φάντασμα to an 
external object, the φάντασμα fails to be of that object at all.) Second, his approach to this issue requires universals 
to act on us, which would be impossible given the account I ascribed to Aristotle in the last chapter. (I discuss 
further how the universal serves as an object for thought in §3.3.) Third, I don’t think a special account of how we 
can make this sort of error is necessary. This sort of error only seems perplexing if one thinks of divisible thoughts  
as being complex in some way that should normally be introspectively apparent, so that divisibility should always be 
obvious to the subject. Propositions are complex in this way, because they are combined by the subject, but this is 
not the case with the concepts that compose them. Even those concepts that are divisible are undivided (unless one 
can divided and reconstituted them, and we play no role in their intensional composition.  
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must be able to entertain the thought that the account applies without knowing that it does. The 
grammar makes it ambiguous as to whether what can be investigated is whether Aristotle’s 
general account of indivisibles is true or whether it applies to a given object (i.e., whether that 
object is indeed indivisible). Given the context, the first interpretation seems more likely, but 
both claims must be true on Aristotle’s account. After all, in this very passage he is conducting 
an investigation of what it is to be uncombined, and he thinks that some of his predecessors 
mistakenly supposed certain combined things to be uncombined.53 
The upshot of the preceding is that, though there is a category of thought that does not 
admit of falsehood, a thinker does not automatically know whether a given thought falls into this 
category. In Chapter 4 we will find reason to doubt that Aristotle thinks there is any infallible 
method by which a thinker can identify (all) the thoughts of this type.54 As has often been 
observed, Aristotle and Plato do not share the modern emphasis on refuting skepticism and 
Aristotle at least was not seeking Cartesian certainty. However this should not be taken as 
evidence that he was not interested in questions of justification. In §4.2, we will see that he does 
advance standards by which putative knowledge can be evaluated, though his focus in doing so is 
less on justifying beliefs than on providing methods by which we can discern new facts—for 
example, that a certain object is indivisible. These methods, and more generally the path to 
indivisible thoughts are a topic for the next chapter, however. We turn now (in §3.2.3) to the role 
that these thoughts play in ἐπιστήμη, before broadening our scope to thought generally and 
taking up (in §3.2.4-5) the earlier postponed issue of the sort of γνῶσις in which thought 
consists.  
3.2.3 Indivisible thoughts as principles of ἐπιστήμη 
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to review some of our results from earlier in the chapter, 
and to restate some familiar Aristotelian doctrines in terms of them.  “Γνῶσις” is Aristotle’s 
general term for knowledge or awareness, which can take place either in a perceptual form or 
intellectually. A γνῶσις of either sort, can be either simple (i.e., without division or combination) 
                                                 
53 Consider the case of Anaxagoras who Aristotle chastises in Physics I.4 for multiplying elements far beyond 
necessity. Presumably someone could make the opposite mistake as well, if e.g. he tried to account for the fifth 
element by making it a complex of the other four. 
54 Though Metaphysics Γ.3-4 may give us an infallible method for identifying certain indivisible thoughts. 
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or complex. Attempts at complex γνῶσις (of either sort) can go wrong in ways that simple ones 
cannot. In the case of attempts at complex intellectual γνώσεις the result of such going wrong is 
falsity. “Thought” (“νόημα”) is a generic term embracing intellectual γνῶσις and failed attempts 
at it. Simple (or uncombined) νοήματα are concepts. Complex (or combined) νοήματα are 
propositions. Some νοήματα are simple in an absolute sense and are not susceptible to division. 
Others can be divided, and in this sense are complex, but nonetheless function as single units in 
thought—as subjects or predicates in propositions. Νοήματα of this last sort are said to be 
divided potentially, but not actually, and they are concepts as well. Their divisibility consists in 
the fact that their definitions can be reconfigured into propositions in which the differentia is 
asserted of the kind, and such propositions are equivalent to the propositions that the complex 
object of the νόημα exists. A successful νόημα of this last sort—one which didn’t go wrong—
would be a complex γνῶσις. Ἐπιστήμη is a variety of complex γνῶσις.  
In particular, ἐπιστήμη is γνῶσις of a complex object as necessary, which we have by 
grasping the object as following from its causes. To e-know an object is “to g-know that the 
cause due to which the object exists is its cause and that it is not possible to be otherwise” 
(Posterior Analytics I.2 71b11-12). The necessity is expressed in the form of a deduction of the 
object from its cause(s). Such deductions are called demonstrations, and an ἐπιστήμη is (or can 
be recast into) a body of demonstrations about a single kind of thing (I.28). 
To use Aristotle’s famous example, if thunder is a certain noise in the clouds one has 
ἐπιστήμη of it when one grasps that the clouds must have this noise because fire is being 
extinguished in them—when one combines the thoughts of noise and clouds through the middle 
term “extinguishing”, which designates the cause of the clouds’ being noisy. If one has done this 
and the thoughts of extinguishing’s being noisy and of clouds’ extinguishing are indivisible, then 
one will grasp the clouds as necessarily noisy. If, on the other hand, the noisiness of 
extinguishing or the clouds’ being extinguishers is divisible, then further middle terms will have 
to be found. (Likely the clouds are extinguishers because they are moist, for example.) Aristotle 
calls the process of deducing from causes demonstration, the first causes from which the 
demonstrations ultimately proceed principles, and the γνῶσις of these principles νοῦς. 
In Posterior Analytics I.2 (72a14-24), Aristotle divides principles into axioms and posits 
(θέσεις). Axioms are presupposed by all learning and are common to all ἐπιστῆμαι, while the 
posits are distinctive to different ἐπιστῆμαι. Posits are then divided into definitions and 
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suppositions (ὑποθέσεις). It is these two types of posit that correspond to the two types of 
indivisible thoughts we have been discussing. A definition is a statement of what something is, 
and a supposition is an assertion of the existence of a basic object, whose existence cannot be 
demonstrated (or at least not demonstrated by the ἐπιστήμη in question).55 Such objects are 
alternatively referred to as “primaries” or (confusingly) “principles”.56 
The ἐπιστήμη itself consists in a body of deductions (demonstrations) from the 
suppositions of the existence of the primaries. Thus Aristotle sometimes tells us that ἐπιστῆμαι 
are distinguished from one another by their posits and sometimes by their terms. The terms 
comprise the items whose existence is posited (viz. the primaries) and the other defined items. 
The things that are posited to exist constitute the kind that is the ἐπιστήμη’s subject matter and 
they serve as the (ultimate) subject terms in its demonstrations. The other terms serve as 
predicates.57 
                                                 
55 We can apply De Anima III.6’s distinction between thoughts that are divided potentially and actually here. A 
thought that can be divided potentially (e.g. the thought of ice) might be left undivided and serve as a supposition for 
an ἐπιστήμη of ice. 
56 Posterior Analytics I.2 71b15-24. “Principle” (ἀρχή) has two related uses in connection with ἐπιστήμη. First the 
undivided thoughts which constitute νοῦς are the principles of ἐπιστήμη in the sense of being the cognitive states 
which on which the ἐπιστήμη depends. This is the usage that we find, for example, in Posterior Analytics II.19. 
Second, the objects of these thoughts are the principles on which the objects of the ἐπιστήμη depend, as e.g. all the 
numbers (for Aristotle) depend on two and three. This is the usage that we find in, e.g. Metaphysics M.10. It is in 
this second sense that the primary objects are called principles, and in this same sense anything’s essence is a 
principle. “Ἀρχή” occasionally appears in a third usage connected with ἐπιστήμη to refer to the starting-points from 
which an inquiry proceeds towards the principles from which ἐπιστήμη will then be reached by demonstration. See, 
e.g., Nicomachean Ethics I.4 1095b4-8. In all these uses the term has the same basic sense of “origin” or “starting-
point”. In the first usage, it is the origin of ἐπιστήμη or demonstration, in the second, it is the origin of the objects, 
and in the third it is the origin of an inquiry. (On “principles” or “primaries” as the indemonstrable terms of 
ἐπιστῆμαι see Sholz 1975 §11.)  
57  See Posterior Analytics I.10 76b11-16:  
For every demonstrative e-knowledge is about three things: whatever it posits to exist (and these 
are the kind whose per se affections it studies), and the common things called axioms, from which 
primaries it demonstrates, and thirdly the affections, of which it assumes what each signifies. 
(Posterior Analytics I.10 76b11-16, cf. I.28) 
Hintikka (1972 5) maintains that what is assumed to exist is simply the kind and “the existential force is carried 
downwards from wider terms to narrower ones”. The idea is, presumably, that from the existence of “animal” (along 
with some other premises) one will prove the existence of the different forms of animal. The text here suggests just 
the opposite: that several forms of animal may be posited separately, with the kind being constituted by the sum of 
the (related) posits. (For criticism of the details of Hintikka’s specific proposal see Ferejohn 1991 33-6.)  Other texts 
(e.g. II.13) show that in at least some cases only certain of the members of the kind, the primaries, are posited (e.g. 2 
and 3 in the case of number), and that the existence of the remaining kind-members is demonstrated. The examples 
of this, however, are all mathematical, and (as of De Anima III.3 and elsewhere) numbers and figures are 
successions rather than kinds proper, so it’s not clear what implications should be drawn from these passages for the 
study of other kinds. Politics IV.4 suggests something like the model Hintikka proposes: 
If we purposed to grasp forms of animal, we would first determine (ἀποδιορίζειν) what it is 
necessary for every animal to have--e.g., some of the senses and what works up and receives the 
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The identification of these truths with concepts, explains a much remarked-on feature of 
Posterior Analytics II.19. There Aristotle frustrates many readers by giving what seems to be an 
account of concept-formation as his long promised solution to the problem of how we know the 
principles of demonstration. Discussions of this chapter typically begin by noting the 
discrepancy between concepts and demonstrative principles which must be propositional in form, 
and then excuse Aristotle by noting that (many of) the propositions in question will be 
definitions, the possession of which may be constitutive of possession of the concept.58 
In fact, of the things Aristotle describes as principles in I.2, only suppositions might be 
able to serve literally as premises in a demonstration, and even this is true only in a qualified 
way. Since a definition formulates what something is, it is not a proposition and nothing follows 
from it as such. Rather, as we saw in the case of the ice demonstration earlier, definitions play a 
role in ἐπιστήμη by making clear what it would be to prove the existence of a given thing. If ice 
is by definition solidified water, then for ice to exist is for water to be solidified, and one proves 
its existence by finding a middle term between water and solidification. Definitions also make 
clear what premises one is entitled to in virtue of knowing that a given thing exists. For example, 
once one knows that there is ice, its definition licenses the premise that it is solid from which 
other things about it may follow (e.g. that it can be walked on). Even in the case of primaries, the 
definitions provide content to the suppositions that they exist, and it is not the suppositions alone 
that serve as premises. Geometrical proofs, for example, do not depart from the premise that 
there are points but from basic premises about them, which are licensed by their definitions—
e.g., from the premise that points have no magnitude. 
                                                                                                                                                             
food (e.g., a mouth and stomach), and, besides these, {it is necessary} for each {to have} the parts 
by which it moves. If these were the only {ones} and they were differentiated (I mean, e.g., {if 
there were} several kinds of mouth and stomach and senses, and again {several kinds of} moving 
parts) then the number of yokings together (συζεύζεις) of these would, from necessity, produce 
several kinds of animal. For, e.g., the same animal cannot have many different {kinds} of mouth, 
nor likewise of ears, so that when all the possible (ἐνδεχόμενοι ) couplings (συνδυασμοί)  of these 
were grasped, they will produce as many forms of animal as there are yokings together of the 
necessary parts. It’s the same way with the constitutions we mentioned. For cities too are 
compounded not from one but from many parts, as we’ve often said. (1290b25-38) 
Here the various forms of animals are “produced” from general knowledge of the kind, and we are told that the same 
method applies in other cases as well. Likely this production amounts to the demonstration of the produced items. 
The same verb (ποιεῖν) is used of principles’ producing demonstrated items in Posterior Analytics I.10 (76a42) and 
for terms’ or premises’ production of a deduction in the Prior Analytics I.7 (29a29) and I.26 (42b24), and the sort of 
production in the present passage can be viewed as an analog of geometrical construction, which is Aristotle’s 
paradigm of demonstration in an actual science. 
58 Ross 1949 679, Barnes 1994 271, Kahn 1981 395, Apostle 1981b 292. 
 161 
The propositions that figure as the literal premises of demonstrations are what Aristotle 
calls in I.4 per se predications. They predicate of an item a feature which by definition belongs to 
it—where the definition in question may be the definition of the subject or the predicate. In 
various contexts Aristotle refers to such propositions as immediate, undivided or uncuttable, 
contrasting them with propositions for which there is a middle term demonstratively uniting the 
subject with the predicate.59 Such terms, however, are partial definitions, and in this sense 
definitions are principles. And, as we’ve seen, to have a concept is to know what something is—
i.e., to have the sort of knowledge that is expressed definition, so it is correct also to say that 
concepts are principles of ἐπιστήμη. I turn next to Aristotle’s discussion of the act of discernment 
in which this knowledge of principles consists. 
3.3 CONCEPTS AS ΓΝΩΣΕΙΣ 
3.3.1 Discerning essence 
Aristotle’s most sustained discussion of intellectual discernment as such occurs in De Anima 
III.4, as part of an argument that νοῦς is distinct from the perceptual faculty.  
Since a magnitude and a magnitude’s being (τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι) are distinct (ἄλλο), 
and water and water’s being {are distinct} (and this is so in the case of many 
other things, but not of all—for in the case of some they are the same), one 
discerns flesh’s being and flesh either by distinct things or by {the same thing} 
distinctly disposed {ἄλλως ἔχοντι}; for flesh is not without matter, but rather, like 
the snub,{it is} a this in this. So, while it is by the perceptive that one discerns hot 
and cold and those things of which flesh is a certain λόγος, one discerns flesh’s 
being by something distinct, either by something separate or by {something that is 
to perception} as the bent {line} is to the same {line} when straightened. Again, 
in the case of the things that exist by abstraction, the straight is like the snub; for it 
involves extension; but its being what it is (τί ἦν εἶναι), if straight and straight’s 
being are different (ἕτερον), is something distinct (let it be duality). One discerns 
it, therefore, by something different or by {the same thing} differently disposed 
(ἑτέρος ἔχοντι). Generally, therefore, as objects are separate from matter so too 
are the {things} about νοῦς. (429b10-22) 
                                                 
59 Posterior Analytics I.15-16, I.22 84a35, I.23 84b35, Prior Analytics II.27 70b14. See also Posterior Analytics 
II.16-19, where the uncuttable propositions are said to be definitions. 
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The faculty (or disposition of a faculty) that Aristotle here distinguishes from the 
perceptive faculty is, is of course, νοῦς. 60 Νοῦς, is distinguished from perception, as the faculty 
that discerns an objects’ being (“τὸ” + dat.+ “εἶναι”) or “being what it is” (“τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι”). In 
my exposition, to avoid grammatical awkwardness, I’ll use the traditional translation “essence” 
for these two Aristotelian formulae, though this translation can be misleading unless one takes 
care to separate the term from the baggage of medieval, modern, and contemporary metaphysical 
speculation. 
Distinct though νοῦς is from perception, a message of the present passage is that, in at 
least many of its operations, it is intimately involved with the perceptual faculty, because the 
essences it discerns are non-accidentally embodied in matter. This connection between νοῦς and 
perception should come as no surprise, given the theme running through De Anima III, on which 
we’re already commented, that there is no thought without either perception or φαντασία. 
However, the connection between perception and matter on the one hand and thought and 
immateriality on the other is not something we have looked at before. Indeed, from the passages 
we have looked at before, and from others to which we will turn shortly, we might have expected 
Aristotle in the present passage to differentiate νοῦς from perception, on the grounds that it 
discerns universals while perception discerns particulars.61 And, in this connection, we’ve 
                                                 
60 For the sake of simplicity, and since it does not matter for our present purposes, I’ll refer to νοῦς as a faculty, and 
ignore the possibility that it is a disposition (ἕξις) of a more familiar faculty. However, we should note that Aristotle 
regarded this possibility as important enough to mention twice, and there is a strong case to be made that he does, in 
the end, regard νοῦς as a ἕξις. When, in the following chapter, he  distinguishes between the productive and the 
affected νοῦς, he describes the former as (amongst other things) a ἕξις, and there are several indications that the 
affected νοῦς is the perceptive part of the soul insofar as it is capable of being affected by the productive νοῦς. The 
doctrine that the affected νοῦς is perishable strongly suggests that it is bodily (431a25). Also III.7-8 tells us several 
times that thinking always involves an image (431a16-17, b2, 432a14-15); the interval between the first two 
statements to this effect concerns the way in which the several senses terminate in a numerically single mean that is 
multiple in being. This suggests this mean is numerically identical to the affected νοῦς (though its being this νοῦς is 
different from its being the terminus of perception). The force of this suggestion is somewhat weakened by the 
unpolished nature of the chapter, which raises doubts as to whether it was written as a continuous whole. (Ross, who 
begins his discussion of it by telling us that “Torstrik pointed out that this chapter is not a connected discussion, but 
a series of scraps put together by an early editor” [303, Cf. Hamlyn 61], thinks that the three comments that I’m 
treating as continuous belong to distinct scraps. I don’t think it is clear that this is the case, as the interpretation I’ve 
suggested above, makes at least rough sense of the continuity  of these passages and of their function within De 
Anima III. But there remains sufficient grammatical and stylistic awkwardness to view the chapter with suspicion.) 
Some further support for the identification of the affected νοῦς with the perceptual part of the soul can be found in 
On Memory 1, on which see below §3.3.2 (especially n. 87). 
61 It is worth nothing that the examples Aristotle gives here of the things discerned by perception are all universals. 
His use of such examples does not contradict his view that in any given instance of perceiving what would be 
discerned would be particular; presumably perception discerns hot from cold only in particular cases, and a universal 
γνῶσις even of these perceptible qualities would require νοῦς. The examples do, however, show a different focus 
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become accustomed to the expansive sense of “matter” that includes “intelligible matter”—a 
phrase which may be a contradiction in terms in the idiom of De Anima III.4, even though 
Aristotle here draws a connection between the extension of geometrical objects, which 
Metaphysics Z.10-11 treats as intelligible matter, and the perceptible matter of which flesh is 
composed—indeed, he seems to cite the extended character of a line as requiring the 
involvement of perception in thoughts of the line, effectively treating the extension that underlies 
the line as a sort of perceptible rather than intelligible matter. 
Matter in the present passage refers to perceptible matter, the stuff out of which bodies 
are composed, and indeed the passage sheds some light on why Aristotle elsewhere describes 
this matter as “perceptible” rather than as (say) “natural” or “bodily”.62 It is this matter which 
our senses discern. The primary sense is touch, and De Anima II.11 identifies its proper objects 
as “the differences of body qua body”—i.e., “those that differentiate the elements: hot, cold, dry 
and wet”. (423b27-9).  
The connection between being perceptible and being bodily is brought out in the present 
passage by the (otherwise odd) example of the perceptual faculty discerning flesh by discerning 
hot and cold. Presumably we’re supposed to imagine ourselves tactilely discerning flesh from 
(say) hair by noticing a difference in temperature, as we might if we ran our hands over 
                                                                                                                                                             
here. As in the other passages from the De Anima at which we’ve looked, he is focused on the hylomorphic division 
and composition that takes place in thought. We can glimpse, though, several ways in which hylomorphic 
decomposition leads to universality. Of course, as we saw earlier, the matter (whether perceptible or intelligible) 
once thought independently of its determining forms, will be a universal. More interestingly, though, the λόγος leads 
to universality in two ways. The more obvious of these, though I think the less important, is that discerning the 
essence or proportion from the matter enables one to grasp commonalities between the item whose essence it is and 
analogous items that consist of like proportions of other matters. In grasping that a line is duality in extension (if 
indeed it is) one unites it to duality in other subjects. Sameness of the λόγος across different subjects gives rise to 
analogous unities. The more important point is that two things can have the same underlying subject and the same 
proportions, while nonetheless differing in degree. Consider, for example, equilateral triangles of different sizes. 
Thus the idea of essence as λόγος gives us some purchase on the sort of sameness enjoyed by members of a form or 
the forms of a (non-ultimate) kind, even if these members differ from one another in the more and the less. Recall 
from Chapter 2, how the different forms of bird were distinguished by sets of features that all varied in the more and 
the less, but whose variations were not independent of one another. For example, swamp dwelling birds had long 
legs and correspondingly long necks. 
62 It is worth commenting briefly in this connection on the distinction here between things that are and are not 
separate from their essences. Things that do not have matter are identical with their essences, and these are the sort 
of absolutely indivisible items that we encountered in Metaphysics H.6 and Θ.10 and discussed in §3.1.4 and §3.2.2. 
These same items will count as identical with their essences in the idiom of the present passage. However, since the 
present passage is concerned only with perceptible matter and not intelligible matter, there may be some items that 
would not count as lacking matter and identical with their essences for the purposes of this passage, which would 
not so qualify for the purposes of the other passages. I have in mind things like numbers other than two and three 
and the fifty some odd movers of the celestial spheres.  
 164 
someone’s head.63 But, of course, when one actually runs one’s hand over a head, textural and 
other differences are far more pronounced than any difference in temperature, and Aristotle does 
recognize such differences as within the jurisdiction of touch.64 And, of course, we more often 
tell where flesh begins and hair ends by sight through differences in color. Hot and cold serve the 
example better than these more obvious visual and tactile differences only because, as 
fundamental terms in  Aristotle’s physical theory, “hot” and “cold” put one immediately in mind 
of bodies, and it is plausible that the essence of a tissue like flesh would be a λόγος of these two, 
and it is this λόγος that is discerned by νοῦς.65 Likely Aristotle mentions only hot and cold here, 
neglecting the wet-dry continuum, because it is easier to think of a λόγος as holding between two 
contrary terms than between four terms that fall along two separate distinct continua. Likely he 
intended us to think of the λόγος as a simple numerical ratio of hot to cold. As we will see, this is 
not ultimately accurate on his view, but this use of simplified examples is par for the course in 
Aristotle. 
                                                 
63 It perhaps goes without saying that what perception is discerning here cannot be the kind  flesh, either in the sense 
of its discerning that there is such a kind or that the touched object is an instance of the kind. Either of these 
judgments would presuppose some sort of knowledge of what flesh is, which is part of what Aristotle is here arguing 
that we need νοῦς for. What perception discerns is this object, which is flesh, and it discerns it from non-flesh 
objects in virtue of (some of) the very differences which differentiate flesh as such from other kinds. Once this 
γνῶσις is articulated and made universal by νοῦς, it will qualify as a grasp of the essence of the kind (or at least of 
“something of the essence”—cf. Posterior Analytics II.8 93a21-29). 
64 De Anima II.11teaches that touch is concerned with many pairs of opposites, including “rough and smooth” and 
“hard and soft”, but these stand to touch as “roughness and smoothness of voice” stand to hearing, whereas the 
differences of body qua body stand to touch as sound stands to hearing (422b17-33, 423b27-a2). 
65 Aristotle does think that essences are importantly analogous to such ratios and that some of his predecessors 
approached his own conception of essence (and related concepts) by speaking of ratios of elements. 
Even Empedocles occasionally stumbles upon this {viz. nature in the sense of final and formal 
cause}, lead by the truth itself, and is compelled to pronounce that the οὐσία and the nature is the 
λόγος—e.g., when he describes what bone is; for he does not say it is some one of the elements, 
nor two or three {of them}, nor all; but rather {that it’s} the λόγος of their mixture. Thus it’s clear 
that flesh too, and each of the other such parts, is the same way (τρόπον).  (Parts of Animals I.1 
642a18-24) 
The reference is likely to Empedocles statement that “white bone” came to be from “two parts glitter of Nestis” (i.e., 
water), “four of Hephaestus” (i.e., fire), and (perhaps) two parts earth (DK 31 B 96, on which see Lennox 2001a 
150-1). Aristotle goes on to say that Empedocles et al. did not draw this last conclusion and consistently cite such 
ratios as causes, because they lacked the ideas of “τί ἦν εἶναι and defining οὐσία”, which he says was touched on by 
Democritus but was only really embraced “in Socrates’ time” (an odd choice of words, since Democritus and 
Socrates were contemporaries). None of this should be taken to commit Aristotle to the view that biological tissues 
are properly defined by such ratios of elements (a position he expressly denies in Meteorology IV.12). The point is 
only that, given their other premises and certain Socratic and Aristotelian insights, the Empedocles et al. ought to 
have regarded ratios as causes. Further Aristotelian insights would have pushed them to replace or supplement these 
ratios with accounts of the roles served by the tissues in animal life. This last move, incidentally, would likely be an 
example of what Aristotle calls “thickening the middle” (Posterior Analytics I.23 84b35), but this is a topic for 
another occasion. 
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 The hot and cold, then, are the matter for the ratio which is the essence. The flesh is 
perceptibly discerned by feeling its higher temperature as one’s hand moves onto it from hair. 
This temperature is the ratio of (say) three parts hot to two parts cold (or two fifths of the way 
from the hot extreme to the cold), and it is this ratio of three to two that is discerned by νοῦς. 
Notice, however, that a thought of ratio as such would not be a thought of flesh.66 If the object is 
going to be flesh rather than the ratio of three to two, then the ratio needs to be thought as a ratio 
of hot to cold, and the involvement of such perceptible qualities in the thought requires the 
involvement of the perceptual faculty. 
The point of the present passage, however, is that the perceptual faculty is not wholly 
responsible for the thought, and it is worth pausing to consider just what it is for νοῦς to discern 
this ratio in the hot and cold. It cannot be simply to feel the specific temperature or even to 
recognize it, this is a function of perception alone. The obvious alternative is that we have 
discerned the essence of the flesh when we have come to regard that distinctive feel as a three to 
two ratio of hot and cold. This must be what Aristotle has in mind here. But he can only regard 
this as a very rough approximation to the truth, because even in the case of something as simple 
as flesh, the essence could not be a literal ratio of perceptible qualities. 
Even if we suppose, counterfactually, that flesh has a consistent ratio of hot to cold (i.e., 
that all flesh is always at a certain temperature), this will surely not be distinctive to flesh, nor 
can temperature alone be how we perceptually discern flesh. We tactilely discern them also (and 
especially) by the various differences in texture alluded to earlier, and their ultimate bodily 
constituents are differentiated (according to Aristotle’s chemistry) not just by the hot and cold 
but also by the dry and the wet. Thus at the superficial level of perceptible qualities and at the 
more fundamental level of physical constitution there are more than two opposed qualities at 
work. These different qualities are not commensurable. One can have a ratio of hot to cold 
                                                 
66 For the same reason, I take it that, were this example true, the essence of flesh, would be “a three to two ratio of 
hot and cold”, rather than simply the ratio “three to two”. The essence of flesh is distinct from flesh not because it is 
the ratio simpliciter, whereas the flesh is the union of this and the underlying hot/cold continuum simpliciter. Rather 
the essence is the hot and cold’s being in that ratio. This is something distinct from the flesh, because the flesh 
includes (whereas the essence does not) the hot and cold’s capability of standing in other ratios (and so not being 
flesh at all). The flesh is the hot and cold in a three to two ratio, whereas the essence is its being in that ratio, and the 
matter is the hot and cold. 
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because hot and cold are along a single continuum, but there is no sense to talk of something 
being one part hot and three parts smooth.67 
Matters get still worse when we set aside the (absurd) supposition that all flesh is always 
at the same temperature. As Aristotle is well aware, flesh will differ from flesh and hair from 
hair both in temperature and in all the other perceptible qualities in which the tissues differ from 
one another.68 He recognizes such differences not only between animal species, but between 
members of a given species, and even between the different parts of a single specimen or in the 
same part at different times. Thus as one runs one’s hand along a body, one may feel differences 
even in the flesh in addition to, but along the same continuum with, those one feels between the 
flesh and the hair. Accordingly, any λόγος of flesh would have to allow for differences in degree 
for each of its qualities, and, as we saw above, it would have to somehow unite incommensurable 
qualities. Neither of these feats could be performed by a ratio. 
There is another reason why essences cannot be ratios of perceptible qualities as such. 
Although touch’s proper object corresponds to the basic oppositions in Aristotle’s physical 
theory, in terms of which it might be plausible to give the essences of things, this is not true of 
perceptible qualities as such. It would be bizarre to suggest, for example, that the essence of an 
apple might be anything like a ratio of light to dark or sweet to bitter, though we discern them by 
their color and taste. If our passage is to say anything coherent about the relation between 
perception as such and νοῦς, its point cannot turn on temperature’s idiosyncrasy of being both a 
proper sensible and a difference of body qua body. I suggested earlier that it is because of this 
idiosyncrasy that Aristotle uses temperature as an example, but for it to function as an example 
we must be able to generalize from it to other cases and this cannot be done unless we allow both 
for more complex relations between perceptible qualities and essence than underlying, and for 
more complex relations than identity between perceptible qualities and the matter that underlies 
essences. 
These several problems are solved by understanding the essence of a perceptible thing as 
the cause of the differences by which it is perceptually discerned. Since a ratio is a formal cause, 
                                                 
67 Indeed Aristotle (at least some of the time) does not to think that the elements earth, air, fire, and water are 
commensurable (Physics VII.4 248b13-15), in which case formulae like “two parts water to four parts fire”, which 
Aristotle attributes to Empedocles (see n. 65 above), are ultimately incoherent.  
68 The History of Animals III.10-23 is devoted to cataloging such differences (some of which are explained  in Parts 
of Animals II.3-9). 
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the (counterfactual) example of flesh’s essence being a ratio of hot to cold would literally fit.69 
Causes, final causes especially, are able to unify large sets of qualities (as we have already 
discussed in §2.4.2), and they can admit differences in degree whereas ratios cannot. Since 
causation is transitive, essences can play a role in causing even features that are accidents of 
something’s matter (as color usually is for Aristotle). Finally since, as we saw in §2.4.5, causes 
are grasped universally, cause can serve as the missing link between thought and universality, 
which (as we noticed earlier) is conspicuously absent from our De Anima III.4 passage. The 
connection can be spelled out as follows: concepts  are γνώσεις of essences, which are causes, 
causes are known universally, therefore concepts must be universal.  
If we understand essence in this way, then what is the message of the passage about the 
relation between νοῦς and perception? It tells us that we perceptually discern certain objects by 
perceptually discerning their matter—that is, we discriminate them from one another and from 
the background in virtue of the perceptible qualities of their matter. Νοῦς then identifies the 
discriminated objects, by formulating a universal λόγος that reveals why the object has the 
perceptual features that it does. In the simplest case, this might be giving a ratio that locates the 
object relative to the extremes along a continuum, but it can (and in actual cases nearly always 
does) involve the whole explanatory apparatus of Aristotelian natural science.70  
What we are given in De Anima is an extremely abstract account of thought, which 
focuses on the thought of a mature knower, and says comparatively little about how we develop 
this sort of knowledge. We will turn out attention to texts in which Aristotle discusses the 
development of conceptual knowledge in Chapter 4. For now we can say that a mature concept is 
a γνῶσις of something’s essence which amounts to the cause of the characteristics by which it is 
discerned by some other γνῶσις. This other γνῶσις is, to use familiar Aristotelian language, 
“prior to us”—that is, it is closer to perception than the essence is.71 In the cases we have been 
looking at the γνῶσις is perception, but this need not be the case. The III.4 passage on which 
we’ve been focused includes an example of a geometrical object—a line, which Aristotle treats 
                                                 
69 However, the actual λόγος of flesh (and other animal tissues) must be final-causal according to Meteorology 
IV.12. (See especially 390a7-15.) 
70 Meteorology IV.12 at least suggests that final causes will always in the end be involved, for it says that everything 
except “the extreme” of matter is for the sake of something. This “extreme of matter” is “nothing else besides” 
matter” and is opposed to the elements in which the “that for the sake of which” is present but extremely unclear and 
unable to be formulated into a precise account. (389b25-a20) The passage, however, is quite difficult and a matter of 
some scholarly controversy.  
71 For this phrase, see, e.g., Posterior Analytics I.2 71b32-a6. 
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as analogous to flesh. As a geometrical object—something that “exists by abstraction”, the line is 
not a perceptible object, and the extension which Aristotle treats as its matter is not matter in the 
bodily sense that hot, cold, wet, and dry are.  
What, then, are the respective roles of perception and νοῦς in this case? Extension is 
matter or at least relevantly matter-like in the sense that is crucial to this passage: it is 
perceptible, for magnitude and figure are among the common sensibles.72 The line (and 
geometrical objects generally) is a special case deserving of separate mention, because it “exists 
by abstraction”—i.e., it is a certain extended magnitude mentally separated from the οὐσία in 
which it inheres and considered as an οὐσία in its own right. This abstracting is an action of νοῦς, 
and the line qua line is an object of νοῦς rather than of perception. Qua length (or extension), 
however, the line is there to be discerned in the perceived or imagined object from which it is 
abstracted. The abstraction is just the taking a specialized intellectual perspective on this 
perceptible length, but it does nothing to eliminate the perceptible character of the extension or to 
liberate the thoughts of the line from their dependence on the perceptive faculty. The essence of 
the line remains some sort of λόγος (perhaps “duality”) that stands to (perceptible) extension as 
the flesh’s λόγος stands to the hot and cold. 
Likely there is another sort of non-perceptually discerned object the discernment of 
which is nonetheless perceptually based. I have in mind objects that are discerned by inference 
from their effects. Examples in Aristotle’s thought include the movers of the many celestial 
spheres and the (never observed) process of spontaneous generation.73 In such cases the essences 
would be the deeper causes of the features by which the things were initially identified. 
Spontaneous generation, for example, would initially be identified as the coming to be of an 
animal from inanimate matter. Its essence would be the cause of this, say the intensification by 
ordinary heat of  special “vital heat” in the “earthy water” resulting in the formation of an 
increasingly earthy bubble that hardens into a shell or skin around the vitally hot material.74 
In however many ways it might do so, and however many intermediate steps might be 
involved in a given case, it is clear that (on Aristotle’s view) thought depends in some way on 
perception for its ability to represent the world. Functions of the perceptual faculty, which trace 
                                                 
72 De Anima III.1 425a14-b11. 
73 Generation of Animals III.11 
74 On this possibility, see Gotthelf 1989. 
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back ultimately to acts of perceiving, partially constitute νοῦς’s ability to represent anything that 
is not identical to its essence—i.e. anything other than the indivisible objects we discussed in 
§3.1.3 and §3.2.2. And there is reason to think that perception plays a crucial role in the 
cognition even of these objects, for we saw earlier that they are g-known through the contrast 
with the things that are derivative on them. If this is right than our cognitive contact with any 
object of thought—our ability to represent it at all—occurs through perception, and in particular 
through perception of its effects. This may come as a surprise, since in §3.2.2, we concluded that 
all representation depends on the ἀδιαίρετον γνώσεις of ἀδιαίρετον objects. I argued in the last 
section that these γνώσεις are the principles of ἐπιστήμη. It follows from this that the objects of 
these γνώσεις are causes, in which case thoughts of effects will depend on knowledge of their 
causes, whereas we just above concluded that thoughts of causes depended on (perceptual) 
knowledge of their effects. We begin to see how these seemingly contrary claims can be 
harmonized in the next two sections, and will return to the issue more directly in Chapter 4. 
First, there is another issue to address. We have not heard much about the universality of 
thought, and in particular whether the object discerned by perception and their intellectually 
discerned essences are universal or particular.  
3.3.2 The universality of thought 
When De Anima III.4 speaks of perception discerning flesh, it presumably does not mean that the 
kind flesh (or any other universal) is discerned by perception, rather what one perceptually 
discerns is a particular sample of flesh, which one perceptual faculty discriminates from other 
objects by differences in its perceptible qualities.75 It is νοῦς that then discerns the sample’s 
being flesh, its “being what it is”—its essence. But, then, is this essence universal or particular? 
If it is particular, then when does the universality of thought enter? And if it is universal, then it 
seems that, contrary to my argument in my previous chapter, there is a universal object to be 
discerned in the particular sample of flesh. 
                                                 
75 Posterior Analytics I.32 tells us that “it’s impossible to perceive what’s universal and applicable to all, for it’s not 
a this nor a now” (87b30-31) and that “to perceive is necessarily to perceive a particular” (87b37-8), and I.8 says 
that “perception is of particulars”(81b6)  On II.19’s seemingly contrary statement that perception is “of a universal”, 
see §4.1.1 
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In answering these questions, it is instructive to remember the lesson of Metaphysics 
M.10 (discussed in §2.5 above). There Aristotle distinguishes ἐπιστήμη in actuality from 
ἐπιστήμη in potentiality, stating that while the latter is universal and of universals, the former is 
particular and of particulars. Ἐπιστήμη is a sort of γνῶσις of derivative objects that is based on 
νοῦς of their principles, and in setting forth the puzzle solved by the distinction between actuality 
and potentiality, Aristotle tells us that the objects of ἐπιστήμη will be universal if the principles 
are universal and particular if the principles are particular. Presumably then γνῶσις of principles 
also, which is νοῦς, is universal when it is in potentiality and particular when in actuality. If so, 
and essences are the objects of νοῦς, then when one is actively discerning the essence of a 
perceived particular, one will be discerning its particular essence, but the grasp of this essence 
that one retains will be a single universal grasp of the essences of anything of its kind. 
The distinction between actual and potential γνώσεις appears in the De Anima as well. In 
III.8, we are learn that  
E-knowledge and perception are divided to correspond to the objects, the potential 
to the potential, the actual to the actual. (431b24-6) 76 
The function this claim serves in the argument makes it clear that Aristotle is here identifying the 
potentials for perception and ἐπιστήμη with the parts or faculties of the soul by which we 
perceive or e-know. Indeed he does not think that there is any more proximate potentiality to 
                                                 
76 I quote the passage in a slightly modified version of Hamlyn’s translation, though I do not think that it is quite 
correct. In his translation, the passage says that potential γνώσεις (of both sorts) correspond to potential objects and 
actual γνώσεις to actual objects. I think that Aristotle’s Greek commits him to this but that this is not what it actually 
says. The text reads as follows: 
τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ’ 
ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ· (431b24-6) 
Hicks, Smith, Hamlyn, and Apostle all translate the “εἰς” with “corresponds to” or some equivalent, but in its first 
occurrence, and likely in the later ones as well, it surely goes with the verb “τέμνεται”. The most natural way to 
understand this verb-preposition pairing is “cut into”, and this is clearly what it means in all its other occurrences in 
the corpus (Physics 250a18, De Caelo II.4 286b31,  Generation and Corruption II.3 330b18, Metaphysics M.6 
1080b29). Of course, it is odd to say that “ἐπιστήμη and perception are cut {i.e. divided} into the objects”, which is 
presumably why translators have resorted to phrases like “divided to correspond to their objects”, but it is not clear 
to me that Aristotle’s words can bear this meaning, and he has a reason to make the odd statement which is the more 
natural interpretation of his words. The immediate context is that he is trying to determine the way in which the soul 
is all things. Perception and ἐπιστήμη serve as a middle term between the soul and objects. All things are knowable 
by one γνῶσις or the other, and the γνῶσις is identical with its object. The (relevant part of) soul is the γνῶσις in 
actuality rather than in potentiality, so Aristotle divides the γνώσεις (=objects) into actual and potential and potential 
objects (=γνώσεις). He then identifies the parts of the soul with the potential objects, thus establishing the way in 
which the soul is all things. (He then qualifies this by saying that it is merely the forms of the things.) 
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actually perceiving than the faculty of perception. III.4 describes this as one of the ways in which 
the faculty of thought differs from that of perception:  
When it {viz. νοῦς} has become each thing, as one e-knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων) 
in actuality is said to do (and this happens when he can actualize his potentiality 
by himself), even then it is {each thing} potentially in a way ({though} surely not 
like before he learned or discovered), and then it is able to think by itself. (429b5-
9) 
It is this potential that corresponds to Metaphysics M.10’s ἐπιστήμη in potentiality. Though the 
function and immediate context of III.8’s mentions of the respective objects of actual and 
potential ἐπιστήμη requires a focus on the more remote potentiality, which is the faculty of 
thought, III.4 forms part of the broader context for the claim that there’s a correspondence 
between levels of actuality of γνώσεις and levels of actuality of their objects, and I see no reason, 
to constrict the scope of this claim to exclude the more proximate potentiality that exists only in 
the case of intellectual states. Moreover, given Aristotle’s general scruples about inferences 
involving relative terms (such as thought and thinkable), we must take the claim to apply, absent 
specific reason not to.77 
I take Aristotle’s position, then, to be as follows: as the faculty of sight stands to color in 
general a particular exercise of sight stands to the particular color seen; and as the faculty of 
ἐπιστήμη stands to what is e-knowable, the ἐπιστήμη in potentiality that triangles have an angle 
sum equal to that of two right angles, stands to triangles in general, and a particular exercise of 
this ἐπιστήμη stands in this same relation to some particular triangle. 
Notice, that like thought, perception in potentiality is of a universal—viz. the universal 
perceptible, and each particular sense-faculty is of some narrower universal: sight is of the 
visible, or more specifically of color. But this doesn’t mean that we in any way perceive 
universals. It just means that what corresponds as an object to the faculty of perception is the 
whole range of perceptible objects and what corresponds as an object to sight is color. What one 
perceives is always some particular thing, and what one sees is always some particular color.  
There are two related differences between the way that perception in potentiality is of a 
universal and the way in which thought in potentiality is of universals. We have already touched 
on the first of these when we observed that in the case of thought, unlike in the case of 
                                                 
77 On relative terms, in general, see Categories 7. The specific cases of e-knowledge/e-knowable and 
perception/perceptible come in for discussed at 7b23-a12. Many instructions concerning the use of relatives in 
reasoning can be found in Topics. See, for example, II.8 114a14-25 and IV.4, V.6 135b16-26, and VI.8. 
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perception, there is a state between the faculty and its full actualization—something which 
counts as an actuality relative to the faculty and as a potentiality relative to the full exercise. 
Because of this, there are such things as thoughts and ἐπιστῆμαι in potentiality, whereas there are 
no perceptions in potentiality (unless by this one means the several senses or the perceptual 
faculties of different animals), there is only the single faculty of perception on the one hand, and 
the many acts of perceiving  on the other. Whereas the faculty of perception has the universal 
perceptible as its object and the faculty of thought has the universal thinkable as its object, these 
many thoughts and ἐπιστῆμαι in potentiality have as their objects the many universals whose 
names do not make reference to our cognitive faculties. Thoughts about triangles as such have 
the universal triangle as their object, and thoughts about men as such have the universal man, etc. 
However, as I argued earlier (in §2.3.3 and §2.5), there need not really be any such things 
as “the universal man” and we’ve seen Aristotle tell us (Metaphysics Λ.5 at 1071a22-3) that 
there aren’t any. Rather, for a thought about men as such to be about the universal man is for it to 
be a δύναμις to have particular thoughts about particular men, in just the same way that sight’s 
having color as its object amounts to its being a δύναμις for seeing particular colors. Color, of 
course, does exist in way as a sort of continuum or axis along which the many colors vary from 
one another, and likewise “man in general” might be said to exist as a continuum or interrelated 
set of continua, but general thoughts about men are not about this continuum as a continuum any 
more than our faculty of sight somehow interacts with the color spectrum as a whole when our 
eyes are closed. Rather, as the faculty of sight is an ability to see any color in the spectrum, so 
our general thoughts about men are abilities to think particular thoughts about any man. 
The second difference between perception and thought that I alluded to earlier concerns 
the relation of the fully actualized state to the universal. We can approach it through a comment 
from Metaphysics M.10:  
For e-knowledge is twofold, as e-knowing also is: one is in potentiality and the 
other in actuality. While the potential, being as matter, is universal and indefinite 
and is of the universal and indefinite, the actual is definite and of the definite, 
being a certain this of a certain this. However, sight sees the universal color 
incidentally, since this color, which it sees, is a color, and what the grammarian 
contemplates, a certain alpha, is an alpha. (1087a15-20)  
The universal cannot be incidental to thought in actuality in the way that it is to perception in 
actuality. Before turning to the case of thought, it is important to get clear in the case of 
perception just what it is that Aristotle is claiming is incidental. First, and most obviously, it 
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cannot be incidental that the color seen is a color, since color is the kind of the various colors. 
Second the color’s being a color is not incidental to sight’s seeing it; indeed it is precisely 
because it is a color that it is seen, since color is the proper object of the faculty of sight. What is 
incidental is the universal’s status as an object of the perception. When one sees a certain shade 
of red, it is only incidentally that one sees color or the perceptible.  
By contrast, when a grammarian e-knows in actuality of the alpha in an occurrence of 
“διδάσκει” that it has an acute accent, it is not incidental that this alpha is an alpha or a vowel. 
Notice that the passage from M.10 does not say that the grammarian contemplates the universal 
alpha only incidentally, though it might reasonably be taken to imply this. I think Aristotle’s 
point in the sentence beginning “however” is to suggest how universality can be involved even in 
actualized ἐπιστήμη. The objects of determinate γνώσεις do fall under (indeterminate) universals, 
so that, even perception can be said to perceive universals, though in this case only incidentally. 
In the case of ἐπιστήμη, however, it is precisely through the determinate objects falling under the 
universal that they are known. The grammarian e-knows the alpha in “διδάσκει” to be accented 
only by regarding it as an alpha and as a short vowel in the penult of a recessively accented word 
with a long ultima.  
It is precisely qua the alpha’s falling under the universals it does that the grammarian e-
know it, and the same thing will hold in any case of ἐπιστήμη, since ἐπιστήμη is demonstrative 
γνῶσις and 
a deduction does not come about that this triangle has two rights unless every 
triangle has two rights, nor that this man is an animal unless every man is an 
animal. (Metaphysics M.10 1086b34-37 cf. B.4 999a24-29) 
Though the actualized ἐπιστήμη (and the actualized νοῦς) is particular and of a particular object, 
it apprehends this object as following from its causes (the γνῶσις of which is νοῦς), and this 
logical relationship of “following” holds between the object and its causes only insofar as both 
fall under the universals they do. These universals are determinables and the way they are 
determined in the particulars is incidental to the relationship of “following” that underwrites the 
ἐπιστήμη. 
This point can be made clearer by analogizing the universals, which are intelligible 
matter, to perceptible matter. If a man is hit on the head by a falling vase, the vase is the cause of 
his injury, but it fell and injured him not insofar as it was a vase, but insofar as it is made of clay 
and thus is heavy; had the clay comprising it been shaped into a ball rather than a vase, it would 
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have still fallen and injured him. Likewise, when an isosceles triangle is shown to have an angle 
sum equal to that of two right angles, this is shown through operations that could still be 
performed on the triangle were it scalene. Thus Aristotle would say that the vase fell qua clay (or 
qua earth) and that the isosceles triangle has the angle sum it does qua triangle.78  
The difference between the two cases is that the clay is a real existent that can take on the 
alternative forms of the vase and the ball, whereas there is no triangle that is capable of taking on 
the alternative forms of isosceles and scalene, except in thought. What exists independently of 
thought is: (1) all the different triangular shapes of different objects and abilities of objects to 
take on different triangular shapes, (2) the availability of a single account embracing all these 
triangles, and (3) the facts that all and only the things embraced by this account have an angle 
sum equal to two right angles and that each of these things can undergo the same geometrical 
operations, which make this equality apparent. 
It so happens that in the case of triangles there is a literal equality of angle sum, which 
follows from an equality in the number of lines and angles. In Chapter 2, I argued that there 
needn’t be any equality—any determinate identity—between all a concept’s instances and that, 
in the case of kinds and forms at least, universality consisted in determinability rather in the 
sharing by the instances of determinately identical characteristics. In deductions involving the 
sorts of universals I focused on there all the terms would be determinable—e.g., “birds have 
wings because they need to fly”, where  each of “bird”, “wing” and “fly” embraces instances that 
differ from one another in the more and the less of the very characteristics in virtue of which they 
constitute a single kind. Notice that determinability does play some role even in the triangle case, 
for the details of the geometrical operations by which one shows a triangle to have an angle sum 
equal to that of two right angles are determined differently for different triangles. (Where, in the 
case of one triangle one of the lines is extended to form a new acute angle with the base, in the 
case of another, the corresponding line is extended to form an obtuse angle.)  
Moreover, at a deeper level, even the account of triangle involves determinability; for 
“line” figures in the definition, and, as Hume observed:  
                                                 
78 See Posterior Analytics I.24: 
If indeed triangle extends beyond {isosceles triangles}, and the account is the same, and triangle is 
not homonymous, and the {angles’ equaling} two {right angles} pertains to every triangle, then it 
is not the triangle qua isosceles but rather the isosceles qua triangle which has these angles. (85b9-
13) 
 
 175 
‘tis evident at first sight, that the precise length of a line is not different nor 
distinguishable from the line itself; nor the precise degree of any quality from the 
quality. (Treatise of Human Nature Book I, Part I, Section VII) 
Hume takes this to exclude the possibility of any “idea” of line “separated” from some  precise 
length—i.e., no concept “line” arrived at by an act of context-omission which disregards the 
precise length of a line and focuses on some distinct characteristic that it shares with all other 
lines. In this Aristotle would agree, but he would disagree with Hume’s conclusion that that a 
line and its precise length are “consequently conjoined with each other in conception”. For 
Aristotle thinks we are able to make objects indeterminate in thought. We can see this in the first 
chapter of On Memory and Recollection: 
We have spoken about φαντασία earlier, in De Anima, and there is not thinking 
without a φάντασμα—for the same affection attaches to thinking and 
diagramming; for in the latter case, making no use of the triangle’s being of a 
determinate size (ποσὸν), we nevertheless draw it determinately with respect to 
size, and it’s the same way with the thinker: if he thinks {something that is} not 
sized, he sets a sized thing before his eyes, but thinks {it} not qua sized; but if 
{its} nature is amongst the sized things but indeterminate, he sets {before his 
eyes} a determinately sized thing but thinks it qua sized only. (449b30-a7)79 
I take it that an example of a non-sized thing about which one might think would be 
red.80 In thinking about red—say in considering different theories of how it derives from black 
and white (as Aristotle does in  De Sensu 3)—one would need to work with an imagined patch of 
red, which would have to be some size, but one’s thoughts would not be of this patch qua this 
size but of it only qua being red. Triangles, lines, and angles would be examples of 
indeterminately sized thought objects. In thinking of triangle one would need to picture a triangle 
made up of lines of determinate lengths that meet at determinate angles, but one could think the 
lines and angles qua lines and angles only, and one could think the triangle qua composed of 
lines of indeterminate lengths meeting at indeterminate angles.   
                                                 
79 Cf. De Anima III.7, where we are also told that “the soul never thinks without a φάντασμα” (431a16-17) and that 
“the νοητικὸν thinks the forms in φαντάσματα” (431b2). Also significant is Posterior Analytics I.31’s comment that 
“while one sees separately in each {case}, one n-thinks simultaneously that it’s so in every {case}” (88a16-17). 
80 Of course the red surface has a size, but this belongs to the red only incidentally, as musical belongs to white 
when a white man is musical. Properly speaking,  it is the surface to which both the red and the size belong, just as it 
is the man to which the white and the musicality belong. This is more obvious in the case of characteristics that 
cannot be literally pictured, for example being musical or good. In one respect, such characteristics would be a better 
examples than red, because you can’t envision an expanse of musicality or goodness, but (for this same reason) it is 
harder to see of what use φαντασία could be in thinking about these things than it is in the case of red. For this 
reason, I chose a perceptible quality as an example here; I discuss cases of more abstract thought below. 
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There is a significant difference between these two cases. One thinks the imagined red 
patch qua red rather than qua possessing some other feature wholly distinct from its redness. In 
the triangle example, the characteristics of the image present and absent from the thought are not 
distinct in this way. Instead of abstracting away from the triangle’s size to focus on some other 
feature, one regards the size as indeterminate. The equivalent operation in the case of red would 
be picturing a determinate shade of red but thinking it qua red only, and presumably this action is 
involved in having thoughts of red as such or color as such. It is just this sort of de-specifying 
operation that Aristotle needs to move from determinate perceptions to determinable concepts, 
and presumably this is the same operation that I described in §2.3.2 as decomposing something 
into its intelligible matter, and in §3.1 as intensional division.81 
What should be most striking in the present context, however, is that this de-specifying is 
part of fully actualized thinking. The language of setting something before one’s eyes and 
thinking it a certain way makes it clear that Aristotle’s subject is not thoughts in potentiality but 
episodes of thinking, which Metaphysics M.10 tells us are determinate and of particulars. I have 
been arguing that such thoughts must involve regarding the particulars as falling under 
universals, and in the present passage we can see that this is the case. In order to think of an 
indeterminately sized object, one imagines a determinately sized one, and thinks same object qua 
sized only. The object of the thought then is the fully determinate object.  
Aristotle does not tell us what it is it to think this very object qua sized only, as opposed 
to merely using it as a sort of visual aid for thinking of some other object of indeterminate size, 
but it is not hard to see what the answer might be. First, there is no such thing as an actual object 
of indeterminate size to think of. There is a potential object of indeterminate size—an intelligible 
matter, but this is not a mind-independent capacity to be any size whatsoever. It is, rather a way 
of describing the complex fact that, due to certain facts about sizes and about us, we are able 
have certain thoughts in potentiality that can be actualized into thoughts of objects of any size. 
To think in actuality of a particular thing qua sized then, could be to actualize one of these 
thoughts-in-potentiality into a thought of that particular—or, put another way, to regard the 
particular as an actualization of the intelligible matter size. This means considering the particular 
                                                 
81 Likewise, the mental operation involved in thinking the imagined sized object “not qua sized” may be the 
operation of abstracting that is involved in thinking of mathematical objects, whereby one separates in thought 
certain determinate characteristics from an οὐσία from which they are inseparable in reality. 
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in light of its commensurability with the other sized things—as something that could be de-
specified into the matter which could then be re-specified into a particular of another size.  
If this interpretation is correct, then the universality of thought consists in its taking a 
certain comparative or assimilating perspective on particulars, and a concept (i.e., an undivided 
thought in potentiality) is an ability with regard to a set of commensurable objects to consider 
any of them in light of its convertibility-in-thought to any of the others. Putting together this 
point with the conclusion of our §3.2.4, this ability must somehow consist in or amount to a 
γνῶσις (in potentiality) of the instances’ essence—i.e., of the cause of the characteristics by 
which they are initially discerned. In the case of the proper objects of a single sense modality, 
these two strands tie together nicely, if (as I suggested earlier) to grasp their (formal) causes is 
simply to locate them along a continuum defined by the contraries with which the sense is 
concerned, since to do this is to relate them to all the other points along the continuum. 
In other cases, the essence will be the (often final) cause that unites the ranges into which 
the instances’ characteristics fall along multiple continua. Here the relation between the causal 
knowledge and the ability to assimilate the instances to one another in thought is more complex. 
First, since (according to Aristotle) it is only by thinking universally that we can grasp causal 
connections, discerning the unifying cause must involve thinking of the effects universally. 
Second, we can see how knowledge of this cause will enable us to think universally of the 
unified whole. The causal connections between instances’ commensurable characteristics along 
different continua will result in (at least many of) a given instance’s characteristics being shared 
by the other instances mutatis mutandis, with the necessary changes in one characteristic being 
determined by differences along some other continua and the causal relations between them. For 
example, a duck, like a hawk, will have a beak, but its beak will be wider, owing to the different 
uses it is put to, because of the duck’s different lifestyle and habitat. Knowledge of the causal 
relations involved here will facilitate the de-specification in thought of any knowledge about the 
hawk’s beak into general knowledge about beaks. So causal knowledge facilitates universality. 
This last point sheds light also on why it is that we need a φάντασμα to think of an 
individual (and thus to think in actuality). The causal connections between an instance’s many 
characteristics hold insofar as each characteristic falls within a range, rather than insofar as it has 
its own determinate identity. This is why taxonomic division has to terminate in lowest 
“uncuttable” forms rather than proceeding all the way to the individual. The individual as such 
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cannot be an object of thought because, when considering its characteristics in their full 
determinateness, one will find no connection between them, so one will no longer have one thing 
in mind that could serve as a subject or predicate. Individuals are numerical unities, and in order 
to think of them, one would need to be able to represent them as such. This is the role of 
φαντασία: because the imagined object is an individual, its determinate characteristics form a 
numerical unity. 
Before closing the present section, there are two remaining concerns I want to address 
about thought’s universality and its relation to perception. The first of these concerns the 
differences between Aristotle’s position and that of the British Empiricists, and the second 
concerns the doctrine that all thought involves φαντάσματα. The first of these concerns is as 
much a question about the British Empiricists as about Aristotle, but I am interested in it here 
only insofar as the comparison helps to bring out interesting features of his position, so my 
treatment of them will be cursory and fairly conventional. In particular, I will not stop over the 
differences between Hume’s and Berkeley’s positions.82 
I wrote earlier that Aristotle differed from Hume in maintaining that we can make objects 
indeterminate in thought, but the account I gave of Aristotle’s view of the universality and 
thought may sound quite like Hume’s and Berkeley’s. Both also hold that a thinker must always 
contemplate a determinate image and that, by not attending to its determinate features, he can 
reach conclusions that can be applied to indefinitely many particulars. Indeed, like Aristotle, 
Berkeley discuss the example of a geometrical proof performed on a drawn or imagined 
“isosceles rectilinear triangle whose sides are of a determinate length,” can yield conclusions 
applicable to all triangles, as long as “there is not the least mention made” in the proof of these 
particulars”. 
Which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique, and the 
sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this 
reason it is, that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalinon, which 
I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled, equicural triangle; and not 
because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. And here 
it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, 
without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. 
                                                 
82 The most significant of these differences concern the role of words in the ability of a single determinate idea to 
represent many similar things which differ from it in detail. Berkeley (Treatise, Introduction, §12) speaks of the 
generality of the words as a consequence of the generality of ideas, whereas Hume (Treatise, I.I.VII) thinks 
linguistic habits facilitate the use of one idea to represent others. 
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So far he may abstract: but this will never prove that he can form an abstract 
general inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so 
far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned 
abstract idea, either of man or of animal, in as much as all that is perceived is not 
considered.83 
Hume speaks of the “custom” and “habit” of applying the same name to different resembling 
objects which results in all of these objects being present “in power” to the mind when it thinks 
upon any one of them, so that we “keep ourselves in readiness to survey any of them as we may 
be prompted by a present design or necessity”.84 
Berkeley and Hume’s “ideas” correspond to Aristotle’s φαντάσματα, so in denying the 
existence of “abstract” or “indeterminate” ideas, they are denying the existence of φαντάσματα 
that are indeterminate (e.g. that are “sized only” without having a determinate size) or that 
entirely lack features inherent to images (e.g., an idea of red thing without size). Thus far they 
have no disagreement with Aristotle, and they agree with him too that we can make use of 
determinate φαντάσματα in thought in such a way as to enable our conclusions to apply equally 
to a diversity of differing objects that are similar in relevant ways to the imagined particulars. 
The difference lies in that, for the Empiricists, all thought or knowledge is, in the first instance, 
of some imagined particular; it is then secondarily of anything that is noticed to resemble it in 
such a way that the same knowledge can apply to it. (For Hume, especially, developed habits 
connected with the use of words facilitate quick notice of the relevant resemblances.85) When 
one knows something of a given triangle qua (or “so forth as”) triangle, all this means for the 
Empiricists is that the way in which one knows it—the proof—makes no use of features that 
                                                 
83 Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §16. 
84Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, I.I.7. 
85 Aristotle would not count the kinds of psychological states and operations by which Hume explains how 
knowledge of one idea gets transferred to others, as cases of thought at all. They are, rather, examples of what he 
calls experience (ἐμπειρία), the associational grouping of memories of similar objects which makes possible the ad 
hoc application of things known about one object to some of the others, and is the penultimate step on the way to 
νοῦς of a universal, but which cannot itself afford knowledge of necessary causal connections. (I discuss ἐμπειρία 
below in §4.1.2.) Hume’s position is, by Aristotle’s lights, that human cognitive development is arrested at this 
stage. It is fitting, then, (and only partially accidental) that Aristotle’s term for it is the etymological root of our 
name for the school of epistemology that Hume epitomizes. “Empiricist” and “empiricism” trace back to a school of 
Greek physicians in the third century BC who called themselves ἐμπειρικοί because they rejected the search for a 
causal theory in medicine and rested content with a body of experiential knowledge about the courses of diseases 
and the effects of different treatments (Allen 2001 89-97, Pellegrin 2006 671-682). The earliest occurrences of 
“empiricism” reported by the Oxford English Dictionary (starting in 1657) denote this same medical methodology. 
From here the term seems to have expanded to analogous methods in other fields before (likely due to the influence 
of Kant) coming into use as a name for philosophical tradition exemplified by Hume and Locke (himself an 
empiricist physician).  
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differentiate this triangle from others, so that the same proof could as easily be performed on any 
other triangle, and therefore the conclusion can be applied to any other triangle.  
For Aristotle, by contrast, universality precedes proof. One can only prove (and thereby 
o-know) of a given triangle that it has (say) an angle sum equal to that of two rights insofar as 
one thinks of it as a triangle.86 And the result of this proof is not a conclusion about this figure 
that can then be applied to other triangles, but rather a conclusion that holds in the first instance 
of triangle generally and is seen to hold of this figure only insofar as it is a certain triangle. 
Moreover, for Aristotle, when knowledge of triangles is in potentiality—when it is held rather 
than exercised—it is not associated with any determinate φάντασμα, but is an indeterminate 
matter that has the whole spectrum of possible triangles as its object and can be actualized into a 
thought of any determinate triangle.87 The generality of thought, for Aristotle, therefore is not a 
matter of one imagined particular’s standing for another, as it is for the Empiricists. Rather, on 
his view, there are psychological states that are determinable with respect to their content and so 
can be realized in contrary ways, just as, in nature, there is matter, which, in its own right is 
indeterminate and so can realize contrary forms. And for an imagined determinate figure to be 
                                                 
86 One may also be able to deduce this of the triangle while considering it as an instance of some narrower universal, 
but not while considering it under no universal at all. 
87 There is, however, some obscurity about the manner in which these concepts exist when not in actuality. They 
cannot simply be stored in memory because “there is not memory even of thinkables without a φάντασμα, so, while 
it is νοῦς’s incidentally, in itself it is the first senses’” (On Memory 1 447a13-14). Especially given Aristotle’s more 
general account of memory as  φάντασμα retention, this seems to mean that the memory of a thought-object is a  
φάντασμα and belongs to the perceptual part of the soul. But, if so, it is doubtful that the memory can be 
indeterminate, or identical to the thought in potentiality. Rather there must also be some additional state of the soul 
in virtue of which it is disposed to organize and regard the remembered content in a specialized way. This may be a 
state of the affected νοῦς, understood as a distinct faculty from perception. Alternatively, if (as I suggested above at 
§3.3.1,  n. 60) the affected νοῦς is merely the perceptual faculty insofar as it can serve as matter for the productive 
νοῦς, then the concept will have to consist in some sort of special (constellations of) φαντάσματα created by the 
productive νοῦς, which, though they belong to the perceptual part of the soul, are specially suited to be re-vivified 
into actual thoughts by the productive νοῦς. It helps in seeing how this might be so to note that words are perceptible 
things, which can be stored as φαντάσματα and might, when remembered in connection with φαντάσματα of sample 
thought-objects help us to recreate the thoughts about those objects. (Though memory of words cannot be sufficient 
for thought, because we know from Nicomachean Ethics VII.3 that it is possible for someone who has knowledge to 
say the words that encode it without exercising the knowledge as drunks “recite the verses of Empedocles” 
[1147a19-24].) Also Aristotle speaks frequently in On Memory 2 of imagistic mnemonic systems that were common 
in the ancient world, and in Prior Analytics I.27-30 and throughout the Topics he uses language likely derived from  
such practices to describe how one should organize one’s knowledge of terms so as to facilitate deduction. (See 
Sorabji 1972 22-34.) This second more reductive interpretation of what Aristotle means by the affected νοῦς and 
consequently of the δυνάμεις in which concepts consist makes Aristotle closer to Hume than the first interpretation, 
but the difference is still pronounced. Even if concepts are in some sense reducible to complex conditions of the 
perceptual part of the soul, each concept is still a distinct enduring γνῶσις that has no analog on Hume’s view, and 
these γνώσεις are to be understood final causally, relative to the activities they make possible, rather than efficient-
causally as the result of psychological processes of association and the like.  
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thought of qua (or “so forth as”) triangle is for the thought of it to be an exercise of this 
indeterminate state, just as for a particular action to be virtuous is for it to be an exercise of a 
virtue.88  
So much then, for Aristotle’s relation to Hume and Berkeley; I turn now to his view that 
all thought requires a φάντασμα. We have encountered this general claim in several times now, 
and we have seen some of the reasons why he thinks it is so. First, if a concept is γνῶσις of an 
essence, and we were right in §3.3.1 that an essence is a cause of perceptible characteristics and 
is and grasped as their cause, then the concept itself is tied to the content that is in the jurisdiction 
of the perceptual faculty, so we can see why thought will require the exercise of this faculty to 
make this content available. Second, if, as I have argued earlier in this section, a concept is an 
ability to regard determinate perceptual contents as falling along determinable continua, it is 
clear that its exercise will require perceptual content to work on. We have, then, two ways in 
which thought might require φαντάσματα and I suggested earlier ways in which the abilities to 
regard objects’ characteristics as falling under determinables and as effects of causes might be 
implicated in one another so that these two strands of Aristotle’s view could cohere into a whole.  
However, though each strand may be clear enough when we consider cases of thought 
that involve either directly perceptible objects (like flesh or noses) or geometrical objects, which 
have directly perceptible characteristics, it remains somewhat mysterious how either could work 
in the case of more abstract thought (using “abstract” in its current sense, rather than in 
Aristotle’s), so it is unclear what role φαντάσματα are needed to play in thoughts of (say) the 
good, or being qua being, or potentiality and actuality, or God, or the Principle of Non-
Contradiction. It is easy to picture things that are caused by some of these objects, but the causal 
chains will be quite remote, and it is not obvious of what use the images would be the thought 
processes, and, in any event they are not all causes—at any rate, non-contradiction and being are 
not. Similarly, for some but not others it is easy to picture determinate things that fall under the 
concepts. Everything is, after all, a being. But, again, it’s not entirely clear what use an image of 
some random being would be in thinking of being as such.  
Aristotle does not say enough about the mechanics of thought about such objects for us to 
be able to find or infer any determinate answer from the text, and one can only surmise. Of 
course, language is used in thought of these abstract things, and since words are sensory in form, 
                                                 
88 For this point about virtue, see Nicomachean Ethics II.4 1105a26-33. 
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they likely require φαντάσματα to hold in mind; but this is an inadequate explanation, because it 
explains too much too easily: it would apply equally well to the cases where we have seen 
Aristotle give other accounts of the role of φαντάσματα in thought.89 A more promising direction 
for speculation concerns the role that Aristotle thinks analogy plays in our grasp of these abstract 
objects and his own pervasive use of (often quite remote) analogies in making abstract points. 
Consider, for example, his frequent recourse of the analogy to the division of lines into points to 
illustrate different aspects of thought (which we saw an example of in §3.1.1) or his constant use 
of the image of the bronze sphere which he regards as structurally similar, in an extremely 
abstract way, to a startling number of extremely different things. Indeed he sometimes (as in 
Metaphysics H.6) writes as though the back of a difficult puzzle is broken merely by relating it to 
this image, with its rich hylomorphic connotations.90 Aristotle is, in short, an overwhelmingly 
analogical thinker, and it would not be surprising if he thought that is was only though this 
method that one could think about broad abstractions. Nor is this view implausible in its own 
right, especially if one thinks (as Aristotle does) that analogy is (or is central to) the relationship 
in virtue of which the instances of extremely abstract concepts cohere into universals and that we 
have perceptual access to some of the analogs and no independent access to the others. These 
concepts are, however, special cases for Aristotle.91 Kind-concepts are predominant and these 
are based on more-and-less relations, the role of which as a middle term between φαντάσματα 
and thought can be inferred from the On Memory 1 passage as we did above. 
 
3.3.3 Νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη as the highest degrees of γνῶσις  
As a final topic under the heading of concepts as γνώσεις, I return to the point mentioned in 
§3.2.1, that γνῶσις admits of degrees. Understanding how this is the case, will help us to 
                                                 
89 On these points, cf. Wedin 1989 249. 
90 The comparison with Plato is also instructive here. He too made pervasive and self-conscious use of analogical 
reasoning, with images that are dramatic, imaginative, and rich in detail. Aristotle’s by contrast are sparse and 
colorless, bold and imaginative only (though strikingly) in the use to which he puts them. Part of this difference is of 
course due to the respective genres in which they wrote, and to the fact that Plato was a literary genius where 
Aristotle was not, but I suspect that part was Aristotle’s isolating and adopting the major cognitive function served 
by Platonic analogy and utilizing it in a form stripped of its literary and rhetorical aspects. 
91 Recall from §2.1.2, that Aristotle does not generally sanction concepts for groups of analogs, though he does in 
the case of the concepts central to metaphysics. 
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understand the relation between thought and perception, and set the stage for discussion (in 
Chapter 4) of how the former arises from the latter. 
Aristotle tells us often that some objects are γνωριμώτερον (more g-known) than 
others.92 Taken on its own this claim is might mean simply that these objects are more easily or 
more widely g-known, but Aristotle once speaks of certain γνώσεις as being γνωστικώτερον 
(more g-knowing) than others (100a11). In isolation, this claim might mean only that the relevant 
γνώσεις have greater scope and thereby encompass more of the world, and this may be part of 
what it does mean,93 but Aristotle also speaks on at least one occasion of these states as being 
truer (ἀληθέστερον) and more precise (ἀκριβέστερον) (Posterior Analytics II.19 100b8, 11). 
These comparative remarks are made in the course of a denial that there is any state surpassing 
νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη in precision, truth, or in being g-known, it is clear that νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη are 
supposed to surpass all other γνώσεις in truth and precision (ἀκρίβεια) and therefore to be the 
highest degrees of  γνῶσις.94 
Before commenting further on the conceptions of truth and precision at work in this 
claim, it is necessary to mention an important qualification to the idea that some things are more 
g-known (and some γνώσεις more g-knowing) than others. When making this claim, Aristotle 
distinguishes between what is more g-known “by nature” or “simpliciter” and what is more g-
known “to us”: 
Things are prior and more g-known in two ways; for prior by nature and prior in 
relation to us are not the same nor are more g-known and more g-known to us. I 
call prior and more g-known in relation to us the things nearer to perception, and 
{prior and more g-known} simpliciter the things that are further. While the most 
universal things are furthest, the particulars nearest, and these are opposite to each 
other. (Posterior Analytics I.2 71b33-a5) 
Since the particulars that are g-known in perception are furthest from what is g-known 
simpliciter, perception will be the lowest form of γνῶσις considered simpliciter, though there is 
another respect in which particulars are the most g-known, and plausibly in this respect it will be 
                                                 
92 Posterior Analytics I.2 72a1-5, Physics I.1 184a17-21, etc.  
93 See Posterior Analytics I.24 86a11-13. 
94 Presumably νοῦς is the highest degree, with ἐπιστήμη being next because it is a derivative state which depends for 
its truth and precision on νοῦς. Such non-theoretical γνώσεις as φρόνησις and τέχνη are not in view in the Posterior 
Analytics. These other virtues of intellect are the analogs of ἐπιστήμη in the practical and productive arenas. Like it, 
they must depend on νοῦς, and therefore they are presumably less true and precise than it. Conceivably they could 
equal ἐπιστήμη in truth and precision, but as will be clear from what follows, Aristotle thinks that less precision is 
necessary and possible when one has an eye to action, than when one is engaged in theoretical thought. 
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the most g-knowing state since the senses are the “the most authoritative (κυριώταται) γνώσεις of 
particulars” (Metaphysics A.1 981b12). 
The idea that there are degrees of truth is not a recurrent doctrine in the corpus, so there is 
comparatively little material to draw on in making sense of it.95 For this reason, and because I 
think it has little bearing on the nature of concepts, I will not stop over it here.96 The idea of 
degrees of precision, however, is both recurrent and relevant, and this will be our topic for the 
remainder of this section. Aristotle’s two most substantial discussions of it occur in Posterior 
Analytics I.27, where he describes what it is for one ἐπιστήμη to be more precise than another, 
and in Nicomachean Ethics I, which is peppered with comments on the degrees of precision 
appropriate in different disciplines. I turn now to the two most significant of the Ethics passages: 
                                                 
95 Outside of Posterior Analytics II.19, I have found only one passage in which Aristotle, speaking as an 
epistemologist or logician, may allow for degrees of truth, and it is ambiguous. In Prior Analytics I.27 (43b11) he 
tells us that the larger a person’s supply of premises appropriate to a given problem the more quickly he will reach a 
conclusion, and “the truer they are the more he will demonstrate” (ὅσω δ’ ἂν ἀληθεστέρων, μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει). 
However, here he may simply mean that a person with a greater number of true premises will demonstrate more, 
rather than that a person will demonstrate more if each of his premises is truer. In other contexts Aristotle speaks of 
rephrasing a point so as to make it truer (Generation of Animals II.6 742b27, Politics IV.3 1290a24), but this is 
likely a more casual usage, and it sounds quite natural to modern English speakers. 
96 Except in a footnote: On its face the claim that there are degrees of truth suggests a middle ground between truth 
and falsity by occupying which some propositions can be less than fully true. Aristotle, to whom we owe the law of 
excluded middle, could not have allowed for any such middle ground. How then are we to understand this claim. If 
we take “truth” generally to refer to the correspondence between a mental state and mind-independent facts, a 
distinction between “degrees of truth” could be based on a distinction between types of facts. Some objects are 
necessarily as they are whereas others could be otherwise. A cognition of the former sort of object might be said to 
be truer or to have a firmer grip on reality, because the reality on which it has a grip is itself firmer—that is, unlike 
the objects of contingent truths, it is unable to change (from one time to another) or vary (from one case to another) 
in such a way as to falsify the cognition of it. (This same point could be made in connection with the distinction 
between things that hold always and “for the most part”.) Another (complementary) way to make sense of the claim 
is to count one proposition as truer than another if the second obtains only because of the first. This strategy would 
not be out of character for Aristotle, who treats degrees of existence and goodness in the same manner. (On degrees 
of existence, see Morrison 1987.) This way of understanding the claim fits nicely with Aristotle’s treatment of truth 
in the Metaphysics and the De Interpretatione, in both places truth was a matter of connection (and separation) of 
terms. Given that some terms are connected with others through intermediates, it is natural to regard the 
intermediates as more connected than the extreme terms. On either interpretation, it is not the correspondence 
between the thought and the object which admits of degrees, but something about the truth-maker. A final way to 
understand the claim does focus on the correspondence relation. Recall that the possibility of falsehood only arises 
because of the act of intensional combination. Indivisible thoughts cannot but be true, because they only manage to 
be contentful by being γνώσεις. Other thoughts inherit their content from these thoughts by means that do not ensure 
truth. These thoughts may be true as well, but, if so, their correspondence to reality depends both on the 
correspondence of the indivisible thoughts and on their being formed in a way that preserves this correspondence. 
Thus, the relation of these thoughts to reality is both less direct and less secure. I favor this last explanation, but the 
difference between the four is slight, and of little consequence for what will follow. In any case, truth is an issue of 
the relation in which a cognition stands to real objects, and for the cognition to be truer would be for its objects to be 
more real or for it to have a firmer grip on them.  
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Our account will be sufficient, if it makes {things} perspicuous in accordance 
with the subject matter; for one should not seek precision in every account alike; 
just as one should not in exercises of craft. But the fine things and just things 
about which statesmanship inquires have a lot of difference and variation, so that 
they seem to exist only by convention and not by nature. And goods also have 
some such variation, because of the harm that results for many from them; for 
some have been destroyed because of wealth and others because of courage. So 
one must be content, {when} speaking about such things and from such things, to 
indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and, when speaking about things that 
hold “for the most part” and from such things, {one must be content} to draw the 
same sort of conclusions. Each of the accounts should also be accepted in just the 
same manner; for it’s for an educated man to seek precision in accordance with 
each kind to the extent that the object’s nature permits. For it’s evident that 
accepting persuasive argumentation from a mathematician and demanding 
demonstrations from an orator are equivalent (1094b11-27). 
It’s necessary to remember what was said earlier and not to seek precision in 
every {case} alike; rather, in each, {one must seek precision} in accordance with 
the subject matter and to the extent appropriate to the discipline (μέθοδος). For 
the carpenter and the geometer seek the right {angle} differently; the former 
{seeks it} insofar as it’s useful for his work, and the latter {seeks} what it is or of 
what sort (ποῖόν τι); for he studies truth. One should proceed in just the same 
manner in other {cases}, so that the tangents don’t overwhelm the work. Nor 
should one demand the cause in every {case} alike, rather it’s sufficient in some 
{cases} that the that has been shown well (e.g., concerning the principles—the 
that is the primary and the principle). (1098a26-b3) 
From these passages, we learn (1) that precise accounts are to be contrasted with rough or 
outline accounts and (2) that the degree of precision to be sought in a given case depends on (a) 
the nature of the subject matter (including the degree to which it is possible to form  
generalizations about it that hold always rather than “for the most part”), and (b) the purpose of 
the inquiry (including whether one’s goal is to use an object for some purpose or to grasp the 
truth about it). Statesmanship is an imprecise discipline because the nature of its objects 
(particular actions) does not permit generalizations that hold always. However, some of the 
objects about which the statesman must know, permit a higher degree of precision than the 
statesman himself ought to pursue, and he ought not to pursue this more precise knowledge 
because it is not required for his purpose. A clear example here is knowledge of the soul, which 
the statesman must study “for the benefit of {his interests} and to the extent sufficient for his 
inquiry; for further precisification (ἐξακριβοῦν) is, perhaps, more laborious than are his 
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assignments” (1102a24-26).97 Similarly, in Topics I.1 Aristotle denies that a “precise account” of 
the forms of deduction is necessary for “the assigned discipline”, in this case dialectic, because 
“descriptions in outline” are sufficient to make one “able to get to g-know each of them in some 
way” (101a18-24).98 
The contrast between precise accounts and outlines, the impossibility of precision in 
domains where propositions hold only for the most part, and the circumstances in which it is 
superfluous, strongly suggest that precision is a matter of fineness of grain, as does the normal 
meaning of the word (in Greek as well as English). I think this suggestion is correct as far as it 
goes, but it fails to bring out an important aspect of precision: that it stems from knowledge of 
causes. We can see this in the passages from the Ethics quoted above. Since, for Aristotle, 
knowing what something is and knowing why it is are equivalent, in seeking what the right angle 
is, the geometer seeks its cause whereas the carpenter and the astronomer do not (because “the 
that” is sufficient for their purposes).99 This aspect takes pride of place in Posterior Analytics 
I.27, which I quote in full: 
An ἐπιστήμη that is of both the that and the why, rather than of the that in 
separation from the {ἐπιστήμη} of the why, is more precise than and prior to an 
ἐπιστήμη {of the that in separation}, and {an ἐπιστήμη} that is not {said} of a 
subject {is more precise than and prior to one that is said} of a subject (e.g. 
arithmetic {is more precise than and prior to} harmonics), and {an ἐπιστήμη that 
proceeds} from fewer things {is more precise than and prior to one that proceeds} 
from an additional thing (e.g. arithmetic {is more precise than and prior to} 
geometry). By “an additional thing”, I mean, e.g.: a unit is a positionless οὐσία, 
but a point is a positioned οὐσία; it is from an additional thing. (87a31-37)100 
                                                 
97 Cf. I.6 1096b30, where precisification of the various ways in which things are called good is said to be more 
appropriate to “another philosophy”, I.12 1101b34 where precisification of subjects of ἐγκώμια is neglected as 
“more appropriate to those who’ve concerned themselves with ἐγκώμια”, X.5 1175a29-b24, and X.9 1180b11.   
98 It’s worth noting that precision about certain things is required in dialectic. In Topics VI.4 students of the 
discipline are told to precisify the conditions under which something is g-known either simpliciter to a particular sort 
of person, and to make use of this precise knowledge in establishing and refuting definitions (142a12). 
99 On the case of the astronomer, see Posterior Analytics I.13 79a3-7. Aristotle’s prohibition against seeking for the 
cause in all cases alike is not wholly distinct from his prohibition against looking for precision in all cases alike, but 
neither are the two prohibitions wholly identical. The prohibition against seeking further causes applies not only in 
cases where the that is sufficient for one’s purposes, but also in the case of a principle, where the that is a 
fundamental fact for which there is no deeper cause to uncover.   
100 Cf. Metaphysics M.3 1078a8-10, where we find the same point that more abstract ἐπιστῆμαι are more precise, 
and E.1 1025b4-8,  which says that the causes of more abstract sciences are more precise. The reference to points 
and units as οὐσίαι might be jarring, but recall that mathematical objects, though not separately or οὐσίαι in reality, 
are regarded as such in thought. 
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Here we’re given two further ways in which one ἐπιστήμη can surpass another in 
precision. Both involve the presence of a factor that renders explanations more complex.  The 
“additional things” Aristotle speaks of are either posits (ὑποθέσεις) or things predicated in the 
definitions of the primary existents posited by the ἐπιστήμη. As such, they are principles and so 
uncaused causes—basic facts that explanations will have to make reference to and take account 
of. As the number of basic facts in an ἐπιστήμη increases, increasing complexity becomes 
possible in the demonstrations. Similar reasoning applies in the case of ἐπιστῆμαι whose objects 
are predicated of a subject. Because the subject, such as sound in the case of harmonics, will 
figure in the definition of the ἐπιστήμη’s subject (e.g., the harmonies will be defined as ratios of 
sound), it will function as an additional principle, so that these ἐπιστῆμαι come under the head of 
ἐπιστῆμαι involving “additional things”.101 In support of this conclusion, notice that Aristotle 
consistently opposes addition (πρόσθεσις) to ἀφαίρεσις which is in different contexts normally 
translated “subtraction” or “abstraction”, and is the term that Aristotle uses to describe how 
mathematical objects exist by “abstraction” from natural bodies. This abstraction consists in 
treating quantitative properties, which have οὐσίαι as their subjects, as though they were οὐσίαι 
in their own right, without subjects.102 Thus in both sorts of case the more precise ἐπιστῆμαι owe 
their superior precision to their “explanatory simplicity”.  
We now have three criteria for precision: fineness of grain, explanatory depth, and 
explanatory simplicity. How are they related? In particular, are these three independent criteria 
or are some reducible to others? We saw earlier that a discipline’s fineness of grain is determined 
in part by its objects and in part by its purpose. It may be that the presence of causal complexity 
in the objects reduces the possible fineness of grain with which they can be known. This is most 
plausible when complicating factor is physical matter (as it is in the cases of harmonics and the 
snub), which might be thought to be inherently variable or unstable. Surely it is the presence of 
physical matter that makes γνῶσις of particulars (such as the practical γνῶσις in which 
statesmanship and φρόνησις consist) inherently imprecise. (As we saw in §2.4, the differences 
                                                 
101 The relation between the two sorts of complication may be even more intimate. Elsewhere (De Anima III.4 
429b18-22), Aristotle effectively treats geometry (which is here the paradigm of an ἐπιστήμη with additional things) 
as an ἐπιστήμη whose objects are predicated of a subject, and likely his reason (in De Anima I.1 at 402a1-6) for 
counting the study of the soul as especially precise is that the soul is considered in isolation from the body, which is 
its underlier. 
102 For discussion of Aristotle’s use of “ἀφαίρεσις” and some of its implications for his understanding of abstraction, 
see Cleary 1985. See Heath 1998 65-6 a discussion of the term in specifically mathematical contexts. 
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between individuals within the same uncuttable form are primarily explained through material 
causes.)  
We have, then, some reason to think that causal simplicity is not an independent criterion 
for precision, but only a means to it. However, it is not clear that complicating factors always 
make fineness of grain impossible. Geometry is more complex than arithmetic, but is it less fine 
grained? Can’t we calculate the length of lines with perfect precision? It is doubtful that Aristotle 
would have thought so, especially given the geometry with which he was familiar. He is 
impressed, for example, with the incommensurability of the diagonal, which amounts to nothing 
more than the impossibility of giving a precise statement of its length in units based on the length 
the square that it bisects. 
Even if the complexity of an object does not prevent us from stating any fact about it with 
perfect fineness of grain, it may introduce convolutions into the demonstrations through which it 
is e-known, which might result in the ἐπιστήμη having a more approximate character. This point 
is brought out  nicely by an intimidatingly complex diagram created by Gotthelf (1997) to 
illustrate the structure of Aristotle’s explanation of a zoological phenomenon in the Parts of 
Animals: 
 
 
 
The S represents a subject of which the predicates (represented by P1-8) are being 
demonstrated via the middle terms (represented by M1-7) with the aid of suppositions about 
matter (represented by h1-n) in the context of general teleological principles (whose global role is 
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represented by placing them in a box at the bottom of the diagram). The result might be 
described as inelegant. Many of the predications depend on several independent middles and so 
resist straightforward analysis into the figures. The suppositions about matter play an inferential 
role distinct from that of the middle terms, because their subject is not the subject of the 
conclusion(s) but rather the matter which is (in some sense) its subject.  
The sort of complexity illustrated by the diagram is not limited to biology; it results from 
just the sorts of additions that Aristotle thinks diminish precision. An added item is either 
something predicated in the definition of the subject of the ἐπιστήμη, in which case it can serve 
as a middle term, or else it is a further subject of which the subject of the ἐπιστήμη is predicated, 
in which case facts about it will play the role in the ἐπιστήμη of Gotthelf’s h1-n. (It is worth 
noting that, given the preceding, the complexity cannot be the result of any variability or 
indeterminacy inherent in biological objects. More plausibly, what we think of as variability in 
these objects is actually the result of the complex interaction of causal factors.) This complexity 
prevents us from capturing all the causally relevant factors in orderly syllogisms, which are our 
means of representing to ourselves the necessity of the effects. Insofar as the demonstrations 
must be disorderly or imperfect, it stands to reason that there should be a loss of resolution in our 
knowledge of why the objects have to be as they are. We have, then, reason to suppose that the 
criterion of explanatory simplicity reduces to fineness of grain, so long as we understand this 
widely enough to include the fineness of grain with which one can apprehend causal 
relationships. 
What then of the relation between fineness of grain and explanatory depth? For Aristotle 
these two must, in the end, amount to the same thing, though it may require a few steps to see 
this. We can begin by observing that γνῶσις of an object, at the intellectual level at least, consists 
in discerning what it is, and Aristotle identifies what a thing is with its cause: 
For in all of these {cases}, it is evident that the what it is and why it is are the 
same. “What is an eclipse?” “Privation of light from the moon by the earth’s 
obstructing”. “Why is there an eclipse?” or “Why is the moon eclipsed?” 
“Because the light is absent, {since} the earth is obstructing”. “What is a 
harmony?” “A numerical λόγος in sharp and flat”. “Why do the sharp and flat 
harmonize?” “Because the sharp and flat has a numerical λόγος”. “Do the sharp 
and flat harmonize?” “Is their λόγος in numbers?” Taking it that it is, “What is the 
λόγος?” (Posterior Analytics II.2 90a14) 
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The cases to which Aristotle refers represent a complete taxonomy of the possible objects of o-
knowledge, which (for him) amounts to a complete taxonomy of existents. So Aristotle is here 
committing himself to the view that everything is its cause, from which, of course, it follows that 
to know what anything is to know its cause, a position that Aristotle embraces explicitly: “o-
knowing the what it is and why it is are the same” (90a31). 
Now, we turn to two passages in which Aristotle discusses the nature of o-knowing what 
and why something is: 
Since, as we have stated, o-knowing what something is and o-knowing the cause 
of whether it is are the same, and the cause is an account of this—that something 
is—, and this is either the thing itself or something else, and, if something else, 
either demonstrable or indemonstrable, accordingly: if it is something else and 
admits of demonstration, necessarily the cause is a middle and the proof is in the 
first figure (for what’s proven is universal and predicable). (II.8 93a3-9) 
While the cause of some things is something different, {the cause} of others is 
not. So, it’s clear that some {cases} of what it is are immediate and principles, for 
which both being (εἶναι) and what it is must be supposed or made evident in some 
other manner (just as the arithmetician makes  {his principles evident}; for he 
supposes both what the unit is and that it is). But for things that have a middle (i.e. 
for things for which there is some different cause of substance), there is, as we 
stated, revealing though demonstration, {though} the what it is is not 
demonstrable. (II.9 93b21-8) 
Both passages draw a distinction between things that are distinct from their causes and 
things that are identical with them. We met this same distinction in only slightly different terms 
in De Anima III.4, where Aristotle told us that, though many things are distinct from their 
essences, some are identical with their essences (429b10-12). Clearly, the things that are 
identical with their causes are the indivisible objects that we earlier called primaries—the things 
whose existence as well as their definitions must be posited, and Aristotle tells us as much in the 
second passage quoted above.103 We can put these objects aside until the next chapter and focus 
                                                 
103 In taking the distinction this way, I am agreeing with (amongst others) Aquinas (Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics [Berquist 2007 272]), Scholz (1975 §11),  and Barnes (1994 221-2). Ross (1943 633) writes that 
the distinction is between οὐσία and existents in the other categories. If this is correct, though, it will be because all 
and only οὐσίαι are identical with their causes/essences. (I do not think this is quite the case, because I think being 
distinct from one’s cause/essence amounts to having an underlier, and that, in some contexts at least, the matter of 
natural οὐσίαι and the intelligible matter of forms of a kind qualifies. This underlier makes it possible for the object 
[either in reality or in thought] to fail to be what it is while remaining in some important sense the same thing. An 
object is identical with its essence only if it cannot but be what it is, which means only if it contains no element of 
potentiality—only if  it is one of the indivisible objects mentioned in Metaphysics Η.6 and Θ.10. However, any 
given ἐπιστήμη will regard the kind with which it is concerned [and often certain members of this kind] as a 
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here on the objects that we earlier called divisible and whose existence needs to be demonstrated. 
Aristotle tells us that to know what such an object is and its cause is to have a middle term for a 
demonstration of its existence. Aristotle’s classic example of this is the case of thunder: 
What is thunder? Fire’s extinction in a cloud. Why is there thunder? Because the 
fire in the cloud is extinguished. Cloud {is} C, thunder A, {and} the B is fire’s 
extinction. B belongs to C, the cloud, (for the fire is extinguished in it), and A, a 
noise, belongs to this; and indeed B is the λόγος of A, the first extreme. If there is, 
in turn a middle term for this it will be from the remaining accounts. (II.8 93b7-
14) 
On a superficial level, thunder is a cloud’s being noisy, and as we will see in the next 
chapter, Aristotle does count knowing this as knowing in one way what thunder is. The cloud’s 
being noisy, however, is divisible into noise’s belonging to fire-extinction and fire-extinction’s 
belonging to the cloud. Thus fire-extinction is the cause of the noise and is what thunder is in a 
less superficial sense. But Aristotle acknowledges the possibility that there may be further 
middle terms, as surely there are. Clouds presumably extinguish fire because they are moist, and 
likely extinguishing is noisy because it produces an exhalation of air, so we can elaborate out 
Aristotle’s demonstration as follows: 
Noise belongs to exhalation of air, which belongs to extinction of fire, which 
belongs to moist, which belongs to clouds. 
And we can continue this process until we reach “uncuttable” propositions. We can describe 
each step in the process as one of going causally deeper, but equally as one of giving a more 
fine-grained account of what we had said at the previous level. The initial characterization of 
thunder that we described as “superficial” is imprecise in that it characterizes a complex 
occurrence without distinguishing the components of the complex. The later accounts specify 
                                                                                                                                                             
primary, and this will serve as a subject for all its predications; this gives rise to a sense in which, in a given domain 
and relative to a given ἐπιστήμη, the same things will count as primaries and οὐσίαι.) Deslauriers (2007 56-66) tries 
to map the distinction on to the distinction in II.2 as 90a2 between being ἐπὶ μέρους and being ἁπλῶς, which she 
casts as a major theme of Posterior Analytics II. In fact, the distinction is made only in passing as a gloss on the “If 
it is”/”What it is” distinction, which Aristotle is explicitly working in that chapter to undermine. Her interpretation 
therefore drops the immediate context in which the distinction is drawn. It is implausible on another ground as well. 
The distinction between “εἰμί ἁπλῶς” and “εἰμί ἐπὶ μέρους” is a distinction between two ways in which something 
can be said “to be”—it is the distinction between the existential and copulative senses of the verb “to be”. In the 
copulative case, the thing that is said to be ἐπὶ μέρους is the subject of the predication, not the predicate. But surely, 
if one of these two is distinct from its cause, it is the predicate, since even Aristotle’s god, which (on anyone’s 
interpretation) would be an example of something that isn’t distinct from its cause, can be the subject of 
predications: it exists ἐπὶ μέρους insofar as it  is immortal, is unmoved, is a cause, etc. 
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more precisely (i.e. in greater detail) just what this occurrence is. 104 And this increase in 
fineness of grain is identical with the increase in causal depth. 
We have arrived, now, at a single account of precision that unites the several criteria we 
saw Aristotle employ for it. Let us recast and expound upon some of our earlier findings in terms 
of it. Ἐπιστήμη is γνῶσις in the highest possible degree of objects that are not causal primaries, 
because it is the most precise γνῶσις of them—because the demonstrations in which it consists 
articulate the complexity of the objects by representing them as a series of terms, one belonging 
to another. We meet these objects, however, initially in perception, the least precise γνῶσις, 
which presents the objects to us as (in the language of the opening chapter of the Physics) 
confused (συγκεχυμένον) wholes. We must divide these wholes in order to grasp the elements 
and relations that constitute them.105 In some cases, the division in question involves isolating in 
thought literal components of the objects, which could be physically divided, but at least as often 
it involves isolating aspects of the objects that cannot exist in isolation. In order to mentally 
isolate such aspects and to grasp the causal connections between the terms into which the objects 
are divided we must represent the objects (and their components of various sorts) universally—
i.e. in a de-specified manner. Aristotle says little about why this point holds, but he makes it 
clear that it does—that demonstration and the apprehension of causes requires universals, which 
stand to particulars as potentiality to actuality—and we have seen indications of how universals 
play their role. Thought is by nature a universal and causal awareness of the world, and concepts 
are the terms of which it is constituted.  
This, then, is the nature of conceptual cognition according to Aristotle. In the present 
chapter, we have already made some observations about how it comes to be, but this has not 
been our focus, and I have said nothing as yet about how a knower might intentionally bring it 
into existence—about the methods of conceptualization. We will deal with these methods, and 
with the process of conceptualization more generally, in the next chapter.  
                                                 
104 Cf. Gotthelf 1987 211: “Explanation… for Aristotle… in large part consists simply of correctly identifying, in 
causally fundamental terms, what is actually happening”. 
105 Byrne 1997 argues that Aristotle understood analysis (from which, of course, the Analytics takes its name) to be 
the untangling or articulating of a confused whole ultimately into an ἐπιστήμη. If, as I think, he is correct, then 
analysis and “precisification” name the same process, though from different perspectives.  
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4.0  ARISTOTLE ON CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Our subject in Chapter 2 was Aristotle’s view of the nature of universality and the ontological 
basis for concepts. I argued, against the standard view, that he viewed concepts not as grasps of 
mind-independent universal objects, but as universal thoughts ranging over classes of instances 
and based on commensurability relations between the instances and on causal relations between 
the parts of each instance. In Chapter 3, we considered the nature of such concepts as mental 
states and units of thought and knowledge, but we focused on them in their mature and perfected 
condition. In the present chapter, we will consider how concepts come into existence and 
maturity, including how this process is up to us and subject to prescriptive norms. 
On a view like Aristotle’s, there are general puzzles as to how concepts can come about 
and more specific puzzles about how we can direct our conceptualization of the world. 
Aristotelian concepts are genuine or attempted γνώσεις, which (in maturity, at least) discern 
essences, and we have seen two respects in which they could be said to stand in a hierarchy 
constituted by dependence relations. First, some concepts are intensionally divisible into other 
concepts and ultimately into the indivisible thoughts that constitute νοῦς and are the principles of 
the ἐπιστῆμαι. The objects known by νοῦς are the primaries, principles, and causes, which 
Aristotle describes as prior and better known by nature or simpliciter than the objects of the 
ἐπιστῆμαι, which derive from them. Second, we have seen that concepts depend on perception: 
thought requires a φάντασμα and essences are discerned in  perceived or imagined particulars. If, 
as I argued in §3.3.1, some concepts are related to perception directly and others only through 
other concepts, then the concepts further from perception will depend in some way on the ones 
that are closer to it. At the very least, the concepts nearer perception play a role in the formation 
of the concepts that are further from it, and earlier (in §3.3.1) I argued for a stronger dependence 
than this—one on which the relation between the later concepts and their objects involves the 
mediation of the earlier ones. Aristotle captures this dependence relation by describing the items 
closer to perception as better known to us (and occasionally prior to us) than those further from 
perception. 
Often these two hierarchies run in opposite directions so that a concept near to perception 
will have its essence partially constituted by the object of a concept that is further from it. 
Aristotle comments on this in Topics VI.4: 
Simpliciter the prior is more g-known than the posterior—e.g., point {is more g-
known} than line, and line than plane, and plane than solid, just as unit {is more 
g-known} than number; for {it is} prior to and a principle of all number. And 
likewise also a letter {is prior to and a principle of} a syllable. But the converse 
sometimes happens to us; for a solid falls most under perception, and a plane is 
more {under perception} than a line, a line more than a mark. For the many first 
get to g-know (προγνωρίζουσιν) such things; since the former are for any chance 
διάνοια to learn, and the latter are for a precise and extraordinary one. 
Simpliciter it is better to try to get to g-know posterior things through  prior ones; 
for such is more e-knowing. Nevertheless, relative to those who are unable to get 
to g-know in this way, it is perhaps necessary to make the account through things 
that are better g-known to them. Among such definitions are those of the point, 
line and plane; for all reveal prior things through posterior ones.  For, while the  
line {is said to be the limit} of the plane, {the plane} is said to be the limit of the 
solid. But we must not overlook {the fact that} it is not possible for people who 
define in this way to reveal the definiendum’s being what it is, unless the same 
thing happens to be  both better g-known to us and simpliciter. Since the person 
who defines correctly (τὸν καλῶς ὁριζόμενον) must {do so} through the kind and 
the differences, and these are among the things that are better g-known simpliciter 
and prior to the form. For {when they go out of existence} the kind and the 
difference abolish the form; thus they are prior to it. And they are also better g-
known; for, although {when} the form is g-known, it is necessary that the kind 
and difference are g-known too (for one who g-knows man, also g-knows animal 
and footed), {when} the kind and form are g-known, it is not necessary that the 
form also be g-known, thus the form is more g-unknown (ἀγνωστότερον). 
(141b12-34) 
There is an obvious tension here. If to have the concept “man” is to g-know the essence 
“biped animal”, but man is better g-known to us than either biped or animal, and therefore g-
known before these other terms, then there will be a time when we g-know the biped animal 
without g-knowing biped or animal. Since this seems impossible, it is hard to see how this theory 
could allow for the possibility of coming to know anything.  
The difficulty here is a variant of a problem that we saw earlier is inherent in the Socratic 
theses that to have a concept is to grasp what its objects are, and that one must know this in order 
to know anything else about the objects. Indeed, an Aristotelian ἐπιστήμη is, in essence, a body 
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of knowledge about a subject based on a knowledge of what it is. The situation for Aristotle is 
somewhat more complicated by the possibility of there being several intermediate steps between 
the subject and what one knows about it, so that instead of two varieties of knowledge, one 
depending on the other, as in the Socratic case, we have a hierarchy of dependence. We saw 
earlier how these Socratic commitments generate the Meno problem—the paradox that it is 
impossible to inquire into what anything is because to pose the “What is it?” question one would 
need to have the concept and therefore to already know the answer (since having the concept 
consists in knowing what the object is). The paradox arises precisely because we clearly do 
inquire, and more generally use concepts productively, before we are able to articulate essences. 
In general, the order in which people seem to learn things is quite different—almost the reverse 
of—what one would expect on the Socratic picture. What is first to us is not what is first by 
nature.  
Plato resolved this difficulty by denying that (in this world at least) there is any such 
thing as learning (Meno 81c-e), and maintaining that even perception depends tacitly on prior 
knowledge of essences (i.e. of Forms) which one may not have full conscious access to (Phaedo 
75b). We have already seen parts of Aristotle’s contrary solution. Γνῶσις comes in degrees 
differentiated by (perhaps amongst other things) precision. Other γνώσεις arise from perception, 
which is the least precise, by a process of “precisification” in which one decomposes a thought 
that is prior to us into one that is prior by nature. Before performing this process, we do have the 
naturally prior thoughts in a way—we have them in the sort of potentiality in which the owner of 
a house has the timbers out of which it is built.1 But once we come to have these thoughts in 
                                                 
1 Aristotle elaborates on a similar example concerning geometrical proofs in Metaphysics Θ.9: 
The constructions in actuality are discovered; for dividers discover {them}. If they had been 
divided {already}, they would have been evident; but now they inhere (ἐνυπάρχει) in potentiality. 
“Why is the triangle two rights?” “Since the angles around a single point are equal to two rights.” 
So if the line beside the side was brought up, it would have been clear straightaway when seeing 
{it}. “Why is there a semicircle in the right {angle} universally?” “Because if three lines are 
equal—the two {forming} the base and the one dropped straight from the middle…” It’s clear to 
whoever sees and o-knows that. Thus it is evident that things that are in potentiality are discovered 
{when} brought into actuality. The cause is that thinking is the actuality, so that the potentiality is 
from an actuality, and, through this, makers {of constructions} g-know (for the numerical actuality  
is posterior in coming to be). (1051a21-33) 
(On the respects in which actualities are and are not posterior to potentialities, see De Anima III.5 430a10-22 and 
III.7 31a1-4.) The divisions in the diagram, through which the theorem is known are present in potentiality even in 
the initial shapes because lines can be extended and bisected and so on. These are intellectual operations, and 
thinking (of the relevant geometrical sort) consists in performing them, and in grasping through them theorems 
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actuality, we can recompose the thoughts that are prior to us from them, and thereby achieve a 
more intensive γνῶσις of the items that are best known to us. 
It is this process—the process of conceptualization—that we will look at in greater detail 
in this chapter. However, we will have to be selective in our treatment of it, because the process 
cannot be separated from the process of coming to know as such, and this is too large a subject to 
tackle in the time remaining. In §4.1 I will discuss the process of concept formation in broad 
outline by focusing on Posterior Analytics II.19, the locus classicus on the issue. II.19 treats the 
process from a third-person naturalistic perspective asking how these precise forms of 
knowledge could come to be from less precise forms. In §4.2 and 3 I look at texts in which 
Aristotle discusses the coming to be or maturation of conceptual knowledge from a more first-
personal perspective. §4.2 addresses Posterior Analytics II.1-10’s solution to the problem raised 
in the Meno of how it is possible to seek and prove what something is—the very knowledge in 
which a concept consists. §4.3 will turn to cases in which Aristotle advocates the introduction of 
new concepts or criticizes existing concepts.  
4.1 THE PROGRESSION TO ΝΟΥΣ IN POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II.19 
About the principles, both how they come to be g-known and what the g-knowing 
state is, will henceforth be clear, after we’ve first raised an ἀπορία. (99b17-19) 
So begins Posterior Analytics II.19. The chapter divides into two broad sections corresponding 
to the two questions. How γνῶσις of principles comes to be is discussed in 99b20-100b5 and the 
g-knowing state is taken up, identified as νοῦς, in 100b5-17. Our present interest is in the first of 
these sections. Its structure is typical of an aporetically motivated discussion. Immediately after 
the ἀπορία is raised (99b20-30), it is followed with an extremely abstract solution derived from 
the terms in which the ἀπορία was set out (99b30-34). This solution makes clear what features a 
concrete account will need to have if it is to resolve the ἀπορία. The discussion then ends with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
about the geometrical objects. Thus, the thinker g-knows the size and sums of the relevant angles with a precision 
that he could not have had by (e.g.) measuring the angles severally—he has ἐπιστήμη. 
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substantive treatment based on facts in the relevant domain, interspersed with remarks about how 
this treatment satisfies the requirements made salient by the abstract solution (99b34-100b3).2 
The ἀπορία is stated as follows: 
It was said earlier that it is not possible to e-know through demonstration unless 
one g-knows the first and immediate principles. Someone might puzzle over g-
knowledge of the immediates and whether it is the same or not the same, and 
whether there’s e-knowledge of each, or e-knowledge of one but some other g-
knowledge of the other, and whether the states, having not been in us, arise in us, 
or, having been in us, have been overlooked. 
On the one hand, it’s absurd if we do have {g-knowledge of the principles}; for it 
follows that possessors of g-knowledge more precise than demonstration overlook 
{it}. On the other hand, if we acquire it not having it before, how would we g-
know and learn, if not from preexisting g-knowledge? For it’s impossible as we 
also said about demonstration. (99b20-30) 3 
Given that there is γνῶσις of principles, it must be either (a) innate or (b) learned; if 
innate it must be either (a1) conscious or (a2) unconscious. To this division we add four 
premises, two explicit and two tacit: 
(P1) Learning proceeds from preexistent γνῶσις.4 
(P2) The γνῶσις of principles is especially precise. 
(P3) For γνῶσις, precision implies self-consciousness. 
(P4) There is a time prior to a given person’s self-conscious apprehension of a 
principle, during which he is not conscious of possessing any γνῶσις with the 
precision characteristic of γνῶσις of principles.  
P4 flatly denies possibility a1, and, when combined with P3, it rules out a2. Therefore, 
γνῶσις of principles must be learned, and, as of P1, this means that it must proceed from 
preexistent γνῶσις. This preexistent γνῶσις must then either be (b1) at least as precise as the 
γνῶσις of the principles or (b2) less precise than it. P3 and P4 rule out b1 (regardless of whether 
                                                 
2 This pattern is followed, for example, in Nicomachean Ethics VII.1-4’s discussion of ἀκρασία. VII.4 provides a 
concrete account that is recognized as a solution to the Socratic ἀπορία when it is viewed in the context of the more 
abstract solution given to the ἀπορία by VII.3’s distinctions between types of εἰδέναι or ἐπιστήμη. For discussion of 
this and other ἀπορίαι in the Nicomachean Ethics, see Section III of my unpublished paper “Aristotle’s Non-
Dialectical Methodology in the Nicomachean Ethics”. 
3 Cf. Posterior Analytics I.1 and Physics I.1, the first sentence of which tells us that εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι proceed 
from γνῶσις of principles, elements or causes. 
4 This premise is, of course, a restatement of the principle with which the Posterior Analytics begins: “All teaching 
and all intellectual learning, arises from pre-existent g-knowledge.” (71a1-2) 
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the earlier γνῶσις is held consciously or unconsciously), so b2 is the only remaining alternative. 
This is what I referred to earlier as the “abstract solution”, and Aristotle states it as follows: 
Accordingly, it is clear that neither do we {innately} have such {states as g-
knowledge of the principles} nor do they arise in us {despite our} being g-
ignorant and having no state. Therefore, while it’s necessary to have some 
capacity {in order to acquire g-knowledge of the principles}, it’s not {necessary} 
to have {one} such as it {viz. the g-knowledge} or {one that’s} more honorable 
than it or more precise. (99b30-34) 
Immediately we’re told that the required state or capacity is perception, a “connate 
discerning capacity” possessed by all animals, but the ἀπορία is not yet resolved because b1 is 
initially implausible. It is not clear how a more precise γνῶσις can arise from less precise ones, 
especially if deduction is one’s paradigm of one γνῶσις arising from another. Thus a wider 
conception of how one γνῶσις can arise from others is called for. It is in order to provide this that 
Aristotle devotes 27 Bekker lines to the manner in which perception “instills the universal”. 
Having done so, he has resolved the ἀπορία and can complete the agenda announced at the 
beginning of the chapter by turning his attention to the “g-knowing state” that results from this 
process—the state he identifies (at 100b12) as νοῦς. 
Our present interest is in the 27 lines about the manner in which the universal is instilled. 
They read as follows:  
{All animals} have a connate discerning capacity, which is called perception; 
since perception is inherent, a retention of the perceptible arises in some of the 
animals, but in others it does not arise. So, for whichever {animals} it doesn’t 
arise (either on the whole or about that for which it doesn’t arise), there is not g-
knowledge for them outside of perception; but for those who’ve perceived in 
which {the perceptible} inheres, it is still in the soul. Once many such things have 
arisen, a certain difference arises, in that for some an account arises from the 
retention of such things, for others not. (99b35-a3) 
So, while from perception arises memory (as we call it), from many memories of 
the same thing arises experience; for numerically many memories are a single 
experience. And from experience, or from all of the universal that has settled in 
the soul (the one beside the many, which would be the same one in all these), 
arises a principle of art and e-knowledge—of art if it’s about what arises, of e-
knowledge if it’s about what is. (100a3-9) 
Indeed the states neither hold in {us} determinately nor arise from other states 
that are more g-knowing, but rather from perception, as in battle: a rout’s 
occurred; {with} one {man} standing, another stands, then another, until it’s 
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arrived at a principle. And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this. 
(100a9-14) 
Let’s state again what was just said, but not said plainly. For, {with} one of the 
undifferentiated things {ἀδιάφορα} standing, the first universal is indeed in the 
soul (for while one perceives the particular, perception is of the universal—e.g. of 
man rather than Callias the man); then in these {something} stands, until a 
partless and universal thing stands —e.g. such an animal until animal, and in this 
likewise. (100a14-b3) 
Now it’s clear that it’s necessary for us to get to g-know the first things by 
induction; for perception too instills the universal in this way. (100b3-5) 
I address the perception from which this process departs in §4.1.1, the stage of experience in 
§4.1.2, and the advent of the universal itself in §4.1.3. But before looking in detail at the 
different states involved in this progression, it is necessary to say a little bit about what it is a 
progression to and about the ἀπορία being solved. 
The subject of II.19 is the γνῶσις of principles. These principles are, viewed in one way, 
concepts and, viewed in another, propositions, because to have a concept is to know what the 
instances are, and this knowledge can be articulated in propositional form. In a way any concept 
might be said to be a principle for ἐπιστήμη (or τέχνη) about its objects. For example, conceiving 
of ice as solidified water (probably even if one does not know that this solidification is due to the 
absence of heat) will enable one to deduce that, say, ice sculptures and ice skating are possible. 
But while the knowledge yielded by such deductions may be ἐπιστῆμαι (or, more strictly, τέχναι) 
there is no distinct ἐπιστήμη with ice as its subject—no science of  “crystology” that takes ice as 
a primary and tries to explain its attributes. Ice is, rather, something to be explained by some 
other ἐπιστήμη, probably meteorology or some other branch of φυσική.  The concepts that II.19 
is interested in, primarily at least, are the indivisible thoughts of primaries—concepts like 
“nature”, for example.  
The chapter’s charge is to explain how such concepts can come about from less precise 
knowledge, but this problem is posed in a very schematic way, and we should expect, even the 
more concrete solution to have a similar character. The charge is not, for example, the Meno’s 
more specific problem concerning how inquiry is possible; this has already been addressed over 
the course of Posterior Analytics II, and we will turn to it in §4.2. II.19 is an appendix to this 
discussion, which focuses only on the possibility of precision arising from imprecision—
principles from non-principles. Its aim is to make coherent, in the context of abstract 
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epistemological and psychological concerns, a progression and method that has already been laid 
out. Our treatment can begin with this appendix because we have already glimpsed enough of 
this progression to have some purchase on it, and because the chapter does provide a synoptic 
perspective on it that will be useful for us going forward, but we should guard against asking 
questions of the chapter that it is not intended to answer, and especially against assuming that the 
stages it enumerates map exactly onto stages in the process of inquiry discussed across Book II, 
and we should keep in mind that it does not offer an account of concept-formation as such, but of 
the way in which νοῦς can come to be. 
4.1.1 The meaning of “perception” in II.19 
Given our present purposes, the stage of perception is of little interest to us in its own right. 
However, confusion will arise later if we do not begin by considering the somewhat unusual way 
in which the word “αἴσθησις” is used in the chapter. It cannot refer specifically to the acts of 
seeing, hearing, touching, etc., because, if it did, the concluding remark that perception instills 
the universal by induction would make no sense. The induction of which Aristotle speaks is 
surely no part of seeing or smelling. Rather it refers either to the whole process of perceiving, 
remembering, associating like memories into experiences or else, perhaps, to some later stage in 
that process. 
Moreover, if we take “αἴσθησις” in its usual sense, we will be at a loss to explain the 
claim at 100a17 that “while one perceives the particular, perception is of the universal”. This 
statement is puzzling on two counts. First, Aristotle elsewhere tells us that perception is of 
particulars.5 And second, it is obscure what it could mean for “what one perceives” and “what 
one’s perception is of” to be different. If “αἴσθησις” were functioning here merely as the 
coordinate of the verb “αἰσθάνεται” so that words refer, in different grammatical forms, to the 
same act, then statement would be incoherent, since the genitive complement of the noun would 
be equivalent to the accusative object of the verb so that Aristotle would be differentiating a 
thing from itself. It’s unlikely, therefore, that Aristotle is using the genitive complement and the 
accusative object to capture different relations in which an object can stand to perception. Rather, 
                                                 
5 See, amongst other places, I.18 81b6, I.31 81a2. 
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the contrast intended is between “αἰσθάνεται” and “αἴσθησις”, which are being said to have 
different objects. 
We can get a purchase on what Aristotle means in contrasting these two forms of the 
same word by analogy to the case of “ἐπίστασθαι” and “ἐπιστήμη”. In the last two chapters I 
made much of the distinction between ἐπιστήμη in potentiality and in actuality (or in first and 
second actuality). It is doubtful that the noun “ἐπιστήμη” was naturally used for the actuality 
anymore than the English noun “knowledge” is. Indeed, Aristotle illustrates the distinction 
between first and second actuality in De Anima II.1 by contrasting “ἐπιστήμη” with the verb 
“θεωρεῖν” (412a22-23), and notice how he distinguishes between the two senses of “ἐπιστήμη” 
in Metaphysics M.10:  
“ἐπιστήμη is twofold, as ἐπίστασθαι also is: one is in potentiality and the other in 
actuality” (1087a15-16)  
Presumably the verb form is mentioned because the sense of actuality more naturally attaches to 
it than to the noun. This is confirmed by Nicomachean Ethics VII.3 where it is “ἐπίστασθαι” 
rather than “ἐπιστήμη” that it said to have two senses:  
But ‘e-knowing’ is said in two ways; for both one who has ἐπιστήμη without 
using it and one who uses it are said to e-know” (1146b31-32). 
Here the noun is used not for something that can become active or not, but for an item in the soul 
which can either be employed or can lie fallow, where the verb can mean either having the item 
or using it. Now surely Aristotle didn’t regard contemplating (or knowing in actuality) as making 
use of an inner item as one might make use of a tool. One makes use of it rather as one makes 
use of an ability, which is to say that it’s quite natural to regard the ἐπιστήμη as the capacity or 
potentiality and its “use” in actualized ἐπίστασθαι as the actuality. So, it wouldn’t be at all 
unnatural for Aristotle to draw the distinction between potentiality and actuality as one between 
ἐπιστήμη and ἐπίστασθαι.  
There is no passage in which he draws the distinction in quite this way, but I think he is 
doing something equivalent with “αἴσθησις” and “αἰσθάνεται” in Posterior Analytics II.19. Now 
of course, for Aristotle there cannot be a direct analogy at the perceptual level to the difference 
between ἐπίστασθαι in potentiality and in actuality. The distinction arises in the case of 
ἐπίστασθαι because, having learned, one can exercise one’s ἐπιστήμη at will. One cannot, 
however, perceive at will by actualizing some internal state, but only when one is actually being 
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affected by the perceptible object.6 Nevertheless, perceiving does leave a trace in one’s soul in 
the form of a state that can (at least sometimes) be actualized at will with a content that can be 
put to various uses. This state and content are, respectively, what the De Anima and Parva 
Naturalia, call “φαντασία” and “φάντασμα”. Neither of these words appears in the Posterior 
Analytics, but II.19 speaks of a “retention” (“μονή”) of perceptibles in the soul and of the 
perception’s “inhering” (“ἔνειμι”) (99b36, 39). Compare this with De Anima III.3’s 
characterization of φαντασίαι as aftereffects of perception that “are retained (ἐμμένειν) and are 
like perceptions” (429a4-5). Recall also that II.19 equates this retained perception with memory, 
which is defined in On Memory 1 in terms of the possession of φαντάσματα (451a14-17). 
I submit, then, that Posterior Analytics II.19 uses “αἴσθησις” in a wide sense to mean 
something like an imagistic content (i.e. a φάντασμα) or the state of having such a content (i.e., 
φαντασία), and that he uses “αἰσθάνεται” for the act of perceiving. The puzzling remark that 
“perception is of the universal” means, in the idiom of Aristotle’s psychological texts, that 
φαντάσματα are of universals. As we will see shortly, this cannot be quite correct on Aristotle’s 
view, but it does approximate to an important point made in On Memory 1. There we learn that 
the φάντασμα in which the memory of an individual consists does not, when considered in its 
own right, have that individual as its content. The φάντασμα  is analogized to “a picture {ζῷον} 
that’s been drawn on a board”, which “is both a picture and a likeness”: 
And one and the same thing is both of these, although it is not the same thing to 
be both of them; and one can contemplate it both as a picture and as a likeness. So 
too, one must suppose the φάντασμα in us to be something itself in itself and 
{also to be} of something else. So, while qua {a thing} in itself it is a θεώρημα or 
a φάντασμα, qua another (as a likeness), it is also a remembrance. And thus, 
whenever the motion of this activates, if it does so qua {what it is} in itself, the 
soul perceives the very same thing (e.g., some νόημα or φάντασμα appears to 
occur); but if {the motion activates} qua of something else, then, just as one 
                                                 
6 As we saw earlier, this is one of the disanalogies that Aristotle draws between perception and thought in De Anima 
III.4:  
When it {νοῦς} has become each thing, as one e-knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων) in actuality is said to 
do (and this happens when he can exercise his ability by himself), even then it is {each thing} 
potentially in a way ({though} surely not like before he learned or discovered), and then it {viz. 
the intellect} is able to think by itself. (429b5-9) 
“Ἐπιστήμων” is an adjective used, e.g., for people well versed in a given art or science, and so probably suggests the 
state or “first actuality” more strongly than “ἐπιστήμη” would. Here “ἐπιστήμων in actuality” means having 
ἐπιστήμη as opposed to merely being able to learn and this state is analogized to perceiving as opposed to merely 
being able to perceive. What the passage tells us is that, in the intellectual but not the perceptual case, even this 
actuality is a potentiality in a way. And it is this way of being a potentiality that Aristotle has in mind in the passages 
in which he refers to ἐπιστήμη or  ἐπίστασθαι in potentiality. 
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views a likeness also in a drawing and, without having seen Coriscus, {views it} 
as Coriscus, and {just as} in this {case} the affection of viewing this is different 
when {it is} viewed as a drawn picture, so too {with the thing} in soul: though it 
occurs as an νόημα only, since it’s a likeness, it is a remembrance. (450b20-51a2) 
There is a way, of course, in which a φάντασμα isn’t analogous to a picture: the latter can 
be considered entirely independent of any representational content as mere paint on a board, 
whereas nothing quite like this can be done with the φάντασμα, which is the retention in the soul 
of a perceptible form without its matter. Likely, what it is to be a particular φάντασμα is wholly 
to be the retention of a form received in perception, and all it is to have mental content of a 
perceptible form is to have it in the perceptive part of one’s soul (either as a current perception or 
as a stored φάντασμα). Therefore, the φάντασμα is inherently representational in a way that the 
arrangement of paint is not. But what it is inherently a representation of is a such (e.g., perhaps, 
man), and not of the this (e.g. Coriscus) that initially transmitted the form. It is only a 
representation of him when considered as a likeness of him.  
With this in mind, let’s look again at II.19’s puzzling remark about perception: 
For, {with} one of the undifferentiated things standing, the first universal is 
indeed in the soul (for while one perceives the particular, perception is of the 
universal—e.g. of man rather than Callias the man) (100a15-b1) 
Most likely, given the context, “undifferentiated thing” refers to an individual member of an 
uncuttable form—e.g. to Coriscus.7 The word “standing” comes from the rout metaphor a few 
lines earlier, where it seems to represent the retention of something in memory. So, for an 
undifferentiated thing to be “standing” is for a perceived individual to be held in memory. The 
                                                 
7 We have already met with the many senses in which Aristotle uses divisional language. In two of its three prior 
occurrences in the Posterior Analytics “ἀδιάφορα” clearly refer to refers to uncuttable forms such as man (97b8, 31) 
(the remaining use, at 97b21, describes an “indifferent” attitude towards pleasure). Thus there is a prima facie case 
that the ἀδιάφορον referred to in the present passage is also an uncuttable form. However, if this is what the term 
means here, then the point of the clause cannot be to affirm that a universal is present in the soul (since it is obvious 
that such a form is a universal), but only to point out which forms are first. If so, the μὲν at 100a15 is odd, and more 
importantly, the parenthetical remark about perception being of the universal is irrelevant). Outside of the Analytics, 
“ἀδιάφορα” is often used to refer to things that do not differ from one another in form (see De Caelo 310b5,  
Generation and Corruption 323b19, De Respiratione 478b23, Generation of Animals 746a31, and Metaphysics 
M.7-8).  (The basic meaning of “ἀδιάφορον”, when used in this way is simply “not different”, and Aristotle 
sometimes specifies the respect in which the things are not different, thus  “ἀδιάφορα κατὰ τὸ εἴδος” [Topics 
103a11, cf. 121b15-22,  De Caelo 277a2-4, Parts of Animals I.4 644a25] or “κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἀδιάφορα μόνον” 
[History of Animals 497b10-11].) If it is being used in this sense here, then “one of the ἀδιάφορα” means one 
member of a group of things that do not differ from one another in form—e.g. one man—and this makes the most 
sense in context, since the assertion that having retained a perception of one of these amounts to having a universal 
in your soul is both bold enough to warrant a μὲν and supported by the comment about perception being of a 
universal.  
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contrast is between the original act of seeing and what remains of it in the soul as a memory. 
Coriscus is perceived as a particular, but this content is retained as a universal, just as we might 
expect should be the case from the On Memory passage quoted above. 
Now, it cannot be that all we retain in memory from the perception of an individual man 
is a representation of man in general, because, then we would have no way to remember 
differences between people. Moreover, people can look quite different from one another and if 
the φαντάσματα are remnants of perception, we should expect them to inherit some of these 
perceptible differences.8 Aristotle cannot be maintaining then that all we retain from the 
perception of Callias is the universal man. Likely his point is simply that instead of retaining 
Callias in all his individuality, we retain a such. The universal man is mentioned as a paradigm 
example of a such, but what would actually be retained would be a much more determinate such 
that includes all of Callias’ distinctive perceptible qualities. Since there is no general name for 
people who look such as Callias does, and Aristotle is only making an aside, he simplifies by 
giving “man” as an example. This interpretation is suggested by an earlier remark:  
There is no e-knowing through perception. For even if perception is of a such and 
not of a this such, still necessarily {one} perceives a certain this and {one 
perceives it} somewhere and now. And it’s impossible to perceive what’s 
universal and applicable to all; for it’s not a this nor {is it} now; otherwise it 
wouldn’t be universal; for what exists always and everywhere we say is universal. 
(I.31 87b29-30) 
The distinction between a this and a such is a distinction between an existent and (all or part of) 
its identity in abstraction from its individuality, time, and location. A “such” is a “way of being” 
(or what some of the early modern philosophers called a “mode”).  As a way of being, a such is 
“repeatable”.  
The point of the remark at 100a17, then, is that there is no special work involved in 
getting from a this to a such, from an individual to a repeatable sort of thing. That part of the 
process of conceptualizing just happens for us when our percepts are retained. Granted the such 
Aristotle mentions is more specific than the such actually retained from the relevant perception, 
but this is not a major problem since he is about to discuss how the soul moves from a specific 
                                                 
8 Perhaps details are blunted in the φαντάσματα, as the details of a signet ring might be blunted in the impression it 
leaves in wax, so that fine differences between similar looking men may not be retained, or may be less salient in the 
φαντάσματα than in the original perceptions, but a perception of Milo the wrestler will surely leave a different 
φάντασμα than a perception of a pigmy, and any remembered difference between two men, however fine grained, 
must be stored in the respective φαντάσματα. 
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such to progressively more general ones. The simplification in the example merely foreshortens 
the number of times this process will have to be iterated. There is, however, an important 
inaccuracy introduced by calling the such retained in memory a “universal”. It can be one only in 
an attenuated sense.9 The retained such of Callias does not satisfy Aristotle’s definition of a 
universal as something that can be predicated of many, because it lacks the unity required to 
function as a predicate at all. The various features in which Callias perceptibly differs from other 
men constitute one visage only numerically and accidentally.  
Before leaving the topic of perception in II.19, I want to address one remaining issue 
pertaining to perceiving itself rather than to the whole functioning of the perceptual part of the 
soul. A number of authors are troubled by the claim that perception is of man because they think 
the De Anima’s theory of perception rules out either man in general or any particular man from 
being anything more than an incidental object of perception. Barnes expresses the worry as 
follows: 
Aristotle’s theory of perception divides the objects of perception into two classes, 
essential and incidental (cf. An B 6). Essential objects are either proper to a given 
sense (e.g. colors to sight, sounds to hearing) of common (e.g. motion, shape, 
size). Incidental objects cover everything else. If X is an incidental object of 
perception, then I perceive X only if there is some essential object Y such that I 
perceive  Y and Y is  X. Individuals are the prime examples of incidental objects 
(An B 6, 418a21; Γ 1, 425a24). There is very little evidence for man, but what 
there is makes it an incidental object (An Γ 6, 430b29); and in any case it is hard 
to see how man could be either a proper or a common sensible. Man, then, is not 
directly implanted in our minds by the senses, as Aristotle’s words in B 19 
suggest; but in that case we need an account, which Aristotle nowhere gives, of 
how such concepts as man are derived from the data of perception.10 
It is by no means obvious that individual men are incidental sensibles. In the two 
passages Barnes cites in support of this view, the things said to be incidental sensibles are, 
respectively, the son of Diares and the son of Cleon. If Aristotle meant to be referring to 
individual men as such he should have spoken about Diares and Cleon rather than their sons. 
That he twice speaks instead of sons cannot be an accident, and it is clear in the second case 
especially that the man’s being a son is precisely what’s at issue. What he says there is that we 
                                                 
9 Notice that, in Metaphysics Z.13, when Aristotle argues that  “none of the things that belong universally is a 
substance” because “none of the things predicated in common signifies a certain this but rather a such” (1038b34-
a2),  he treats being a universal as a sufficient condition for being a such, but he does not say or imply that it is a 
necessary condition. 
10 Barnes 1994 266. Cf. McKirahan, 1992 253ff.  
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perceive “Cleon’s son not because he is Cleon’s son, but because he is white”. Surely he repeats 
“Cleon’s son” rather than using the man’s name or saying “this man” because he wants us to 
focus on a characteristic that is unambiguously incidental both to his being a man. 
The passages are silent as to whether being a man in general or this man is a common or 
incidental perceptible.11 But, contra Barnes, it is not hard to see how it could be a common 
sensible. Magnitude, shape, and motion are common sensibles, and surely a man’s being the size 
and shape he is and moving in the way he does is part of what it is for him to be a man. After all, 
Aristotle’s model definition of man is “biped animal”, and being bipedal is largely a matter of 
having a certain shape and moving in a certain way. Even if a man’s shape and means of motion 
are not part of what it is to be a man (or to be the man he is), these things are surely more than 
incidentally connected to his being a man. They are consequences or expressions of his being a 
man, which stand to being a man as being noisy does to being thunder. There is a strong case to 
be made, then, that the common sensibles include some of the things that makes individuals be 
what they are. If this is so, then the individual objects will be non-incidentally perceived. And, 
though the form “man” won’t be (non-incidentally) perceived “for it’s not a this nor {is it} now”, 
we will perceive the features in virtue of which Callias is here and now a man.12 
4.1.2 The nature of ἐμπειρία 
From memories of perceived particulars, we progress to experience, about which II.19 tells us 
only that it “arises from many memories of the same thing” (“for numerically many memories 
are a single experience”) and that a principle of τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη arises from it (“or from all of 
the universal that has settled in the soul”).13 Metaphysics A.1, discusses this stage in greater 
detail: 
                                                 
11 The same goes for the passage Barnes cites from III.6, at which we looked earlier. All that is said there is that the 
perception that the white thing is a man can be false whereas the perception of white cannot be because white is a 
proper sensible. But De Anima III.3 (428b22-25) tells us that we can be wrong about common sensibles as well as 
about things perceived incidentally. 
12 It is worth adding, in this connection, that the issue of going from individuals to kinds exists just as much for the 
proper sensibles as for man. In perceiving the red of a rose for example, one receives a determinate such, which may 
(in some contexts at least) qualify as a universal, but one does not as a unit receive the kind red, which subsumes 
many differing shades.  
13 On the parenthetically quoted disjunction, which is the subject of some controversy, see below §4.1.3. 
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So while the other {animals} live by φαντασίαι and memories but have little 
experience, mankind {lives} also by art and reasoning. Experience arises from 
memories for men; for many memories of the same object culminate in 
(ἀποτελέω) a single capacity (δύναμις) for experience. And experience is quite 
like e-knowledge and art, but e-knowledge and art come about through experience 
for men; for experience made art, as Polus stated, but inexperience luck. But art 
arises when, from many notions (ἐννοήματα) of experience, a single universal 
view (ὑπόληψις)  arises about similar things. For, while it is for experience to 
have the view that this benefited Callias when afflicted with this illness and 
Socrates {too} and many such particulars, it is for art {to have the view} that it 
benefited all such {people} defined according to a single form when afflicted with 
this illness (e.g., phlegmatic or choleric {people} when burning with fever). 
(980b25-a12) 
In fact, relative to acting, experience seems no different from art, rather the 
experienced succeed more than those without experience who have an account. 
The cause is that, while experience is g-knowledge of the particulars, art is of the 
universals; and actions and occurrences are all about the particular; for one 
doesn’t heal man when doctoring (or else {one does it} incidentally) but rather 
{one heals} Callias or Socrates or someone else spoken of in this way, who is 
incidentally a man. So, if someone without experience has an account and, while 
g-knowing the universal, is g-ignorant of the particular under it, he will often 
mistake the treatment; for the treatment is particular. But, just the same, we think 
o-knowing and comprehending (ἐπαΐειν) belong more to art than experience, and 
we suppose the artist to be wiser than the experienced (as, with respect to being 
more o-knowing, wisdom is implied in every case); this is because the former o-
know the cause and the latter do not. For while the experienced o-know the that 
but don’t o-know the why, the others g-know the why and the cause. (981a12-30) 
Whereas the Posterior Analytics passage speaks only of ἐμπειρίαι, here Aristotle 
mentions first a “δύναμις for ἐμπειρία” and then “ἐννοήματα of ἐμπειρία”. The δύναμις must 
either be the innate ability to have ἐμπειρία as such, or a state that stands to a given ἐμπειρία as 
an ἐπιστήμη in potentiality stands to an ἐπιστήμη in actuality. Clearly the latter is what is meant 
here, since the δύναμις is said to come about from memories, and what comes about from the 
memories of a certain sort of thing must be a δύναμις for ἐμπειρία about that sort of thing. 
Likely, then, the “ἐννοήματα” are exercises of the δύναμις. This would not be an unnatural 
meaning for this unusual word.14 
                                                 
14 The only other occurrence of “ἐννοήμα” listed by the TLG (in Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus at 38)  likely refers 
to an enduring state rather than a transient thought, but Aristotle uses the connate verb ἐννοεῖν in contexts where he 
wants to stress the occurent character of a mental state. For example it occurs in On Memory 1 at 451a6, where 
Beare amusingly translates it as “gets a sudden idea” (cf. De Anima III.6 430a10, where it refers to what one “has in 
mind” in a short segment of time, and On Dreams 1 458b18, where it refers to thoughts that occur during dreams).  
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Since II.19 (and, perhaps, Metaphysics A.1) seems to be giving us an account of concept-
formation as an account of principle acquisition, we might wonder whether possessors of 
ἐμπειρία have concepts. The word “ἐννόημα”, based as it is on “νόημα” might suggest that that 
ἐμπειρία is a conceptual state, as might the talk of people experienced in medicine. Surely, 
Aristotle has in mind here adults who are able to have thoughts of like: “Socrates felt better after 
having chicken soup when he was coughing like that, so maybe it will help Callias now.” 
Moreover, the II.19’s disjunction “from ἐμπειρία, or from all of the universal that has settled in 
the soul” (100a6-7) could be taken epexegetically to mean that ἐμπειρία just is the settling of a 
universal in the soul, in which case ἐμπειρία would almost certainly involve concepts. (I’ll return 
to this issue in the next section.) Finally, the statement that experienced people “o-know the that 
but don’t o-know the why”, employs the jargon of the earlier chapters of Posterior Analytics II 
(to which we will turn in the next section) and places them on a par with people discussed there 
who know (and can define) thunder as a “certain noise in the clouds” and analogizes τέχνη with 
the grasp of thunder as “noise in the clouds due to the extinguishing of fire”.15 This all suggests, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
15 This point is made by Bolton (1976 530), who identifies experience with “the type of understanding which is 
nearest to sense” and is enjoyed by “the possessor of a nominal definition”. From this, he concludes: 
Experience is that type of codification of information about actual particulars drawn from sense 
experience of them which marks the first stage in learning where it is appropriate to speak of 
concept acquisition (Posterior Analytics, 100a3-9, Metaphysics, 980b28-981a2,a5-7). From this 
stage, Aristotle says, science takes its start (Posterior Analytics,100a6-8, cf. Prior Analytics, 
46a17f.). This makes clear why nominal definitions, being starting points in science of the type 
which are better known to us contain information of the sort embodied in experience. Experience 
involves “a universal stabilized as a complete whole within the soul” (though not the final form of 
the universal, 100a6-7, 16). It also involves a “knowledge of particulars” (100a4-7, Metaphysics 
981a15-16). Experience is a type of systematized memory(100a4-6) and as such involves a 
knowledge of a universal which is not detached from the knowledge of and memory of actual 
particulars. The specification of such a universal requires a reference to particulars though not by 
name or by mention of uniquely identifying characteristics. So when Aristotle characterizes 
nominal definitions as accounts from the point of view of what is better known to us and what is 
best known to sense he means that they focus on actual familiar perceptible instances of a kind and 
define the kind partly by means of a reference to those instances. 
Bolton thinks that the tie to the individuals is crucial to the progression, because he reads Aristotle as having a 
Putnam-like account of reference, on which the concept refers to all the items that share an essence with the 
individuals in connection with which it was initially formed. Since we do not know this essence at first, reference 
has to be fixed causally (rather than descriptively) through those remembered individuals. But this account is 
predicated on a Moderate Realism about concepts and essences that we have seen that Aristotle does not hold. 
Moreover,  as we saw in the last section, Aristotle thinks that already in retaining a percept in memory, the inherent 
link to the perceived individual is broken. The retained φάντασμα is still an individual in the sense of being 
determinate, and insofar as we have the ability to consider it in relation to the perceived individual, but in its own 
right it is of a such rather than a this and so cannot include reference to any deep essence that the individual object 
may have. (The respective φαντάσματα generated by water and the analogous substance on a Twin Earth, to use the 
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then, that ἐμπειρία is conceptual, and that the move from it to τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη is one of 
increasing the precision and causal depth of one’s knowledge, rather than one of moving from an 
essentially perceptual and particularistic form of γνῶσις to a conceptual and universal one.16 
 On the other hand, the comment that some animals have ἐμπειρία, even if only a little, 
suggests strongly in the opposite direction. Moreover, A.1’s initial statement of the difference 
between ἐμπειρία and τέχνη focuses on universality rather than on causal depth, which is only 
mentioned when Aristotle shifts his attention to how useful τέχνη and ἐμπειρία each are. That the 
experienced person’s capacity affords him ἐννοήματα and ὑπολήψεις about particular cases, 
where the person with τέχνη has a single universal ὑπόληψις suggests that τέχνη enables its 
possessors to think universally about the relevant objects, whereas ἐμπειρία does not, which 
would mean that τέχνη but not ἐμπειρία involves the possession of concepts. This should not be 
                                                                                                                                                             
standard example, would be the identical.) So it is doubtful that experience can have the kind of tie to individuals 
that Bolton needs. Granted, we can consider our φαντάσματα as likenesses of the individuals that figured in their 
causal histories, but in II.19, Aristotle’s focus is precisely on the respect in which they are not bound to the 
individuals, which he seems to regard as important in grasping how perception can lead ultimately to (genuine) 
universals (presumably through the progressive de-specifying, correlating and explaining of the suches that remain 
after the inherent link with the individual is broken). 
16 This view is maintained by Modrak (2003): 
As described here {viz. at 981a5-12} experience consists in many notions (ἐννοημάτων). The 
external world through sense perception acts on the mind, producing not only perceptions and 
memories, but also particular conceptualizations of the observed phenomena. The experienced 
person is in a position to articulate these observations in sentences describing the effects of the 
medication on this patient and that one. Experience comes into play when past and present 
observations are grouped together and common features are recognized and generalizations based 
on these features are made. (97-8) 
But it seems that this is precisely what experience cannot do, else it would have a ὑπόληψις that the medicine 
“benefited all such {people} defined according to a single form when afflicted with this illness”, which is precisely 
the sort of γνῶσις that Aristotle contrasts with experience. One might think, however, that the merely experienced 
people are defective not in universality as such but in the degree to which their universals are “defined according to 
a single form”. But there is no evidence for this in A.1 or II.19, and the impetus for such an interpretation would 
likely come from the view that “experience” denotes the highest stage of knowledge attained by non-specialists in a 
field and that it underwrites their ability to think and speak about it. However, we know from Parts of Animals I.4, 
that Aristotle thinks that laymen sometimes  do have well defined universals: 
Perhaps, then, it is right… to speak in common in accordance with kinds wherever {one} is 
spoken of properly (καλῶς), men having defined it well, and has a single common nature and, in 
it, forms that are not very different, {e.g., the kinds} bird and fish, and {likewise} if there is any 
other that, though unnamed, includes the forms in it like a kind…  (644b1-6) 
Surely the men who defined bird and fish well, by (as Aristotle goes on to tell us) noting “the figures of the parts of  
the whole body”, are ordinary people, rather than specialists; for Aristotle’s point in this chapter is that we should 
eschew weird concepts introduced by philosophers (e.g., the Sophist’s “swimmers” [220b] which Aristotle has just 
rejected [644a12-16]) in favor of (certain) concepts in ordinary use and of any new concepts that can be introduced 
on the sound policies that they exemplify. This respect for (but not subservience to) natural language is evident in 
other parts of the corpus as well. See my discussion of the “named virtues” in Section II of “Aristotle’s Non-
Dialectical Methodology in Ethics”. 
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taken to imply, however, that the merely experienced person lacks concepts altogether, only that 
he lacks certain concepts, and this points the way to a solution that reconciles most of the 
evidence. 
There are different δυνάμεις of ἐμπειρία, resulting from memories of different sorts of 
objects. We can think of each as a precursor to a concept, so that someone who is merely 
experienced about a given thing will not yet have the concept for that thing, though he may have 
other concepts, which may even play some role in his ἐμπειρία. A concept too is a δύναμις; its 
exercise is a universal perspective taken on particulars. An example of such an exercise would be 
the thought of Socrates as a bilious man burning from fever. The concepts “bilious” and “fever” 
are universal γνώσεις linked with one another, and with other concepts, through deductive 
relationships than enable us, when thinking of Socrates as bilious and feverous, to draw further 
conclusions about him. Α δύναμις for ἐμπειρία of biliousness, by contrast, would consist of a 
body of associated memories of individual bilious men and how they fared in different 
circumstances, and the ἐννοήματα in which it issues would be memories about these particulars 
that are especially relevant to present circumstances or perhaps ὑπολήψεις resulting from them 
about other particulars.  
There is nothing to prevent the memories in which the δύναμις consists or the ἐννοήματα 
it produces from involving some conceptual content. For example, one might remember that 
Callias drank broth and that his complexion became less sallow, holding all this material in a 
conceptual form. What cannot be present, however, is the concept “bilious”. The experienced 
man will simply regard the various bilious people as evocative  of one another in some way, 
which disposes him to apply material remembered about one to the others.17 The experienced 
                                                 
17 Cf. Charles 2000 152: 
The experienced person can pick out particular people as the ones to be treated by this medicine, 
but will still lack the resources to say (or understand) what groups them together as a unit. Thus, 
she may be able to say correctly ‘This case is like that one’, but not yet grasp in any general terms 
what the relevant likeness consists in. Her ability comes to no more than her being able to say: 
‘This individual (Socrates) is like that one (Kallias) in (e.g.) that respect’(pointing to some 
demonstrated feature of Socrates.) 
Similar remarks may apply to her grasp of this illness or this medicine. In each case, the relevant 
person with experience has no more grasp on illness or medicine than is given by her ability to 
discriminate particular instances on the basis of their being like other particular cases. Thus she 
will not grasp universals.  
He goes on to note that some may describe the experienced person as having “the concept of the relevant illness” 
since she “can discriminate instances when confronted with them”,  
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man like the possessor of a τέχνη may reach a conceptual ὑπόληψις that Socrates would do well 
to drink some broth. The difference will be that the τέχνη-possessor will reach this on the basis 
of a knowledge of biliousness and will think it of Socrates qua bilious, whereas the merely 
experienced person has no concept “bilious” and no content about bilious people as such,  only 
more or less associated content about different bilious men. He has, if you will, no mental file for 
biliousness, though he keeps papers that might be collected together into such a file in a (more or 
less distinct) pile.18  
In the previous example the subjects of the memories that cohere into the δύναμις for 
ἐμπειρία are individuals, but (for all that Aristotle says) this need not always be the case. We can 
envision a similar associational state arising among universals. A person might, for example, 
have the concepts “ant”, “beetle”, “bee”, etc. while lacking the concept “insect” and yet have his 
(perfectly general) ant-knowledge associated with his beetle-knowledge, in such a manner that it 
often occurs to him that something may be true of beetles when he knows it to be true of ants. 
Thus we can envision different degrees of conceptual sophistication that might be involved in 
different ἐμπειρίαι. A cat may have ἐμπειρία of mice without having any concepts at all, while a 
pre-Aristotelian metaphysician might, on the basis of a sophisticated hierarchy of concepts, have 
ἐμπειρία (but no concept) of potentiality, essence, or final causality.19 
(The experienced person’s frequent ἐννοήματα may, of course, prompt him to organize 
the pile into a file—to form a concept for the biliousness that Socrates and Callias have in 
common—and this is likely Aristotle’s point when he says that a “single universal ὑπόληψις” 
arises “from many ἐννοήματα of ἐμπειρία”. However, this move represents a step beyond the 
limits of experience into [or at least towards] ἐπιστήμη or τέχνη.20 Until he takes that step, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
but this label is misleading. Aristotle’s point is this: the content of a knowledgeable person’s 
thoughts is fully general, involving universal which contain no essential reference to particular 
cases, but the person with experience alone enjoys a distinctive type  of content, essentially 
constituted by reference to particular cases. 
18 I owe this analogy to Binswanger (1989), who was elaborating on Rand’s (1990 67) likening of one’s body of 
concepts to a complex filing system. 
19 See (amongst others) the texts discussed above in §3.3.1 n. 65. 
20 Charles, with whose treatment of experience I largely agree, describes what this step might consist in: 
Reflection on what is common in the particular cases of illness one has confronted and treated, and 
how they differ from other somewhat similar cases, gives an initial impetus towards grasping the 
relevant universal and seeing its connections with, and distinctions from other related universals. 
Initially, one may introduce a term (e.g. ‘dropsy’) as a way of labeling the instances one thinks of 
as examples of one type of illness. One may grasp some of the symptoms which one has found in 
general terms (nausea and lethargy followed by fever), and also note which medications work for 
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experienced person lacks the concepts in which the τέχνη [e.g.] of medicine consists, and which 
would enable them to render precise more ordinary concepts like “sick” which they may have 
and to grasp the causes of symptoms that they may be able to conceptualize at some level of 
precision. Someone, possibly a medical student, might have imprecise versions of [at least some 
of] the concepts lacked by the merely experienced person, without fully having the τέχνη, as 
someone might learn the concept “insect” or “thunder” without yet having a deep understanding 
of what an insect or thunder is. Someone who uses the word thunder, and knows that it 
designates a “certain noise in the clouds” will have the concept. Mere ἐμπειρία with regard to 
thunder would be possessed, for example, by a child who has started associating memories of 
that certain sound, but doesn’t yet treat it as a unit in thought, or by an animal that has come to 
expect to hear such a sound whenever it sees lightening.) 
If the preceding interpretation of ἐμπειρία is correct, then a complex body of largely 
conceptual knowledge might qualify as a (δύναμις for) ἐμπειρία relative to the concepts that 
would serve as principles of an ἐπιστήμη or τέχνη—say, perhaps, to the concepts of the four 
humors in medicine. Aristotle, writing in his brisk and essentialized manner, may have simply 
omitted the formation of the other concepts which we would form in the course of the 
progression from perception to these concepts and which would be partially constitutive of our 
medical ἐμπειρία, especially since it is likely not true in the case of every ἐπιστήμη that the 
experience from which its principles arise involves concepts. Surely the concept “animal” is a 
principle of zoology, as may be the concepts for some kinds and forms of animals, and these are 
just the sorts of concepts that a child is likely to form first.21 
                                                                                                                                                             
which patients. For, one is concerned to see which types of treatment work for which patients and 
which do not, and to find some way of representing this knowledge at a general level (e.g. so as to 
communicate it to others). (2000 156-7) 
If one follows a route of this type, one has some reason to think that one is in touch with a genuine 
kind. This thought is underwritten by the similarities one sees in the cases with which one 
interacts. While it is a step beyond experience to grasp in general terms the illness with which one 
interacts, it is one which arises naturally from experience. 
21 On some of the issues involved in whether the various forms and kinds of animals are primaries, posited by the 
science, see above §3.2.3, n. 57. Posterior Analytics I.10 tells us that the kind an ἐπιστήμη studies is constituted by 
the things that it posits to exist, which may suggest that the kind animal, which is the subject of zoology, is 
constituted by multiple distinct posited forms of animals, in which case each may be a primary. On the other hand, it 
may be that all or some of the animal forms have their existence demonstrated from the existence of the kind animal, 
the basic contraries predicated of that kind, and relationships between these various dimensions of contrariety. 
Likely, both kinds of structures are to found in ἐπιστῆμαι. Politics IV.4 1290b25-38 endorses the latter sort of 
structure in the case of zoology, but there is hardly any evidence of it in the zoological works themselves. A notable 
exception is Generation of Animals III.11’s bizarre speculation about fiery animals on the moon, which gives some 
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The alternative to this interpretation of Aristotelian ἐμπειρία is to think of it as extending 
much further. If it does, then Aristotle will not be able to consider any concept a fully fledged 
universal (or even perhaps fully a thought) until it has been rendered perfectly precise and has 
taken its place in a finished ἐπιστήμη, because, until this point, one will still be at the stage of 
ἐμπειρία and he tells us that in some sense at least ἐμπειρία is of particulars rather than 
universals.22 I have indicated why I do not think this is correct, but little of consequence for my 
position turns on this point.23 It is largely an issue of whether or not the stage at which someone 
conceives of thunder as “a certain noise in the clouds” is called “ἐμπειρία”. What will be 
important as we move into the next section, is that an experienced person has a certain δύναμις 
that is distinct from a (precise) concept but can approximate to its function. 
                                                                                                                                                             
indication that Aristotle thinks he can derive the existence of different broad animal types from general principles 
concerning animals and the four elements (761a33-b23). 
22 This is Bolton’s (1976) position, as he thinks that the tie to the remembered particulars is necessary to fix the 
reference of the thoughts until one has a deep understanding of the essence. Modrak’s view is similar, and she 
stresses the idea that the contrast between universal and particular ὑπολήψεσις in A.1 is between precise or scientific 
cognition and a more casual sort of universality that she thinks is part of ordinary thought and language use. 
By grouping together appropriate memories, the experienced person is able to make use of 
generalizations and to bring past observations to bear on the present situation. Insofar as this 
person employs generalizations, this person can be said to produce homespun universals, and 
Aristotle’s description of experience in the Posterior Analytics {at 100a6-9} suggests as much. 
What experience does not yield are universals in the Posterior Analytics’ definition of universal 
{i.e. the one given in I.4 at 73b25-a4} , and Aristotle often makes the divide between experience 
and art by employing the contrast between universal and particular in the strict sense. The scope of 
the universals of art and science should be such that the universal is predicable of all and only 
those objects that exemplify the universal at issue, and this is equally true for the universal 
principles of art and science, where one universal description is predicated universally of another. 
The differences in scope and character between the rudimentary universals of experience and the 
universals of art and science parallels the difference between linguistic meanings and scientific 
definitions. (2003 98) 
Though I agree that the sense of universal defined in Posterior Analytics I.4 captures an important difference 
between ἐπιστήμη and art on the one hand and less precise conceptual γνώσεις  on the other, I know of no evidence 
that Aristotle ever (much less “often”) uses this definition to distinguish art and science from experience, and I can 
find none in Modrak. (She cites Metaphysics A.1 981a15-20, but nothing of use is to be found there.) I also agree 
more generally that there is a difference between the most imprecise universal γνῶσις that will allow for thought 
(and speech) and the precise form in which concepts figure in a mature ἐπιστήμη—a point which she is right to 
emphasize and to which I do not think Charles gives sufficient attention. But I do not think there is any item in 
Aristotle’s thought corresponding to a “linguistic meaning” and I don’t think that thought or speech arises until after 
the level of experience. Language is an expression of thought, which is universal (putative) γνῶσις and experience is 
not yet universal in character. 
23 This does make a big difference, however, for some of the scholars who approach Aristotle through the lens of 
20th Century philosophy of language, and especially for Bolton, because the more inclusive reading of experience, 
makes the attribution of a Putnam-like theory of reference to Aristotle more plausible than it otherwise would be. 
Thus the defense of this view is central to Bolton’s project, and to Charles’ refutation of (and alternative to) reading 
Aristotle as a “modern essentialist”. 
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4.1.3 The advent of universals 
We are told tantalizingly little about the step from perceptual cognition of particulars to the grasp 
of universals. On Aristotle’s first pass through the progression, he makes only the remark we’ve 
already seen—that a principle arises “from experience, or from all of the universal that has 
settled in the soul—the one besides the many, which would be the same one in all these” (100a6-
8). We are next given the famous metaphor concerning a rout in battle, which is supposed to 
illustrate this explanation of how γνῶσις of principles can arise from less g-knowing states 
(100a10-13). Then (at 100a15-b3) Aristotle concludes with (what he takes to be)  a more “plain” 
restatement of the account. 
In this last treatment of the issue, Aristotle explains the progression using 
decompositional or divisional language. When one of the form-members is standing there is a 
universal present,  
then in these {something} stands, until a partless and universal thing stands—e.g. 
such an animal until animal, and in this likewise. (100b1-3) 
Here we have a clear example of intensional division, that fits nicely with the morals we drew 
earlier from De Anima III and Metaphysics H.6. Man can be divided into “such an animal”—i.e. 
into (say) animal and bipedal, then animal can be divided into (say) living thing and perceptive, 
until one is left with indivisible primaries.24 (Notice, incidentally, that Aristotle does not say that 
we do not have a principle of ἐπιστήμη until we arrive at the partless universal.  He says only 
that this is where the process stops. It may be that prior to that point we have already reached a 
principle from which a less precise ἐπιστήμη can depart.) 
Paradoxically, the rout metaphor, which is supposed to represent the very process that is 
explained more “plainly” in divisional terms, involves the coming together of a whole from 
parts. A phalanx is no part of a hoplite; quite the reverse. Given its position in the text, the 
metaphor must be meant to illustrate the coming to be of something determinate like the phalanx 
from something indeterminate like the bunch of routed hoplites. However, the metaphor is too 
complex to be used to illustrate only that order can arise from disorder, and the reuse of the 
                                                 
24 Likely in this case the primaries would include οὐσία (which is the widest kind or ultimate intelligible matter 
under which man falls) as well as νοῦς, perception, and the activity of nutrition, which are definitive of (the different 
levels of) life. 
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language of “standing” in the subsequent “plain” treatment suggests that the details and stages in 
the metaphor are meant to have analogs in the cognitive process. Let us, then, consider how a 
phalanx would re-form after a rout and how its stages might mirror the stages of the progression 
from memory through experience to principles. 
It is significant that the phalanx is a functional whole. A single hoplite standing his 
ground is able to maneuver in certain ways, deflecting blows from one side with his shield while 
thrusting from the other, but he is not able to take the actions distinctive of a phalanx or to 
function as he would as a phalanx member. Even after a number of other hoplites have joined 
him, each still must function as an individual, but now increasingly they can work together. 
Without yet being organized into a phalanx, they can begin to engage in primitive versions of the 
actions distinctive to a phalanx. This, I think, is the analog of experience, which allows one to 
reach a conclusion about a novel case based on old γνῶσις , but not in the systematic way that 
ἐπιστήμη or art does.  
Continuing our story of the rally, at a certain point all the members of the phalanx are 
present. Now there is a step between the ad hoc co-functioning of all of the whole group of 
hoplites and their self-conscious organization into a proper phalanx. It is the analog of this move 
that is signaled by the phrase “from experience or from all the universal that has settled in the 
soul”, around which there is some scholarly controversy. McKirahan (1992 243) frames the issue 
nicely: 
Is {the conjunction “or”} (a) disjunctive (the principle of science comes either 
from experience or  from the universal in the soul), (b) explicative (it comes from 
experience, that is to say from the universal in the soul), or (c) progressive (it 
comes from experience, or rather from the universal in the soul, which is the next 
stage after experience)? 
Reading (a) is implausible and hasn’t won any significant defenders.25 Reading (b) is 
accepted by Barnes (1993 294), Bolton (1976 530),  Modrak (2003 98) and  probably Ross.26 
                                                 
25 Though Charles (2000 150-151, especially n. 8 and n. 10) makes some interesting suggestions along these lines. 
26 In his periphrastic translation, Ross renders the “ἤ” as “i.e.” (1947 674), but his comments on the on the relation 
between experience and universals could be read as suggesting something nearer to the position I advance below: 
What is revived by memory has been previously experienced as a unit. Experience, on the other 
hand, is a coagulation of memories; what is active in present consciousness in virtue of experience 
has not been experienced together. Therefore (a) as embodying the data of unconsciously selected 
awareness it foreshadows a universal; but (b) as not conscious of what in the past is relevant, and 
why, it is not aware of it as universal. I.e. experience is a stage in which there has appeared the 
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The third, which McKirahan adopts, was Aquinas’(2007 339)  view and is defended by Charles 
(2000 151ff). I think this reading is closest to correct, but that the “or” is not quite corrective. 
Rather, I think the rout metaphor gives us a way to see the whole universal’s coming to settle in 
the soul as a sort of culmination or limit to experience, at which it becomes something over and 
above mere experience, as, when there are enough of them and they are well enough organized, 
the bunch of hoplites ceases to be a mere bunch and becomes a phalanx. On the metaphor, 
experience is the gathering group of hoplites that functions ad hoc, without central command. 
There will be a moment when the whole of the phalanx is there, and it remains only for it to 
conceive of itself as a whole and self-consciously function as such. At the corresponding 
moment in the soul, there is a universal present, in that the δύναμις in which the experience 
consists has acquired all the functionality of a concept. At this moment the knower, can say 
about the instances what they are and see this as a basis for having the sorts of ὑπολήψεσις about 
them that his δύναμις for experience has been generating for some time. Thus he is in possession 
of a concept and a principle that he did not have before.  
The preceding is speculative, as any interpretation must be given the sparseness of 
Aristotle’s imagery, but I think it is suggestive. Whether or not the details are right, what is most 
significant is that that the metaphor involves a group of things forming a functional whole by 
coming into a determinate order. Since the universal is said to come to be from many memories 
by way of an experience, this compositional perspective is significant. If we look at the process 
only divisionally, as the cognitive extraction of a single universal from the many memories in 
which it resides, it becomes mysterious why many memories would be necessary at all. If the 
universal resides in each, then why can’t we grasp it from one memory alone?27  (Perhaps the 
                                                                                                                                                             
ability to interpret the present in light of the past, but an ability which cannot account for itself; 
when it accounts for itself it becomes art. (1924a 116-7 [and quoted in 1947 677]) 
Here he treats it as ambiguous whether the merely experienced person has a universal, and the sense in which he 
thinks he does have is amounts to nothing more than his possession of the inarticulate ability that I’ve attributed to 
him, whereas on Modrak’s and Bolton’s views, we the experienced person should be able to give some sort of 
account of his reasons for thinking what he does about present cases. Certainly the person who conceives of ice as 
“solidified water” (without knowing that this is due to the total absence of heat) could explain why he thinks he’ll be 
able to skate on the ice rather than falling through it. And the person who knows that it is now eclipsed, will either 
know this by perception, in which case he will be able to say that he can see that it has no light, or else by inference 
(e.g., [if he is looking at the ground rather than the sky] from the moon’s failure to cast a shadow [cf. Posterior 
Analytics II.8 93a37-b3]), in which case, he should be able to state his premises.  
27 And II.19 is not the only evidence that we need to have perceived many particulars to grasp the universal: 
There is no e-knowing through perception. For even if perception is of a such and not of a this 
such, still necessarily {one} perceives a certain this and {one perceives  it} here and now. And it’s 
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many memories could make the universal form salient by providing contrasting contexts for it, 
but if this were Aristotle’s view, we would expect the metaphor to bring it out, or at least for 
there to be some indication of it in the text, and there isn’t either in II.19 or elsewhere.) Aristotle 
needs an account of concept-formation with both compositional and divisional dimensions, 
because, as we saw earlier, it is only by viewing things universally (i.e. in an indeterminate 
manner) that we can isolate their various causally relevant aspects and relate them (deductively) 
to one another. In II.19’s language we can see both of the dimensions of concept-formation. If 
my speculation about the role of the rout metaphor is correct, we can also read into the chapter 
another aspect that we saw earlier must be a part of Aristotle’s view of concepts: the idea that 
concepts are functional items and specifically that they are a means of explaining so that a theory 
of concept-formation will be a component of a theory of how we reach explanations.  
4.2 SEEKING AND PROVING WHAT SOMETHING IS 
A concept is a unit of thought that consists in (putative) knowledge of what something is, the 
account of which knowledge is a definition. The relationship between the processes of defining 
and explaining and the role of these two in the development of ἐπιστήμη is the theme of 
Posterior Analytics II. We can see this in the way the book’s project is framed. The first chapter 
introduces four “things we seek”, which come in two pairs: first, the that (e.g. that the clouds are 
noisy) and the why (e.g., because fire is being extinguished in them) and, second, the if it is (e.g. 
if there is thunder) and the what it is (e.g. the noise of fire being extinguished in the clouds) 
(89b24-5); and it tells us that the second item in each pair is sought when the first is o-known. 
                                                                                                                                                             
impossible to perceive what’s universal and applicable to all; for it’s not a this nor {is it} now 
(otherwise it would be universal; for what exists always and everywhere we say is universal). So, 
since demonstrations are universals and {one} can’t perceive these, it’s evident that there is no e-
knowing through perception; but rather it’s clear that even if one could perceive that the triangle 
has angles equal to two rights, we would seek a demonstration and not, as some say, already e-
know it; for, while what one perceives is necessarily a particular, e-knowledge is by getting to g-
know a universal. That’s why, even if, while on the moon, we saw the earth intercepting, we 
would not o-know the cause of the eclipse. For we would have perceived that there’s now an 
eclipse, and not wholly why; for there was not perception of the universal. Nevertheless, {since} 
the universal comes about from observing this many times, if we hunted {for it} we would have a 
demonstration; for from many particulars the universal is revealed. (I.31 87b28-a5) 
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The second chapter collapses the two pairs into one another, treating the second member of each 
pair as the middle term in a demonstration of the first member. We have met with these ideas 
before: what something is and why it is are the same, and the proposition asserting the existence 
of any divisible thing is a reconfigured version of its definition into a predication; thus the first 
item in both pairs is a predication, and the second is the middle term through which the 
predication can be demonstrated. To establish the first item in the pair, through some means 
other than this middle term, is to establish that there must be some middle, which one will then 
seek. Thus the third chapter announces the book’s project as follows: 
It is clear, then, that everything that’s sought is a search for a middle; but let’s say 
how one proves (δεικνύναι) the what it is and what the manner of the reduction 
(ἀναγωγή) is and what a definition is and of what things {there are definitions}, 
having first gone through the ἀπορίαι about these things. (90a35-8) 
The agenda given here is carried out in II.3-10. After developing the ἀπορίαι in II.3-7, 
Aristotle gives a positive account of how definitions can be proved and how they relate to 
demonstrations in II.8-10. This can be seen as completing the project announced in the first two 
chapters. The remainder of the book further develops a positive account of the means by which 
definitions and explanations can be reached, drawing on the framework laid down in the earlier 
chapters. Chapters 11 and 12 address some general issues about causality in light of the view that 
causes are middle terms. Chapter 13 returns to the topic of definition, this time giving advice on 
how to “hunt out what is predicated in what something is”. 14 discusses a method of determining 
what connections are suitable to be demonstrated and for arriving at demonstrations of them. 15-
18 discuss relations between different demonstranda and middle terms, and the relevance of 
these relations to the process of explaining. 
Though all of this material bears on our subject matter, limitations of space will force me 
to be selective in my treatment. In particular, I will have little to say about the positive advice 
Aristotle gives for constructing definitions in II.13 or about the method of (taxonomic) division, 
which Aristotle argues (in II.5) does not prove a definition, but which he appeals to in both II.13 
and II.14 as playing a role in establishing definitions and framing problems to demonstrate. I will 
focus instead, in this section, on Aristotle’s answer to the specific question of how we can search 
for and prove what something is, since as we have seen his identification of a concept with 
knowledge of what something is, threatens to make such inquiry and proof impossible. In the 
next section I will deal with some of the remaining issues discussed in Posterior Analytics II 
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(particularly II.14), though my focus will have shifted from that book proper to the question of 
what Aristotle has to say about the forming concepts, in those cases where this is done 
deliberately. Since our present interest is in Aristotle’s positive account of how it is possible to 
inquire into or prove what something is, we will focus on II.8-10, but an important point about 
the character of this account is brought out by considering the ἀπορίαι with which Aristotle 
motivates it in II.3-7, So it is best to begin with a word about these chapters.  
Notice that, in the quoted passage from II.3, Aristotle announces a concern with how one 
proves the what it is. “Proof” is a justificatory notion, what Aristotle is concerned with here is 
establishing the correctness of a definition. We can see this in his criticisms of proposed methods 
of defining that that they beg the question, and therefore do not establish the definition.28 It is 
evident also in his interest in whether definitions can be demonstrated. In discussing 
demonstrations, I have emphasized their role as explanations of their demonstranda, but they are 
also arguments through which ἐπιστήμη is established. If asked how one knows that a triangle 
has angles equal to two right angles or that the summer will be hotter than the winter, the 
relevant demonstrations would be appropriate responses, and would settle the question to the 
satisfaction of anyone with the education necessary to appreciate the arguments.29  
Aristotle feels the need for a way to justify definitions as well as conclusions and so is 
considering whether demonstration can perform the task and, if not, whether there is some 
analogous method that can.30 The clearest evidence of the justificatory nature of Aristotle’s 
concern with definition comes from II.7: 
                                                 
28 This is the case with attempts to prove what something is by conversion (II.4 91a35-b11) or division (II.4 91b12-
27).  
29 The justificatory character of demonstration is obscured by translation of “ἐπιστήμη” as “understanding” (as in 
Barnes 1975 and 1993) . Understanding, as that term is normally used in English, presupposes knowledge that what 
is understood is the case, but is not (as usually conceived at any rate) a type of knowing that it is the case. Rather, 
one understands one thing, by knowing another, which is its cause. This knowledge of the cause, however, needn’t 
be any part of one’s knowledge that the explained effect obtains, which may not alter in any way when one learns 
the cause. For Aristotle, by contrast, to e-know something is to o-know it in a certain way—viz. on the basis of 
demonstration.  
30 We can see this same concern in De Anima I.1: 
We seek to study and g-know the nature and οὐσία of this {viz. soul} {…} But for everything and 
of everything, this is the hardest to obtain any conviction about. For the search (I mean that 
concerning the οὐσία and the what it is) being common to many other things too, it might seem 
that there is some single method for everything about which we wish to g-know the οὐσία, just as 
there is demonstration for the incidental distinguishing characteristics, so that we have to seek this 
method. But if there is not a single and common method concerning the what it is, then the 
business becomes still harder; for we will need to obtain the manner {in which to proceed} about 
each {object}. And if it is evident whether this is demonstration or division or some other method, 
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Also, it is evident that those who define in accordance with the current manners of  
ὅροι31 do not thereby prove that it is. For, even if there is something equidistant 
from the middle; why does the thing {so} defined exist? And why is this a circle? 
 For one could say that it was {the ὅρος} of  mountain-copper. For ὅροι do not 
display (προσδηλοῦν) that what’s described is possible, nor that definitions are of 
what they say they are; rather one can always ask why. (92b19-25)32 
                                                                                                                                                             
there are still many ἀπορίαι and mistakes (πλάναι) {about the things} from which we should seek; 
for different things have different principles, like numbers and planes. (402a7-22) 
Posterior Analytics II fulfills the need observed here to seek the common method, if there is one, for proving the 
what it is. 
31 “Definition” in my translations renders “ὁρισμός”. Sometimes (as throughout this passage) Aristotle uses “ὅρος” 
with the same or a closely related meaning. To differentiate, I leave “ὅρος” in the Greek when it is being used in this 
way, and I leave both words in the Greek when they occur in proximity to one another. Linguistically these two are 
related as the English “limitation” is to the noun “limit”, so it is natural that they should mean nearly the same thing. 
(In non-philosophical use “ὅρος” denotes a limit or boundary, and “ὁρισμός” is the abstract noun derived from the 
related verb “ὁρίζειν”, which denotes the act of setting or marking boundaries. “Ὁρισμός”, therefore, means “a 
setting or marking of boundaries”.) Though, I cannot prove this here, I suspect that there is a slight but significant 
difference between these terms as Aristotle uses them and that “ὅρος” has a single sense for him across the 
respective usages in which it is standardly translated “definition” and “term”. As we observed earlier, “term” for him 
is (harmlessly) ambiguous between the word the thought and the object, but if it ever denotes the word it does so 
only insofar as the word symbolizes a certain thought and so is of certain objects. Thus the same word used (as we 
would say) in two different senses  would amount to two different terms (ὅροι), and it would be fairly natural for 
Aristotle to describe these as different “ὅροι” of the word. This is likely what he is doing at 93b38-a9, when he 
speaks of different ὅροι of (the word) “ὅρος”. In this usage, it would be natural to translate “ὅρος” with “meaning” 
or “sense”, but aside from carrying so much philosophical baggage, those words doesn’t convey the sense of 
“definiteness” which is the root meaning of “ὅρος”. Think then of “ὅρος” in this use as meaning “definite sense”. 
The ὁρισμός, then, is the definition or the “being definite” of that definite sense. Or to make the same point in 
slightly different terminology, which connects it to my broader project: if we think of a ὅρος is a concept, then a 
ὁρισμός is a conception. It is perfectly natural English to move readily between talk of having different concepts and 
different conceptions of (say) justice. (And if one holds that to have one of these concepts is putatively to know what 
justice is, then one might think of both of these words as roughly equivalent “definition”.) This way of rendering the 
words unites what are normally seen as two and could be seen as three distinct usages; however, like the translations 
involving “meaning” or “sense”, it carries too much philosophical baggage to use, it is idiosyncratic, and it doesn’t 
reflect the root meaning of “boundary”; these problems offset any advantages it might have over the standard 
translations of “term” and “definition”. However, considering these alternatives sheds light on the relations between 
terms in Aristotle’s Greek even if it doesn’t help us to better represent it in English. In fact when “ὁρισμός” and 
“ὅρος” are used in the same passages “ὁρισμός” often seems to mean something like the line of reasoning by which 
a term is defined (the sort of thing which might be analogous to demonstration), whereas ὅρος has a more static 
connotation befitting something that would result from such a process. Consider for example, the opening sentence 
of II.13: 
How the what it is is exhibited in the ὅροι and in what manner there is or is not demonstration or 
ὁρισμὸς of it has been said earlier… (90a20-22) 
32 It might be surprising  that Aristotle attributes definitions’ failure to show that the definienda exist to their failure 
to show that what’s described is possible  (δυνατόν). This implies that showing that something is possible suffices to 
show that it is, which may seem odd. It may be significant that the example in question is of a kind mathematical 
object, the existence of which amounts to nothing more than the possibility of constructing such objects. For all the 
definer has said it might not be possible to construct  described figure (as it would not be if he had given an account 
like  “rectilinear figure equidistant from a center”). In this connection, Barnes comments: 
This anticipates the point later stressed by Leibniz that in a satisfactory definition the definiens 
must be consistent. Aristotle is commonly taken to imply that sufficiency is sufficient for 
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The reference to the definer’s failure to address the sorts of objections and questions that might 
be raised by an opponent, makes it clear that what is at issue here is the justification of 
something put forward as an item of knowledge. 
Summing up the preceding, what Aristotle is looking for in  Posterior Analytics II.3-10 is 
a method by which we can discover essences or causes and justify the definitions in which we 
state them; and he has a special interest in the relation of this method to demonstration. 
4.2.1 Varieties of εἴδησις that or what something is 
Aristotle’s positive account in II.8 begins with a passage, and a distinction, that we looked at 
earlier:  
Since, as we’ve stated, o-knowing what it is and o-knowing the cause of whether 
it is are the same, and the cause is an account of this (that it is), and this is  either 
the thing itself or something else, and, if something else, either demonstrable or 
indemonstrable, accordingly: if it is something else and admits of demonstration, 
necessarily the cause is a middle and the proof is in the first figure (for what’s 
proven is universal and predicable). In a way, then, there would be 
{demonstration of what something is}—{the way} that’s now been examined: 
proving by means of another thing that it is. For the middle of a what it is is 
necessarily a what it is and {the middle} of a distinguishing characteristic  (ἴδιον) 
{is necessarily} a distinguishing characteristic. Thus one proves one but not the 
other of the things that it is for the same object to be what it is. It was said earlier 
that this way would not be a demonstration; rather it is a rationalistic (λογικὸς) 
                                                                                                                                                             
mathematical existence; but this does not square with his general views on mathematical objects, 
and 92b23 only shows that consistency is a necessary condition for existence. (1993 216) 
It is not clear to me what commentators Barnes is responding to here (Heath [1949 70-71], for example, who also 
draws the connection to Leibniz, does not mention this possible implication), but what I take the passage to imply is 
not that consistency is sufficient for mathematical existence, but that possibility is. Consistency is nowhere 
mentioned in the passage. It is natural to suppose, especially in light of modern mathematics, that the only thing that 
would make a defined figure impossible is inconsistency, as in the case of the square circle I defined above; but it is 
not clear that this is how Aristotle would think of it. One demonstrates the existence of a figure by constructing it, so 
what the definer needs to do to show that the figure exists is to show that it can be constructed. It’s not clear that 
Aristotle could have envisioned a way to show that the definition was not inconsistent without performing such a 
construction, so it’s hard to speculate about whether he would take that as proof of existence. In any event, there is 
at least one passage that suggests that Aristotle held that possibility is sufficient for the existence of even non-
mathematical kinds. I have in mind Politics IV.4 1290b-25-38 (quoted and discussed above in §3.2.3, n. 57), where 
Aristotle tells us how to produce the forms of a kind by figuring out the possible combinations of differences in the 
characteristics that necessarily belong to all kind-members—for example, one might produce a form of animal by 
seeing that a certain type of stomach is compatible with a certain type of eye and with bipedality. Here again we 
seem to have possibility as proof of existence. (And recall, from §4.1.2, n. 21,  that we may have an example of 
Aristotle inferring the existence of an unobserved kind of animal by this method in Generation of Animals III.2 at 
761a33-b23.) 
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deduction of what something is. But let’s discuss the manner in which 
{definitions} do admit {of demonstration}, stating {the issue} again from the 
beginning.  (93a3-16) 
What something is is its cause (or an “account of whether it is”) and this is either 
identical with the thing or distinct from it. We’ve seen that something identical with its cause is a 
primary which is an object of an indivisible concept and has its existence posited as a principle 
of ἐπιστήμη. By contrast, something distinct from its cause is a derivative whose existence must 
be demonstrated. It consists in a predicate’s belonging to a subject (which is what it is for a 
predicate to exist) not per se, but through a middle, which is its cause and what it is. Aristotle 
mentions, in order to dismiss it, that there may be a way in which this middle can be 
demonstrated, in which case what the thing is will be in a way demonstrable, but not without 
begging the question. The task of II.8 is to find a legitimate way in which demonstration factors 
in the establishment of the definitions of derivative items. II.9 then (briefly) treats the case of 
primaries, and II.10 recapitulates the results of the previous two chapters in the form of a 
distinction between different sorts of definitions, which stand in different relations to 
demonstrations.33 
Aristotle’s thesis in II.8 is that the what it is is proved in the process of demonstrating, 
without being itself demonstrated (i.e., without being either the conclusion or the major term).34 
As he puts the point at the end of the chapter: 
It has been stated how the what it is is taken and becomes g-known: {1} neither 
deductions nor demonstration of the what it is come about, but it is clear that {it is 
taken and comes to be g-known} though deduction and demonstration; {2} 
without demonstration, one cannot g-know the what it is of something whose 
                                                 
33 This division of labor into separate accounts for the primaries and derivatives is anticipated in I.3: 
The universal is honorable because it reveals the cause; hence, about such things ({i.e.} any whose 
cause is other {than itself}) the universal is more honorable than perceptions and thought; about 
the primaries, {there’s} another account. (88a5-8) 
34 It is worth saying a word at this point about a harmless ambiguity as to what a demonstration demonstrates. 
Viewed in one way it is the major term premise (i.e., the major’s belonging to the minor), but in another way it is 
simply the major term, because for a non-οὐσία to exist is simply for it to belong to something. Notice, in this 
connection, that “ὑπάρχειν”, the copula in Aristotle’s logic, can be used existentially or copulatively, just like our 
verb “to be” (and Aristotle’s “εἰμί”); unlike these other verbs, however, when “ὑπάρχειν” serves as a copula, its 
subject is the predicate of the proposition it is used to express. If we translate “ὑπάρχειν” as “obtain” and “εἰμί” as 
“to be”, we can capture this difference as follows: one can say that something is either (a) simpliciter or (b) “in part” 
by adding qualifying predicates that tell us how it is (cf. Posterior Analytics II.2 89b37-a5,  90a9-14, a31-34); but 
one can say that something obtains either (c) simpliciter or (d) by adding a subject for which obtains. Assuming that 
what obtains is not a primary (and it is not clear whether Aristotle would use that verb for primaries), for it to obtain 
is for it to obtain of something. 
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cause is something else; {3} there is no demonstration of this, as we sated also in 
the discussions of puzzles. (93b15-20)  
In particular, something’s what it is is proven by demonstrating that it is. In a certain 
sense this is obviously true on Aristotle’s view, because, the proposition that a thing exists 
predicates one element in its definition of another: thunder is a noise in the clouds, which means 
that what thunder is is the noise’s belonging to the clouds, and a demonstration that thunder 
exists concludes that noise belongs to the clouds. Thus, in II.10, where Aristotle distinguishes 
types of definition, he writes:  
Again, a ὅρος of thunder is noise in the clouds; and this is a conclusion of a 
demonstration of what it is. (94a7-9) 
This is not quite accurate, however, since the relevant ὅρος of thunder does not assert the noise 
of the clouds whereas the conclusion does.35 In the course of describing another sort of ὅρος (to 
which we will turn in a moment), Aristotle speaks of an account that is “said in different 
manners” and is only a ὁρισμός when said in one of these. Likely the same point is meant to 
apply in the present case. In any event, what the demonstration proves is the proposition 
corresponding to the definition “noise in the clouds”, not that this is what thunder is: for all the 
demonstration shows, it might be the definition of mountain-copper (to echo Aristotle’s concern 
at 92b22). The sort of definition that is proven to be a definition by the demonstration is what 
II.10 calls “an account revealing why something is”. This sort of ὅρος is 
like a demonstration of what it is, but differs from a demonstration in {how it’s} 
posited. For stating why it thunders and what thunder is differ; for in the one case 
you say “because fire is being extinguished in the clouds”; but “What is thunder?” 
“The sound of fire being extinguished in the clouds.” So the same account is said 
in different manner, and the former way it is a continuous demonstration, while 
the later it’s a ὁρισμός. (94a1-5) 
It is this sort of definition and its relation to demonstration that, in II.8, provides a 
resolution to the problems raised in II.3-7. The progression of reasoning that leads to it begins 
with the standard doctrine that γνῶσις (and a fortiori εἴδησις and ἐπιστήμη) of what or why 
something is presuppose γνῶσις that it is (because something that is not simpliciter cannot be 
anything or the result of anything). Consequently someone who comes to g-know why (=what) 
something is must either already know that it is or else come to g-know this simultaneously, a 
                                                 
35 On this point see I.10 76b35-39 quoted above in §3.1.1 (see especially n. 21, where I address some interpretive 
issues). 
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point which Aristotle makes at 93a16-20. Since Aristotle is interested in the process of seeking 
and establishing knowledge, he takes up the case where we know the that without the why, 
because, of the two cases, this is the one in which we’re in a position to seek the why.  
He turns to the issue of what it is to grasp that something is without grasping why—a 
condition that may seem impossible since why something is and what it is are the same, and it is 
unclear what it would be to know that something exists without in any way knowing what it is. 
Aristotle’s answer is that in those cases where we have any real grasp on the existence of a thing, 
we also have something “relative to the what it is”: 
But {as to} if it is, sometimes we have it incidentally and other times {when} we 
have something of the object itself—e.g., thunder, that {it’s} a certain noise in the 
clouds, and eclipse that {it’s} a certain privation of light, and man that {it’s} a 
certain animal, and soul, that it moves itself. In the case of anything about which 
we o-know incidentally that it is, we necessarily have nothing relative to the what 
it is: for we don’t o-know that it is; and to seek what it is, not having that it is, is 
to seek nothing. But in the case of anything of which we have something, it is 
easier. Hence, as we have that it is, so we have also {something} relative to the 
what it is. (93a21-28) 
A standard Aristotelian example of  incidental being, is the white’s being musical. This is 
incidental, because musicality doesn’t belong to whiteness, rather both belong to a man. Likely, 
then, to know only incidentally that something is would be to know (e.g.) that the white was 
musical, or, more generally to know of the co-presence of several terms without knowing the 
subject to which they belong. An example of this sort of knowledge might be found in the 
experienced person: whereas the proper subject for judgments about a treatment would be a 
certain form of patient, such as bilious people burning with fever), the experienced person, 
lacking the concepts “bilious” and “fever”, would only be able to make judgments about 
particular patients (whose distinguishing characteristics are incidental to the form that is the 
proper subject). Or else he might manage to make claims about sorts of patients identified by 
some characteristic(s) that follows on the relevant form. He might say, for example, that “The 
white and short should take chicken soup.” In this connection, consider the first of the ὅροι of 
“ὅρος” discussed in II.10: 
Since a ὁρισμός  is said to be an account of what it is, it is evident that one sort 
will be an account of what a name (or some other name-like λόγος) signifies—
e.g. what “triangle” signifies.  When we have that it is, we seek why it is; but it is 
difficult to grasp in this way something of which we don’t o-know that it is. The 
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cause of the difficulty was stated earlier, that we don’t o-know if it is or not, or 
rather {we o-know this only} incidentally. (93b29-37) 
This suggests the possibility of words signifying λόγοι that are strung together from 
predicates like “white and short”, so our merely experienced person might even have words in 
which to make his claims (which fail to predicate one thing of one thing) appear like legitimate 
predications. He might even use the word “bilious”, without possessing the concept “bilious”, to 
express his incidental knowledge.36 He would be opposed to someone who, while not knowing 
what biliousness is in a deep or complete way, grasps something of what it is and does signify by 
it an account that reveals a unity—i.e., a definition of the sort that can be reconfigured into a 
proposition predicating one thing of another, which proposition could then be the conclusion of a 
demonstration that biliousness exists.37 This person, but not the merely experienced man, would 
be in a position to seek what “biliousness” is. The latter may, on the basis of his experience, 
come to grasp the relevant universal, in which case he would then be in a position to seek the 
what it is; however, it is doubtful that his use of the word “bilious” to signify an incidental unity 
will be of much use to him in this progression. Likely this ὅρος of “ὅρος” is mentioned in II.10 
only so that attention can be directed away from it and towards “the account revealing why 
something is” (93b38-9).38 
                                                 
36 As an example of inferring the existence of something of which we know only incidentally what it is, Ross (1949 
630-1) suggests a case in which “we hear someone we trust say ‘that is a so-and-so’” and “infer the existence of a 
so-and-so” though “we may have no notion of its nature”.  
37 I am assuming here, for the sake of argument, that biliousness is not a primary, though Aristotle may have 
regarded it as at least a plausible candidate for one. 
38 Notably, Aristotle rails against the idea that a definer proves what a name signifies in II.7. In the end he concludes 
that the view is a non-starter because a demonstration couldn’t “demonstrate that this name reveals this” 
(presumably because what names stand for is conventional); but, before doing so, he raises a number of absurd 
consequences, connected with the idea that a ὁρισμός is “an account signifying the same as a name”: 
For, first, there would be {ὁρισμοί} even of non-οὐσίαι and of non-existent things; for one can 
also signify non-existent things! Again, all accounts would be definitions; for one can posit a 
name for any account whatsoever, so that we would all converse in ὅροι and the Iliad would be a 
definition! (92b26-34) 
Since the connection between a name and what it signifies is conventional, Aristotle has little interest in it. Having 
words for one’s concepts facilitates their serving as terms (though sometimes name-like λόγοι suffice), and it is 
important to know what they signify, and to disambiguate when this is necessary to avoid homonymy and other 
errors),  but knowledge of what our words signify is readily available and does not represent substantial knowledge 
distinct from the knowledge of the signified objects. Nor do I find evidence that Aristotle thinks it is a normal state 
of affairs to have a word and know what it signifies without knowing whether the signified thing exists. Charles 
(1990, 2000) thinks that such a state is the first of three stages in the development of ἐπιστήμη, from which a thinker 
advances to establishing that the thing exists and then to discovering its essence. I agree in essence with Charles 
about how names for non-existent things can be significant so that we can sensibly consider whether centaurs or the 
void or Platonic Forms exist (see above §3.2.2 n. 46, n.52), but such questions only arise as a result of cognitive 
 226 
Similarly, incidental knowledge is mentioned in II.8 to direct attention away from it and 
towards genuine knowledge that something is, which involves having something relative to the 
what it is and so makes it feasible to proceed to g-knowing what it is in a more robust sense—
indeed, to proving it. If our conclusions about incidental knowledge are correct, then o-knowing 
that something is non-incidentally, should consist in having knowledge that can be expressed in a 
proper proposition predicating one thing of another, and this knowledge should constitute a grasp 
of something relative to the essence. Let us consider then, whether the examples Aristotle gives 
in the II.8 passage of grasps of something relative to the what it is fit the bill. They are: (1) 
knowing of thunder that it is a certain noise in the clouds, (2) knowing of an eclipse that it’s a 
certain privation of light, (3) knowing of man that he’s a certain animal, and (4) knowing of soul 
that it moves itself.39 The case of thunder is easy because it contains both terms of the conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
missteps. It is only because previous people mistakenly thought that there were such things that we have words for 
them at all. Normally one only introduces or learns words to signify things one knows exist, and I think it is a 
mistake to elevate something that is the result of previous error into a stage in the development of ἐπιστήμη. It 
would count as a stage, perhaps, on a view according to which the scientist progresses by posing tentative theories 
(possibly including several rival theories simultaneously) which he then elaborates over time, all the while gradually 
assimilating evidence for them. On such a view, the theorist would need words to denote various theorized items 
that he is not yet sure are real. However, I know of no evidence that Aristotle thinks that ἐπιστήμη develops in this 
way, and it is not how he conducts his own enquires. Nor does he tend to regard it as an open question whether most 
of the things signified by words in ordinary language exist. Almost all of the terms that Aristotle deems to be empty 
(or that he considers might be) are neologisms of the wise. The obvious exceptions are the toy examples of centaur 
and goatstag, which derive from mythology. Likely others can be found in the History of Animals and elsewhere, 
where Aristotle considers outlandish reports about exotic animals and the like. But serious questions never arise as 
to whether birds or natures or fire or cities, or virtues exist. (He does occasionally object to misconceptualizations in 
the vernacular [for an example, see §4.3.4 n.85], but [as for reasons sketched below in §4.3.4 n. 87] I do not think 
that disputing such concepts amounts to raising questions about the existence of anything.) 
39 These examples are sometimes thought to be, like the example of man, cases of the genus without the differentia. 
 (Tredennick 1960 202, Deslauriers 2007 77; the idea is considered and rejected by Barnes [1993 218-19]). This 
may be right for the case of soul (though I doubt it), but I think it is unlikely in the other two cases. Could Aristotle 
regard noise as the genus of thunder? Of the three terms in the demonstration-like definition of thunder, “extinction” 
and “cloud event”, both have better claims (though, see Topics IV.5 126a3-13, where Aristotle prefers “motion” to 
“air” as the genus of wind.) It is in studying clouds or the behavior of fire that one would study thunder, not as part 
of a “study of noises”, which would be the proper place if thunder was a form of noise. If thunder were to be studied 
as part of a study of noise, it would not be qua thunder but qua being a noise of a certain sort that can also be 
produced by, e.g., the metal sheets that used to impersonate thunder on radio dramas. The noise would be defined by 
being a certain sort of motion in air—one that is violent and has a non-numerical λόγος, etc. I grant, however, that 
the issue is complicated because it is not entirely clear what role in an attribute’s definition is to be played by its 
subject. One possible basis for thinking that the examples give genera would be some premise to the effect that 
phases of the form “X τί” must always mean a species of the genus X. This is what seems to be driving Deslauriers. 
But it is not true: “a certain X” needn’t mean anything more than something that is X—e.g., a τόδε τι  is not a 
species of the genus τόδε. (Bolton [1976 529-30] argues that the “τί” in these cases is a way of including in the 
account material that cannot yet be articulated—we know that thunder is a certain noise, which we can recognize as 
a matter of ἐμπειρία, but we are unable to describe just how it is different from other noises, prior to arriving at a 
causally deep definition. This is plausible: surely prior to knowing thunder’s cause we can say a fair amount to 
distinguish the noise from others—it’s loud, it’s rumbly, it’s non-musical, etc.—but, without knowing the cause, we 
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of the proposition affirming its existence. It is clear from the treatment of eclipse that Aristotle 
goes on to give that “privation of light” must be the major term, so we are not told the minor in 
this case, but surely we are meant to understand that it is the eclipsed thing—viz., the Moon in 
the case of the lunar eclipse Aristotle goes on to discuss. In the case of man we are only given 
the kind, which would be the minor term, but “certain” may be meant as a stand-in for the 
differentia or major term (as, likely, in the other cases it is meant as a stand in for the details of 
the major term). The case of soul is more difficult, because it is almost certainly a primary, on 
Aristotle’s view, whose existence will not be demonstrated, so I’ll reserve comment on it for the 
time being.40  
Putting aside this last case as a possible exception, then, all the examples give us terms 
(or stand-ins for terms) that would figure in the conclusion of a demonstration of the 
definiendum’s existence. There is a difference in that in the case of man the subject (or minor 
term) is the genus, whereas in the other cases it is the οὐσία that underlies an attribute. But this 
should not trouble us. If the existence of man is to be demonstrated, it would be by showing that 
some animals are a certain way. Whereas the existence of thunder would be demonstrated by 
showing that clouds are sometimes noisy.41 
                                                                                                                                                             
may not be able to unite all these distinguishing characteristics into a single thought and so may only be able to 
represent them jointly through the numerical unity φαντάσματα. However [if one knows enough about sound] there 
is likely a way to unitarily differentiate the sort of noise possessed by the clouds [and things that sound like them] 
without knowing thunder’s cause, so this disunity is unlikely to be a necessary feature of the stage of knowledge 
Aristotle is illustrating. Moreover, Aristotle would almost certainly have regarded it as beneath him to devote more 
than a word to describing how thunder sounds in the context of giving an example, and this is the most likely reason 
for his describing it simply as “a certain noise”.) 
40 In any event, initiating motion is one of the two characteristic features by which Aristotle tells us that soul was 
distinguished by previous philosophers and which he emphasizes in his own treatment (see De Anima I.2, III.3 
427a17, and III.9), and locomotion is one of the activities of which soul is defined (in II.2) as a first actuality. 
41 This parallelism is a result of the fact that the kind, as intelligible matter, is the subject for its forms, as perceptible 
matter is the subject for natural οὐσίαι, and οὐσίαι for their attributes. These two ways of being a subject are the 
same only at a very abstract level. Natural forms of οὐσία will have subjects of both sorts, as will many attributes. In 
a universe populated by sui generis individuals—or, better, by individuals that fell into uncuttable forms but not 
wider kinds—, some would have others as subjects, which would need to be mentioned in accounts of them. The 
forms do fall into kinds when they are related (in the manner summarized in §2.4.3) such that, we must group them 
and think of them generally in order to grasp their causal roles, including their having subjects or serving as subjects 
for other things. It would be a mistake to give an account of man or horse in terms of the relation between soul and 
body. These are to be defined as forms of animal and the soul-body relation should then be accounted for at the level 
of animal as such (or, perhaps, at the level of ἐμψῦχον—it is ambiguous because soul and life form successions 
rather than proper kinds). 
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4.2.2 Proving what it is by demonstrating that it is 
As his first extended example of non-incidental knowledge that something is, Aristotle returns to 
the case where one comes to know the that and why simultaneously: 
When we have something of the what it is, first let it be thus: eclipse in the A 
position, Moon in the C position, and the Earth’s interception in the B position. 
So then, so {to ask} whether its eclipsed or not is to seek the B—does it exist or 
not? This doesn’t differ at all from inquiring whether there is an account of it; 
and, if there is, we claim it’s eclipsed. Or: {we ask} of which {part} of the 
contradiction is the account—of having two rights or of not having them. When 
we discover {it}, we simultaneously o-know the that and the why, if we 
{proceed} through middles;42 but if not {we o-know} the that but not the why. 
(93a29-37) 
In the example, prior to performing the deduction, we do not know that eclipse belongs to the 
Moon (i.e., that it has ceased to shine or is “deprived of light”),43 and we seek to discover 
deductively whether or not the predication holds, by finding whether there is some λόγος of it—
some middle term connecting the deprivation to the Moon. In the example we are not trying to 
prove that there are such things as lunar eclipses (though one could construct a similar case); 
rather we are astronomers trying to infer whether one is taking place.44 In order to hit on the 
Earth’s interception as our middle term, we must already know that the Earth’s interception 
belongs to Moon and that this deprives whatever it belongs to of light. Through this we 
                                                 
42 Reading “διὰ μέσων” with Barnes and the MSS; Ross prints “δι’ ἀμέσων”. 
43 The Greek “ἐκλείπειν”, unlike our verb “eclipse” (which derives from it only through the name of the 
astronomical phenomenon) does not mean to block, but to desert, abandon, fail, cease, etc.  
44 That the fact demonstrated here is particular shouldn’t surprise us, since we’ve seen that ἐπιστήμη in actuality has 
particular objects (though not qua determinate). Moreover, in II.12 (in another passage that we have considered in 
part before) Aristotle makes it quite clear that he sanctions demonstrations of eclipses at particular times: 
The cause of something’s coming about and of its  having come about and of its being in the 
future is the same as {the cause} of its existing; for the middle is the cause; except that {it’s the 
cause} of existence {when its} existing, but {the cause} of coming to be {when it’s} coming to 
be, and {the cause} of future existence {when it} will exist. E.g., “Why has an eclipse come 
about?” “Because the Earth has come to be in the middle.” And it is coming about because it is 
coming to be there; and {there} will be {an eclipse} because {the Earth} will be in the middle; and 
there is {one} because it is {there}. “What is ice?” Assume that it is solidified water. “Water” is in 
the C position; “solidified” is in the A position; the middle, “total absence of heat”, is the cause in 
the B position. Now B belongs to C, and “having solidified”, which is in the A position, belongs to 
this. And ice is coming about when B is coming about, and it has come about when it has come 
about, and will be, if it will be. (Posterior Analytics II.12 95a10-21) 
The deduction through a causal middle that the moon is eclipsed, will enable us to grasp why the moon must now be 
eclipsed (since, by knowing about the orbits, we will be able to see that the middle term, the earth’s interception, has 
to hold now). 
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demonstrate that the Moon has ceased its shining, and, in so doing, we know what (and why) this 
ceasing is: it is (and is because of)  the Earth’s interception of (the light from the Sun to) the 
Moon. 
From here, Aristotle moves to a case where we hit on some other middle term, one which 
is not really in the middle—i.e., which is not a cause. The eclipse demonstration has the lovely 
feature of having its middle term be something that takes place spatially in between the Moon 
and its light source, and this is likely why Aristotle chooses as his next case one in which the 
middle term is spatially downstream of the Moon: 
Moon is C, eclipse A,  {and} in the B position is the full moon’s not being able to 
produce a shadow although nothing visible is between {it and} us. Accordingly, if 
B (not being able to produce a shadow though nothing is between {it and} us) 
belongs to C,  and A (being eclipsed) {belongs} to this, then, while it’s clear that 
it’s eclipsed, {it is} not {clear} why, and, while we o-know that there is an 
eclipse, we do not {o-know} what it is. (93a39-b3) 
In this example we are astronomers again—or at any rate, we have enough astronomical 
knowledge to know without looking at it that the moon is full tonight. If we looked, we would 
see that it had ceased its shining, and so wouldn’t need any deduction. Our eyes are trained on 
the ground, where we notice that there are not the sorts of shadows that we would expect from a 
full moon. We infer from this that the moon must have ceased its shining. As a result, we know 
that the moon must have ceased, without knowing why it has forsaken us. Do we know what the 
eclipse or ceasing is? Well we know something of it—namely that it is a ceasing of the moon. 
But we don’t know that it consists in the Earth’s interception of the light it normally receives 
from the Sun.  
Once we are in this position of knowing that having ceased to shine belongs to the Moon 
(whether we got there through this shadowy inference or by direct observation), we can go about 
trying to discover why it has ceased by seeking a middle with which to demonstrate the 
connection between the ceasing and the Moon, just as we did in the first example (though then 
we did not yet know whether it had ceased or not). As Aristotle puts it: 
When it’s clear that A belongs to C, {to seek} why is to seek what B is—whether 
it’s interception or rotation of the moon or extinction. And this is the account of 
the other extreme—e.g., in this {case} of A; for the eclipse is the earth’s 
interception.  (93b3-7) 
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When we find this middle term, we will be in the same cognitive position as we were 
after finding it in the initial example, when it was only through it that we discovered that there 
was an eclipse. We will have proved that there is an eclipse in such a manner that we know why 
and what it is—that is, we will have ἐπιστήμη. Only in this second case, though, will we have 
discovered and proved the what it is of an object that we already had in view at the beginning of 
the process. The proof comes about though the same demonstration that yields the ἐπιστήμη. The 
conclusion of this demonstration will be that the eclipse, understood as the privation of light, 
exists, but the demonstration as a whole will embody a fuller grasp of what the eclipse is, and it 
will connect this fuller grasp with the privation of light by which the eclipse was initially 
discerned and conceptualized. As a result, the demonstration will show both that the eclipse 
exists and that the middle term defines it (rather than, say, defining “mountain copper”) ; thus 
both of II.7’s concerns about contemporary methods of defining (92b19-25) are addressed. 
The process as described here involves a single eclipse rather than the kind eclipse; but 
nothing turns on this. One could wonder about whether the Moon is ever deprived of light (as, in 
geometry, one might wonder about whether parallel lines ever meet) and set out to prove that it 
does or doesn’t; or, knowing that the moon sometimes is deprived, one can seek to determine 
why it is so.45 Whether one is concerned with a particular lunar eclipse or lunar eclipses in 
general, however, in demonstrating, one regards it universally (qua lunar eclipse) and must call 
upon universal premises concerning the effects of intercepting bodies on light. The case is 
somewhat complicated here by the fact that the example involves the heavens, where the Sun and 
Moon are sui generis, but in the example of thunder, which immediately follows that of the 
eclipse in the text, the premises would be wholly general truths about fire, extinguishing, clouds, 
and noise. (Though, even here, to have fully actualized ἐπιστήμη of thunder, one will have to be 
contemplating these universals as realized in some particular cloud at some particular time.) 
We have seen, now, how Aristotle thinks that it is possible to know in an imprecise (or 
causally superficial) way about eclipses (and derivative items generally) both what and that they 
are, and then, on the basis of this knowledge, to seek a deeper grasp, by intensionally dividing 
one’s initial grasp that there are eclipses into the terms “Moon” and “privation of light”, and then 
seeking a causal middle term through which the privation can be demonstrated of the Moon. 
                                                 
45 Though, plausibly, in thinking this through one will have to project a specific eclipse and consider the relative 
positions of the Sun, Earth, and Moon. After all, one cannot think without a φάντασμα. 
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This, then, is Aristotle’s solution to the Meno problem, at least in the case of non-primaries. In a 
significant sense, on this view, there is not really a distinction between knowing that something 
is and knowing what or why it is, for any knowledge that something exists will correspond a sort 
of knowing what it is, which will provide content to one’s knowledge that it is. Knowledge is 
primarily a relation to an object, and to know the object is to know it as a certain thing that exists 
(i.e., to have both a what and a that), but one can formulate this knowledge in different ways so 
as to focus on the existence or the identity of object. However, there are also different degrees to 
which an object can be known—different levels of precision or causal depth. The lowest level is 
that of incidental knowledge, at which one hasn’t really know the object at all; this level can be 
set aside. At the next level, one has discerned the object, but one does not know it as necessary, 
merely as the belonging of a predicate to a subject. At the highest level one does know it as 
necessary—as the belonging of the predicate to the subject through the middle. It is by grasping 
the identity of the object with increased precision that we grasp it as necessary, and this is why, 
when we know something with a lesser degree of precision, we can be said to know “that it is” 
and not to know “what” or “why” it is.  
I have spoken here as though there is only one level between incidental knowledge and 
perfectly precise knowledge in which the object is apprehended as necessary, but this need not be 
the case, and there is evidence in II.8 that it is not. Recall that, in connection with the case of 
thunder, which we considered in Chapter 3, Aristotle writes: 
What is thunder? Fire’s extinction in a cloud. Why is there thunder? Because the 
fire in the cloud is extinguished. Cloud {is} C, thunder A, {and} the B is fire’s 
extinction. B belongs to C, the cloud, (for the fire is extinguished in it), and A, a 
noise, belongs to this; and indeed B is the account of A, the first extreme. If there 
is, in turn, another middle for this, it will be from the remaining accounts. 
(93b7014) 
Supposing that there is another middle, the person who has proceeded from grasping thunder as 
mere noise in the clouds to grasping it as noise in the clouds due to the extinction of fire still 
does not see why (even granted that there is fire being extinguished there) the clouds must be 
noisy as they are. Why couldn’t they extinguish silently? He knows that there is no silent 
extinguishing, but this knowledge has the same imprecise and contingent character that his 
knowledge that the clouds were noisy previously did, and this contingency at the deeper level 
redounds upon the conclusion that the clouds are noisy. Nevertheless, progress has been made,: 
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the noisiness of the clouds is known with greater precision than it had been, and an element of 
contingency has been removed. 
 
4.2.3 The primaries and how they are known 
Aristotle tells us on a number of occasions that γνῶσις of primaries (or things that are the same 
as their cause or essence) works differently than γνῶσις of other things. We can see an indication 
of this in Posterior Analytics II.8 93a3-9, quoted above, and it is explicit in Aristotle’s brief 
statements on principles in II.9 and 10: 
While the cause of some things is something different, {the cause} of others is 
not. So, it’s clear that some {cases} of what it is are immediate and principles, for 
which both being and what it is must be supposed or made evident in some other 
manner (just as the arithmetician makes {his principles evident}—for he supposes 
both what the unit is and that it is). But for things that have a middle (i.e., for 
things for which there is some different cause of οὐσία), there is, as we stated, 
revealing though demonstration, {though} the what it is is not demonstrable. 
(93b21-8) 
The ὁρισμός of an immediate is an indemonstrable posit of what it is. Therefore, 
one ὁρισμός is an indemonstrable λόγος of what it is, one is a deduction of what it 
is differing in declension from a demonstration, and a third is a conclusion of a 
demonstration of what it is. (94a9-14) 
The central idea in the Posterior Analytics passages is that a mature, maximally precise, 
γνῶσις of a non-primary consists in a demonstration of it, and that this cannot be so in the case of 
the primaries.46 Rather they must be known as necessary in a different way. II.19 characterized 
these principles as partless universals and described a process of intensional division by which 
                                                 
46 One implication that might be drawn from this is that it may not be possible to know primaries imprecisely, so 
that if one knows them at all it will either be with perfect precision or else only incidentally. The reason that we can 
know derivative items imprecisely is that they have a Middle, which we can fail to know even while knowing the 
extremes, and this situation cannot occur in the case of primaries, which are unmiddled. Nevertheless, I think it is 
possible to grasp the primaries imprecisely. Soul is a primary—it is the principle of animal life—and one can grasp 
that there is some such principle—a first cause in animals of their life processes—without understanding just how 
these processes are caused. One might, for example, mistakenly look for a material cause for these processes, and so 
identify the soul with spherical atoms, as Aristotle tells us Democritus did (De Anima I.2 404a1-8). Putting the point 
more schematically, it is possible to know that there is a middle between two terms, without knowing what it is. 
Aristotle describes this state at Posterior Analytics II.1 90a5-6. It is possible therefore to know principles as middles 
without knowing anything more about what they are.  
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they are reached. We saw what is likely the same idea in a passage from De Anima III.6 at which 
we looked earlier: 
The point and every division, and what’s ἀδιαίρετον  in this way, is revealed just 
as the privation {is}. And the same account applies to the rest—e.g., how one gets 
to g-know evil or black: for one gets to g-know them in a way by their contraries. 
(430b20-22) 
Here the non-primaries are thought of as divisible items, and the primaries as indivisibles. One g-
knows the former by g-knowing their constituents, but this cannot be so with the latter. Rather, 
the indivisibles must be known by contrast with their contraries. Earlier  (in §3.1.3), I argued  
that these contraries are the things that are divisible into them. One grasps a point, for example, 
as indivisible by contrast to the divisibility of a line. Similarly, we might expect that principles 
will be defined as principles or primaries of a certain domain. In fact, we do occasionally find 
definitions like this in the corpus. Physics II.1, for example, defines nature as the “principle and 
cause of motion and rest” (192b21).47  
Before pursuing this line further, it is best to observe that being a primary or  principle or 
element is relative to a way in which one thing can be derived or constituted from others. A 
primary is that which is not derived, and from which other things are derived. There is a nice 
example of this in Posterior Analytics II.13, where Aristotle defines the triad as the number that 
is “primary (πρῶτος) in both ways—both as not measured by a number and as not composed 
from numbers” (96a37-8). Normally “πρῶτος”  in this passage is translated “prime”, and it is 
natural to do so since it is the word used to describe what we call “prime numbers” (the ones that 
Aristotle describes as not “measured by number”), and Aristotle clearly recognizes this as  the 
default sense of the term as applied to number, because he recapitulates his definition of the triad 
as “a number, odd, primary and thusly primary (πρῶτος καὶ ὡδὶ πρῶτος).” However, these 
numbers are called “prime” or “primary” just because they are not derivative of other numbers in 
a certain way—namely, “by being measured by them” or having them as factors. Aristotle is 
happy to say that some of these primary numbers are not primary in another respect because 
                                                 
47 The definition of soul developed in De Anima III.1-3 might also be an example. It is said to be a principle of life 
and as a first actuality (which, surely, makes it some kind of cause). But the case is complicated by soul’s status as a 
succession which may not admit of a fully universal account. 
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there is another in which they are derived from prior numbers—not by multiplication but by 
addition.48  
In ancient mathematics, numbers are composed by multiplication from the prime 
numbers, and the prime numbers were composed by addition from two and three. These two are 
the only numbers that are wholly primary. Odd and even are attributes of number as such, but 
they belong in the first instance only to these primaries (cf. 96b21-25). Whether a number other 
than two or three is odd or even is an effect of how it’s composed from prior numbers. 
Essentially two is the principle of the even numbers (since anything measured by two is even) 
and three of the odds (since any odd number will have to have three somewhere in its 
genealogy), so “primary odd number” is a quite sensible definition of three. And it is sensible 
that the “additively” primary should come after “multiplicatively primary”, since the non-
additively-primary odds have three in them by multiplication (directly or indirectly), whereas the 
multiplicatively primary odds (e.g. 5, 7, etc.) have three as a component only by addition. 
Another way of being derivative is being a form of a kind, which is generated from the 
kind by the process of taxonomic division. Thus the triad, though primary in that it is not 
composed from other numbers, is derivative in that it is a form of the kind number. Aristotle tells 
us that it and the dyad are number’s “primary uncuttables in form” (96b16), by which (I take it) 
he means that the other uncuttable forms of number (the tetrad, etc.) are derived from the triad 
and dyad, as discussed above.49  
Again, the four elements are the primary bodies because other bodies are composed out 
of them, the triangle is the primary figure because the other figures are composed (in quite a 
                                                 
48 This also explains why the terms in the definition of the triad have the order they do. Charles (2000 224-30) 
stresses that the order must be significant: if it were arbitrary, the definition would be one only by conjunction; and, 
in any event, Aristotle’s language “up to the point where…” suggests a definite progression. Yet it is not obvious  
why these three differentia belong in the order in which they occur, especially since they do not quite narrow 
successively (i.e., form narrower and narrower subdivisions of a single group), since the final differentia includes 
the dyad, which has already been excluded by the previous ones. Charles gives an alternative explanation for the 
order, involving a mathematic procedure known as “Eratosthenes’ sieve”. I find this less convincing, because there 
is no direct evidence for it in this passage, and I don’t know of any evidence anywhere else of interest on Aristotle’s 
part in this method. On the other hand, notice that on the very same Bekker page, Aristotle goes on to talk about the 
primaries in each kind and their importance when “engaging a whole”, and he mentions two and three as examples.  
49 Number is not a kind in the strictest sense of that term, but a succession (on which, see §2.1.2, above) in which 
some members are derivative on others. The same goes for the succession of figures. In a proper kind, all the 
members are on a par. In II.13, when Aristotle speaks of “engaging a whole” he seems to mean a succession, in 
which some items depend on others, though there may be some subtle distinction between a succession and a whole 
in this sense. See Metaphysics Λ.1 1069a18-22, in which the possibility that the universe is a whole is contrasted 
with the possibility that it is a succession. Whatever difference Aristotle has in mind in that passage, it is clear that in 
either case there will be a first item (οὐσία) on which the others somehow depend. 
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different way) from triangles, the phonemes are primaries in vocalization, etc. What is important 
in each of these cases is a derivative inherits its characteristics from the primaries and from the 
way in which it is derived from them. Thus, Aristotle describes the value of knowing about the 
primary uncuttables (i.e. the dyad and triad or their analogs in geometry) as follows: 
For the attributes of the things composited from the {primary} uncuttables will be 
clear from the definitions, because the principle of everything is the definition and 
the simple thing, and the attributes  belong per se only to the simples, but [they 
belong] to the others in virtue of these. (96b21-25) 
The same sort of inheritance relation Aristotle describes here between the primary numbers and 
the derivatives holds too between kinds and their forms: each form inherits the universal traits of 
the kind, though in a specialized way determined in accordance with its differentia. For example, 
all birds have wings, and hawks have wings of a certain form suited to their predatory lifestyle. 
And, as we know from Meteorology IV, the characteristics of bodies composed from the 
elements is a function of what elements they are composed from the ways in which they are 
composed from them. 
Some of these derivation or composition relationships exist in reality independent of the 
mind, whereas (as I have argued) the relation between kinds and forms (and more generally 
universals and particulars) does not. But though there are not real universals, there are real facts 
about objects that can only be apprehended universally—namely, the causal and (mind-
independent) compositional relations in which they stand. A pentagonal object is, in reality, 
divisible into three triangular ones, and has certain geometrical attributes as a result of this; it is 
only through thinking of it as a pentagon that we can see why this must be. Similarly there are 
real relations between the beaks and wings of different individual birds, and these are 
apprehended only by thinking of them as birds. It is because universals are our means of 
knowing causes that (what we might call) metaphysical and epistemological composition 
relationships can be given this sort of uniform treatment. 
With this all in mind, we can return to the idea of knowing primaries by contrast with 
their derivatives. A kind stands to its forms as a primary to derivatives, and (as we saw earlier in 
§2.3.2) Aristotle tells us in Metaphysics I.8 that: 
with reference to that which is called the kind none of the forms which belong to 
the kind is either the same as or other than it in form (rightly so, for the matter is 
indicated by negation, and the kind is the matter of that of which it is called the 
kind… (1028a21-3) 
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We grasp the kind by “negating” the differences that distinguish the forms from one another, i.e. 
by intensional division of the forms. This means, then, that we grasp the kind as the intelligible 
subject of certain forms, which forms we will then define in terms of the kind. Now, some kinds 
will, in turn, get defined as forms of higher kinds, but this will not be possible with the highest 
kinds—the primary kinds. Plausibly something analogous will hold with other sorts of 
constitution or dependency relations, and first causes will be defined simply as the causes of the 
things they cause—as a nature is defined a principle of motion and rest. Just as to have ἐπιστήμη 
of derivatives is to see them as following from their primaries, to have νοῦς of primaries is to see 
them as that from which their derivatives follow. 
To confirm this interpretation would require a more intensive study of Aristotle’s 
definitions of principles than there is room for here. But, however exactly Aristotle understands 
the grasp of primaries, it is clear that he thinks it is possible for us to think that we have arrived 
at them when we have not. This point is made in Posterior Analytics I.5: 
 We must not overlook {the fact that} erring often occurs and what’s proven does 
not belong primitively universally, {though} it seems to be proven universally 
primitively. We make this mistake when either {i} there is nothing from higher to 
take (λαβεῖν) besides the particular [or the particulars] or {ii} there is but it is 
unnamed over objects that differ in form, or {iii} one chances to prove an existent 
as a whole in part; for the demonstration does belong to the things in {the} part 
and will be of everything; but, just the same, the demonstration will not be of this 
primary universal. (74a4-12, cf. Prior Analytics I.35) 
The “primary universal” is the highest universal for which a given attribute holds (e.g., triangle 
in the case of the attribute of having an angle sum equal to that of two right angles), and it is at 
this level of universality that demonstrations must occur to capture causal relations (as we saw in 
§2.5, when we looked at Posterior Analytics I.24). The present passage treats cases of 
inadvertent failure to rise to this level of universality. In such cases, a deduction is falsely 
thought to be a demonstration and its premises to be principles. Three causes of this sort of error 
are discussed, and at least the second consists in the lack of concept (specifically a concept for a 
kind).50 This brings us to our final topic: the introduction of new concepts.  
                                                 
50 There is some question as to how to understand the three cases Aristotle describes here (and how they correspond 
to the examples he discusses for the remainder of the chapter). The third case is clear enough and of least interest to 
us. The primary problem concerns what the first is supposed to be, and how one answers it will have some influence 
on how widely one construes the second. Not much turns on this for my immediate purposes, the second case clearly 
involves unnamed kinds (whether or not it extends to all of them). First it is worth considering the possibility that 
the first case is not meant to be distinct from the second: the disjunction between them may be a sort of correction or 
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 4.3 FORMING NEW CONCEPTS 
4.3.1 Making up names 
At the beginning of Chapter 2, we identified concepts with affections of the soul that Aristotle 
thinks are normally symbolized by words and serve as terms in deductions. These terms are 
universal and we have seen that they enable us to grasp causal relations and thereby to 
demonstrate. At the close of the last section we saw Aristotle blaming some failures to 
demonstrate on the lack of a word—or, more precisely, on lack of a named thing that ranges over 
a group of differing objects and can be “taken” and used as a term in a demonstration.  
The normal state of affairs is for such things to be named, and their being named 
facilitates their functioning as terms. Thus he often advocates “making up names” 
(“ὀνοματοποιεῖν”), an act that he seems to regard as a integral part of conceptualizing a 
domain—of distinguishing (διωρίζειν) the forms and kinds in it.51 This is a process that can be 
                                                                                                                                                             
else express an ambivalence about how to describe a single sort of case. Suppose that (to elaborate on one of 
Aristotle’s example) we had no concept “triangle” as distinct from the concept “isosceles” (either because we had 
only encountered isosceles triangles or because we somehow failed to notice the similarities between isosceles and 
scalene triangles); would there be nothing higher than isosceles to “take” or would there be a nameless higher thing? 
That depends on whether you think that the higher thing is there for the “taking” when there is no concept for it (or 
at least no name). On Aristotle’s view the triangles are such that they ought to be “taken” together, and in this sense 
there is something there to take—there is a kind there that needs to be conceptualized, even though the kind doesn’t 
exist as a mind-independent  identical thing in the triangles; nevertheless there is no term (expressed by a name) that 
one can “take” and in this sense one might say that that there is nothing higher to take. Assuming, however, that the 
two cases are meant to be distinct, then the first must refer to a weaker sort of unity between the instances than is 
present in the second but one still strong enough to make universal demonstration possible and necessary. Since the 
second case clearly refers to kinds, Aristotle likely has in mind cases of analogous unities which he doesn’t think 
should be conceptualized, but which should nevertheless sometimes be demonstrated together—a sort of case he 
discusses, using very similar language,  in II.14 at 98a20-23:  
Again, another manner is excerpting with respect to analogy. For one cannot take one same thing 
that squid-pen, thistle, and bone should be called; but there will be things that follow these also, as 
though there were some such single nature. (98a20-23)  
The link to this passage, and to others that we will discuss in the next section, strongly favors understanding the first 
two cases in the present passage as distinct, and favors the current interpretation. 
51 One example is discussed in the text below. Until then, I offer two examples to support the claim, quoting at some 
length so as to give a sense of the enterprise in which Aristotle is engaged: 
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performed correctly or incorrectly and he sometimes criticizes other thinkers for doing it 
improperly and (occasionally) for inappropriately introducing terms. We have already seen one 
such criticism, from Parts of Animals I.4.52 Let us turn back to that passage now and use it as a 
point of entry into the topic of the role of words in concepts and concept-formation. 
Someone might puzzle over why men have not denominated (προσαγορεύειν), by 
some one name encompassing both at once from above, one kind, which 
comprises those of the animals that are aquatic those that fly. For there are some 
                                                                                                                                                             
There are also three other means that, though they bear a likeness to one another, differ from one 
another; for they all concern what’s common in speech and action, but they differ, since one is 
concerned with truth in these things, and the others with pleasure: the first {being concerned with} 
this in kidding and the second in everything with respect to lifestyle. So, we must discourse about  
these also, so as to observe better that the mean is praiseworthy in everything while the extremes 
are neither praiseworthy nor right but blameworthy. Most of these also are unnamed, but we 
should try, as in the other cases, to makeup a name that makes each plain and easy to follow. So, 
then, concerning truth: let’s say the intermediate {person} is a sort of “true” (ἀληθής τις){person} 
and the mean is “trueness”; pretense to greatness is “boastfulness”, and its possessor is “boastful”; 
{pretense} to meanness is “irony”, and its possessor “ironic”. Concerning the pleasures in kidding: 
the intermediate {person} is “witty”, and the condition “wit”; the excess is “buffoonery”, and its 
possessor a “buffoon”; and the deficient one will be a sort of “bore”, and the state “boorishness”. 
Concerning the remainder of pleasure, which is in lifestyle: the one who is pleasant as one ought 
to be is “friendly”, and the mean “friendliness”; the one who exceeds, if it is not for the of 
anything, is “obsequious”, but if it is for his own advantage, he’s “ingratiating”; the one who’s 
deficient and unpleasant in all things is a sort of “contentious” and “ill-tempered” {person}. 
(Nicomachean Ethics II.7 1108a9-30) 
A citizen simpliciter is defined by nothing so  much as by participation in judgment and office. 
But, of offices, some are delimited with respect to time so that, either one cannot officiate twice on 
the whole, or only after some determinate time; but there is also indefinite {office}—e.g.,  the a 
judge’s or assemblyman’s. Now, maybe someone would claim that these are not officers and don't 
participate in office because of this; yet it is ridiculous to deprive the most authoritative {people} 
of an office. However, it makes no difference; for the account is only about a name; for what's 
common to a judge and an assemblyman is unnamed by something that one should call them both. 
In order to distinguish, let it be “indefinite office”. Now, we posit those who participate in this to 
be citizens. (Politics III.1 1275a22-33) 
Notice that, in the Ethics passage, Aristotle speaks explicitly about “making up names”, saying that it is necessary to 
do this “here as in other cases”. The names are made by pressing words into specialized usages (indicated by the 
occurrences of “τις”) and forming abstract nouns from adjectives. (Cf. Categories 7, where he advocates making up 
nouns like “ruddered” [“πηδαλιωτόν”] and “headed” [“κεφαλωτόν”] to serve as the relatives for “rudder” and 
“head” [7a13, 16].) In the Politics passage Aristotle introduces a descriptive phrase (presumably the sort of thing he 
has in mind when he speaks of a “λόγος ὀνοματώδη” at Posterior Analytics II.10 93b30-1). Turning back to the 
present texts, Aristotle is clear in the Politics passage about his reasons for thinking there is a distinct type of office 
common to the juror and the assemblyman and deserving of a name. He is less clear in the Ethics passage, which is 
taken from his initial enumeration of the virtues of character, each of which is later treated in more detail in III.6-V. 
The discussions of most of the unnamed virtues include justifications of the existence of a distinct state that requires 
a name. (See Section II of my unpublished paper “Aristotle’s Non-Dialectical Methodology in the Nicomachean 
Ethics”.) Even in this initial discussion, however, we glimpse his reasons, and we see clearly a point that is less 
obvious in the more detailed later treatments: that the introduction of terms for these several states is part of a 
project of systematically conceptualizing a domain in which only some of the relevant forms have been previously 
distinguished and named. 
52 Another can be found in Rhetoric III.13, quoted and discussed below in §4.3.3. 
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affections common to these (and to all other animals). Just the same, they are 
correctly distinguished in this way. For, while whichever of the kinds differ in 
degree and in the more and the less have been yoked together under one kind, 
whichever are analogous {have been kept} separate; I mean, e.g., a bird differs 
from a bird in “the more” and in degree, (for the one is long-feathered and the 
other short-feathered), while fish differ from a bird by analogy (for what a feather 
is for this one, a scale is for the other.) But this isn’t easy to implement (ποιεῖν) in 
every case; for many animals have the same affections analogously. (644a12-23) 
When we looked at this passage earlier (in §2.2.1), we were focused on the more-and-less 
relations that hold between the members of a kind. But consider it from another perspective: 
there is a strong implication here that kinds are in some way man-made, and in particular that 
names play some role in yoking things together into kinds. Notice that the puzzle raised is not 
whether there is a kind embracing flying and swimming animals, but why men do not refer to 
them by one name (as Plato does by the name “swimmers” at Sophist 220b). The reason Aristotle 
gives why we have not, and ought not to have, introduced such a name is not that there isn’t a 
kind to be named;53 rather, he answers by sketching approvingly a standard that that lies behind 
an existing practice of yoking some things together into kinds and keeping others apart. 
Moreover, sometimes when Aristotle does speak of whether a kind exists, he  seems to 
treat this as dependent on whether there is a name for it. Fourteen Bekker lines below the 
previous passage he writes: 
Perhaps, then, it is right, on the one hand, to speak in common in accordance with 
kinds wherever {one} is spoken of properly (καλῶς), men having defined it well, 
and has a single common nature and, in it, forms that are not very different ({e.g., 
the kinds} bird and fish, and {likewise} if there is any other that, though 
unnamed, comprises (περιέχει) the forms in it like a kind), and, on the other hand, 
wherever there is not such {a nature}, {to speak} particularly (e.g., about man, 
and {likewise} if there is any other such {form}). (644b1-7) 
                                                 
53 To my knowledge, the only text in the corpus that says that, in some case, there is not or should not be a name 
because there is not a kind is History of Animals II.15 505b28-32, where we find the following list of blooded 
animals:  
These are man and the live-bearers and egg layers among the quadrupeds, and bird and fish and 
cetacean and if there is some other that is unnamed because there is not a kind, but rather simple 
forms applying to the particulars—e.g. snake and crocodile.  
The text here is disputed and the passage of dubious authenticity. Balme brackets it entirely on the grounds that it 
contradicts material in the surrounding text on a number of points. See his forthcoming commentary for discussion 
of the problems here and on the emendations proposed by earlier editors. 
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The unnamed thing is said to comprise forms “like a kind”, which suggests that, it is not itself a 
kind, so long as it is unnamed.54 On the other hand, Aristotle does occasionally speak of 
“unnamed kinds”—e.g., in Posterior Analytics II.13, he says of a collection of items predicated 
in the being of a triad: “if this isn’t a triad’s being, it is some such kind, either named or 
nameless” (96b6-8).55 
Given the interpretation of sameness in kind developed in Chapter 2, above, we should 
not be surprised to find some ambiguity in Aristotle as to whether kinds exist independently of 
us; for we found there that, though there is a relationship in virtue of which instances are the-
                                                 
54 Consider also the following passage from History of Animals I.6: 
Among the remaining animals {viz. those that aren’t birds, fish, cetaceans, shellfish, soft-shells, 
softies, or insects} there are not greatest kinds; for one form does not comprise many forms; rather 
sometimes the form is itself simple, not having a difference (e.g., man), and other times it does 
have {a difference} but the forms are nameless. (490b16-19) 
Seemingly, having forms that comprise further forms is being used in the first passage as a criterion for being a 
greatest kind; and, because this criterion is not satisfied by any group of animals outside of the seven greatest kinds 
he has already named, Aristotle denies that there are any further greatest kinds; but, given what he says in the last 
clause of that same sentence, the criterion only fails to be satisfied if unnamed forms don’t count as forms. The 
situation is complicated, however, by what he goes on to say about quadrupedal live bearing animals: 
Now there are many forms of the kind of the quadrupedal and live-bearing animals, but they are 
unnamed; rather, {one} says {them} particularly, so to speak: as man is stated, {so is} lion, deer, 
horse, and the rest of these {stated} in the same manner (since there is indeed a certain single kind 
applying to those called equines—e.g., horse, ass, mule, γίννος, ἴννος and what in Syria are called 
a half-asses—they’re called half-asses because of a likeness {to asses}, {despite} not being the 
same form simpliciter {…}). That’s why, taking these separately, it is necessary to study the 
nature of each of them.  (490b31-a6) 
Is he acknowledging that there are really forms comprising the uncuttable forms in this case, even though there are 
not names for them? If so, it is unclear why he thinks we still need to study the uncuttables particularly rather than 
under these forms (presumably he is allowing that we can study them under the higher universal quadrupedal live-
bearing animal, since he shows no hesitation in treating this as a kind—what’s at issue is only whether it’s a 
greatest kind).  Nevertheless he does seem to say that there are forms there, and he does often seem to treat this kind 
as a greatest kind (e.g. II.15 505b25-32). Possibly, he thinks that this kind has not been divided into forms more 
proximate than the uncuttables but that it is susceptible to such division, having undergone which it would then 
qualify as a greatest kind. If this is right, his treatment of it as an greatest kind in another passage could be due to 
any of (at least) three reasons: (1) the passage represents a later stage in the investigation at which the requisite 
division has been performed; (2) the passage predates History of Animals I.6, in which he is reconsidering his 
previous treatment of live-bearing quadruped is a greatest kind; (3) Aristotle sometimes treats life-bearing 
quadruped as a greatest kind provisionally, on the assumption that the requisite division will eventually be carried 
out. 
55 Several other examples can be found in the History of Animals, where he speaks of kinds that are “unnamed by a 
single name”. In such cases the forms of the kind are named severally, but the kind as a whole can only identified by 
a descriptive phrase. At I.6 490b11, he explicitly includes “τὰ μαλακόστρακα”, and, by implication the other 
greatest kinds of bloodless animals, in this category. I.5 divides flying animals by the material out of which their 
wings are made—feathers, membrane, or skin—and gives examples of animals that fall into each category, before 
telling us that “while the feathered kind of animal is called bird, the remaining two are {each} unnamed by a single 
name” (490a13-14). (See also, 623b5, though the text here is disputed). There is also at least one mention of an 
unnamed  εἴδος: Meteorology II.4 tells us of one εἴδος of exhalation “while the whole is nameless, it is necessary to 
denominate it as a sort of smoke, using universally {the name that} applies to the part” (359b30-32).  
 241 
same-in-kind, the kind itself only exists as a unitary object when considered relative to our 
intellectual abilities: the kind is not prior to our concept of it, except insofar as the relations 
between the kind-members give them a potentiality to be conceptualized in the relevant way by 
us. We have not, however, observed the importance Aristotle places on names before. This is not 
an idiosyncrasy of the present passage. We can see this emphasis also in Topics VIII.2: 
While in some inductions it is possible to ask for the universal, in some it is not 
easy, because a common name has not been laid down for every likeness; rather, 
whenever anyone needs to take (λαβεῖν) the universal, he says “{it’s} so in all 
such things”. But this—which of the things put forward are and aren’t “such”—is 
among the most difficult things to distinguish (διορίζειν). And, besides this, 
{people} often lead one another astray with respect to the accounts, some 
claiming things to be alike which are not alike while others dispute the likeness of 
things that are alike.  That’s why one must try oneself to make up a name 
applying to all such things, so that it won’t be permissible for the defense to 
dispute {on the grounds} that the cited thing is said in an unlike {way} (ὡς οὐχ 
ὁμοίως τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον λέγεται), nor for the questioner to allege that {it’s said in 
a} like {way} to what’s been said, since many of the things said {in an} unlike 
{way} appear to be said {in a} like {way}. (157a21-33) 
In outline, the difficulty with which Aristotle is concerned is clear: an induced conclusion 
needs a subject term. Without one, the inducer will be forced to resort to a vague stand-in like 
“all such things”, which because, of its vagueness, can be extremely difficult to apply even when 
one is trying one’s best to be objective, and this difficulty makes it easy for unscrupulous 
interlocutors to twist the argument to their partisan ends. The vagueness of a conclusion about 
“all such things” is due to its not being genuinely universal. It makes reference to the particulars 
in the sample (be they numerical individuals or lower universals); Because these particulars may 
be similar and dissimilar to one another and to any new particular in myriad ways, there will 
always be some question as to whether the new particular is like the ones in the sample in the 
way that would warrant ascribing to it the characteristics that have been observed in them.  
It is worth noting that this passage confirms our findings in §4.1.2, above. Knowing that a 
certain characteristic holds of all things “such as” a number of particulars, without being able to 
articulate what those particulars have in common, is a perfect example of ἐμπειρία, and the 
present passage tells us that this state comes about, in argumentative contexts at least, as a result 
of lacking a name. The person of ἐμπειρία, then, is someone who lacks certain concepts, rather 
than the one whose concepts are insufficiently precise, since once he “makes up a name” he will 
be in a position to take the universal properly. 
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Aristotle cannot, however, think that simply introducing a name will make the difference. 
Since, as he tells us in Posterior Analytics II.7 (92b31), “one can posit a name for any sort of 
λόγος”. One could simply assign the name “cloak” to some λόγος of the form “all things such as 
Socrates and Callias”, and this would not be a cognitive advance. Just as people now bicker over 
whether the new particular is such, they will bicker over whether it is a cloak; for this name can 
no more transform this λόγος into a single term than it can for the λόγος “white man” or “man 
and horse” (see above, §2.1.1).  Aristotle must, then, have more than the mere introducing of a 
name this in mind when he speaks of “making up a name”. We can see an indication that this is 
so already in the present passage. He tells us that the reason we cannot ask for the universal in 
certain inductions is that “a common name has not been laid down for every likeness.” The 
names that facilitate inductions then, are laid down for likenesses, and what one must try to do 
when inducing in a case where no such name has been laid down is to identify the likeness 
relevant to the induction and make up a name for it. This likeness will have to be one of the 
concept-basic relations that we discussed in §2.1.2—a sameness in form or in kind, or perhaps an 
analogous, focal, successive unity.  
Presumably it will not always be possible or necessary in every case to introduce a name 
in the sense of a “vocalization significant by convention, without time, none of whose parts is 
significant in separation”.56 What is strictly necessary to avoid the troubling consequences is 
something that can function grammatically as a subject or predicate and which is understood by 
the parties concerned to apply to a plurality of objects insofar as they are alike in a certain 
determinate way. This function is never far from Aristotle’s mind when he advocates making up 
names.57  
However there is another function served by the making up of names in Aristotle, that is 
not strictly necessary to avoid the kinds of difficulty and non-objectivity that Aristotle describes 
in connection with induction. The Topics example (and the nature of the enterprise in that treatise 
                                                 
56 De Interpretatione 2 16a19-21. 
57 It is worth noting, in this connection, that the one time he uses the term semi-pejoratively it is to dismiss the idea 
that there is any value to introducing names as such, apart from their value in grasping objects and the relations 
between them: 
It should make no difference whatever it is called; for it is not because we want to make up names 
that we have divided them in this way, but so that we should not overlook whatever differences 
there may be among them. (Topics I.11 104b36-a2). 
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generally) suggests that the induced conclusion will be pressed immediately into service as the 
major premise in a deduction. He likely has in mind a situation like this one, from Plato’s 
Euthyphro: 
We speak of something that is carried and of carrying, of what’s led and of 
leading, of what’s seen and of seeing, and you understand that these things are all 
different from one another and how they differ? {…} So there is something that is 
loved and, something different from this, the loving? {…} Now tell me, is the 
carried thing a carried thing because it’s being carried or for some other reason? 
{…} And the led thing is so because its being led, and the seen thing because it’s 
being seen? {…} Then it is not because it is a seen thing that it gets seen, but, on 
the contrary, it’s a seen thing because it gets seen; and it is doesn’t get led because 
it’s a led thing, but it’s a led thing because it gets led, and it doesn’t get carried 
because it’s a carried thing, but it’s a carried thing because it gets carried. Is what 
I mean clear, Euthyphro? I mean this: if something gets changed (γίγνεται) or 
affected (πάσχει), it does not get changed because it is a changed thing 
(γιγνόμενον)—rather it is a changed thing because it gets changed, nor does it get 
affected because it is an affected thing (πάσχον)—rather it is an affected thing 
because it gets affected. Or do you not agree to this? {…} Then is a loved thing 
something that is either changed or affected by something? {…} Therefore it too 
is such as the previous things: it is not because it is a loved thing that it gets loved 
by those who love it; rather it is a loved thing because it gets loved. (Euthyphro 
10a5-c11) 
Here Socrates manages to state his conclusion with full generality, but it is difficult to 
regard the cumbersome and disjunctive subject of his induction as a name. If he (or Plato) had 
longer-term aspirations for the induced conclusion, he might have used less unwieldy and more 
“name-like” language (though likely he would not have been able to devise a plausible single-
word name). Aristotle regularly introduces new words or phrases, that become standing parts of 
his vocabulary in this way. Indeed we needn’t look beyond the chapters we have been discussing 
in the present section to find an example of him taking the universal from an induction in this 
way: 
Roughly, kinds have been defined by the figures of the parts and of the whole 
body, should they bear a likeness—e.g., the kind of the birds has affections 
related in this way and the kind of the fish and the softies and the shellfish. For 
the parts of these differ not by analogous likeness, as in {the case of} man and 
fish featuring bone relative to thistle, {but} by “the more” in bodily affections—
e.g. in largeness, smallness, softness, hardness, smoothness, roughness, and such 
things—on the whole, in the more and the less. (Parts of Animals I.4 644b7-15) 
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Here we have an induction about the sorts of likenesses that have (properly) served as the bases 
for groupings into kinds. Aristotle moves from a list of particular more-and-less variations to the 
universal “the more and the less” (τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον).  
The neuter article allows “τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον” function for Aristotle in a name-like 
manner; indeed, one is sometimes tempted to hyphenate it in translation. This name-like 
character is more obvious in the cases of numerous other stock Aristotelian phrases (“τὸ τι ἐστιν” 
“τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι”, “τὸ καθ ἕκαστον”, etc.) for the sake of translating which a sizeable portion of 
our philosophical vocabulary was formed. When we add to these the words that Aristotle 
introduced into Greek (“καθόλου”, “ἄμεσος”, “ἐνέργεια”, etc.) or pressed into special service 
(“κατηγορία”, “ὕλη”, “ἴδιον”, etc.), we begin to get a sense of the extent to which names he 
made up are standing features of Aristotle’s thought—and, indeed, of our own.58 
By “encompassing simultaneously from above” appropriately related existents and 
representing them in speech, these names help bring kinds into existence as unitary objects for 
thought, about which, we can collect knowledge, which can then be applied to their instances. To 
make up a name, for Aristotle is to form a concept, though the concept is not just the name. It is 
the capacity to regard particulars universally—to de-specify them in thought, in the case of 
kinds, or to perform some analogous operation in other cases. To my knowledge, Aristotle never 
tells us just what role words play in this ability, but we can seen enough to infer at least a part of 
their role. Universality is a feature of a thought in virtue of which it is able reveal a causal 
connection by serving as a term in a demonstration. But in order to function as a term, at least in 
speech and likely also in thought, the universal must be somehow represented or embodied by a 
perceptible symbol that can be placed in different relations to other terms.59 
                                                 
58 There are also a number of name-like phrases that regularly serve as terms in Aristotle’s zoology, including, 
notably all of the labels by which Aristotle describes the greatest kinds of bloodless animals (“τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα”, 
“τὰ μαλακόστρακα”, “τὰ μαλάκια”, and “τὰ ἔντομα”). In each of these cases, though there is only one word 
following the article, the word is an adjective which the article allows to function as a substantive. Interestingly 
these descriptions are not found in the singular, which shows that they do not function fully as names. For discussion 
of this and other issues connected with these zoological terms, see Balme 1962 90-91, Gotthelf 1985a 31, and 
Lennox 200b1 60-61.  
59 They may also play some role in the storage of universal knowledge, since thoughts cannot be remembered qua 
thoughts, but only qua φαντάσματα. See above, §3.3.2 n. 87. 
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4.3.2 Concepts as components of a filing system aimed at explanation 
Aristotle’s discussion, in Parts of Animals I.4, of the proposed kind embracing fish and bird and, 
more generally, of the conditions under which it is and is not proper “to speak in common in 
accordance with kinds” reflects his engagement (in a specifically zoological context) with the 
problem that he treats in Posterior Analytics I.24. In that chapter he concludes that 
demonstrations must take place at the highest possible level of universality. In II.14 he outlines a 
method by which we can both discover what this level is and acquire the premises needed to 
demonstrate at it. The discussion, which includes reference to the problem of potential terms that 
lack names, helps to make clear why concepts are necessary in some cases but not in others. I 
begin with the beginning of the chapter 
In order to possess the problems (Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ προβλήματα), you ought to 
select from both the anatomies and divisions, and to select in such a way that, 
supposing the kind common to everything (e.g., {animal}, if the things being 
studied are animals), {you select} what belongs to all animals, and, having taken 
this, you then select what follows all {instances of} the first of the remaining 
things—e.g., if this is bird, what follows all birds—and in this way always {select 
what follows} the nearest thing; for it’s clear that we will already be poised to say 
why the things that follow belong to what’s under the common thing—e.g., why 
they belong to man or to horse. Let animal be in the A position, {let} B {be} the 
things that follow every animal, and {let} certain animals be in the C, D, and E 
positions. Then it’s clear why B belongs to D, for it’s because of A. Likewise in 
other cases, and always the same account applies to the lower things. (98a1-12) 
In the jargon of the Organon, a “problem” is a proposition to be proven; in the specific 
context of the Posterior Analytics,  it is a demonstrandum.60 There is some ambiguity as to what 
it is to “possess” (ἔχειν) a problem: is it “to formulate the propositions to be proved” or to 
“acquire premises appropriate to its solution”?61 We needn’t pursue this question here, however, 
                                                 
60 For discussion of Aristotle’s use of term, including some of its historical context, see Lennox 2001d. 
61 The quotes are, respectively, from Ross (1949 662) and Barnes (1994 250) and express their contrary 
interpretations of the passage. Lennox (1987a 97ff,  cf. 2001c 47ff, 2001d 82) argues a position that can be seen as 
incorporating elements of these two. He distinguishes between two types of demonstrations  (or explanations): those 
in which a form’s possession of a feature is deduced from its membership in the widest kind to which the feature 
belongs, and those in which the possession of a feature by such a kind is explained. II.14’s method enables one to 
find all the demonstrations of the first type, and so to come to see the features as primarily features of the kinds, and 
this puts one in a position to seek out demonstrations of the second type.  It is controversial whether demonstrations 
of the first sort qualify as genuine explanations or demonstrations at all (see Lennox 2001c 67-8 n.16 for some of the 
issues here and for the evolution of his own position); but, however this controversy is to be settled, the sort of 
progression Lennox describes is surely present. On Lennox’s account, we can see II.14 as telling us how to arrive at 
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since it is clear that Aristotle thinks the described method will contribute to both pursuits.62 
Moreover, both pursuits are clearly in view in Prior Analytics I.27-30, which provides a more 
elaborate version of the same method.63  
                                                                                                                                                             
demonstrations of the first sort, and thereby how to pose demonstranda of the second sort. There is still, however, 
the (semantic) question as to what it means to “ἔχειν τὰ προβλήματα”. Does it mean to solve the problems that can 
be solved with demonstrations of Lennox’s first sort or to frame the problems the solution of which requires 
demonstrations of the second sort?  
62 The method will put one in a position to demonstrate that a feature belongs (even) to the widest kind to which it 
belongs (in those cases where this is demonstrable at all); for the middle term for such a demonstration will have to 
be something else that belongs to this kind, and which (assuming that we know of its existence) will be made salient 
by the method of selecting. There is some question as to how we are to know which of the coextensive terms is the 
cause and which the effect. This gets some attention in II.16-17 (cf. I.13), though Aristotle’s answer is somewhat 
unclear. Hankinson (1998 164-167), who favors Aristotle’s position over “modern accounts with eschew the notion 
of cause as an anachronism to be replaced by directionless functional relations”, speculates as to Aristotle’s answer. 
Speaking of how we know that the Earth’s imposition is the cause rather than the effect of an eclipse and that the 
planets’ failure to twinkle is an effect rather than a cause of their nearness (cf. I.13 78a22-39), he writes: 
we assume that phenomenal properties such as {…} steady shining and obfuscation rest upon, and 
hence are to be explained by, other ontologically more basic facts. 
We do surely assume this about the phenomenal properties mentioned here; but it cannot be because they are 
phenomenal—i.e., observable—that we assume them to be effects. Aristotle sometimes allows that we can observe 
causes. If we were on the Moon, he tells us, we would observe the Earth’s imposition (II.2 90a26-30, cf. I.31 88a12-
17). In such a case we would know only by inference that (from the vantage point of someone on the Earth) the 
Moon had ceased to shine. In this case the effect which is normally, but not presently, observable would have to be 
inferred from the cause which is normally, but not presently, unobservable. Moreover there are actual cases in which 
we can perceive causes as well as their effects. Someone who is on the Earth during a lunar eclipse and  looking up 
at the sky can see the Moon’s darkness as well as (if he looks down at the ground) its consequent failure to cast a 
shadow. Hankinson goes on to a suggest that we can tell what is prior to what experimentally by seeing which factor 
we can change by changing the other, but he doesn’t point to any evidence of such experimentalism in Aristotle, and 
though there may be some to be found, experiment is surely not a pervasive feature of his science. Material for a 
more satisfactory answer may be found in Aristotle’s remarks (which Hankison describes as “obscure and 
apparently contradictory”) about whether a cause and its effect are coextensive. He writes that the effect or major 
term must be coextensive with the causal middle term for a given minor term, which will be a form, but he allows 
that there may be other minor terms for which the same major is caused by a different middle (99b4-6). All and only 
the instances of the minor to which the middle belongs will possess the major, but there may be other minors that 
possess it, and there will presumably be some relation between the middles in virtue of which they produce the same 
major in different forms of minor (an issue to which II.15’s discussion of the different ways in which problems can 
be related is surely relevant). If this is right, then we may be able to tell which is the cause and which the effect by 
appealing to wider causal knowledge. For example, the middle term for eclipse’s belonging to the Moon is the 
Earth’s intervention. The middle term for eclipse’s belonging to the Sun is the Moon’s intervention. Now these 
interventions cause eclipses (i.e. deprivations of light) in significantly different ways but both are explained though 
optics, and on the basis of optical knowledge it is clear that the intervention causes rather than results from the 
eclipse in each case. A similar approach can be taken to the example (introduced by Aristotle in II.16-17 [98a37-
b17, b32-38, 99a23-29]) of broad-leafed plants which shed their leaves due to the coagulation of sap at the leaf stem. 
If there is solidification of sap at the leaf stem of a tree, then leaves will be shed, and if a tree sheds its leaves there 
will be such solidification. But leaf-shedding is an example of one thing’s becoming detached from another, and 
surely there is more general knowledge about this sort of phenomenon that we can bring to bear. Presumably the leaf 
is shed when the sap hardens because hard things are brittle and brittle things break, and presumably the sap 
coagulates at the stem of broad-leafed plants because there is a sort of bottle neck where the sap moves between the 
broad leaf and the narrow stem. So, insofar as we can see the leaf (or eclipse) case as falling under still broader 
universals, we can see how Aristotle’s theory of explanation can capture the directionality of cause and effect. At the 
widest level of generality in any given domain, there will be a subject and one or more sets of contraries that 
 247 
The method consists in “selecting” (ἐκλέγειν) things, which will then serve as terms in 
demonstrations.64 “Ἐκλέγειν” makes frequent appearances in the Topics and Rhetoric, and 
though “selecting” is probably the best available translation, it can be misleading; the following 
passages bring out its sense: 
One should also select {them} from written accounts and make charts (διαγραθὰς) 
putting them down (ὑποτιθέντας) about each kind separately—e.g., about good 
and about animal, and about every good, starting with what it is. (Topics 1.5 
105b12-15) 
I call dialectical and also rhetorical those deductions that are about the things we 
call τόποι; but these common {τόποι} are about legal things and natural things 
and political things and about many things different in form—e.g., the 
commonplace of the more and the less; {…} But distinctive {τόποι} are 
whichever are from premises about each form and kind—e.g., about there are 
premises about natural things from which there are neither deductions nor 
enthymemes about ethical things {…} Those former {τόποι} will not make 
{people} intelligent about any kind; for {they’re} not about any subject; but 
whosoever better selects these latter [premises] will unselfconsciously produce an 
ἐπιστήμη other than dialectic or rhetoric; for, should he chance upon principles, it 
will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric but rather that {ἐπιστήμη} of which he has 
the principles. (Rhetoric I.2 1358a9-26) 
In both passages, what is being selected are premises, and it is clear that to select them is 
not merely to employ or single them out on a given occasion; rather the selection involves filing 
them away in a manner that will facilitate future use in the construction of arguments.65 This is 
surely what is meant also in Posterior Analytics II.14 (and Prior Analytics I.27-31). In that 
chapter, however, what one is filing is not premises as such but terms.66 Earlier, I analogized 
                                                                                                                                                             
essentially belong to it. The other objects in the domain will be explained in terms of the belonging to a subject of 
certain of the contraries, or by the interactions of subjects differentiated by these contraries, etc. 
63 The Prior Analytics version is at once more detailed and more widely applicable: more detailed, because it 
includes treatment of negations, which would be necessary for finding demonstrations but are not mentioned in 
II.14; and more general, because it includes a means of finding deductions that are not demonstrations. (On the need 
for negative premises in some demonstrations, see Posterior Analytics I.15.) 
64 However, it is worth noting that the first two occurrences of “ἐκλέγειν” here, though in some manuscripts, are not 
in most. See Ross (1949 663) for his reasons for printing the text as he does. 
65 Thus Smith (1997) not unreasonably renders “ἐκλέγειν” “collect”, though I do not think this quite captures its 
connotation. It seems to be regularly used to describe selecting people for jobs. Plato uses it to describe selecting 
rulers in the Republic (535a), and Liddell, Scott and Jones note that it often describes the selection of soldiers or 
rowers. To “select” a premise, then, is to appoint it to a position on one’s cognitive staff, or (to change the metaphor) 
to add it to one’s cognitive arsenal).  
66 However, this distinction can be overstated: the Prior Analytics chapters do speak occasionally (e.g., at 43b1) of 
selecting premises; and to select something as a ὑπάρχον of a subject is, in effect, to supply oneself with a premise 
predicating it of the subject.  
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having a concept to having a file folder. Aristotle is advising us here to go through anatomies of 
animals—i.e. lists of their parts and possible of other features, and to file in the “animal” folder 
all the characteristics that all animals have, then to proceed to the kinds into which animal is 
divided (e.g. bird) and to file in each of their folders all of the remaining characteristics 
possessed by all members of the kind, and so on down to the level of uncuttable forms.67 At the 
same time, we should file in the folder for each characteristic all the things that follow it. The 
resulting filing system will put us is a position to see what terms need to be demonstrated of 
                                                 
67 There is some controversy over what “anatomies” means in this context. Normally Aristotle uses the word to refer 
to dissections and written accounts of them, but there’s reason to doubt that he’s referring to them here, because 
such a reference would not be natural in a purely logical treatise; it would apply only to biological 
problems, not to problems in general, and it is ruled out by the fact that the words that follow 
describe a purely logical procedure (Ross 1949 664) 
Mure (1928) comments that 
ἀνατομή seems to mean that analysis of a subject, for the purpose of exhibiting its properties, 
which would precede the process of division exhibiting the true generic character in virtue of 
which the subject possesses those properties. 
He goes on to note that Bonitz thought the term was being used synonymously with “διαίρεσις”. Ross reads the 
passage this way as well, commenting that if Aristotle had meant what Mure thought “he would probably have 
devoted some words to explaining the distinction between the two things”. But if he had not meant there to be some 
difference he probably would not have devoted six words (“τάς τε ἀνατομὰς καὶ τὰς διαιρέσεις”) to a thought that 
could more clearly have been expressed with two (“τὰς διαιρέσεις”). I agree with Ross, however, that is unlikely 
that the reference here could be meant to refer exclusively to zoological anatomies (or, as Barnes [1994 250] and 
Lennox [1987a 97 n. 16, 2001b 115] think, to the lost work reporting on them, which he references sometimes in the 
zoological treatises), though this is the only other sense in which the word appears in Aristotle. On balance, I think it 
is most likely that the term is being used in a sense extended from its meaning in zoological anatomy. In the 
application of the described method to zoology, there is a natural function to be served by literal anatomies (reports 
of dissections) which is distinct from that served by divisions, and this function will need to be served with in other 
domains as well. The method requires determining, for each taxon in a taxonomic division, what belongs to it. In the 
zoological case you would determine whether, say, all birds have gizzards by turning to your anatomies of birds. 
Thus the divisions will provide the subjects (animals, birds, hawks, etc.) and the anatomies the predicates (wings, 
gizzard, heart, etc.) (I see these respective roles for anatomies and divisions as following naturally from Lennox’s 
view that the II.14 method represents a stage “Between Data and Demonstration” in which one organizes one’s raw 
data so as to facilitate later demonstrating. If the anatomies are literal reports of dissections, then each anatomy will 
describe the parts and features of the specific dissected animal; before one can make demonstrative use of this data, 
one will have to run through one’s divisions and find the right level of generality at which to ascribe each part.  
Lennox himself, however, describes the divisions as a source of predicates [1987a 98] and, more generally, writes as 
though they and the anatomies play the same role [cf. 2001c 48]; perhaps he is envisioning more complex divisions 
in which much but not all of this correlating work has already been performed.) A similar procedure will have to be 
performed in other fields as well. To determine whether all planets exhibit recession, for example, one would need 
to look to astronomical charts, which would contain data about the planets individually. “Ἀνατομή”, could be 
naturally generalized from its root meaning of a dissection of an animal or a report on one to anything that 
documents the parts or attributes of specimens considered at a low level of generality.  Possibly this is the sort of 
thing Mure had in mind by an analysis of a subject that exhibits its properties without its “true generic character”, 
but his statement is misleading at best. The distinction between a διαίρεσις and an ἀνατομή is not that the former has 
greater explanatory depth than the latter; for διαίρεσις does not, on its own, explain anything. The relevant 
difference is that between a taxonomy and a list of something’s parts or attributes. Before one can be in a position to 
demonstrate, one needs to combine the information encoded in both. 
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which (e.g. wings of birds) and to easily find the middle terms through which these 
demonstrations can be effected. 
The process as described requires at least the rudiments of this filing system to be already 
in place. To proceed, we must have an arsenal of concepts and quite a bit of knowledge of their 
interrelation. Indeed, the passage presupposes that we have already engaged in the sophisticated 
conceptual tasks of taxonomic division and of anatomizing objects; likely it is referring us to the 
written up results of work. Aristotle soon acknowledges, however, the possibility that it may be 
necessary to add new folders to the filing system: 
Though we now we speak in accordance with the common names that have been 
handed down, it is necessary to enquire not only in these cases. Rather, also, if 
any other common attribute (ὑπάρχον) should be observed, then, after selecting it, 
{enquire into} what it follows and what follows it—e.g. possessing a vase 
belongs to the possessors of horns (τοῖς κέρατα ἔχουσι) {as does} not being 
amply-toothed, then {inquire into} what follows horn possessing (τὸ κέρατ’ 
ἔχειν). For it is clear why what was mentioned belongs to these things; for it 
belongs to horn possessing. (98a13-19)  
The situation Aristotle describes here is, like the one we saw him discuss in Topics 
VIII.2, a case of an induction in which we lack the name necessary to “take the universal”. There 
are some differences of course: in the Topics example, Aristotle envisages inducing a single 
universal proposition from particulars admitted by an interlocutor and then (likely) putting this 
proposition to immediate deductive work, whereas, in the present case, the particular  premises 
will be drawn from anatomical research, and, instead of inducing a single new proposition, we 
will relate it at once to a number of terms that follow it and so situate it in a network of terms 
from which we can produce enumerable propositions.68 
Notice that Aristotle effectively introduces a name here. Granted, “τὸ κέρατ’ ἔχειν” is a 
phrase rather than a single word, but we have seen that this is sometimes necessary, and the 
otherwise unnecessary repetition of the phrase signals that it is now functioning as a term.69 That 
                                                 
68 In reading the chapter in this way, I am following Lennox (2001c, cf. 1987a). 
69 Phrases of the form “τὸ Χ ἔχειν” appear with some frequency as terms in the demonstrations (endorsed or 
considered) in Parts of Animals (see 683a7, 868b26-7, 687a9, and, perhaps, 655b4). Of special significance is “τὸ 
πλεύμονα ἔχειν” (“lung possessing”), which III.6 tells us belongs in the οὐσία of certain animals for whom what is 
common is unnamed (669b8-13, see Gotthelf 1985b 31-33). The phrase reappears at 697a17 where lung-possessing 
is cited as the cause of an anatomical feature that he (incorrectly) ascribes to cetaceans. (On the error here, see 
Lennox 2001a 342.) “Τὸ τὸν πλεύμονα ἔχειν σομφόν” which could be thought of as a form of τὸ πλεύμονα ἔχειν” is 
also cited as a cause at 671a9-10. (On Aristotle’s method of explaining an affection by reference to elements in the 
essence of a kind and then explaining variations in that feature with reference to variations in the kind, see Lennox 
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Aristotle means it to qualify as something like a name a name is confirmed by what he goes on to 
say: 
Again, another manner is select with respect to analogy. For one cannot take one 
same thing that squid-pen, thistle, and bone should be called (δεῖ καλέσαι); but 
there will be things that follow these also, as though there were some such single 
nature. (98a20-b3) 
 “Selecting with respect to analogy” is introduced by contrast to the manner of selection about 
which Aristotle has just illustrated with the example of “horn possessing”. Therefore, when he 
differentiates this new manner by saying that “one cannot take one same thing” that the analogs 
jointly “should be called”, he it is effectively telling us that one can do this in the earlier case. 
Thus there is one can therefore take one thing that can be “taken”, which horn-possessing 
“should be called”—namely “τὸ κέρατ’ ἔχειν”.70 He does not go so far as to call this a name, but 
it is presumably one of the name-like λόγοι alluded to in Posterior Analytics II.8 (93b29-30).71 
Notice that Aristotle identifies this thing which horn-possessing should be called with a 
common nature; for the antecedent of “such” in the phrase “some such common nature” must be 
the “one thing” that can be “taken”, and which the instances “should be called”. Likely the idea 
is that, in calling the instances by the single name, one attributes the common nature to them.72 
Horn-possessing, which presumably qualifies as a kind, differs from the analogous grouping in 
that it possesses a single nature, whereas the group of analogs does not.73 Recall that Parts of 
Animals I.4’s advice on this matter: 
                                                                                                                                                             
1987a.)  Interestingly, “τὸ κέρατ’ ἔχειν” does not appear in the Parts of Animals, though we do find “τὰ κέρατα 
ἔχοντα” (meaning, in context, “their possession of horns”) in III.2 at 663b18. That chapter discusses at some length 
which animals do and don’t possess horns of various sorts, and offers explanations for these phenomena (including 
the one mentioned Posterior Analytics II.14, that animals with horns do not have a second row of teeth). The  
animals that do possess them are referred to as “κερατοφόρα” (663a18, b25, b35). Likely in the Posterior Analytics 
passage Aristotle prefers an infinitive to a participle because he wants to focus on the attribute of possessing horns, 
whereas a participial form would naturally be taken to refer to the horn-possessors (thus Lennox [2001 50-1] 
translates“κερατοφόρον” “horn-bearing animal”). 
70 It would be a mistake to take this “should” (δεῖ)  in a strongly normative fashion to mean that there ought to be a 
name. In Politics III.1 at 1275a30-32  (quoted above in n. 51), Aristotle says that there isn’t anything common that a 
juror and an assemblyman should both be called and then goes on to introduce a common name himself.  
71 His not calling “τὸ κέρατ’ ἔχειν” a name is consistent with his practice of denying that such kinds as τὰ 
μαλακόστρακα are named by one name (see above, n. 55). In these cases too, something that can function 
(approximately) as a name has been made up (if only by Aristotle himself). 
72 The failure to spell this out is typical of Aristotle’s tendency to move readily between talk of linguistic, 
psychological, and existential items. On this tendency see §2.1.1 n. 17 and §4.2  n. 31. 
73 Horn-possessing, if it is a kind, is not a kind of animal, of course. It is an unnamed kind of animal feature 
consisting in the possession of a (named) kind of animal part. 
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Perhaps, then, it is right, on the one hand, to speak in common in accordance with 
kinds wherever {one} is spoken of properly (καλῶς), men having defined it well, 
and has a single common nature and, in it, forms that are not very different ({e.g., 
the kinds} bird and fish, and {likewise} if there is any other that, though 
unnamed, comprises (περιέχει) the forms in it like a kind), and, on the other hand, 
wherever there is not such {a nature}, {to speak} particularly (e.g., about man, 
and {likewise} if there is any other such {form}).  
Roughly, kinds have been defined by the figures of the parts and of the whole 
body, should they bear a likeness—e.g., the kind of the birds has affections 
related in this way and the kind of the fish and the softies and the shellfish. For 
the parts of these differ not by analogous likeness, as in {the case of} man and 
fish featuring bone relative to thistle, {but} by “the more” in bodily affections—
e.g. in largeness, smallness, softness, hardness, smoothness, roughness, and such 
things—on the whole, in the more and the less. (644b1-15) 
Putting together some of the points made about natures, kinds, and analogs in this 
passage, Posterior Analytics II.14, and some of the other texts we considered in the last section, 
we arrive at the following view:  
There are things that share a single nature and differ from one another only in 
degree. In these cases, there will be other things that follow the common nature, 
and we ought, first, to make up a common name, with the aid of which we can 
regard the things sharing a nature as a single kind, and, then, to select the items 
that follow this kind. In other cases, things are related analogously; though such 
things do not share a nature, there are things that follow them as though they did, 
and one must make selections in these cases as well, though without making up a 
common name. 
This raises a number of questions: What is a common nature? How do we make selections in the 
case of analogous unities? Is it never appropriate to make up names for analogous unities? Can’t 
we make up names and form concepts for them without thereby imputing to them a stronger 
form of unity than they have? I will address the first of question in the next section. The 
remaining questions concern analogous groupings, and Aristotle says little to answer them, so I 
will comment on them only briefly before turning my attention to the common natures distinctive 
to kinds.  
The first point to make here is that, as observed in §2.1.2, Aristotle does sometimes give 
single names to things he takes to be analogous unities. The clear cases here are metaphysical 
concepts such as “potentiality” and “actuality”. Second, notice that what he is opposing in Parts 
of Animals I.4 is treating analogous groupings as though they were kinds, rather than introducing 
names for them as such. There is certainly a strong implication there and in some of the other 
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passages at which we’ve looked that named items will normally be kinds, but I know of no place 
where he says that it is never appropriate to name a group of analogs. What Aristotle is worried 
about in these passages is not primarily that we might have a name “body covering” which 
applies to feathers and scales, but that we might take this to be the kind of which feather and 
scale are members—that we might take a feather’s membership in this analogous grouping to be 
part of what it is for it to be a feather.74 So long as we do avoid this error there should be no 
problem with introducing names for analogous groupings or making selections about them. To 
extend our file-folder analogy, we ought not to file our feather and scale folders within a larger 
“body covering” folder, though we may have such a folder which will stand in some other 
relation to the folders for different body coverings, whereby information from it can be easily 
applied to them.75 
Posterior Analytics II.17 tells us that analogous demonstranda will have their middle 
terms the same by analogy (99a15-16), and Posterior Analytics I.5 (discussed above §4.2.3) 
makes it clear that, in such cases, there is will be one universal demonstration rather than two 
analogous ones at a lower level of generality.76 And this is clear too from what Aristotle says in 
Posterior Analytics II.14 about the need to make selections for analogous groupings. Why then 
do we not more often have names for these groups, and why does Aristotle not advocate making 
such names up? On these questions we can only speculate. Likely Aristotle thinks that, because 
they do not share a nature, groups of analogs will have fewer things following them than do 
                                                 
74 I take it that part of what it is for something to be a form of a kind is for each of its features (or of its essential 
ones) to be a form of a kind of feature belonging to the kind. This will not be so with the members of analogous 
groupings.  
75 Lennox (2001c 50) helpfully speculates about how the selection would likely work in the case of bone and its 
analogues: 
The three sorts of ‘skeletal’ parts referred to are related by analogy. But there may be predicates 
within the divisions being used which belong to all of them (as if they had a single common 
nature). Thus, ‘excerpting’ {ἐκλέγειν} by analogy’ means searching ‘the dissections and divisions’ 
for differentiae common to subjects related by analogy.  At PA 653b33-36, Aristotle says that 
“among those animals having bones, the nature of bones, being hard, has been devised for the sake 
of preservation of the soft parts, and in those not having bones the analogue <has been devised for 
this>, for example among some of the fish, fish-spine {= ‘thistle’},  among others cartilage.” 
Accordingly, APo. 98a20-23 may propose that certain capacities, e.g., hardness or brittleness, 
belong to each of these analogous parts in virtue of a common function that each plays in the life 
of its respective kind, or in virtue of a common material nature (since all these parts are earthen). 
Again, it might also mean that all three analogous hard parts are associated with soft flesh and 
viscera, an association which would naturally suggest the idea that the analogous parts play an 
identical functional role in their respective kind’s life. 
76 Or at least it does if we read it as I recommend above in n. 50. 
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kinds. Because of this he may think that we can usually do without names for these groupings, 
identifying them instead with phrases like “blood and its analog” as Aristotle himself often does 
in his zoological writings.  
 
4.3.3 Concepts and causal roles 
Turning now to the common nature shared by members of a kind. What does it mean for such a 
nature to there for the “taking”? The first thing to observe is that “φύσις” is not being used here 
in the sense in which it is defined as a “principle of motion and rest” since horn-possessing is the 
example we’re given of such a φύσις and it does not satisfy this definition.77 More broadly, any 
kind will qualify as a φύσις in the present sense including derivative kinds and even ones that are 
not involved with movement at all—e.g., the kind triangle. Metaphysics Δ.4, gives us a number 
of usages for “φύσις”, but even the most general, on which “every οὐσία is said to be a φύσις” 
(1015a12) is too narrow, as horn-possessing is not an οὐσία, except perhaps in an extremely 
                                                 
77 It is significant in this connection that the term Aristotle has taken is “horn-possessing” and not “horn-possessor” 
or “horn-bearer” (“κερατοφόρον”) (see, above, n. 69). A horn-bearer might be a kind of animal, which could in turn 
be identified with its nature (i.e., with its soul or certain of its soul-capacities). But I don’t think that this is plausible 
with the case of horn-possessing. It is worth noticing, also, that Aristotle never treats horn-possessing as a subject to 
which predicates might belong in the way they might belong to animal or bird. At 98a1a-2 we are told to lay each of 
these two terms down (in its turn) and then to select the things that follow it. We are never told to suppose horn-
possessing, and it is given as an example of a “common ὑπάρχον” (98a15), a term which stresses its role as a 
predicate, rather than as a subject. We are told to select what follows it. Such selections would likely be expressed 
with a formula common in the zoological writings “Of animals (or of animals of a certain sort—say, four-legged live 
bearing animals), whichever have horns (ὅσα ἔχει κερατα) have features X, Y and Z.” Gotthelf (1988 110-11) and 
Lennox observed the ubiquity of this formula in the History of Animals, and Lennox (1987a 116) notes how the 
present case evokes it. One striking feature of this formula is that it does not predicate the thing that follows of the 
thing which it follows. Rather the subject is animal, which remains in the background. (The formula is a natural 
language equivalent of contemporary logic’s “∀x(Fx⊃Gx)”, with “animal” serving to set the universe. By contrast 
there is no formula in modern symbolic logic that properly captures “Beak belong to all birds”, or the equivalent 
“All birds have beaks”.) This allows one to draw relations between predicates without making accidental 
predications (such as the “white is musical”) or using terms that aren’t unities (e.g. “white man”), when one hasn’t 
yet identified the proper subject to which a predicate belongs. (See, above, §2.1.1 n. 13.) Before one would have 
reason to think that one had identified a new kind of animal, one would need find an overwhelming number of 
features counter-predicating with horn-possessing and likely to see that all these features stand in complex 
determinable-determinate relations with subordinate forms or superordinate kinds. And even at this point one might 
not have any reason to think that horn-possessing is essential to the kind, so it would be misleading to use it as a 
name. (Recall that, when making up names for unnamed things,  we should do so in a way that “makes each plain 
and easy to follow” [Nicomachean Ethics II.7 1108a18-19], and naming something for an incidental feature would 
not do this.) 
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extended sense of that term. In any event, it is clear from other passages that Aristotle sometimes 
uses “φύσις” in a still broader sense. An especially obvious example of this can be found in  
Metaphysics Γ.2, where he writes that “existence and unity are the same and a single φύσις” 
(1003b23). Neither existence nor one is an οὐσία (much less a source of motion and rest). The 
conception of “φύσις” at work in this passage is quite thin, as must be the one in Posterior 
Analytics II.14 and Parts of Animals I.4. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the sameness of a kind or form—including the sameness of its 
nature—consisted in the commensurability of its instances, which enables us to de-specify them 
into intelligible matter. But notice that there are many respects in which bone and thistle do 
differ in the more and the less: bone is harder, for example.  In §2.4.3, we found that kind-
members must share numerous commensurable characteristics, with each falling within a range 
along its continuum causally related to that of the others along their continua. Now, for one  
characteristic (or range along a continuum) to be causally connected to another is either for it to 
be a cause or effect the other or for both to be effects of some third thing. In any case, since an 
effect follows its cause, the characteristics will each find a place in the network of items that 
follow one another, which Posterior Analytics II.14 tells us to construct.  Likely something’s 
“nature”, in the broad sense in which that word is used in that chapter and elsewhere, is the set of 
relations of following and (especially) being-followed-by in which it stands. (Notice that this 
makes perfect sense of Metaphysics Γ’s claim about existence and unity having the same nature; 
for both follow of everything.)  
The function of a universal is to reveal causes, and each universal can be seen as 
revealing the causal role played by its instances (which role will be common to all the instances 
when the items they interact with are also considered universally).78 I take it that “following” is a 
distinct relation from causality. Whereas there cannot be reciprocal causation (at least for a given 
type of cause), two terms can follow one another—i.e., they can convert. So, a nature (in the 
present sense) isn’t quite a causal role—we might call it an “inferential role”, to borrow a piece 
of modern jargon. But, for Aristotle, the point of this enterprise of selecting terms and what 
follows them is to point the way to causal connections, which he thinks are easily found once one 
                                                 
78 That is: the causal role of this particular wing is distinct from that one because it involves the life of this particular 
bird whereas that wing’s causal role involves the life of that bird; but, considered simply as wings, they have the 
same causal role in the life of birds considered as such.  
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knows what follows what. And anything that has an inferential role, for Aristotle, will have a 
(closely related) causal role. It is not entirely clear, then, if the nature (in the broadest sense) is 
the inferential or the causal role, but it shouldn’t matter for our purposes, and it may be a mistake 
to conceive of the two as fully distinct from one another; to be an effect of something is, after all, 
to follow from it in a certain way.79 
Aristotle is able to maintain that there is this close connection between inferential and 
causal role only because he does not allow terms for non-unitary things like “man and horse” or 
“white man” (or “grue” or “bagleet”). If he did, the number of possible inferences would 
multiply to infinity and the fact that one term follows from another would cease to indicate that 
there is any causal relation in the vicinity. But, if this approach makes the transition from a body 
of concepts and inferential relations between them to a causal account of a domain 
unproblematic, it is only because some sort of causal or proto-causal knowledge must already be 
involved in the formation of the concepts. This knowledge will be necessary to ensure that the 
things we are conceptualizing have the proper sort of unity. 
Forming concepts only for things with features differ “in the more and the less” will not, 
on its own, ensure that we have the right sort of unity. White men, for example, differ in the 
more and the less from one another, just as men do, so this criterion is not sufficient to 
distinguish the proper groupings from improper ones. Moreover, every perceptible object differs 
in the more and the less of each of its perceptible attributes from every other perceptible object. 
This is true by the very nature of perception, because each sense modality  has as its proper 
object some continuum along which it discerns objects. Any visible object is so in virtue of its 
color which will be lighter or darker than that of any other visible thing. Any tangible thing will 
be hotter or colder, wetter or drier, harder or softer, etc. than any other tangible thing.80 The 
same point applies also to the common sensibles: any shaped thing will be larger or smaller than 
any other in each of its parts, in the degree of its angles or curves, etc.; any moving thing will be 
faster or slower than another. 
Clearly, then, it would be impossible to discriminate a kind along any single 
continuum—how would one know where to divide? So kinds will have to be discriminated along 
                                                 
79 A certain amount of vagueness here is, unfortunately, unavoidable. Aristotle’s general conception of a cause is not 
well understood, and the attempt to reconstruct it would be a substantial project in its own right.  
80 On the tactile continua, see §3.3.1 n. 64. 
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multiple continua, when one notices that a certain range along one coincides with a certain range 
along another. But this immediately raises the question of what makes this coincidence of 
characteristics one thing. The answer is, of course, that there are causal relations between these 
characteristics; and (some of) these must be grasped in some form—however approximately or 
imprecisely—if one is to form concepts; otherwise the “concepts” will not be unities and so will 
not be able to function as terms in thought. 
Let us put aside, for the moment, the issue of how concepts might be formed directly 
from perception, and turn back to the sorts of cases we considered in the last section, in which a 
new concept is introduced into an already formed filing system. Here, whatever vagueness there 
may be about the details, it is easier to see how we might grasp that there is the requisite sort of 
unity: we notice that, there is a certain range of objects that, if “taken” and used as a term, would 
interact inferentially with our existing concepts in certain ways—other already identified things 
would follow it, and it could serve as a middle term between these things and several differing 
subjects which they are already known to follow. 
We can only get limited mileage, however, out of the example of horn-possessing (at 
least as it is given in Posterior Analytics II.14), because we are not told how we might come to 
notice this characteristic in the first place. And, in any event, it hardly seems to be a new 
characteristic in addition to horns which much have already been conceptualized. It will be 
helpful, then, to find another example, ideally one where part of what is at issue is where and 
whether to divide up a continuum of some sort. Such an case can be found in Rhetoric III.13, 
which I quote in full: 
There are two parts of a speech; for it is necessary both to state the object which it 
is about and to demonstrate this. That’s why one cannot fail to demonstrate what’s 
stated nor to demonstrate what hasn’t been stated; for {someone} demonstrating 
demonstrates something, and {someone} introducing introduces for the sake of 
demonstrating. One of these is a proposal, the other a persuasion, just as if 
someone divided {it such} that the one is the problem and the other the 
demonstration. 
Currently {people} divide {it} ludicrously: surely a narration is only for a judicial 
speech; and how could there be a narration such as they say there is in an 
exhibitionistic or demagogic speech, or {replies} to the adversary or an epilogue 
in a demonstrative speech? A prelude, a comparative reply, and a recapitulation 
occur in demagogic speeches when there is an opposing speech; for often there is 
accusation and defense, but not as deliberation (rather it’s an epilogue). Yet there 
isn’t {an epilogue} for every judicial speech—e.g., if the speech is short or the 
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object is memorable; for it comes about from the subtraction of length. Therefore 
the necessary parts are proposal and persuasion. These then are the proper 
{parts}, but at most {there is} an prelude, proposal, persuasion, and epilogue; for 
{replies} to the adversary are amongst the persuasions, and a comparative-reply is 
an expansion of this, so it is some part of the persuasions—for the {part} that 
produces this demonstrates something, whereas the prelude doesn’t, nor the 
epilogue, rather it reminds. So, if anyone continues dividing like this, as those 
around Theodorus do, there will be another narration and supra-narration and pre-
narration and refutation and supra-refutation. But one should posit a name {only 
when} speaking of some form and by a difference (δεῖ δὲ εἶδός τι λέγοντα καὶ 
διαφορᾷ ὄνομα τίθεσθαι); or else it becomes vain and ludicrous, as Licymnius did 
in The Art, naming a “gusting” and a “wandering” and “offshoots”.  (1414a30-
b15) 
This chapter is a promising source of evidence. In the second paragraph, we see Aristotle 
disagreeing with some of his contemporaries over how a speech is to be divided up into parts. 
What is at issue is clearly not whether some portion of a given speech exists—e.g., the part that 
Licymnius would call a “gusting”—but whether that portion of the speech constitutes a part 
which corresponds to a parts found in other speeches and ought to be named. He rejects several 
concepts for speech-parts as illegitimate, criticizes others as in some way defective or misused, 
and even in the process appeals to a principle about when names should and should not be made 
up. 
It is not obvious at first sight, however, what Aristotle’s complaint is against Theodorus’ 
cronies and the other contemporary theorists of rhetoric. He is quite exercised that they include 
“narration”, “{replies} to the adversary”, “recapitulation” and “comparative-reply” among the 
parts of a speech in addition to (or instead of) the two parts that he argues all speeches must have 
and the two additional parts that are present in certain speeches. Though he takes their error to be 
somehow related to a violation of a principle about when names should be made up, he doesn’t 
actually reject any of their concepts. It is clear even from the present chapter that he does think 
there are such things as narrations and comparative-replies, and even that they are in some sense 
parts of some speeches, and this is confirmed by III.16-18, where these parts come in for 
sustained discussion. Aristotle does give several examples of names that should not have been 
made up, but they are all either his own inventions (“supra-narration”) or due to Licymnius, who 
he seems to regard as more obviously foolish than Theodorus and company. Yet these examples 
are supposed to somehow serve as a reductio ad absurdum of the way that the people around 
Theodorus divide speeches. 
 258 
We can understand Aristotle’s criticism if we begin by looking at how he justifies his 
own division of speech parts. The two parts he attributes to all speeches are the proposal and the 
persuasion. The latter conducts the main business of a speech, the function of which is to 
persuade. But in order to persuade you must first tell the audience what point you are trying to 
persuade them of; since doing this is distinct from persuading, it will require a distinct part 
present in every speech. The additional parts that he attributes to some speeches, the prelude and 
the epilogue, serve similarly distinct functions that are necessary only in some circumstances—
we can see from the present passage that the epilogue is necessary only when the arguments 
made are difficult to remember and so need to be synopsized.81 He later allows that some 
speeches do have narrations, replies to adversaries, and comparative replies, but he does not treat 
these as parts of the speech in their own right, but rather as subdivisions of the persuasive part. 
What Aristotle objects to, then, is, first, the false attribution of certain parts to certain speeches 
(e.g. of narrations to exhibitionistic speeches), and, second, the treatment of sub-sections as on a 
par with the proposal and persuasion (and with the prelude and epilogue, when these are 
present.).  
To understand the relevance of the principle about making up names to these two 
problems, we have to consider what would have lead the people around Theodorus to make the 
two moves to which Aristotle objects. If they simply attributed (say) epilogues to all speeches, 
when they only occur in some, they might have done this through hasty generalization, but they 
seem to have gone further than this and attributed epilogues specifically to certain sorts of 
speeches that do not have them—e.g., to demonstrative speeches. This means that they must 
have been misidentifying portions of demonstrative speeches as epilogues. What would cause 
them to both make this sort of error and to fail to recognize subordination relations between 
speech parts? Both errors would arise from a failure to focus on function. Likely, the people 
around Theodorus simply partitioned different speeches into sections, named them, and tried to 
find an isomorphism between these named parts. Thus one would call the end of every speech an 
“epilogue” regardless of whether it summarizes the preceding material, and one wouldn’t realize 
that the several, separately named, argumentative portions of the speech cohere into a unit.  
If this is indeed the manner in which they divided the speech into parts, then they could 
have kept introducing new divisions indefinitely (until, in any given speech, they got to the level 
                                                 
81 These two parts and their functions are discussed in III.14 and 19, respectively. 
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of sentences) and would have no reason to stop at any given point and no means by which to 
subordinate some of their sections to others. Thus, their method would lead to such terms as 
“pre-narration” and “supra-narration”, or “gusting” and  “wandering”. These terms are wholly 
illegitimate, because they do not denote functional parts of the speech. Though the people around 
Theodorus, did not make up such names; they turned legitimate concepts (or, at least, legitimate 
names) into the equivalent of “supra-narration” by using them in disregard of the functional facts 
that give rise to them. 
The principle regarding names that Aristotle cites here is that “one should posit a name 
{only when} speaking of some form and by a difference”. Presumably the point is that mere 
portions of speeches are not forms, because they are not differentiated in the right way. But this 
principle in itself does not tell us what is required for there to be a difference. The moral that we 
can draw from this passage as a whole, given what we have seen earlier, is that it is the presence 
of a causal role. In speeches specifically, it is because a portion is a functional component, that it 
constitutes a form—a knowable type that can be recognized in different speeches and learned 
about. And it is only when this is the case that it is proper to introduce a name. Presumably it is 
because a speech is an artifact, that its parts are distinguished and defined by their functions, and 
the same would apply to a living thing. We can generalize this point to apply also to non-
teleological items (e.g., presumably, thunder) by replacing the talk of functions with talk of 
causal roles. More generally, then, the problem with Theodorus and company is that they do not 
take a causal perspective when they form and use their concepts. 
Now, in the present passage, it is likely that Aristotle thinks he has a relatively deep 
understanding of the causal factors at work (especially since the passage occurs near the end of a 
treatise on rhetoric). The people around Theodorus, by contrast, probably know what an epilogue 
is only incidentally. And the derisive tone Aristotle takes towards them, shows that he regards 
their condition as a sort of blameworthy aberration, rather than as a normal and healthy stage in 
the development of knowledge. Presumably, there will be a state between theirs and Aristotle’s 
own in which one has enough knowledge to intelligently coin and use terms for parts of 
speeches, without knowing fully what these parts are—a state in which one has “something of 
the essence”. Surely there must be, or else the words that Theodorus’ cohort abused couldn’t 
have gained currency. (It’s very unlikely that Aristotle thought that anyone prior to him had a 
kind of causally deep understanding of rhetoric). In any event, we know that, in general, 
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Aristotle thinks that someone an grasp “something of the what it is” without knowing what it is 
in a causally deep sense. The present passage confirms our earlier conclusion that such a person 
must nonetheless have some sort of causal knowledge in virtue of which his concepts represent 
non-arbitrary groupings and non-incidental unities. Let us turn, then, to the question of what sort 
of causal γνῶσις is involved in the initial formation of concepts. 
4.3.4 Ordinary concept-formation and imprecise causal γνῶσις  
If we are correct that this is some sort of causal or proto-causal knowledge involved in forming a 
concept as such, then some such knowledge will be involved not only in extending one’s filing 
system in the course of practicing the method described in Posterior Analytics II.14, but also in 
the sort of ordinary and unmethodical concept-formation in which children and non-specialists 
engage and by which we acquire most of our vocabulary. I return once again to Parts of Animals 
I.4, for an example of such concept-formation: 
Perhaps, then, it is right, on the one hand, to speak in common in accordance with 
kinds wherever {one} is spoken of properly (καλῶς), men having defined it well, 
and has a single common nature and, in it, forms that are not very different ({e.g., 
the kinds} bird and fish, and {likewise} if there is any other that, though 
unnamed, comprises (περιέχει) the forms in it like a kind), and, on the other hand, 
wherever there is not such {a nature}, {to speak} particularly (e.g., about man, 
and {likewise} if there is any other such {form}).  
Roughly, kinds have been defined by the figures of the parts and of the whole 
body, should they bear a likeness—e.g., the kind of the birds has affections 
related in this way and the kind of the fish and the softies and the shellfish. For 
the parts of these differ not by analogous likeness, as in {the case of} man and 
fish featuring bone relative to thistle, {but} by “the more” in bodily affections—
e.g. in largeness, smallness, softness, hardness, smoothness, roughness, and such 
things—on the whole, in the more and the less. (644b1-15) 
I take it that “men” here refers to people at large, rather than specific wise men who may 
have offered definitions of bird and fish. Ordinary people define these kinds by the shapes of 
their parts and of their bodies as wholes, and in so doing they define them well, capturing a 
single common nature. We are not told much about how this can be, but it’s not difficult to 
imagine. The shape of each of an animal’s parts is complex and so can vary along many different 
continua, and the animal’s shape as a whole is more complex. But its unity is easy to apprehend 
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when we observe the animal in motion. In observing the animal move we acquire a great deal of 
causal knowledge that enables us to appreciate the animal’s oneness. Aristotle does clearly think 
such causal knowledge and the concepts in virtue of which we have it can be easily acquired 
from perception. He tells us as much in Posterior Analytics I.31: 
…even if, while on the moon, we saw the earth intercepting, we would not o-
know the cause of the eclipse. Nevertheless, {since} the universal comes about 
from observing this many times, if we hunted {for it} we would have a 
demonstration; for from many particulars the universal is revealed. So it’s evident 
that it’s impossible to e-know any of the demonstrables by perceiving, unless 
someone means by “perceiving this” having e-knowledge through demonstration. 
Now certainly some among the problems are reduced to perception’s absence. 
For, {with} some, if we saw we would not seek, not because we o-know by 
seeing, but rather because we have the universal from seeing. E.g.: if we saw the 
glass to be perforated and the light going through, it would also be clear why {it 
goes through}, even if, one sees separately in each {case} and thinks 
simultaneously that it’s so in every {case} (87b39-a17)82 
Here Aristotle denies that that one can know causes in perception alone, because real 
causal knowledge requires the universality necessary to grasp the necessity in the form of a 
deduction. But he does think that perception plays the dominant role in the acquisition of some 
causal knowledge, and he illustrates this with two counter-factual examples in which we perceive 
the workings of a mechanism that, in reality, is hidden from us. In each case, all that is required 
to grasp the causes at work is to universalize—that is, to represent generally in thought what we 
perceive happening in several cases. To do so we will have to omit from the thought some 
                                                 
82 There are some textual difficulties in 88a14-16. I am reading them which Barnes as follows: 
οἷον εἰ τὴν ὕαλον τετρυπη μένην ἑωρῶμεν καὶ τὸ φῶς διιόν, δῆλον ἂν ἦν καὶ διὰ τί καί ει τὸ ὁρᾶν 
μὲν χωρὶς ἐφ’ ἑκάστης, νοῆσαι δ’ ἅμα ὅτι ἐπὶ πασῶν οὕτως.  
Ross reads: “…καίει, τῷ ὁρᾶν…”, which translates 
…would be clear why it kindles, by seeing {it} separately in each {case} and thinks  
simultaneously that it’s so in every {case}. 
The manuscripts are split on καίει vs. καί ει. Ross’ reading seems to have more support, but since the difference 
between the two is one of spacing and accent, both of which post date Aristotle, the manuscripts readings are not 
authoritative.  Ross’ “τῷ” is just an emendation due to Bekker. If “καίει” is right, then Ross suggests that it is a 
reference to a view of Gorgias’ recounted in the following passage from Theophrastus’ De Inge 73: 
ὅτι δ’ ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίον φῶς ἅπτουσι τῇ ἀνακλάσει ἀπὸ τῶν λείων, [τί τὸ ἄπορον; συμμιγνύουσι 
δὲ τὸ ὑπέκκαυμα] ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὐχ ἅπτουσιν, αἴτιον δ’ ἥ τε λεπτομέρεια, καὶ ὅτι συνεχὲς 
γίνεται μᾶλλον ἀνακλώμενον, τὸ δὲ ἀδυνατεῖ διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα. ὥστε τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀθροισμῷ καὶ 
τῇ λεπτότητι διαδυόμενον εἰς τὸ ἔκκαυμα δύναται καίειν, τὸ δ’ οὐδ’ ἕτερον ἔχον οὐ δύναται. 
ἐξάπτεται δὲ ἀπό τε τῆς ὑέλου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ  τοῦ ἀργύρου τρόπον τινὰ ἐργασθέντων, 
οὐχ, ὥσπερ Γοργίας φησὶ καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες οἴονται, διὰ τὸ ἀπιέναι τὸ πῦρ διὰ τῶν πόρων. 
The two readings have Aristotle giving significantly different examples, but both illustrate the same point. Barnes 
reading yields a more natural example, which is why I prefer it.  
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attributes and determinations of attributes that are present in the perceived particular (as we 
discussed above in §3.3.2 in connection with On Memory 1), otherwise we will not have the 
unity necessary for a thought. But it is not difficult to see how in these cases we would be able to 
do this.  
Consider the case in which we see light pass through glass by passing through pores in it. 
For the sake of the example (which is not true to Aristotle’s own view of light or transparency) 
light must be imagined to be either something like a fluid or else made of particles smaller than 
the pores in the glass.83 In either case, surely the relevance of this fact about the light to its 
behaving as it does would be part of the content of the perception. What we would perceive in 
each case and need to conceive universally is a certain sort of small body (or fluid) passing 
through a hole, and we would grasp this action as something that has this sort of body as its 
subject. These facts are causal and, in the example, perceptually accessible, requiring only to be 
universalized to count as causal knowledge. 
We cannot in fact see the micro-structure in virtue of which light passes through glass 
(and indeed Aristotle does not himself think there is any such microstructure) but there are other 
similar mechanistic facts that we can perceive; for example, we can see birds and other winged 
animals flying by means of their wings—that is, we can see the involvement of wings in flying in 
just the way that we see the involvement of smallness in passing through a pore. Flying is 
something a winged animal does with its wings.84 More generally, perception gives us bodies 
with certain figures taking certain motions (recall that the basic sense of touch has as its proper 
object the basic differences of body as such and that figure and motion are among the common 
sensibles); one cannot perceive a motion without perceiving it as the motion of a body with some 
figure, and many motions are figure-specific: winged things fly, round things roll, etc. 
Consequently there will be enough causal material available at the very beginning of cognition to 
(unselfconsciously) form at least some concepts. And likely we also unselfconsciously form 
further concepts with the aid of these when we notice (through experience) that by dividing up 
the world in certain ways we arrive at terms that follow and are followed by our initial concepts 
in regular ways. Experience is, after all, an inarticulate grasp of which particulars follow from 
                                                 
83 Aristotle rejects Pre-Socratic views of light as a body. See De Anima II.17, especially 418b13-25 cf. De Sensu 2-
3.  
84 A fact that is made more obvious in Greek by the linguistic relation between the noun “πτίλον” (“wing”) and the 
verb “πέτομαι” (“fly”). 
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which, and, as it develops, it progressively approximates to a concept, so that, in the end, by 
making up or leaning a name one can pass from a (well developed) δύναμις for ἐμπειρία to a 
concept.  
The process descried in Posterior Analytics II.14, amounts to a deliberate, conceptually 
guided interrogation of experience with the aim of conceptually identifying all the experienced 
connections in a form that can be enable us to find the demonstrations that will convert this mere 
γνῶσις into ἐπιστήμη. In Prior Analytics I.30 he describes this same process as follows: 
{We should} select each of the existents—e.g., about good and e-knowledge. For 
most {things} are distinctive to each. That’s why, it is for experiences to impart 
(παραδοῦναι) the principles about each; I mean (e.g.) {it’s for} astronomical 
experience {to impart the principles of} astronomical e-knowledge (for, the 
appearances have been sufficiently taken, in this way the astronomical 
demonstrations were found); and it holds likewise too of any other art of e-
knowledge whatsoever; so that, if the things belonging to each have been grasped, 
the demonstrations are already ours to bring readily to light. For, if none of the 
attributes that truly belong to the objects have been omitted from our study 
(ἱστορία), then, concerning everything, we can find and demonstrate those of 
which there is a demonstration, and, for those of which there is not by nature a 
demonstration, we can make this evident. (46a10-27) 
What is described here is a self-conscious, methodical move from experience in a domain 
to a conceptual understanding of it—to an ἐπιστήμη. But some form of this process can take 
place non-methodically, and it must have already done so, resulting in the formation of some 
concepts, and in some causal knowledge, before we can be in a position to undertake any such 
inquiry.85 Just as cities are first formed by nature and then perfected through the τέχνη of 
                                                 
85 An interesting question is whether Aristotle thinks that our initial, pre-methodical conceptualizations may have to 
be revised in the course of an inquiry. Here I think it is important to distinguish two sorts of cases. Recall that, in 
Parts of Animals I.4, Aristotle advises us to “speak in common according to kinds whenever {one} is spoken of 
properly (λέγεται καλῶς), men having defined it well” (644b1-3). In some cases, the concepts in the vernacular will 
not define kinds well and speak of them properly. The concepts will be mis-formed—the results of some sort of 
error—and will need to be replaced. We get an example of this in Poetics 1 1447b13-16 when Aristotle complains 
that  
people, by conjoining “τὸ ποιεῖν” to the meter, name (ὀνομάζειν) “ἐλεγειοποιός” or “ἐποποιός”, 
denominating them not insofar as they produce with respect to imitation, but rather commonly 
with respect to the meter. 
That at least the second of these illicit names had currency is confirmed by its appearance in Herodotus (II.120). In 
this sort of case, the names ought to be abandoned and new concepts formed, but only because there where was 
something irrational about the grouping in the first place. A second sort of case, would be a classification which was 
entirely appropriate at a certain stage of an inquiry but which needs to be altered or replaced at a later stage based on 
causally deeper knowledge. (For examples of such cases in actual science, see Lennox 2006.) I know of no passages 
in which Aristotle considers this possibility, and I doubt it would have occurred to him. The naturalness with which 
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statesmanship, so causal and universal knowledge is first formed naturally and then perfected 
(made precise) though τὰ ἀναλυτίκα which includes both knowledge of the structure of ἐπιστήμη 
and methods for bringing it about.86 Central to these methods is the process  of conceptually 
“filing” the contents of one’s experience, which is advocated in Posterior Analytics II.14 and 
Prior Analytics I.27-31. This is the process that Aristotle describes in the above passage as 
ἱστορία, and which he practices in (amongst other places) The History of Animals.87 But the 
methodology Aristotle preaches and practices is a subject for another occasion. I have aimed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
such cases occur to us reflects a perspective on the nature and pace of scientific progress that Aristotle was too early 
to have had. 
86 Cf. Rhetoric I.1 1354a1-11’s contrast between the respect in which everyone participates in rhetoric (and 
dialectic)  and the respect in which it is an art: 
Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic; for both are about such sorts of thing as are common in some 
manner for everyone to g-know and not a delimited e-knowledge; and that’s why everyone in 
some manner participates in both; for all to some extent endeavor to examine and to maintain an 
account and to defend and to accuse. Of the many, some do this haphazardly, the others because of 
habituation from a state; since it’s possible both ways, it’s clear that {it} would also be {possible} 
to produce {it} by a method; for it’s possible to study the cause though which the former succeed 
because of habituation and the latter by chance, and already everyone would agree such is a 
function of art. 
87 For argument that the method described in Prior Analytics I.26-31 and Posterior Analytics I.14 is the central 
method of the History of Animals and that Aristotle refers to it at ἱστορία, see Lennox 2001c (cf. 1987a).  I broadly 
agree with Lennox’s account of how ἱστορία functions, including his view (contra Charles [1990; see Lennox 1990]) 
that it precedes the search for causes. However, I think that it nonetheless presupposes some (very imprecise) causal 
knowledge of the sort that will be gained naturally in the course of forming such concepts as “animal”, “bird”, etc. 
Without knowing that the objects of these concepts play some causal role (even if one doesn’t know the details of 
it), one wouldn’t be able to form unitary thoughts of them at all, and so would not be able to set out on a systematic 
ἱστορία of them. Given a stock of preexistent concepts, one could form new concepts in the course of a ἱστορία  
without yet grasping new causal relationships simply by seeing that there is an inferential role to be played—i.e., 
that certain features “follow” or are followed by the already conceptualized items. In seeing more causal knowledge 
in the background than Lennox does, I am agreeing with Gotthelf (1994). I agree with him also in doubting that the 
establishment of kinds is an aim of the History of Animals. Though Lennox (following Charles) sometimes writes as 
though this were a central aim of the treatise (e.g. 1990 170), the essence of his view is that ἱστορία is the sort of 
filing operation discussed above at which one frames connections between subjects and predicates at the right level 
of generality for demonstration. Though it may sometimes be necessary to introduce new concepts to do this, it will 
not always be necessary (for we may have enough concepts) and, in any event, it is not as such a goal of the process. 
Where such new concepts for kinds are introduced, though we can say in some sense that the kinds are 
“established”,  I do not think with Charles (1990, 2000) that this is the same thing as establishing for the kind that it 
is, in the sense discussed in Posterior Analytics II.1-10. (Lennox [1990 170] adopts Charles’ language about 
establishing “the existence of kinds” and recasts some of his earlier [2001c] points in terms of it.) In all the cases 
treated in the Analytics, establishing that something is means establishing not that things fall into a kind but that 
something exists as opposed to not existing (e.g. that there is a noise in the clouds as opposed to their not being, not 
that the many different noises heard in the clouds constitute a kind). It is not clear to me that a kind could exist in the 
relevant sense, and in any event, in all the examples Aristotle considers, one could make the existence claim of a 
particular under the universal as easily as of the universal itself (and, as we saw in §4.2.2 Aristotle sometimes does 
make these claims for particulars). When Aristotle does talk about whether or not forms constitute a kind, as in Parts 
of Animals I.4, his focus is on the relations between the items, rather than on whether anything exists.  
 265 
say just enough about it here to show how we as cognitive agents play some role in and have 
some responsibility for the formation of our concepts. 
4.4 ARISTOTLE AND THE PROBLEM: CONCLUSIONS 
To bring this chapter and this dissertation to a close, let’s return to the Problem of Concepts with 
which we began and review some of what we have seen Aristotle’s position on it to be. In 
Chapter 1, I posed the Problem as the question how we are able to have unitary cognition of a 
plurality of differing objects. The answer standardly attributed to Aristotle is that there is a mind-
independent universal object that these cognitions are, in the first instance, of and which stands 
in some relation to the differing objects in virtue of which the cognition applies to them. We 
have seen that, on his view, there is no mind-independent universal object for a concept; rather 
the concept is a determinable thought-in-potentiality that can be actualized into a thought of any 
of a number of related objects and so can be said in a way to have as its object an indeterminate 
potentiality to be any of the objects, though (in most cases at least) no such potentiality exists 
independent of the mind.88  
What does exist independent of the mind are the individual objects and certain relations: 
chiefly, the relation of difference “in the more and the less” between the objects, and causal 
relations between objects and between the parts or attributes of a given object. Both sorts of 
relation makes it possible for us to decompose the objects in thought—to intensionally divide 
them—so as to form the concepts (or indeterminate thoughts). These are then symbolized by 
words (or, failing that, name-like λόγοι), which enable them to serve as terms in propositions. 
The propositions recombine the thoughts to represent objects as composites, some of which can 
be seen to follow deductively from one another. Through these deductions we apprehend the 
necessity of causal connections, and grasp the objects as having to be the way they are. 
This causal-conceptual perspective on the world develops gradually from perception, 
which is a particularistic and imprecise (or causally shallow) knowledge of the objects, and it 
culminates in νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη which are universal and maximally precise. The early stages of 
                                                 
88 In those cases where it does, the intelligible matter will happen to correspond to the perceptible matter. This might 
be the case with ice, if water is its kind.  
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this process occur naturally, but the later ones require methodological knowledge based on a 
philosophical understanding of universality—on a solution to the problem of concepts. (For 
example, the process described in Posterior Analytics II.14 depends on division, and as of 
Metaphysics H.6, proper division depends on right understanding of relation of potentiality to 
actuality that holds between a kind and its forms.) 
The structure of knowledge that is build up in this way depends for its connection to the 
world in one way on the knowledge of the deepest causal relations, which is reached only at the 
end but is present in another way (in potentiality) throughout the process, and this presence is 
sufficient to make our thought meaningful (if imprecise) even at the earlier states. In another 
way, the whole structure depends on the most imprecise knowledge—perception—with which it 
begins, because everything that comes later is reached by processing this knowledge so as to 
bring out material that is present in it in potentiality. 
Several of these points represent the tips of icebergs that I have only began to chart in the 
text above. But, if I am correct both that Aristotle’s view of universality is quite different from 
what it is usually thought to be and that it is intimately connected to his views of knowledge and 
explanation more generally, then it is inevitable that my positive account should have this 
sometimes preliminary character; for much more about Aristotle’s philosophy needs to be 
rethought than can be in several years and several hundred pages. 
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